THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


THE    FUTURE    OF    THE 
SOUTHERN     SLAVS 


THE  FUTURE  of  THE 
SOUTHERN     SLAVS 


BY 

A.    H.    E.    TAYLOR 


NEW  YORK 
DODD,    MEAD    AND    COMPANY 

1917 


{All  rights  reserved) 

PRINTED  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 


D 


PREFACE 

In  the  summer  of  1915  it  was  suggested  to  me  that 
an  article  contributed  by  me  to  the  British  Review  on  the 
Benascence  of  Serbia  might  be  expanded  into  a  volume 
on  the  subject.  When  eventually  I  acted  on  this  suggestion, 
instead  of  expanding  the  article  in  question  I  thought  it 
better  altogether  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  what  I  had  written 
into  a  volume  on  the  future  of  the  Southern  Slavs  rather 
than  to  confine  myself  to  the  more  limited  design  and 
to  the  past.  Some  paragraphs  of  Chapter  I,  and  a  portion 
of  Chapter  III  section  II,  appeared  in  the  British  Review 
for  April  1915,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  second  section 
of  Chapter  VI  dealing  with  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty 
of  1912  appeared  in  the  same  Keview  for  September  1915  ; 
the  latter  article  in  its  original  form  was  also  reprinted 
by  request  in  Mr.  Crawford  Price's  book  Light  on  the 
Balkan  Darkness.  With  these  shght  exceptions  the 
matter   of  this  volume  is  entirely  new. 

It  has  frequently  been  said  in  connection  with  proposed 
reconstructions  of  the  map  of  Europe  that  you  should  not 
divide  the  bear's  skin  until  you  have  killed  the  bear,  and 
in  some  quarters  all  such  proposals  are  consequently 
deprecated.  In  spite  of  the  finality  with  which  some 
people  regard  a  proverb  as  being  invested  there  are  very 
good  reasons  why,  so  far  as  South-Eastern  Europe  is 
concerned,  the  supposed  application  of  this  particular 
proverb  should  be  disregarded.  It  is,  for  instance,  advisable 
if  you  are  out  hunting  to  know  what  sort  of  animal  you 
are  after ;  if  it  is  a  bear  that  you  are  hunting  it  is  not  wise 
to  arm  yourself  with  a  shot-gun.     In  this  case,  moreover, 


8  PREFACE 

part  of  the  bear's  skin  has  been  promised  already  by  those 
in  authority,  so  that  the  question  has  been  opened  up. 
More  especially  is  such  discussion  not  only  advisable  but 
even  necessary  in  regard  to  the  Balkans.  Hitherto  the 
attitude  of  the  general  public  towards  Balkan  problems 
has  been  one  of  indifference  tempered  with  annoyance  at 
certain  small  nations  whose  affairs  are  continually 
threatening  to  set  other  people  by  the  ears,  while  the 
attitude  of  our  Foreign  Office,  if  not  actuated  always  by 
indifference,  though  indifference  has  largely  been  present, 
has  constantly  been  based  upon  a  misapprehension  of  the 
problems  at  issue.  Our  Balkan  policy,  if  it  deserves  the 
name  at  all,  has  been  carried  on  from  hand  to  mouth  and 
has  usually  at  any  given  moment  sought  the  line  of  least 
resistance  regardless  of  the  ultimate  results.  Even  if 
popular  opinion  is  to  have  less  say  on  the  subject  of  the 
terms  of  peace  than  is  sometimes  claimed  for  it,  and  if 
those  terms  are  to  be  framed  by  those  whose  conduct  of 
the  Eastern  Question  has  been  so  remiss,  yet  it  is  probable 
that  the  public  will  have  much  more  influence  than  it 
has  possessed  in  similar  circumstances  in  the  past.  All 
classes  of  the  community  have  suffered  grievous  losses  in 
the  war,  and  it  is  natural  that  they  should  demand  that 
the  settlement  should  be  thorough  and  as  permanent  as 
possible.  Unfortunately  the  mass  even  of  educated  people 
is  but  ill-informed  of  the  real  issues  in  the  Balkans ;  the 
problem  has  not  been  studied  in  the  past,  and  consequently, 
so  far  as  the  general  public  is  concerned,  there  is  no  clear 
idea  of  the  aims  to  be  pursued  in  the  future  settlement. 
Particularly  is  this  true  of  the  Southern  Slav  question 
whose  solution  for  many  is  contained  in  the  phrase 
"  compensations  for  Serbia  ".  To  the  general  indifference 
there  has  been  one  exception  which  is  furnished  by 
Bulgaria.  Bulgaria  has  been  regarded  as  almost  the  sole 
important  factor  in  the  Balkans,  her  well-advertised  claims 
are  known,  and  the  ceaseless  reiteration  of  them  has  in 
many  people  wrought  the  conviction  that  they  must  be 
well   founded.    While  this  result  has  been   largely  due   to 


PREFACE  9 

the  skilful  Bulgarian  propaganda,  it  has  also  its  origin  in 
the  circumstances  under  which  Bulgaria  gained  her 
independence  with  the  upshot  that  she,  the  Balkan 
Prussia,  has  taken  a  place  in  the  hearts  of  some  English- 
men which  is  really  quite  unique,  and  which  furnishes  a 
not  inapt  commentary  on  the  concluding  phrase,  at  any 
rate,  of  Bishop  Creighton's  remark  when  told  that  some- 
thing would  go  straight  to  the  heart  of  the  English 
people:  "A  very  nasty  place  to  go  to,  the  last  resting- 
place  I  should  like  to  be  found  in — a  sloppy  sort  of  place, 
I  take  it  ". 

My  object,  then,  has  been  to  attempt  to  set  forth  the 
main  features  of  the  Southern  Slav  problem  as  they  exist 
to-day,  and  the  solution  at  which  we  should  aim.  Of 
necessity,  in  discussing  territorial  questions  I  have  assumed 
such  a  complete  victory  for  the  Allies  as  will  result  in 
the  dismemberment  of  Austria.  However  unlikely  such  a 
victory  may  seem  in  view  of  the  past  mishandling  of  our 
resources,  the  want  of  grip  and  energy  of  our  rulers,  and 
the  bungling  ineptitude  which  seemed  intended  to  prove 
the  truth  of  the  saying  that  a  democracy  can  neither  keep 
peace  nor  make  war,  it  is  the  only  possible  basis  for  such 
a  study  as  this.  If  the  Central  Powers  win  outright  the 
peace  will  be  dictated  by  them  on  their  own  terms,  while, 
if  the  victory  of  either  side  be  less  complete,  as  the  extent 
of  such  victory  cannot  be  foreseen,  so  no  discussion  is 
possible  of  the  resultant  terms  of  peace,  which  will  vary 
with  the  nature  of  the  victory.  The  hypothesis  adopted 
enables  us  at  any  rate  to  examine  what  is  the  ideal  settle- 
ment which  should  be  aimed  at  in  proportion  to  the  success 
which  may  attend  our  arms  and  our  consequent  ability  to 
enforce  our  views.  Since  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars 
there  has  been  no  such  opportunity  for  a  national  readjust- 
ment of  European  relations,  and  if  the  opportunity  be  lost 
now  it  may  never  recur,  and  in  any  case  can  only  recur  at 
the  same  hideous  cost.  A  partial  settlement  will  leave  a 
chronic  state  of  unrest  in  the  Balkans,  and  this  fact  must 
be  realized  ^by  the  British  public  if  its  influence  is  to  be 


10  PREFACE 

used  aright.  No  war  weariness  should  induce  us  to  relax 
our  striving  for  an  out-and-out  victory,  coute-que-coute,  and 
not  the  least  of  the  benefits  to  be  attained  will  be  found 
in  the  settlement  of  the  Southern  Slav  question  for,  as  I 
have  endeavoured  to  indicate,  it  is  in  a  real  sense  our  affair 
also. 

The  difficulty  of  writing  such  a  book  under  present  condi- 
tions has  been  greater  than  will  be  realized  by  those  who 
have  not  essayed  a  similar  task.  Some  topics  have  perforce 
been  avoided  altogether,  others  barely  indicated,  and  this 
quite  irrespective  of  their  importance. 

I  wish  to  offer  my  thanks  to  those  to  whom  I  am  in 
various  ways  indebted.  The  publication  of  this  book  has 
been  delayed  for  various  reasons,  and  while  the  foreign 
matter  has  been  brought  up  to  date,  the  references  to 
the  English  Government  are  to  the  administrations  of 
Mr.  Asquith.  The  circumstance*?  attending  the  formation 
of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  administration,  the  arguments  ad- 
duced for  the  change,  and,  I  think,  the  results  already 
attained,  afford  an  amply  sufficient  justification  for  the 
strictures  on  its  immediate  predecessors  which  may  be 
found  in  these  pages. 

I  have  used  the  Serbo-Croat  names  of  the  Dalmatian 
towns  and  islands,  as  the  use  of  Italian  names  has  proved 
a  fertile  cause  of  misapprehension  as  to  the  real  nationality 
of  their  inhabitants.  Moreover,  this  usage  is  in  accordance 
with  the  growing  practice  of  making  use  of  the  correct 
native  names  of  places  save  where  long  familiarity  and 
custom  have  resulted  in  a  genuine  English  form  which  it 
would  be  pedantic  to  disregard.  Serbo-Croat  names  have 
been  spelt  in  accordance  with  the  "  Croatian  orthography  ". 
The  Orthodox  Serbs  use  the  Cyrillic  alphabet  which  is 
phonetic,  the  Croats  use  the  Latin  alphabet  modified  in 
order  to  render  the  sounds  of  the  language  and  to  represent 
the  more  numerous  letters  of  the  CyrilHc.  Thus  c  (which 
in  pronunciation  is  either  k  or  s)  is  rejected  and  made  use 
of  as  an  arbitrary  symbol,  while  the  sound  of  other  letters 
is  modified  by  various  diacritic  marks.     It  is  a  pity  that  the 


PREFACE  11 

Croatin  orthography  is  not  more  extensively  used,  as  its 
adoption  would  avoid  a  great  deal  of  unnecessary  confusion. 
The  name  of  General  Zivkovic,  for  example,  I  have  seen 
spelt  in  at  least  six  different  ways  (Jivkovitch,  Givkovich, 
Zhivkovics,  etc.),  and  similar  cases  sometimes  leave  one  in 
doubt  as  to  who  or  what  is  intended.  The  Croatian  script 
is  not  an  artificial  "system"  of  transliteration,  but  the 
script  in  use  for  the  common  language  by  that  part  of  the 
race  which  employs  the  Latin  alphabet.  Moreover,  like 
the  modern  Cyrillic  alphabet,  it  is  the  result  of  a  scientific 
reform,  the  work  of  Serbo-Croat  philologists  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century.  There  is  consequently  no  need  to 
supersede  it  by  any  "  system  "  or  attempt  to  render  words 
phonetically,  the  latter  in  any  case  impossible,  as  the 
English  letter-signs  vary  in  value.  I  append  a  Table  of 
the  necessary  letters. 

c  =  ts  in  sound  j   =  y 

d  =  ch  Ij  =  liquid  gl 

c  =  tch  nj  =  liquid  gn 

B=sh  r  has  a  vowel  sound,  e.g.,  Srb. 

z  =  French  j 

Lj  is  sometimes  written  (presumably  in  order  that  one 
Cyrillic  symbol  may  be  represented  by  one  Latin  symbol) 
1;  nj,  n;  and  dj  or  gj,  d:  dz  corresponds  to  a  single 
Cyrillic  character. 

The  following  list  of  Serbo-Croat  place-names  with  their 
equivalents  may  be  of  use  : — 

Bar,  Antivari  Lopud,  Mezzo 

Brae,  Brazza  Losinj,  Lussin 

Cres,  Cherso  Mljet  or  Mlet,  Meleda 

Dubrovnik,  Bagusa  Rijeka  or  Rieka,  Fiume 

Gruz,  Gravosa  Sibenik,  Sebenico 

Hvar,  Lesina  Sipan,  Giuppana 

Korcula,  Curzola  Spljet  or  Splet  or  Split,  Spalato 

Kotor,  Cattaro  Susac,  Cazza 

Kranjska,  Carniola  Trogir,  Trau 

Krk,  Veglia  Vis,  Lissa 

Lastovo,  Lagosta  Zadar,  Zara 

Ljubljana,  Laibach  Zagreb,  Agram 


CONTENTS 


PAGB 

PREFACE .       7 

CHAPTER  I 
A  PLEA  FOR  SERBIA  .  .  .  .  .15 

CHAPTER  II 
A  SKETCH  OF  SERB   HISTORY— 

I.    THE     RISE     OF     SERBIA  :     HISTORY     OP     SERBIA     TILL 

THE   DEATH   OP   STEPHEN   DuSaN     .  .  .28 

II.    THE     SUBMERGENCE     OF    SERBIA  :    PROM    THE    DEATH 

OF   DUSAN   TILL    1804 — THE   HUNGARIAN    SERBS      .      51 

III.    THE  RESURGENCE  OP  SERBIA  :   1804-1908  .  .      64 

CHAPTER  III 
THE  RENASCENCE   OF   SERBIA— 

I.   EFFECTS   OP  THE  AUSTRIAN   OCCUPATION   OP   BOSNIA — 

AUSTRIA   AND   THE   SOUTHERN   SLAVS  .  .       80 

II.    THE   RENASCENCE  OF  SERBIA  :    1908-1914  .  .      94 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC— 

I.    GENERAL   OUTLINE   OF   THE   PROBLEM     .  .  .    105 

II.  GEOGRAPHICAL  AND  HISTORICAL  CLAIMS  OP  ITALY 
TO  DALMATIA — CHARACTER  OF  THE  VENETIAN 
RULE  ......    120 

III.  THE   ETHNOGRAPHY    OP    DALMATIA    IN   THE  PAST  AND 

PRESENT  ......    128 

IV.  ITALIAN   STRATEGIC   CLAIMS  .  .  .  .136 
V.    WHAT   ITALY    CAN   RIGHTLY   CLAIM            .                  .  .150 

VI.    THE  DALMATIAN  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  THE  ENTENTE 

AND   ITALY     ......    161 


14  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  V 

PAOB 

PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  .  .  .  .  -169 

CHAPTER  VI 

MACEDONIA:    THE    SERBO-BULGARIAN   TREATY    OF 
1912— 

I.  HISTORY   AND   ETHNOGBAPHY   OF  MACEDONIA   .  .    200 
II.    THE  TREATY   OF   1912       .....    209 

CHAPTER    VII 
THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA       .  .  .221 

CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  FUTURE   SOUTHERN   SLAV  STATE— 

I.    AREA   AND   POPULATION    .....    249 

II.  FUTURE     RELATIONSHIP      TO      EACH     OTHER     OF     THE 

DIFFERENT   PROVINCES  ....    255 

CHAPTER    IX 
SOME   PROBLEMS   OF   THE   NEW   STATE  .  .  269 

CHAPTER    X 

THE  EUROPEAN  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN 

SLAVS      .     .     .     .     .     .304 


INDEX   .     .      .     ,     .     .     .     .321 


MAP  ......    Facing  page  320 


The  Future  of  the  Southern  Slavs 


CHAPTER  I 

A  PLEA  FOR  SERBIA 

It  might  seem  at  first  sight  unnecessary  to  commence 
a  volume  dealing  with  our  Balkan  ally  and  the  Southern 
Slavs  with  a  plea  for  Serbia,  whose  enormous  sacrifices 
in  the  common  cause  and  indomitable  valour  entitle  her  to 
the  fullest  possible  measure  of  gratitude  from  her  allies. 
Unfortunately,  however,  such  a  plea  is  by  no  means 
superfluous,  but  forms  a  very  necessary  prelude  to  the  study 
of  the  pressing  problems  that  attend  the  future  of  the 
Southern  Slavs,  in  view  of  the  influences  which  are  still 
working  in  England  to  their  prejudice,  and,  looking  upon 
them  as  mere  pawns  in  the  game,  do  not  hesitate  to  urge 
that  they  should  be  sacrificed  to  the  desires  of  their  enemies, 
though  it  is  true  that  the  qualities  of  the  Serb  race,  its 
progress,  especially  in  military  matters,  and  its  prospects 
for  the  future,  have  won  a  recognition  that  in  the  past 
has  been  wanting,  recognition  even  better  founded  in  the 
history  of  Serbia  during  the  last  few  years  than  is  yet 
generally  known.  It  is  twenty  years  ago  since  the  author 
first  offered  a  plea  for  Serbia,^  and  in  those  days  and  for 
long  afterwards  that  plea  stood  almost  alone,  for  a  few 
quotations  will  show  that  anti-Serb  feeling  has  its  roots 
in   days   long  before   the   assassination  of  Alexander   and 

*  A  Plea  for  Serbia,  "  the  Piedmont  of  the  Balkans  ".  Westmimter 
Review,  July  1897.  This  article  is  disfigured  by  the  anti-Russian 
prejudice  common  at  the  time  which,  with  fuller  knowledge,  I  abjured 
soon  after. 

16 


16  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Draga.  In  that  article  I  wrote,  "Of  all  the  recently 
emancipated  communities  in  the  Balkans  the  most  interest- 
ing, both  from  its  past  history  and  its  probable  future, 
is  probably  Serbia.  It  is  undoubtedly  that  which,  to  all 
appearance,  and  if  it  plays  its  cards  well,  has  the  most 
brilliant  future  before  it ;  for  it  will  benefit  not  only  by 
the  break-up  of  the  Turkish  Empire  in  Europe,  but  also 
by  the  disappearance,  in  its  present  form,  of  another  State — 
the  Austrian".  In  that  same  year  appeared  Travels  and 
Politics  in  the  Near  East,  by  that  able  and  impartial 
authority  Mr.  WiUiam  Miller,  and  it  is  interesting  to  note 
how  widely  different  was  his  opinion.  He  gave  it  as  his 
idea  that  the  "dream  of  a  great  Serb  Empire"  was  "un- 
practical ".  ^  Speaking  of  the  Prince  of  Montenegro's  play. 
The  Empress  of  the  Balkans,  he  remarked :  "  Into  this 
drama  the  Prince  has  put  those  grand  ideas  which  every 
Serb  imbibes  with  his  motheji's  milk  and  cherishes  dearly, 
however  unpractical  he  may  admit  them  to  be  in  his  calmer 
moments.  The  restoration  of  the  old  Servian  Empire, 
which  rose  with  DuSan  and  fell,  I  believe,  for  ever,  on  the 
fatal  field  of  Kosovo  five  centuries  ago,  is  one  of  the 
Prince's  daydreams ".-  Of  the  occupation  of  Bosnia  by 
Austria  he  said:  "The  monarchy  possesses  resources,  alike 
in  men  and  money,  which  no  independent  Balkan  State,  no 
fantastic  Servian  Empire,  could  produce  ".  3  "  The  notion 
of  a  great  Servian  Empire,  of  which  Bosnia  and  the 
Hercegovina  would  form  a  part,  or  parts,  is  one  of  those 
fantastic  daydreams  which  are  repugnant  alike  to  the 
teachings  of  Balkan  history  and  the  dictates  of  common 
sense  ".4  The  use  of  the  word  "Empire"  introduces  a 
certain  ambiguity  into  these  judgments,  but  the  general 
sense  of  the  context  and  of  v/hat  is  generally  meant  by  a 
Serb  "empire"  seems  to  include  in  his  condemnation  not 
only  the  idea  of  an  empire,  but  of  a  greater  Serbia  confined 
to  the  Serb  race,  yet  time  has  shown  that  these  daydreams 
are,  on  the  supposition  of  a  victory  for  the  Allies,  on  the 
eve  of  fulfilment. 
'  Op.  cit.  p.  33.        '  Ibid.  p.  47.        ^  Jbid.  p.  119.        ■♦  Ibid.  p.  128. 


A  PLEA  FOR  SERBIA  17 

Mr.  Miller,  however,  wrote  with  gravity  and  a  real 
sympathy,  and  his  conclusions  were  reluctant ;  far  other- 
wise was  it  with  the  generality  of  writers.  "  Milan's 
miserable  nation  of  pig-drivers"  was  the  expression  of  a 
weekly  illustrated  paper  which  affected,  and  affects,  an 
interest  in  foreign  politics.  The  same  paper  accused  the 
Serbs  in  1885  of  having  as  little  stomach  for  the  fighting 
as  they  had  in  1876 — the  accusation  of  cowardice  against 
this  warlike  and  brave  people  has  been  a  common  one. 
On  this  latter  point  a  leading  Conservative  paper  in  the 
mid  nineties  remarked  that,  having  "  little  prestige  to  lose  ", 
there  existed  in  Serbia  an  "  absence  of  the  stimulus  of  pride 
in  past  prowess  ".  The  same  paper  advocated  about  the 
same  time  the  partition  of  Serbia  between  Austria-Hungary 
and  Bulgaria.  When  the  reform  scheme  for  Macedonia 
was  promulgated  about  eleven  years  ago,  Old  Serbia  ^  was 
expressly  excluded  from  its  scope,  the  Serbs  there  being  left 
to  the  mercy  of  Albanians.  Mr.  Brailsford,  in  his  book 
Macedonia,  remarked :  "  Servia  is  not  exactly  a  credit  to 
civilization,  and  one  cannot  say  that  her  political  extinction 
would  be  a  serious  loss  to  Europe  ",*  a  strange  dictum  from 
a  Liberal  and  an  adherent,  in  some  cases  a  vehement 
adherent,  of  the  principle  of  nationality.  During  the 
annexation  crisis  of  1908-9  the  Saturday  Bevieio 
described  the  Serbs  as  "  this  rascal  nation " ;  while  at 
the  time  when,  during  the  Balkan  War,  the  question  of 
a  Serb  outlet  to  the  Adriatic  was  under  discussion,  Mr. 
Nevinson,  another  Liberal  and  nationalist,  wrote  con- 
temptuously in  the  Daily  Chronicle  that  doubtless  a  railway 
could  be  built  to  Porto  Medua  good  enough  to  carry  pigs. 
Mr,  de  Windt  renewed  the  charge  of  cowardice:  "As 
General  B remarked,  '  Every  Servian  is  a  soldier  and 

'  The  term  "  Old  Serbia "  (Stara  Srbija)  is  used  throughout  in  its 
historic  sense  as  denoting  the  territory  roughly  corresponding  to  the 
former  Turkish  vilayet  of  Kosovo  with  the  Sanjak  of  Novipazar.  Sinca 
the  Balkan  War,  it  is  sometimes  applied  to  the  kingdom  as  existing  from 
1878  to  1912,  the  recent  gains  being  designated  "  New  Serbia  ".  This 
practice  is  needlessly  confusing. 

'  Macedonia,  p.  319. 

2 


18  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

every  soldier  a  chauvinist*,  and  this  is  probably  true — 
until  war  is  declared.  Then,  as  events  have  proved  (at 
any  rate  during  the  past  thirty  years),  the  warlike  ardour 
of  the  Servian  perceptibly  diminishes  in  proportion  to  the 
gradual  approach  of  his  foe  "  !  ^  Two  days  before  war  was 
declared  the  Manchester  Guardian  remarked  :  "  If  it  were 
physically  possible  for  Serbia  to  be  towed  out  to  sea  and 
sunk  there,  the  air  of  Europe  would  at  once  seem  cleaner", 
a  statement  which  provoked  the  comment  that  evidently 
that  paper's  version  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  famous 
apostrophe,  put  in  the  mouth  of  Russia,  would  have  been, 
"  You  dare  to  lay  hands  on  that  little  fellow !  Then  I  will 
take  him  out  to  sea  and  drown  him  ". 

To  recall  these  dicta  would  be  a  task  both  thankless  and 
harmful  were  it  not  that  in  many  quarters  the  old  prejudice 
remains  and  finds  frequent  expression,  not  always  direct, 
with  results  that  may  prove  extremely  harmful  to  Serbia 
when  the  day  of  settlement  arrives,  as  it  has  already 
done  more  to  poison  the  relations  between  England  and 
Serbia  than  the  general  public,  which  can  judge  only  by 
official  expressions  of  opinion,  has  any  idea  of.  The  lack 
of  sympathy  with  which  Serbia  has  been  treated  throughout 
the  war  by  our  Government,  and  by  a  large  section  of  our 
publicists,  is  brought  out  in  the  history  of  the  negotiations 
which  were  carried  on  in  the  summer  of  1915  with 
Bulgaria,  and  in  the  articles  which  appeared  at  the  time  in 
the  daily  and  periodical  Press.  The  recital  of  the  course  of 
these  negotiations  will  show  the  scant  regard  in  which  the 
interests  of  Serbia  were  held  and  the  altogether  exaggerated 
tenderness  paid  to  the  exacting  demands,  themselves  not 
put  forward  bona  fide,  of  her  eastern  neighbour.  No  doubt 
the  part  which  diplomacy  had  to  play  was  extremely  difficult 
and  its  motives  were  innocuous,  but  neither  the  difficulty  of 
the  case  nor  the  purity  of  motive  offers  adequate  excuse  for 
the  manner  in  which  our  ally  was  treated  and  her  interests 
made  subservient  to  the  behests  of  Bulgaria.  Although  the 
story  is  an  old  one,  a  brief  recapitulation  will  serve  to 
"   Through  Savage  Europe,  pp.  194,  195.     Popular  Edition. 


A   PLEA   FOR   SERBIA  19 

indicate  the  errors  of  our  past  dealings  with  Serbia,  and  the 
nature  of  the  course  which  we  should  avoid  steering  in  the 
future.  I  mention  only  such  affairs  as  were  known  at 
the  time. 

From  the  commencement  of  the  war  Bulgaria  adopted 
an  attitude  of  dubious  neutrality  which  indicated  clearly 
the  ultimate  trend  of  Bulgarian  policy,  and  when  in 
November  1914  it  seemed  likely  that  the  Austrian  invasion 
would  prove  successful  the  mask  was  thrown  off  and  so- 
called  "  bands  "  cut  the  vital  artery  of  the  Salonica  railway 
at  the  very  moment  when  the  much-needed  munitions 
were  being  forwarded  to  the  army,  and  for  some  days 
Serbia  in  consequence  stood  in  deadly  peril.  There 
followed  in  January  191.5  the  conclusion  of  a  loan  with 
Germany,  or  rather  the  payment  by  Germany  of  an 
instalment  of  a  loan  concluded  before  the  commencement 
of  the  war.  It  was  explained  that  the  matter  had  no 
political  significance  and  entailed  no  political  obligations. 
It  was  obvious  that  Germany  had  no  money  to  lend  to 
neutrals  without  a  quid  pro  quo,  and  above  all  that  she 
was  unhkely  to  export  any  gold  in  view  of  the  efforts 
being  made  at  home  to  gather  the  metal  into  the  coffers 
of  the  Reichsbank ;  yet  the  explanation  was  accepted. 

In  the  spring  of  1915  took  place  the  negotiations  with 
Turkey  with  reference  to  the  strip  of  territory  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Marica  through  which  runs  the  railway 
from  Bulgaria  to  Dedeaga6.  In  the  negotiations  with 
Turkey  in  1913  Bulgaria  had  stood  out  for  the  whole 
of  the  Hne  but  had  been  forced  to  give  way,  a  result 
which  constituted  a  legitimate  grievance.  The  final 
upshot  of  the  negotiations  of  last  year  was  that  Turkey 
conceded  the  necessary  area,  some  thousand  square  miles 
in  extent.  Again  the  explanation  was  given  out  from 
Sofia  that  the  matter  was  purely  commercial  and  of  no 
political  importance,  and  that  it  did  not  bind  her  future 
action  in  any  way.  Nothing  could  be  more  unlikely  than 
that  such  a  cession  of  territory  should  have  been  made 
without   political    obligation ;    the   cession    obviously  was 


20    THE   FUTURE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  outcome  of  a  pledge  for  the  future,  otherwise  all 
motive  on  the  part  of  Turkey  would  be  lacking.  It  would 
be  difficult  in  any  case  to  exceed  the  cynicism  of  the 
Bulgarian  explanation  even  if  the  latter  were  taken  at 
its  face  value.  Possibly  this  very  cynicism  lent  it  credence, 
as  being  prima  facie  characteristic,  at  any  rate  Bulgaria's 
friends  asked  us  to  accept  it  as  being  correct,  and  appa- 
rently believed  in  it  themselves.  Finally  came  the 
mobilization  of  the  Bulgarian  Army  on  September  19, 
which  followed  the  offer  on  September  1  of  great  con- 
cessions by  Serbia.  This  mobilization  could  have  only 
one  meaning.  There  was  a  wide  advertisement  of  a  forth- 
coming Austro-German  attack  on  Serbia,  and  an  ominous 
significance  attached  to  the  fact  that  the  final  offer  of 
concessions  had  been  followed  by  silence  on  the  part  of 
King  Ferdinand's  government  on  that  point  while  the 
possibility  of  a  war  with  Serbia  was  more  and  more 
openly  canvassed.  A  last  exhibition  of  duplicity  was  given 
when  Professor  Stephanov  came  to  England  and  gave 
what  he  called  a  message  from  M.  Kadoslavov  to  the 
English  people,^  breathing  nothing  but  goodwill  and 
expressions  of  devotion.  This,  we  were  assured  by  her 
friends,  represented  the  real  sentiment  of  Bulgaria,  and 
all  would  yet  be  well.  Their  eyes  were  shut  to  the 
evidence  of  double  dealing,  and  they  continued  to  urge 
upon  the  country  the  policy  of  sacrificing  our  friends  to 
our  foes. 

Beyond  this  the  extreme  Bulgarophils  in  England 
proceeded  at  every  turn  to  dot  the  i's  and  cross  the  t's 
of  our  diplomacy  in  their  own  sense  and  in  a  manner 
that  was  most  injurious  to  our  interests.  The  result  was 
a  general  impression  of  feebleness  on  our  part.  We  seemed 
to  be  going  cap  in  hand  to  Bulgaria,  as  though  success  or 
failure  in  the  war  were  dependent  upon  the  line  which  she 
might  choose  to  adopt,  we  were  told  continually  that 
Bulgaria  held  the  key  to  the  Balkan  position  and  that  she 
must  be  made  the  pivot  of  our  Balkan  policy.  Our  natural 
'  Vide  interview  in  the  Morning  Post,  September  28,  1916. 


A  PLEA  FOR  SERBIA  21 

friends  became  more  and  more  bewildered  and  uneasy,  and 
less  and  less  inclined  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  a  side 
which  seemed  to  care  less  for  the  interests  of  its  friends 
than  of  its  enemies,  till  at  length  we  reaped  the  results 
which  usually  attend  the  conduct  that  sacrifices  friends  in 
order  to  placate  enemies.  In  England  a  vigorous  Press 
campaign  was  waged,  and  it  was  even  seriously  suggested 
that  Russia  should  "coerce"  Serbia,  while  the  other 
Powers  should  threaten  Greece  with  blockade,  with  a  view  to 
landing  troops  in  Salonica  to  occupy  Macedonia/or  Bulgaria  ! 
The  whole  treatment  of  our  ally  savoured  of  inequality. 
National  rights  which  in  Dalmatia  had  been  disregarded  to 
the  detriment  of  the  Southern  Slavs  became  a  sine  qud  non 
when  it  was  alleged  that  they  favoured  Bulgaria ;  the 
strategic  claims  which  elsewhere  had  weighed  down  the 
balance  against  Serbia  became  a  feather-weight  when  urged 
on  her  behalf,  and  while  the  Entente  set  itself  to  realize 
Bulgarian  unity  it  would  not,  and  in  view  of  its  previous 
engagements  to  Italy  could  not,  guarantee  the  unity  of  the 
Serbo-Croats.  The  concessions  agreed  to  by  Serbia  went 
to  the  utmost  limit  of  what  it  was  reasonable  to  ask,  and 
beyond:  she  abandoned  the  Salonica  railway,  placed  another 
customs  barrier  between  herself  and  the  ^gean,  surrendered 
Bitolj  (Monastir),  the  terminus  of  another  line  to  Salonica, 
while  the  reservation  of  Ochrida  maintained  contact  with 
Greece  in  a  purely  formal  manner,  for  a  line  to  Salonica 
thence  would  perforce  pass  through  Bitolj,  though  in  the 
future  a  very  roundabout  way  might  be  made  through 
Korica  and  Castoria.  With  the  exception  of  Ochrida  and 
Prilip  it  was  a  return  to  1912,  in  spite  of  all  that  had 
passed  since  then — the  treacherous  attack  of  her  former 
ally,  the  blood  shed  in  the  second  Balkan  war,  and  the 
attitude  of  her  foe  during  the  present  war.  She  gave  far 
more  than  had  seemed  at  all  likely.  I  well  remember  the 
answer  of  a  Serb  publicist  to  a  query  of  mine  with  reference 
to  a  possible  surrender  of  the  Monastir  region  :  "  Yes — after 
another  Kosovo".  Even  so  Bulgaria  was  not  satisfied — nor 
were  her  friends  in  England. 


22  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

The  unwillingness  to  face  facts,  the  blind  adherence  to 
the  Bulgarian  legend,  were  maintained  to  the  very  end.  It 
was  not  unnatural  that  Sir  Edwin  Pears,  with  his  close 
and  honourable  connection  with  the  very  rebirth  of  the 
Bulgarian  people  should  be  willing,  so  late  as  October  8, 
apparently  to  accept  assurances  given  to  him  from  Bulgaria 
that  no  ministry  could  last  a  week,  which  proposed  war 
with  Russia  or  opposition  to  England,  and  that  nothing 
would  ever  induce  the  Bulgarians  to  fight  on  the  side  of 
Turkey,  and  to  plead  that  Bulgaria  should  be  given  another 
chance,^  but  others  had  not  the  same  excuse.  Even  after 
the  Russian  ultimatum  the  Daily  Netvs  on  October  6 
remarked,  "  We  should  like  to  think  that  the  offer  of  the 
Entente  Powers  was  still  valid."  Speaking  two  days  later, 
Mr.  C.  R.  Buxton  said  that  he  was  not  convinced  that 
Bulgaria  was  going  to  war,  and  that  he  failed  to  find  certain 
evidence,  although  to  any  one  not  wilfully  self-blinded  then 
at  least  the  matter  was  clear  to  probation.  Mr.  H.  M. 
Wallis,  in  a  letter  to  The  Times  written  on  October  5, 
thought  that  the  Bulgarian  nation  stood  ''in  a  light  calling 
for  our  deep  commiseration  and  forbearance".  He  added 
that  in  a  popular  song  which  he  had  received  from  Sofia,  it 
was  "  the  Greek  and  the  Serb  who  are  held  up  to  execra- 
tion. And  with  some  reason".  Two  days  before  the  news 
arrived  of  the  Bulgarian  attack,  on  October  9,  the  Nation 
still  thought  that  there  was  a  possibility  that  the  German 
of&cers  in  Bulgaria  were  only  on  their  way  to  Turkey,  or 
existed  only  in  the  heated  imagination  of  a  hostile  Balkan 
witness.  It  urged  even  greater  concessions ;  "  the  offer 
might  very  easily  be  improved.  It  is  worth  while  making  a 
good  offer,  a  high  bid  not  merely  for  active  support,  but  for  a 
benevolent  neutrality  ".^  Yet,  as  has  been  seen,  the  offer  was 
already  as  high  as  could  be  expected — Bulgaria's  legitimate 

'  Letter  to  the  Nation  of  October  9. 

•  It  is  only  fair  to  state  that  the  Nation  gave  an  admirable  example 
of  impartiality  by  admitting  to  its  columns  lengthy  letters  whose  con- 
tents would  certainly  not  have  received  editorial  endorsement,  and  this 
at  a  time  when  it  was  not  easy  to  obtain  a  hearing  for  Serbia's  case 
elsewhere. 


A  PLEA  FOR  SERBIA  23 

claims  had  been  more  than  met.  Even  the  outbreak  of  war 
was  followed  by  a  final  appeal  from  Messrs.  C.  R.  and 
N.  Buxton,  which  caused  renewed  hesitations  in  neutral 
Balkan  quarters.  The  net  result  was  to  create  the  impres- 
sion, as  indeed  it  showed  the  reality,  of  excessive  weakness 
on  the  part  of  our  Foreign  Office,  and  an  inability  to  grasp 
the  essential  facts  of  the  situation. 

The  warnings  which  we  had  received  from  Serbia  fell 
on  deaf  ears  and  met  with  no  response.  As  early  as  April 
our  Foreign  Office  was  informed  that  Bulgaria  had  come 
to  an  understanding  with  the  Central  Powers,  but  nothing 
was  done  to  avert  the  danger  that  thus  presented  itself. 
On  July  7  the  Minister  of  Serbia  in  London  suggested  the 
the  sending  of  British  troops  to  Serbia,  but  the  military 
authorities  replied  that  we  had  no  troops  to  send,  being 
then  engaged  in  a  further  extension  of  the  disastrous 
Dardanelles  expedition,  which  could  only  be  carried  on  at 
all  so  long  as  Serbia  remained  unsubdued.  It  was  in 
truth  one  of  the  most  crucial  points  of  the  war,  and  the 
neglect  of  Serb  advice  and  interest  has  entailed  vast 
responsibilities  and  diiSculties  on  the  Allies.  Following 
on  the  Bulgarian  mobilization  of  September  19  Sir  Edward 
Grey  "  was  pressed  "  on  September  27  for  his  opinion  on 
the  Serb  proposal  to  strike  at  Bulgaria  while  that  Power 
was  in  the  midst  of  mobilization — a  contingency  which 
forms  the  nightmare  of  every  general  staff — and  gave  a 
reply  which  could  only  be  construed  as  a  refusal.  It  was 
Serbia's  last  chance,  hazardous  indeed,  but  the  only  course 
which  in  the  absence  of  allied  aid  ^  promised  any  prospect 
of  success,  but  it  was  denied  to  her  and  she  was  left  alone 
to  bear  the  double  attack  made  upon  her  when  her  ad- 
versaries had  completed  all  their  preparations  methodically 
and  without  let  or  hindrance. 

To  the  very  end  our  Government  had  yielded  itself  to 
the  Bulgar  obsession  which  has  marked  our  dealings  with 

«  On  September  24  an  offer  was  made  to  Greece  to  send  troops  to 
Salonica  in  order  to  aid  her  in  the  fulfilment  of  her  treaty  obligations. 
They  began  to  land  on  October  5. 


24  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  Balkans  ever  since  1878,  an  obsession  which  nothing 
that  Bulgaria  could  do  or  leave  undone  v^as  able  to  shake. 
Everything  was  looked  upon  from  the  standpoint  of 
Bulgaria,  her  claims  were  always  just,  her  opponents 
always  in  the  wrong,  nor  was  any  penalty  ever  to  be 
exacted  from  her  however  often  she  might  bite  the  hand 
that  had  fed  her.  For  thirty  years  she  has  been  the  spoilt 
child  of  Europe  immune  from  the  criticism  and  the 
exigencies  which  are  the  lot  of  other  States.  The  excuse 
made  for  our  diplomacy  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1915 
that  its  aim  was  to  restore  the  Balkan  League,  means 
in  effect  that  our  Foreign  Office  had  set  itself  to  a  task 
which  was  foredoomed  to  failure  and  which  it  was  unable 
to  recognize  as  based  upon  an  utter  ignorance  of  realities ; 
it  was  the  hegemony  of  the  Balkans  which  Bulgaria 
desired  and  not  an  accord  based  on  mutual  rights.  M. 
Rizov  has  stated  ^  that  a  governing  motive  was  to  prevent 
Serbo-Croat  union  and  the  formation  of  a  Southern  Slav 
State  which  would  be  more  powerful  than  Bulgaria. 
People  and  ruler  were  at  one,  the  Bulgarians  have  always 
docilely  followed  the  lead  of  King  Ferdinand,  and  in 
the  absence  of  any  serious  movement  of  dissent  must  be 
held  to  have  endorsed  his  policy.  "When  the  last  two 
Obrenovic  sovereigns  of  Serbia  pursued  an  anti-national 
policy  Serbia  was  in  a  continual  ferment,  as  all  the  world 
was  made  aware,  and  when  finally  no  other  way  of  escape 
from  ruin  offered  itself  the  issue  was  the  tragedy  of  1903. 
No  such  exhibitions  of  opposition  to  the  policy  of  King 
Ferdinand  have  ever  manifested  themselves  among  the 
Bulgarians,  and  the  attempt  to  dissociate  the  people  from 
their  ruler  fails. 

It  is  difficult  to  sum  up  this  political  desertion  in  any 
other  terms  but  as  the  betrayal  of  Serbia,  and  whatever 
may  be  the  outcome  a  terrible  responsibility  lies  upon 
our  Government  for  all  the  misery  that  has  ensued  to 
that  unhappy  country,  the   devastation  of   her   towns  and 

'  Vide  report  of  an  interview  given  by  M.  Kizov,  Minister  in  Berlin, 
to  a  German  paper,  in  Westminster  Gazette  of  November  17. 


A  PLEA  FOR  SERBIA  25 

villages,  the  losses  of  her  Army,  the  hideous  sufferings 
of  her  people,  the  death  of  thousands  of  women  and 
children,  the  exile  of  her  aged  and  heroic  King.  For 
the  blood  of  these  martyred  women  and  children  whose 
bodies  littered  the  via  dolorosa  to  the  Adriatic  our  Govern- 
ment stands  largely  answerable  at  the  bar  of  history  and 
to  the  Serb  race.  Even  the  (promise  of  aid  given  by  our 
Foreign  Minister  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  September 
28  was  subsequently  explained  away  as  being  a  promise 
to  Greece  to  help  her  to  keep  her  treaty  obligations ! 

In  more  senses  than  one  we  owe  an  immense  debt  to  the 
valiant  and  sorely  tried  Serbs,  and  a  plea  on  their  behalf  is 
not  out  of  place  as  a  prelude  to  the  study  of  Serbia's  future. 
That  country  has  suffered  much  from  the  nature  of  the 
news  diligently  disseminated  throughout  Europe  by  Austro- 
Hungarian  agencies.  No  tale  was  too  disgraceful  nor  too 
unlikely  for  use  as  a  means  of  prejudicing  western  European 
opinion.  Rumours  of  plots  that  had  no  existence,  of  un- 
speakable infamies  concocted  by  the  ingenious  brains  of  the 
Ballplatz,  of  unrest  and  disorder,  were  spread  abroad  in  the 
justified  anticipation  that  if  enough  mud  were  thrown  some 
would  be  sure  to  stick.  The  result  has  been  that  perhaps 
no  people  in  the  world  has  been  more  misrepresented  and 
misunderstood  than  the  Serbs.  Its  strong  spirit  of  national 
feeling  became  mere  turbulence,  its  justifiable  hopes  lawless 
ambitions  against  the  consecrated  status  quo,  its  impatience 
of  misrule  a  sign  of  its  anarchical  proclivities.  No  English 
journalist  was  resident  in  Serbia,  and  all  news  came  through 
tainted  sources.  One  example  will  suffice  here.  When 
King  Alexander  was  killed  all  the  world  was  told  that  his 
body  had  been  hacked  about  and  thrown  out  of  the  window 
into  the  garden  beneath,  where  it  was  left  to  lie  all  night, 
yet  I  have  been  informed  that  there  is  no  word  of  truth 
in  these  details.  My  informant  was  the  son  of  one  of  King 
Alexander's  Prime  Ministers,  and  his  own  authority  was 
the  personal  testimony  given  to  him  by  the  king's  physician. 
"  It  was  all  an  Austrian  lie  "  was  the  sense  if  not  the  actual 
words  of  my  informant's  summing   up.     Not  long  ago  a 


26  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

cultured  gentleman  of  my  acquaintance  remarked  that  it 
would  be  well  if  the  Balkans  were  put  under  the  sea  for 
twenty-four  hours,  and  that  he  regarded  the  Serbs  as  little 
better  than  their  own  swine.  The  prejudice  showed  itself 
even  in  details — not  until  three  or  four  years  ago  would 
writers  acknowledge  that  after  all  perhaps  the  Serbs  knew 
their  own  language  best  and  that  DuSan  did  not  mean  "  the 
strangler".  EngHsh  ignorance  of  the  Serbs  was  profound.^ 
On  the  occasion  of  an  address  by  Father  Nicholas  Velimir- 
ovic  a  lady  came  up  to  him  after  he  had  concluded  and 
asked  hjm,  in  the  writer's  presence,  in  what  language  he 
would  have  spoken  if  he  had  spoken  in  his  native  tongue ! 
He  replied  with  politeness  and  gravity  that  he  would  have 
spoken  in  Serb,  which  was  a  Slav  language  with  a  general 
affinity  to  Russian  for  example.  The  question  interested 
others,  for  almost  immediately  a  gentleman  approached  to 
say  that  he  and  his  friends  had  been  interested  in  his  ability 
to  speak  English  and  would  like  to  know  what  was  his 
native  tongue ;  had  the  Serbs  a  "  language  of  their  own  "  ? 
A  second  polite  explanation  was  followed  not  long  after  by 
the  approach  of  a  third  enquirer  who  had  evidently  a  little 
dangerous  knowledge  of  the  ethnological  perplexities  of  the 
Danubian  regions.  He  asked  whether  the  native  language 
of  the  Serbs  were  not  Cech ! 

Prejudice  and  ignorance  form  a  powerful  combination, 
and  it  is  evident  that,  to  a  great  extent,  neither  has  been 
dispelled  even  yet.  Unless,  however,  we  are  to  make,  or 
allow  our  rulers  to  make,  great  and  lamentable  mistakes  at 

'  So  well-known  a  publicist  and  eminent  colonial  governor  as  Sir 
Harry  Johnston  has  suggested  the  cession  of  the  Hercegovina  to  Serbia 
as  the  solution  of  the  Southern  Slav  question  I  Such  an  idea  from  such 
a  source  gives  the  measure  of  the  profound  ignorance  of  the  very 
elements  of  the  Southern  Slav  problem  which  exists  in  the  most  "  well- 
informed  "  quarters.  "  Eeasonable  compensation  to  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro would  take  the  form  of  the  cession  to  Serbia  of  Herzegovina,  to 
Montenegro  of  Cattaro,  and  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro  of  the  right  to 
deal  as  they  pleased  with  all  Albania  with  the  exception  of  the  circum- 
scription of  Valona  and  Epirus". — Germavy,  Africa,  and  the  Terms  of 
Peace.  Nineteenth  Century  Beview,  April  1915,  p.  765.  Serbia  and 
the  Hercegovina  are  not  coterminous  1 


A   PLEA   FOR   SERBIA  27 

the  end  of  the  war  it  is  essential  not  only  that  prejudice 
should  be  dissipated  but  ignorance  dispelled.  It  is  likely 
enough,  and  in  view  of  the  sorry  record  of  our  diplomatists 
reasonable  enough,  that  the  general  body  of  public  opinion 
will  demand  a  much  larger  voice  in  the  settling  of  the  terms 
of  peace  than  has  been  the  case  in  the  past,  and  if  that 
public  opinion  is  not  itself  to  be  misled  and  misleading  it 
is  necessary  that  the  English  people  should  possess  not  only 
a  working  knowledge  of  the  historical  past  of  the  Serbs, 
but  a  clear  appreciation  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
problems  with  which  they  are  faced  in  the  present.  A 
boggled  and  patched-up  peace  in  the  Near  East,  born  of 
shear  weariness  and  distaste  will  be  the  sure  precursor  of 
fresh  wars,  and  will  even  afford  our  present  enemies 
opportunities  of  which  none  know  better  how  to  avail 
themselves. 


CHAPTER  II 
A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY 

I 

The  Rise  of  Serbia 

A  SHORT  sketch  of  the  history  of  the  Serbs  will  serve  the 
purpose,  which  is  all  that  is  attempted  here,  of  setting  out 
recent  events  and  their  outcome  in  something  of  their 
historical  setting,  the  aim  being  rather  to  illustrate  the 
forces  at  work  than  to  give  a  full  account  of  events  which 
in  so  short  a  compass  would  be  impossible,  and  if  attempted 
useless.  "We  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  the  Balkan  peoples 
as  young  nations,  and  the  phrase  is,  of  course,  abundantly 
justified  if  we  regard  the  present  scale  of  their  culture 
and  the  stage  which  they  have  attained  in  political  growth. 
It  has  to  be  remembered  at  the  same  time  that  in  another 
sense  they  are  by  no  means  young  nations.  They  had 
reached  and  passed  their  early  zenith  before  Prussia  had 
come  into  existence,  and  in  the  Middle  Ages  they  were 
the  legitimate  heirs  of,  and  sharers  in,  the  culture  of 
Byzantium.  It  has  been  their  tragedy  that  just  when 
they  seemed  on  the  point  of  entering  on  the  course  of 
development  which  marked  the  fifteenth  century — and 
this  applies  in  a  very  real  degree  to  the  Serbs — they  came 
under  the  curse  of  the  Turkish  blight.  It  was  not  so 
much  that  the  current  of  their  development  was  changed, 
or  even  forced  to  take  a  subordinate  position,  but  that 
all  they  were,  or  possessed,  in  the  way  of  political  develop- 
ment,   cultural    achievement,    architectural    and    artistic 

i28 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  29 

aspiration,  was  stamped  flat  under  the  Turkish  hoof,  and 
simply  ceased  to  exist.  For  four  hundred  years  only  their 
heroic  ballads  served  to  keep  alive  among  the  Serbs  the 
memory  of  past  greatness,  and  to  lift,  in  even  the  slightest 
degree,  the  life  of  the  people  above  the  level  of  an  arduous 
struggle  for  mere  physical  existence.  When  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  these  people  attained  again  to  a  national 
independence  it  is  not  surprising,  not  only  that  they  re- 
tained many  of  the  marks  of  long  generations  of  servitude, 
but  that  they  took  up  the  threads  of  national  life  where 
they  had  been  snapped  short  by  the  Turkish  conquest. 
It  is  this  that  without  doubt  largely  accounts  for  the 
"historical"  bias  which  has  marked  their  renewed  con- 
sciousness. If  we  could  imagine  English  history  a  blank 
from  the  reign  of  Richard  II  to  our  own  days,  how  much 
more  real  and  present  a  character  would  seem  Edward  III, 
and  with  what  different  eyes  should  we  look  upon  the 
battles  of  Cregy  and  Poictiers,  the  question  of  Calais  and 
Guienne.  It  is  not  altogether  their  fault  if  they  are  apt 
to  exasperate  the  twentieth  century  with  detailed  claims 
derived  from  the  fourteenth.  All  this  has  to  be  remem- 
bered if  we  would  understand  and  sympathize  with,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  the  word,  their  present  aspirations  and 
outlook. 

The  original  home  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  which  term 
is  usually  confined  in  practice  to  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes,  but  in  this  connection  includes  the  primitive 
Slav  element  in  the  Bulgarian  people,  is  supposed  to  have 
been  to  the  north  of  the  Carpathians  between  the  Vistula 
and  the  Dnieper.  They  entered  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
towards  the  end  of  the  sixth  century,  and  in  620  are  said 
to  have  been  invited  to  migrate  into  his  dominions  by  the 
Emperor  Heraclius,  though  a  steady  infiltration  had  been 
going  over  a  long  time.  The  general  appellation  of  these 
tribes  was  Slovene,  and  it  was  not  till  the  ninth  century 
that  specific  designations  for  their  main  divisions  emerge. 
The  term  Slovene  is  used  also  in  the  same  general  sense 
as  its  English  derivative  Slav,  e.g.  in  such  expressions  as 


30  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Slovenski  Jug — Slavonic  South — Macedo-Slovenes,  and  so 
forth.  It  is  apparently  an  accident  of  history  that  the 
term  has  become  also  the  specific  appellation  of  one  of 
the  three  branches  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  possibly  because 
that  small  branch  retained  the  original  general  name  while 
its  more  numerous  neighbours  acquired  particular  desig- 
nations of  their  own.  The  terms  Croat  and  Serb  emerge 
in  the  ninth  century,  but  it  is  significant  of  the  funda- 
mental identity  of  these  two  kindreds  that  to  the  early 
Byzantine  historians  the  terms  are  interchangeable. ^  The 
origin  of  these  names  is  unknown,  but  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  the  name  Serb  is  applied  to  themselves  by  the 
nearly  extinct  Slavs  of  northern  Saxony  and  the  adjacent 
part  of  Brandenburg  who  are  usually  known  to  us  as  Sorbs 
or  Wends.  When  the  Serbs  and  Croats  eventually  differ- 
entiated themselves  the  former  are  found  to  be  occupying 
roughly  the  kingdom  of  Serbia,  as  existing  from  1878 
to  1912,  Old  Serbia  (the  country  round  Prizren, 
Pristina,  etc.),  the  late  sanjak  of  Novipazar,  Montenegro, 
southern  Dalmatia,  the  Hercegovina,  Bosnia  and  Srem 
or  Syrmia,  the  Timok  being  their  immemorial  boundary 
on  the  east  while  in  Dalmatia  the  Cetina  divided  them 
from  the  Croats  who  occupied  northern  Dalmatia,  Croatia, 
and  Slavonia,  the  Triune  Kingdom  as  it  came  later  to  be 
called.  In  addition  to  these  regions  the  early  Slav  invaders 
overran  the  greater  part  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  The 
modern  Bulgaria  and  Macedonia  were  occupied  by  them, 
while  the  population  of  Albania  and  northern  Greece  has 
a  large  Slav  element  in  its  composition  which  in  the 
former  case  is  specifically  Serb.^  The  easterly  and  southern 
invaders  seem  to  have  been  largely  lacking  in  the  sense 
of  a  specific  national  consciousness,  as  has  been  the  case 
to  the  present  day  in  the  case  of  the  Macedonians,3  possibly 

'  Git.  Nevill  Forbes.     The  Southern  Slavs,  p.  16. 

'  "  Perhaps  the  majority  of  place-names  of  central  and  northern 
Albania  are  Slavonic  ".  H.  M.  Brailsford,  Macedonia,  p.  231.  Pro- 
fessor Eliot  Smith  holds  that  the  Albanians  are  part  of  the  original 
Slav  population.     British  Association  Meeting,  1915. 

3  See  also  Chapter  VI. 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  31 

because  the  original  population  of  these  regions  was  more 
numerous  than  in  the  north-west,  and  so  the  invaders 
became  more  mixed  in  blood. 

In  679  the  Bulgarians  under  Isperich  conquered  Lower 
Moesia,  inhabited  by  these  Slav  invaders,  and  founded  their 
first  Balkan  Bulgarian  Kingdom.  The  new-comers  were 
of  Tartar  origin,  and  though  they  were  to  a  certain 
extent  absorbed  by  the  conquered,  the  nation  has  always 
been  marked  by  many  of  the  characteristics  of  its  non- 
Slav  ancestors.  Though  the  new  immigrants  learned  the 
Slav  tongue — to  this  day  Serb  and  Bulgar  can  understand 
one  another,  "when  they  choose",  as  Sir  Charles  Eliot 
says — their  manners  and  polity  remained  sharply  dis- 
tinguished from  those  of  their  Serb  neighbours.  They 
owned  the  sway  of  an  autocratic  Khan  who  lived  in 
Oriental  seclusion,  and  throughout  its  history  the  people 
has  been  marked  by  the  passivity  with  which  it  has 
submitted  to  its  rulers.  The  absence  of  any  really 
serious  revolt  against  Turkish  domination  cannot  be 
ascribed  entirely  to  the  geographical  features  and  position 
of  the  country,  less  difficult  than  Serbia  or  Greece,  less 
remote  than  Roumania.  The  acquiescence  in  the  absolute 
rule  of  the  powerful  Stambulov,  and  latterly  with  disastrous 
results  in  that  of  King  Ferdinand,  seems  to  be  of  a  piece 
with  what  is  known  of  their  ancient  history.  In  early  days 
indeed  this  trait  in  their  character  allowed  of  a  rapid 
development  of  the  power  of  the  Bulgarians,  lending 
itself  to  the  designs  of  their  Khans  and  Tsars,  and  in 
consequence  they  were  centuries  before  the  Serbs  in  the 
consolidation  of  a  serious  political  power.  With  the  advent 
of  the  Bulgarians  the  era  of  considerable  invasions  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  came  to  an  end  till  the  coming  of  the 
Turks.  At  this  period,  then,  we  find  the  north-western 
area  in  the  hands  of  the  Serbs,  with  the  Bulgars  to  the 
east  of  them.  In  Albania  the  original  stock  had  been 
pushed  back  into  the  utmost  recesses  of  the  country — the 
Mirdites  are  said  never  to  have  come  under  the  effective 
sway  of    any  foreign    Power — while    in    the   rest   of    the 


32  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

land  there  was  a  considerable  infiltration  of  Serb  blood. 
Macedonia  had  been  largely  occupied  by  a  Slav  stock 
which  must  have  been  akin  to  the  Serbs,  but  here  their 
blood  was  largely  diluted  with  elements  derived  from  the 
provincial  population  of  the  later  Empire.  To  this  day 
the  still  dwindling  element  of  that  stock — much  more 
numerous  in  the  Middle  Ages — perched  on  the  mountain- 
tops  of  the  Pindus  and  its  offshoots  overlooking  the  land 
that  once  was  theirs  preserves  alike  in  its  language  and 
its  name — Aromuni — the  boast  of  descent  from  the  lords 
of  the  ancient  world,  though  these  Vlachs  (Kutzo-Vlachs, 
lame  Vlachs)  as  they  are  generally  known,  can  have  had 
but  comparatively  little  genuine  Roman  blood.  Still, 
Romanized  Thracians  as  they  were,  they  have  pre- 
served to  us  the  "provincial"  of  the  Empire.  The 
metropolitan  province  of  Constantinople  was  Greek, 
though,  as  has  been  seen,  in  its  native  land  Greek 
blood   was   now  largely  intermingled  with   Slav. 

In  organization  the  Serbs  were  poles  asunder  from  the 
Bulgarians.  They  owned  to  no  fixed  central  authority, 
but  were  a  congeries  of  tribes  acknowledging  the  rule  of 
their  tribal  chiefs  known  as  zupans  but  knowing  nothing, 
save  at  rare  intervals,  of  a  national  ruler.  Indeed,  to  the 
end  of  the  Middle  Ages  not  only  were  Croats  and  Serbs 
separate,  but  the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  under  their  Bans 
occupied  a  position  of  precarious  and  delicately  balanced 
independence  between  the  rival  claims  to  suzerainty  of 
the  Kings  of  Hungary  and  the  Kings  and  Tsars  of  Serbia. 
From  time  to  time  one  zupan  more  powerful  than  his 
contemporaries  would  succeed  in  uniting  a  large  part  of 
the  nation  under  his  sway  as  Grand  Zupan.  The  fissiparous 
tendencies  of  Serb  political  life  have  been  the  bane  of  the 
nation,  a  truth  that  at  long  last  has  been  bitten  deep 
into  the  consciousness  of  the  Southern  Slavs.  It  has, 
however,  to  be  remembered  that  this  very  impatience  of 
restraint  and  fierce  love  of  independence  has  been  of 
untold  value  to  the  people  in  times  of  adversity,  keeping 
alive  through  centuries  of  oppression  the  hope  of  eventual 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB   HISTORY  33 

national  restoration  and  a  burning  desire  to  achieve  it. 
Time  and  again  they  rose  against  the  Turks  till  the  very 
name  of  Serb  stank  in  Turkish  nostrils,  and  they  never 
sank  as  others  into  a  sluggish  and  oriental  acquiescence 
in  their  servile  political  lot.  The  character  of  their 
country  also,  mountainous  and  split  up  into  a  number 
of  comparatively  small  valleys,  and  mountain-surrounded 
basins — the  poljes  of  Balkan  geography — as  it  forbad  any 
easy  road  to  national  unity  so  it  fostered  a  sturdy  love 
of  independence  and  a  vigorous  local  life. 

Of  the  early  centuries  of  Serb  history  but  little  is  known, 
and  in  a  brief  sketch  such  as  this  that  little  need  not 
detain  us  long.  It  is  not  till  830  that  we  find  definite 
mention  of  the  name  of  a  Grand  Zupan  in  Voislav,  while 
shortly  after  in  the  rule  of  one  Eadoslav  occurred  the  most 
momentous  event  of  early  Serb  history,  and  one  of  the 
most  momentous  in  the  whole  history  of  the  race,  the 
conversion  of  the  people  to  Christianity  according  to 
the  Orthodox  Eastern  rite  by  the  Southern  Slav  apostles, 
SS.  Cyril  and  Methodius,  who  in  the  reign  of  Boris  of 
Bulgaria  converted  the  people  of  that  country  also.  The 
Croats  received  their  religion  from  western  Roman  sources, 
and  for  centuries  the  difference  in  religion  has  been  perhaps 
the  most  weighty  of  the  causes  which  have  kept  the  two 
branches  of  the  race  apart.  One  of  the  causes  of  this 
difference  is  to  be  found  not  only  in  the  more  westerly 
position  of  the  Croats,  and  the  greater  accessibility  of  their 
land  to  Western  influences,  but  in  the  fact  that,  roughly 
speaking,  the  dividing  line  between  Croat  and  Serb  had 
been  the  old  dividing  line  of  the  Eastern  and  Western 
Empires  as  it  became  that  of  Eastern  and  Western 
Christianity,  From  S.  Cyril  is  derived  the  name  of  the 
"  Orthodox "  alphabet  in  use  among  the  Serbs  which 
has  undergone  various  modifications  since  its  introduction, 
perhaps  in  the  form  of  what  is  known  as  the  Glagolica 
alphabet ;  the  Croats  on  the  contrary  use  the  Latin 
alphabet  with  various  diacritic  marks  in  order  to  represent 
the   sounds   of   the  language,   the   Cyrillic  alphabet  being 

3 


34    THE   FUTURE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

phonetic.  The  reign  of  the  Grand  ^upan  Vlastimir  was 
marked  by  a  three-year  attack  by  the  Bulgarians  under 
Presjam,  the  predecessor  of  Boris,  which  was  beaten  back. 
This  is  perhaps  the  earliest  occasion  on  which  the  two 
peoples  came  into  conflict  since  their  institutions  had 
crystallized  into  something  like  a  definite  polity,  and  marks 
the  beginning  of  the  secular  struggle  between  them.  The 
almost  constant  state  of  warfare  between  Serbs  and  Bulgars 
may  be  likened  in  its  insistence,  if  not  in  its  scale,  to 
the  agelong  conflict  between  France  and  "the  Empire", 
and  both  alike  have  been  renewed  in  our  own  days  with 
an  intensity  of  feeling  which  has  certainly  not  lessened 
with  the  passage  of  the  centuries.  This  is  sometimes 
forgotten  by  those  who,  ignorant  apparently  that  the  mutual 
animosity  has  its  roots  deep  down  in  the  history  and  his- 
torical consciousness  of  Serb  and  Bulgar,  not  only  preach, 
as  well  they  may,  a  gospel  of  peace  to  them,  but  allow  their 
desires  to  outrun  the  realities  of  the  situation,  and  either 
take  their  hopes  for  facts  or  grow  impatient  if  those  hopes 
are  deceived.  That  nothing  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  is  so 
desirable  as  the  laying  aside  of  the  feud  which  has  worked 
such  incalculable  mischief  is  as  true  as  that  the  same 
applies  to  Frenchman  and  German,  or  Englishman  and 
German,  in  the  west,  and  the  two  feuds  are  likely  to  have 
their  end  about  the  same  time.  At  any  rate  it  is  not 
for  western  Europe  to  take  up  a  superior  attitude  of  pained 
surprise  or  lofty  disdain  towards  the  blindness  to  their 
real  interests  of  the  two  peoples  who  might  well  respond 
with  Quis  tulerit  Gracchos  ?  This  hatred  between  the  two 
kindred  peoples  is  a  fact  which  is  as  saddening  in  the 
thought  for  the  future  as  in  the  record  of  the  past,  but 
it  is  a  fact  to  ignore  which  is  simply  a  mark  of  incom- 
petence. The  two  nations  are  antipathetic,  which  may 
be  due  to  the  fact  that  after  all  the  Bulgars  are  at  least  as 
Mongol,  or  at  any  rate  non-Slav,  as  Slav.  Boris  renewed  the 
attack  against  the  sons  of  Vlastimir  but  was  unsuccessful,  and 
Muntimir,  the  eldest  of  them,  succeeded  his  father  as  Grand 
Zupan,  an  office  which  was  tending  to  become  hereditary. 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB   HISTORY  35 

What  Boris  had  been  unable  to  accomplish  was  effected 
by  his  son  the  great  Tsar  Simeon,  founder  of  the  first 
Bulgarian  Empire.  Under  him  the  territory  ruled  by 
the  Bulgarians  touched  the  three  seas  which  are  the  goal 
of  Ferdinand  in  our  own  time,  and  included  the  eastern 
part  of  Serbia  with  Ni§  and  Belgrade.  In  917  Simeon 
made  Paul  Brankovic  Grand  Zupan  after  Peter  his  pre- 
decessor had  been  decoyed  into  the  Bulgarian  camp  and 
treacherously  murdered.  Frequent  Serb  revolts  were  put 
down  with  ruthless  severity  and  the  country  ravaged  to 
desolation.  After  the  death  of  Simeon  Serbia  became 
independent  under  Ceslav,  who  succeeded  in  driving  out 
the  Bulgars,  but  after  his  death  Serb  history  becomes 
again  almost  a  blank  illumined  by  the  emergence  of  one 
or  two  names.  We  hear  of  a  John  Vladimir  who  was 
defeated  by  Samuel  the  successor  of  SiSman,  who  had 
founded  the  "western  Bulgarian  Empire",  and  sub- 
sequently murdered  by  John  Vladislav  the  last  of  the 
early  Bulgar  tsars.  As  nearly  always,  the  fortunes  of 
the  two  nations  were  inversely  connected,  and  the  fall 
of  the  Bulgars  and  their  subjection  to  the  Eastern  Empire 
for  a  century  and  a  half  saw  the  dawn  of  a  better  day 
for  the  Serbs,  and  in  1040  Stephen  Voislav  ruled  as  an 
independent  sovereign  over  Zahumlija,  Zeta,  and  Ra§ka, 
while  Michael  his  son  was  even  recognized  as  king  by 
Gregory  VII,  though  he  was  wise  enough  to  maintain  his 
peace  with  the  Emperor.  Both  Serb  and  Bulgar  rulers 
engaged  in  an  occasional  flirtation  with  the  Papacy  when 
they  required  aid  against  Constantinople. 

It  was  with  the  accession  of  the  Nemanja  dynasty  in 
the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century  that  the  heroic  epoch 
of  Serb  history  began.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the 
kingdom  of  Serbia  as  it  existed  from  1878  to  1912  is 
by  no  means  the  cradle  of  the  original  Serb  State,  and 
cannot  be  spoken  of  in  any  historical  sense  as  Serbia 
"proper"  as  is  sometimes  loosely  done.  The  designation 
"  Serbia  "  has  been  a  political  term  for  that  portion  of  the 
Serb   lands   which   has  been  independent,   and  Danubian 


36  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Serbia  in  no  sense  corresponds  to  East  and  West  Prussia 
as  "Prussia  proper".  At  this  time  the  Serb  tribes  had 
coalesced  in  certain  fairly  constant  State  formations  both 
in  the  Primorija  or  coast  region  along  the  Adriatic,  and 
Zagorija  or  transmontane  region  of  the  interior.  Bosnia, 
as  the  name  implies,  had  its  centre  in  the  basin  of  the 
river  Bosna.  To  the  south  lay  Zahumlija,  or  the  land  of 
Hum  or  Primorija,  corresponding  roughly  to  the  modern 
Hercegovina.  Zeta,  another  subdivision  of  the  territory, 
was  the  representative  of  the  present  Crnagora,  or  Monte- 
negro. The  main  Serb  State  w^as  Raska,  which  compre- 
hended the  late  sanjak  of  Novipazar,  Old  Serbia  to  the 
§ar  mountains,  and  western  Serbia  (as  we  know  it)  as 
its  permanent  elements,  the  eastern  part  of  Serbia  was 
at  times  in  dispute  with  the  Bulgars,  as  ^Belgrade  and  the 
Macva  were  with  the  Hungarians,  for  in  those  days  as 
in  our  own  time  the  configuration  of  the  latter  region 
made  it  hard  to  defend.  Vidin  in  Bulgaria  was  also  a 
subject  of  dispute. 

Stephen  Nemanja,  whose  accession  to  power  is  variously 
dated  as  1143  or  1160,  succeeded  after  conflict  with  his 
brothers  in  uniting  Zahumlija,  Zeta,  and  RaSka  under  his 
sway  as  Grand  Zupan,  and  henceforth  to  RaSka  in  its 
varying  extent  may  be  applied  the  name  of  Serbia.  He 
was  born  at  Dioclea  in  Zeta  in  which  town,  now  ruined, 
some  have  seen  the  origin  of  the  name  of  Diocletian.  For 
a  time  he  succeeded  in  uniting  Bosnia  also  to  his  dominions. 
His  attempts,  however,  to  throw  off  the  suzerainty  of  Con- 
stantinople ended  in  failure,  and  he  was  obliged  to  make  a 
humiliating  submission  to  the  Emperor  Manuel  Comnenus. 
After  the  death  of  Manuel  in  1180  Nemanja  was  able  to 
gather  strength,  and  he  added  Ni§  to  his  territories,  and 
five  years  later  he  assumed  the  title  of  king  though  he 
was  never  crowned.  In  1195  he  abdicated  the  throne  in 
favour  of  his  son,  became  a  monk  under  the  name  of 
Simeon  and  retired  to  the  famous  monastery  of  Hilindar 
which  he  had  founded  on  Mount  Athos,  where  he  died 
four  years  later.     From  his  time  the  sovereigns  of  Serbia 


A   SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  37 

almost  without  exception  bore  the  name  of  Stephen, 
probably  from  its  signification — a  crown.  The  titles  of 
these  sovereigns  are  variously  given :  I  have  followed 
the  simplest  nomenclature,  giving  the  other  designa- 
tions by  which  they  are  sometimes  known  in  brackets. 
Nemanja's  son  Stephen  II  (sometimes  called  Stephen 
Urog)  had  to  contest  his  right  with  one  of  his  brothers 
stirred  up  by  Andrew  II  of  Hungary,  jealous  of  the  rising 
power  of  Serbia,  but  the  quarrel  after  some  fighting  was 
allayed  by  the  king's  youngest  brother  who  had  taken 
orders  and  is  known  in  Serb  history  as  S.  Sava.  The 
latter  indeed  might  almost  in  some  respects  be  considered 
the  veritable  founder  of  the  new  State,  composing  quarrels, 
organizing  the  Church,  and  pressing  on  the  work  of  civili- 
zation.^  Stephen  II  at  one  time  coquetted  with  the  Pope 
and  was  even  crowned  by  a  Papal  legate ;  but  this  act, 
though  undertaken  for  political  reasons,  aroused  the  Ortho- 
dox resentment  of  his  subjects.  He  was  acknowledged  by 
Baldwin  the  first  Latin  Emperor  of  Constantinople  as 
independent  King  of  Serbia,  Dalmatia,  and  Bosnia.  S. 
Sava,  who  became  Archbishop  of  U^ice,  crowned  his  brother 
again  and  henceforth  the  latter  was  known  as  PrvovenSani, 
"the  first  crowned".  The  organization  of  the  State  was 
completed  by  the  recognition  accorded  by  the  Patriarch  of 
Constantinople  to  the  Serb  Church  as  an  autonomous  body 
in  1219.  War  with  Hungary  followed  the  acquisition  of 
Bosnia  with  results  favourable  to  the  Serbs.  The  reigns 
of  Stephen  III  (Eodoslav)  and  his  brother  Vladislav  were 
contemporaneous  with  the  growth  of  the  second  Bulgarian 
Empire  under  John  Asen  II.  The  former  of  these 
sovereigns  obtained  Syrmia,  a  province  which  throughout 
the  Middle  Ages  had  a  close  connection  with  Serbia  and 
stood  somewhat  apart  from  the  kingdom  of  Croatia- 
Slavonia,  from  Hungary  and  Vidin  from  Bulgaria,  but 
the  latter  acquisition  was  lost  by  his  brother. 

'  "  If  the  father  endowed  the  Serbian  State  with  a  body,  the  son 
gave  it  a  soul".  Father  Nicholas  Velimirovid,  Religion  and  Nationality 
in  Serbia,  p.  7. 


38  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

The  country  made  notable  progress  during  the  reign  of 
a  third  brother,  Stephen  IV  the  Great  (Stephen  Uro§  I), 
who  ascended  the  throne  of  Serbia  in  1242.  He  married 
Helena,  a  niece  of  Baldwin  of  Constantinople,  of  whom 
her  husband's  subjects  were  lavish  in  praise  for  the  manner 
in  which  she  seconded  the  king's  efforts  for  the  advance- 
ment of  his  people.  A  curious  memorial  of  her  is  to  be 
found  in  the  ruined  church  of  Gradac,  in  the  former  sanjak 
of  Novipazar,  which  in  a  strange  land  bears  the  impress 
of  the  French  Gothic  of  her  own  people.  The  reign  was 
one  of  peace  on  the  whole,  though  Serbia  had  to  undergo 
a  terrible  invasion  of  the  Mongols,  who  were  not  defeated 
till  they  had  ravaged  the  country  to  the  shores  of  the 
Adriatic.  Among  other  measures  taken  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  country  was  the  opening  up  of  the  mining 
industry,  for  which  experts  were  sought,  it  is  interesting 
to  note,  from  Germany.  His  son  Dragutin  was  married  to 
a  daughter  of  Bela  IV  of  Hungary,  and  the  close  of  the 
old  king's  reign  was  marked  by  one  of  the  domestic  trage- 
dies which  form  so  great  a  blot  on  the  medieval  history 
of  Serbia.  Assisted  by  the  Hungarians,  his  son  rebelled, 
and  Stephen  the  Great  was  forced  to  abdicate  in  1276. 
Stephen  Dragutin  did  not  long  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his 
unfilial  conduct,  for,  stung  by  remorse,  he  abdicated  in 
favour  of  his  younger  brother,  reserving  for  himself  the 
Ma6va  and  Syrmia,  which  for  many  years  he  ruled,  with 
success. 

Under  Stephen  VI  Milutin  (Uro§  II  Milutin),  Serbia 
entered  upon  a  vigorous  policy  which  aimed  at  aggrandize- 
ment at  the  expense  of  the  Eastern  Empire,  which  since 
the  decline  of  the  Bulgarian  realm,  under  the  successors 
of  John  Asen  II,  had  been  in  possession  of  Macedonia. 
Milutin's  first  campaign  was  completely  successful,  and  the 
Serb  armies  penetrated  to  Seres,  to  the  Aegean,  and  the 
lakes  of  Ochrida  and  Prespa.  Not  all  these  conquests  were 
retained,  however,  but  northern  and  a  part  of  central  Mace- 
donia remained  in  his  hands.  Equally  successful  against 
the  Bulgarians,  he  took  Vidin  in  1291,  and  on  a  renewal 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  39 

of  the  struggle  against  the  Greeks  made  himself  master  of 
Durazzo  and  northern  Albania,  gains  which  were  partly 
offset  by  the  loss  of  the  Macva  to  Hungary  on  the  death  of 
his  brother,  the  Hungarian  king  claiming  that  province 
equally  with  Syrmia  as  a  fief  of  his  crown.  A  new  foe  was 
encountered  by  the  Serbs  for  the  first  time  in  the  reign  of 
Milutin.  The  rapid  advance  of  the  Turks  in  Asia  Minor 
might  well  give  pause  to  the  Balkan  sovereigns  who  were 
wasting  their  manhood  in  perpetual  warfare  among  them- 
selves. Possibly  it  was  an  appreciation  of  this  danger  that 
caused  Milutin  during  the  latter  half  of  his  reign  to  pursue 
a  policy  of  peace  and  alliance  with  Constantinople.  This 
alliance  was  sealed  by  the  marriage  of  Milutin,  a  widower, 
with  Simonis,  daughter  of  Andronicus  II.  In  1303  the 
Serbs,  in  alliance  with  the  Greeks,  crossed  into  Asia  Minor 
and  took  part  in  the  victory  of  Angora,  in  which  the  Turks 
were  defeated.  Twelve  years  later  Serbia  again  came  to 
the  help  of  Constantinople,  in  dire  straits  owing  to  an  inva- 
sion of  Thrace  itself  by  the  Turks.  Again  the  Serbs  were 
successful,  and  the  Turks  were  swept  into  the  Sea  of  Mar- 
mora. Progress  was  marked  in  the  development  of  civili- 
zation in  the  kingdom,  and  Milutin  has  been  called  the 
"  roi  batisseur  "  of  his  dynasty.  The  monastery  of  Hilindar 
was  rebuilt  on  a  larger  scale  by  him,  and  religious  or  charit- 
able foundations,  the  results  of  his  munificence,  were  found 
in  cities  so  widely  dispersed  as  Salonica,  Skoplje,  Seres, 
Constantinople,  and  even  Jerusalem,  while  the  church  of 
Ban] ska,  near  Mitrovica,  also  owned  him  as  founder.  In 
his  reign  the  archiepiscopal  see  of  Serbia  was  removed  from 
Uzice  to  Pec,  in  Old  Serbia,  which  since  1913  has  been 
included  in  Montenegro.  His  later  domestic  relations  were 
unhappy,  for  his  wife  Simonis  intrigued  against  the  suc- 
cession of  his  eldest  son  in  favour  of  her  own  child.  The 
former  was  exiled  to  Constantinople,  and  his  stepmother  is 
said  to  have  given  orders  for  him  to  be  blinded ;  but  the 
executioner  only  pretended  to  do  his  horrid  work,  and  after 
seven  years  the  prince  returned  to  his  country  with  eye- 
sight  unimpaired,   and   in    1321    ascended   the   throne   as 


40  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Stephen  VII,  Decanski  (Uro§   III).     Milutin   was   buried 
at  Sofia. ^ 

The  new  monarch's  surname  was  derived  from  the  most 
magnificent  monument  of  medieval  Serb  art  in  existence, 
the  Monastery  of  Decani,  near  to  Pec,  and,  Hke  that  town, 
now  included  in  Montenegro.  Built  of  red  and  white 
marble  by  an  architect  from  Kotor  (Cattaro),  one  of  the 
Serb  seaports,  it  has  impressed  itself  with  a  species  of 
superstitious  veneration  upon  the  minds  of  even  the  wild 
Albanians  in  its  vicinity,  and  retains  to  this  day  the  con- 
temporary frescoes  of  early  Serb  monarchs.  During  the 
retreat  of  the  Serb  army  in  1915  the  Albanians  are  said  to 
have  made  an  attempt  to  destroy  that  which  they  have 
respected  through  the  centuries,  so  contaminating  are  the 
methods  of  war  as  practised  by  the  apostles  of  kultur.^ 
Stephen  De6anski's  short  reign  was  marked  by  almost 
continuous  warfare.  The  king  of  Hungary  attacked  the 
Wallachs,  who  were  allies  of  Stephen,  and  the  latter 
crossed  the  Danube  and  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon  his 
enemies.  In  1325  he  lost  Zahumlija  to  Kutromanic,  Ban  of 
Bosnia,  in  a  war  which  had  been  caused  by  a  revolt  of  the 
Serb  king's  half-brother.  At  the  end  of  his  reign  he  had 
to  face  a  combination  of  Bulgaria  and  the  Eastern  Empire. 
His  action  was  prompt  and  brilliantly  successful.  Inter- 
posing himself  between  the  forces  of  the  two  allies  he 
crushed  the  former  State  in  the  battle  of  Velbuzd,  not  far 
from  Kustendil,  in  which  the  Bulgarian  Tsar,  who  had 
repudiated  his  wife,  Stephen's  sister,  was  killed.  Stephen 
placed  his  sister  on  the  Bulgarian  throne  as  regent,  and 
henceforth,  almost  till  the  final  destruction  of  Bulgaria  by 
the  Turks,  that  State  remained  the  vassal  of  her  western 
neighbour.     The  Greek  forces  retreated  without  awaiting 

'  The  "  Church  of  the  Holy  King  "  in  which  he  was  buried  has  lately 
been  renamed  by  the  Bulgars,  who  glory  in  the  desecration  of  Milutin's 
remains. 

'  The  report  apparently  has  done  an  injustice  to  the  Albanians.  That 
which  the  wild  caterans  respected  was  left  to  the  Austro-Bulgars  to 
spoil.  The  treasures  of  Decani  have  been  carried  away  and  a  sordid 
dispute  haa  been  carried  on  by  the  robbers  as  to  their  respective  shares. 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB   HISTORY  41 

an  attack.  Yet  again  domestic  differences  marked  the  close 
of  a  Serb  king's  reign.  Unmindful  of  all  that  he  had 
suffered,  De6anski  took  a  Greek  princess  for  his  second  wife, 
with  the  usual  result  that  she  intrigued  against  her  stepson 
Stephen — the  role  of  royal  women  in  Balkan  politics  has 
indeed  been  miserable.  Stephen  took  up  arms  against  his 
father  and  dethroned  him.  Shortly  after,  in  1331,  the  old 
king  was  strangled,  it  is  said  against  the  new  king's  wish 
and  at  the  instigation  of  the  nobles. 

With  the  reign  of  the  new  king  Stephen  VIII,  DuSan, 
medieval  Serbia  reached  its  zenith.  For  years  the  surname 
of  this  monarch  was  derived  by  English  historians  from  a 
Serb  word,  duSiti,  to  strangle,  and  was  translated  as  "  the 
strangler  ",  or  "  throttler".  It  is  now  agreed  that  the  Serbs 
were  right  in  deriving  it  from  dusa,  "  the  soul  ",  and  that  it 
means  the  soul  or  darling,  i.e.  of  the  people.  A  Serb  has 
informed  me  that  the  former  derivation  was  absolutely 
impossible  on  grammatical  grounds.  He  resumed  the  war 
against  the  Byzantines,  and  his  earlier  campaigns  were 
completely  successful,  Andronicus  III  himself  being  forced 
to  suffer  a  siege  in  Salonica,  and  to  agree  to  terms  of  peace. 
As  a  result  of  the  treaty  of  1340  DuSan  was  left  in  posses- 
sion of  Albania,  with  the  exception  of  Durazzo,  Epirus, 
Acarnania,  Thessaly,  and  Macedonia  to  Seres,  except  for 
the  town  of  Salonica,  while  Bulgaria  was  a  vassal  State, 
so  that  he  was  master  of  the  greater  part  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula.  Soon  after  he  intervened  in  the  civil  war  waged 
between  the  Empress  Anne  and  John  Cantacuzene,  taking 
at  first  the  side  of  the  latter,  but  reversing  his  action  when 
Cantacuzene  called  in  the  aid  of  the  Turks.  Here  we  can 
perceive  the  prescience  of  Du§an,  and  perhaps  the  first 
germs  of  the  project  on  which  he  was  occupied  at  the  time 
of  his  death.  So  great  was  his  power  and  so  extensive  his 
dominions  that  the  title  of  king  no  longer  sufficed  for  him, 
and  he  assumed  the  title  of  Emperor  or  Tsar.  A  cor- 
responding increase  of  dignity  was  conferred  upon  the 
Archbishop  of  Pec,  who  was  elevated  to  the  title  of  patri- 
arch, and  so  commenced  the  long  and  glorious  history  of 


42  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  Patriarchs  of  Pe6,  who  were  in  sadder  circumstances  to 
uphold  the  standard  of  Serb  nationalism  when  all  temporal 
authorities  had  been  forced  to  bow  the  neck  to  the  Turkish 
yoke.  The  Patriarch  of  Constantinople  protested,  and  it 
was  not  till  some  thirty  years  after  that  he  consented  to 
recognize  the  new  dignity  of  the  Serb  metropolitan.  One 
of  the  jfirst  acts  of  the  new  Patriarch  was  to  crown  his 
sovereign  in  company  with  the  Archbishop  of  Ochrida,  the 
occupant  of  which  ancient  and  historic  see  was  titular 
metropolitan  of  Bulgaria  and  Justiniana  Prima.  At  Skoplje 
on  Easter  Day,  1346,  Stephen  DuSan  was  crowned  and 
proclaimed  "Emperor  of  the  Serbs  and  Romans".  The 
title  was  in  itself  a  challenge  to  Byzantium,  and  seems  a 
clear  indication  that  the  Tsar  had  by  this  time  definitely 
decided  on  his  grand  design,  though  it  was  another  nine 
years  before  he  put  it  into  execution.  Henceforth  the  Tsar 
assumed  imperial  state  and  titles,  while  he  founded  an  order 
of  chivalry,  the  Order  of  S.  Stephen. 

Nor  was  DuSan  a  conqueror  only;  he  resembled  the 
great  sovereigns  of  history  in  being  a  lawgiver  also. 
He  caused  a  code  to  be  drawn  up  based  upon  a  recension 
of  Byzantine  law  to  which  some  two  hundred  articles 
were  added,  said  to  have  been  largely  derived  from  the 
laws  of  the  Adriatic  seaport  Budva,  and  in  1349  was 
promulgated  his  famous  Zahonik,  or  law  code.  So  far  as 
I  know  this  code  has  never  been  translated  into  English, 
and  the  most  complete  analysis  of  some  of  its  main 
provisions  is  to  be  found  in  Prince  Lazarovi6-Hrebel- 
janovic's  book  The  Servian  People.  What  is  there  set 
forth  is  sufficient  to  arouse  the  interest  of  any  one  who 
has  passed  through  the  Oxford  History  School  and 
possesses  a  working  knowledge  of  medieval  English  law  and 
the  social  conditions  on  which  early  law  throws  so  illumi- 
nating a  light.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that,  when  peace  restores 
our  scholars  to  their  accustomed  studies,  one  of  them,  his 
interest  aroused  in  our  Balkan  ally,  will  give  himself  to 
the  work  of  bringing  out  an  annotated  edition  of  this 
code,  even   though  the   actual  translation   should  be   the 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  43 

work  of  another  hand.  It  shows  us  a  state  of  society 
and  a  law  procedure  which  can  fitly  be  compared  with 
their  countertypes  in  the  West,  while  to  the  interest  of 
the  resemblances  is  added  the  force  of  contrast  provided 
by  those  elements  which  were  due  either  to  native  Serb 
conditions  or  to  the  influence  of  Byzantine  elements. 
The  Tsar  was  also  a  patron  of  learning,  and  built  many 
schools  and  churches. 

The  following  year  saw  the  conclusion  of  a  fresh  peace, 
this  time  between  Du§an  and  Cantacuzene  who  had  made 
himself  master  of  the  Greek  Empire  and  with  Turkish  aid 
had  won  back  some  of  DuSan's  most  easterly  conquests. 
What  the  latter,  however,  lost  in  the  east  he  more  than 
recovered  in  the  west.  Louis  the  Great  of  Hungary,  jealous 
of  the  Tsar's  power,  invaded  the  latter's  dominions  only  to 
experience  the  fortune  that  had  attended  the  Hungarian 
adventure  against  Stephen  Decanski.  Defeated  by  DuSan 
he  was  compelled  to  give  up  Belgrade,  while  Bosnia, 
together  with  Zahumlija  (the  Hercegovina),  which  latter 
province  had  belonged  to  Bosnia  since  1325,  passed  under 
DuSan's  hand.  Kotor,  Budva,  Bar  (Antivari),  on  the 
Adriatic  were  likewise  part  of  the  Serb  realm,  that 
particular  portion  of  the  Adriatic  being  known  as  the 
Serb  Sea,  while  friendly  relations  were  entertained  with 
the  independent  Serb  republic  of  Dubrovnik  (Eagusa). 
Thus  was  formed  at  length  the  medieval  Great  Serbia, 
the  union  of  the  Serb  stock  in  one  realm.  Even  before 
this  year — ten  years  earlier  if  the  date  be  correct — DuSan 
had  claimed  the  lordship  of  Bosnia.  Sir  Arthur  Evans 
has  told  how  in  the  Franciscan  monastery  of  Fonjica  in 
Bosnia  he  saw  "  The  Book  of  Arms  of  the  Nobility  of 
Bosnia  or  Illyria,  and  Serbia,  together  set  forth  by 
Stanislaus  Rub5ic,  priest,  to  the  glory  of  Stephen 
Nemanja,  Tsar  of  the  Serbs  and  Bosnians.  In  the  year 
1340 " ;  the  book,  however,  being  a  late  medieval  copy 
of  the  original.  The  present  aspirations  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  are  here  prefigured,  for  among  the  quarterings  of 
the  various  Serb  provinces  surrounding  the   white  double 


44  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

eagle  are  to  be  found  the  three  bearded  kings  of  Dalmatia, 
the  hounds  of  Slavonia,  and  the  red  and  silver  chequer 
of   Croatia. 

In  1355  DuSan  took  up  in  earnest  his  great  design. 
The  Greek  Empire  was  growing  feebler  and  feebler.  Apart 
from  a  short  stretch  of  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  all  that  re- 
mained to  the  successors  of  the  Roman  Emperors  was  the 
metropolitan  province  of  Constantinople  and  Thrace ;  the 
Turks  were  passing  from  conquest  to  conquest,  and  already 
the  Serbs  had  met  them  in  battle  in  Europe ;  evidently 
Constantinople  was  doomed  to  pass  into  alien  hands,  and 
Du§an  determined  that  those  hands  should  be  his  own. 
He  formed  the  magnificent  project,  altogether  justified  by 
circumstances,  of  seizing  Constantinople  and  refounding 
the  Eastern  Empire  under  himself.  Had  the  scheme 
succeeded,  and  had  Dusan  lived  out  his  life  to  a  normal 
span,  the  whole  current  of  European  history  might  have 
been  changed.  As  it  was  the  strength  of  the  imperial 
city  enabled  it  to  hold  out  for  another  hundred  years, 
and  if  it  had  been  held  by  a  young  and  vigorous  race, 
reawakening  to  life  the  dry  bones  of  the  Empire,  re- 
juvenating its  population  and  institutions  with  fresh 
impulses  and  a  new  awakening,  it  might  well  have  been 
that  the  Turks  would  have  thundered  at  its  gates  in  vain, 
and  south-eastern  Europe  have  been  spared  five  hundred 
years  of  misery,  bloodshed,  and  decay.  Not  less  than 
80,000  men  were  gathered  beneath  the  Tsar's  standard, 
he  had  sympathizers  in  the  city,  and  there  was  no  adequate 
military  force  to  oppose  him.  Adrianople  and  Thrace  fell 
into  his  hands,  and  he  had  approached  within  forty  miles 
of  the  capital  when  he  was  suddenly  taken  ill  and  died 
in  December  1355,  the  circumstances  raising  the  suspicion 
that  he  had  been  poisoned  by  the  Greeks.  He  was  not 
yet  fifty  years  of  age.  His  forces  immediately  turned  back, 
and  bore  the  body  of  the  great  Tsar  to  be  buried  in  the 
monastery  which  he  had  founded  in  Prizren  the  Tsarigrad. 
In  that  tomb  was  laid  also  the  future  of  Serbia. 
In  estimating  the  civilization  of  the  medieval  Serbs  we 


A   SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  45 

are  faced  not  merely  with  scanty  documentary  evidence 
but  with  the  almost  "complete  obliteration  of  those  enduring 
monuments  which  in  happier  lands  speak  so  eloquently 
across  the  ages.  Yet  sufficient  remains  to  indicate  that 
they  were  not  the  savages  or  mere  copyists  that  they 
have  been  represented  to  be.  Their  civilization  has  two 
sources;  the  more  immediate  was  Byzantium  with  its 
great  traditions  and  continuous  life  from  Roman  times, 
on  the  other  hand,  especially  through  Dubrovnik,  that 
lamp  of  the  eastern  Adriatic,  Serbia  lay  open  to  the 
influences  of  Italy  and  the  West :  the  historic  role  of 
Serbia  imposed  upon  her  by  her  geographical  position  is 
to  be  at  once  the  keeper  of  the  gate  between  East 
and  West  and  interpreter  of  the  one  to  the  other — a  role 
which  it  is  to  be  hoped  she  will  shortly  resume.  But 
little  description  has  appeared  of  the  relics  of  Serb 
architecture,  even  from  those  who  have  seen  them.  It  is 
necessary  to  go  back  to  Denton's  Servia  and  the  Servians, 
published  so  far  back  as  1862,  for  anything  like  a  reasoned 
account  of  some  of  its  features.^  Throughout,  Serb 
architecture  seems  to  have  exhibited  a  melange  of  western 
and  eastern  forms,  which  in  some  respects  becomes  more 
marked  towards  the  close  of  the  period.  Some  of  the 
most  beautiful  churches,  though  by  no  means  large  judged 
by  western  standards,  date  from  the  last  years  of  Serb 
independence  and  are  the  work  of  "Tsar"  Lazar,  his  wife, 
and  son.  Such  is  the  extremely  beautiful  little  church  at 
Kru§evac,  and   the  fine  fortified  monastery  of   Manassija, 

'  A  short  account  is  given  in  Servia  by  the  Servians,  edited  by 
A.  Stead.  This  section  of  the  book,  however,  suffers  from  bad  trans- 
lation, the  translator  having  apparently  but  little  acquaintance  with 
architectural  terms.  The  term  "Roman"  for  example  is  applied  not 
only  to  Romanesque  art,  but,  as  the  context  shows,  to  Gothic. 
"Tambour"  is  untranslated,  though  its  literal  rendering,  a  "drum," 
is  also  correct  technically.  The  climax  is  reached  when,  by  a  slip, 
the  fourteenth-century  churches  are  stated  to  be  marked  by  the 
occurrence  of  a  "polygamous  tambour,"  a  feature  surely  more  suited 
to  Mohammedan  than  Christian  art  I  Still,  read  with  care,  the 
section  is  interesting  and  instructive. 


46    THE   FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

whose  towered  enceinte  still  remains.  It  has  been  said 
that  Serbia  was  on  the  point  of  developing  a  new  style 
"First  Pointed  Byzantine,"  that  is  to  say  a  style  which 
combines  many  of  the  features  of  "First  Pointed  Gothic  " 
with  those  of  Byzantine  architecture. 

From  the  latter  this  later  Serb  architecture  is  dis- 
tinguished by  several  features.  Byzantine  churches  though 
they  show  a  transept  in  elevation,  do  not  generally  show 
one  in  plan  (in  York  Cathedral  the  great  transept  projects 
beyond  the  line  of  the  aisles  and  therefore  shows  in  plan, 
the  smaller  eastern  transept  shows  in  elevation,  but  as  it  is 
practically  flush  with  the  aisle  walls  does  not  show  in  plan) ; 
the  Serb  churches,  however,  which  we  are  considering, 
possess  slightly  projecting  transepts  the  projection  taking 
the  form  of  polygonal  transverse  apses.  The  place  of  a 
dome  is  taken  by  a  low  octagonal  tower  not  unlike  those  to 
be  found  in  some  "  Early  English  "  churches  as  at  Uffington, 
and  these  towers  were  covered  by  a  pyramidal  cap  originally, 
though  in  some  cases  these  have  been  mistakenly 
"restored"  with  bulbous  domes  of  Eussian  type.  Eose 
windows  are  a  very  prominent  feature,  and  the  likeness  to 
Gothic  is  sometimes  enhanced  by  the  occurrence  of  "lancet" 
windows  grouped  in  pairs,  with  a  circle  in  the  head  but 
not  under  a  containing  arch.  It  is  much  to  be  hoped  that 
in  the  future  Serb  architects,  instead  of  copying  the  present 
academic  art  of  the  west,  will  set  themselves  to  follow  up 
the  trend  of  their  own  traditions :  to  possess  a  national 
style  of  architecture  which  has  not  been  "worked  out"  is 
indeed  a  boon,  the  greatness  of  which  they  do  not  seem 
hitherto  to  have  appreciated  as  they  ought.  Owing  to  their 
history,  moreover,  it  has  never  been  superseded  by  any  other 
tradition,  only  a  few  important  buildings  having  been 
erected  in  recent  times. 

Of  the  social  conditions  which  prevailed  in  medieval 
Serbia  we  can  get  information  from  Tsar  DuSan's  Zakonik.^ 

'  I  rely  in  the  following  paragraphs  on  the  analysis  given  in  Prince 
Lazarovid-Hrebeljanovic's  book  already  cited,  vol.  i,  chap.  vi.  Some  of 
bis  comments  and  comparisons  are  by  no  means  free  from  partiality, 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  47 

At  the  head  of  the  great  officers  of  State  stood  the 
Chancellor  (Logothet)  and  by  his  side  were  found  a  High 
Steward  (Veliki  Celnik)  and  Treasurer  (RizniCkni  Oelnik). 
For  administrative  purposes  the  country  was  divided  into 
districts  under  administrators  with  the  title  of  Knez. 
The  Crown  possessed  large  estates  whose  revenues,  as  was 
the  case  with  the  "ancient  demesne"  of  England,  were 
applicable  alike  to  the  personal  expenses  of  the  ruler  and  to 
the  needs  of  State,  while  other  receipts  were  derived  from 
the  hearth  tax,  from  the  mines,  from  judicial  fines,  customs 
dues,  and  the  fixed  contribution  paid  by  Dubrovnik  (Ragusa) 
in  lieu  of  individual  trade  licences.  Local  administration 
was  exercised  through  the  Zupa  and  the  village  (selo)  each 
of  which  possessed  its  local  assembly,  the  centre  of  the 
former  being  the  grad,  whose  attributes  and  origin  seem 
to  be  closely  analogous  to  the  Saxon  burh. 

The  nobles  (vlastela)  were  divided  into  two  grades,  great 
and  small,  both  of  which  had  places  in  the  Sabor,  or 
national  council,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  commoners,  though 
originally  these  latter  had  possessed  rights  of  representation. 
The  landed  property  of  the  nobles  fell  under  two  classifica- 
tions, ba§tina  and  pronja.  The  former  of  these  was  freehold, 
it  could  be  disposed  of  after  the  consent  had  been  obtained 
of  the  family,  or  zadruga,  and  confirmation  by  the  Crown. 
The  holder  was  bound  to  give  military  service  and  to  pay 
the  hearth  tax.  The  second  form  of  noble  tenure  was  the 
pronja  {irpovoia).  This  was  not  a  freehold  but  a  life  tenure, 
it  could  not  be  disposed  of  by  sale  or  gift,  and  on  the  death 
of  the  holder  it  returned  to  Crown.  Article  57  declared 
the  pronja  to  be  forfeit  in  the  event  of  oppression  of  the 
tenants.  The  pronja  represented  an  usufruct  granted  as 
stipend  to  State  officials  and  dignitaries. 

Below  the  nobles  came  the  commoner  (sebar).  The 
first  order  of  these,  called  Slobodnji  Ljudi,  or  independent 
people,  possessed  baStina,  or  freehold  property,  and  was  liable 

but  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  the  correctness  of  the  translations  given  by 
him  or  statements  made  as  of  fact.  The  allusions  to  medieval  Engheh 
conditions  are  my  own. 


48    THE   FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

to  military  service.  His  position  in  other  respects  seems 
to  have  been  in  general  not  dissimilar  in  its  social 
relationships  to  that  of  the  English  freeholder  or  tenant 
in  socage,  account  being  had  of  the  fact  that  in  Serbia 
the  feudal  system  had  but  little  hold  in  its  organized 
western  form.  The  second  order  of  sebri  was  composed 
of  the  merops  or  kmets.  This  latter  class  composed 
the  great  mass  of  the  population.  Their  property  might 
consist  either  of  bastina,  which  however  was  encumbered 
with  servitudes  towards  a  noble's  demesne,  or  of  land 
rented  from  such  a  demesne.  The  baStina  could  be 
aliened  (Article  174)  provided  that  there  should  be  a 
work-hand  to  perform  labour  (robot)  due  to  the  lord's 
demesne.  The  duties  are  defined  in  Article  68  which 
forbad  any  exaction  beyond  the  robot  prescribed  by  law, 
and  in  the  event  of  such  exaction  the  kmet  could  cite  the 
lord  before  the  royal  court,  an  improvement  on  the  rights 
of  the  villein  in  the  English  court  customary.  Each 
merop  house  had  to  give  the  labour  of  one  man  for  two 
days  in  the  week,  each  tenant  was  further  bound  to  give 
one  day's  work  (all  the  tenants  working  together)  at 
haymaking,  and  another  in  the  vineyard  ;  the  hearth  tax 
and  military  service  were  also  due,  as  well  as  labour  on 
public  works,  fortresses,  and  the  like,  the  latter  taking 
the  place  of  the  contributions  in  the  form  of  taxes  levied 
for  a  similar  purpose  on  the  nobles.  Lodging  and 
hospitality  had  also  to  be  given  to  certain  State  officials 
on  circuit.  The  position  of  the  merop  was  so  far  superior 
to  that  of  the  English  villein  in  that  he  was  capable  of 
possessing  freehold  property  (ba§tina)  which  the  villein 
could  not ;  on  the  other  hand  he  owed  labour  service  for 
his  freehold,  so  that  he  was  in  respect  of  the  latter  some- 
what in  the  position  of  the  class  in  England  which  held 
their  land  in  what  has  sometimes  been  called  villein  socage, 
the  smallest  class  of  manorial  freeholders.  In  other 
respects,  and  if  none  of  his  land  were  freehold,  he  occupied 
very  much  the  same  place  in  rural  and  social  economy 
as   the   villein.     Article  22   enacted :    "  Merops   who  have 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  49 

abandoned  their  land  to  go  and  settle  on  Church  lands 
shall  return  to  their  original  domain",  and  Article  201 : 
"If  a  merop  abandons  his  tenure,  the  overlord  of  his 
[sic  ?the]  domain,  upon  finding  him,  can  have  him 
punished,  and  exact  a  bond  for  good  behaviour,  but  he 
cannot  seize  any  of  that  merop's  property".  The  appli- 
cation would  seem  to  be  to  a  merop  not  owning  baStina 
of  his  own,  but  holding  of  the  lord. 

The  lowest  class  of  all  was  formed  by  the  otroks.  These 
were  strictly  ascripti  glehae  but  could  not  be  transferred 
apart  from  the  estate.  Civil  cases  between  otroks  were 
decided  before  their  lord,  for  criminal  offences  they  were 
answerable  to  the  royal  courts.  They  may  be  compared 
to  the  lowest  class  of  EngHsh  villeins,  the  bordars  and 
cottars  of  early  documents.  Legal  slavery  there  was 
none.  Article  21  enacted:  "Whoever  sells  a  Christian 
shall  lose  his  hand  and  have  his  nose  slit ". 

The  administration  of  justice  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
royal  courts,  the  country  being  divided  into  circuits 
(Article  179),  while  local  justice  was  administered  in  the 
"  grads "  (head  seat  of  a  2;upa)  by  the  court  of  the  grad 
presided  over  by  the  Tjephalia  (Greek  kephalia),  the  captain 
or  governor  of  the  grad,  in  the  villages  by  village  courts 
composed  of  judges  locally  elected  styled  "  good  men " 
(dobri  Ijudi)  presided  over  by  the  village  elder  :  the  suitors 
were  the  judges.  In  addition  there  were  the  ecclesiastical 
and  commercial  courts.  Article  171  expressly  enacted 
the  subjection  of  the  Sovereign  to  the  laws  ;  "  In  case 
My  Imperial  Majesty  should  give  to  any  person  a  '  writing  ' 
.  .  .  which  is  contrary  to  the  law  .  .  .  the  judge  shall 
pay  no  heed  to  that  writing,  and  shall  judge  regularly 
and  according  to  law  and  shall  see  to  it  that  his  judgment 
is  executed".  Articles  184  and  185  forbad  imprisonment 
without  a  writ  of  judgment  or  order  of  a  judge — an  anti- 
cipation by  three  hundred  years  of  our  Habeas  Corpus. 
The  pristavs,  or  sheriffs,  were  forbidden  to  act  save  in 
accordance  with  legal  provisions.  Article  152  ordained 
that  both  in  civil  and  criminal  cases  a  man  could    be 

4 


50  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

judged  only  by  his  peers  "  as  in  the  time  of  my  grand- 
father, the  holy  King  Milutin  ". 

The  two  blots  on  the  code  were  the  inequality  of 
punishment  for  the  same  offence  and  the  draconian 
severity  of  some  of  these  punishments.  Personal  injury 
inflicted  by  a  great  vlastelin  upon  a  lesser  vlastelin  was 
punished  with  a  fine  of  one  hundred  perpers  (one  perper 
was  equal  to  half  a  Venetian  ducat  or  Serb  zlatnik  whose 
value  was  about  nine  shillings),  in  the  contrary  case  the 
punishment  was  a  fine  of  one  hundred  perpers  and  corporal 
punishment,  but  this  differentiation  did  not  extend  to 
crimes  against  public  order  or  the  State.  Article  145 
ordered  that  villages  where  was  found  a  robber  or  a  thief 
should  be  dispersed,  the  robber  hanged,  the  thief  blinded. 
Parricides  were  burnt  at  the  stake.  Some  examples 
exhibit  both  defects.  Manslaughter  committed  by  a  noble 
against  a  sebar  was  punished  by  a  fine  of  one  thousand 
perpers,  in  the  contrary  event  by  a  fine  of  three  hundred 
perpers  and  loss  of  a  hand.  If  a  nobleman  violated  a 
gentlewoman  both  his  hands  were  to  be  chopped  off  and 
his  nose  slit,  for  a  like  offence  the  sebar  was  hanged, 
but  if,  in  the  latter  case,  the  sebar's  offence  was  against 
one  of  his  own  order  the  punishment  was  loss  of  both 
hands  and  the  nose  to  be  slit,  as  in  the  case  of  a  noble 
offending  against  his  own  order.  Such  draconian  severity 
does  not,  however,  ever  seem  to  have  been  exercised  in 
cases  where  the  offence  was  obviously  disproportionate; 
the  cruelty,  if  such  it  be  called,  was  reserved  for  crimes 
which  rightly  excited  detestation  and  was  not  exercised 
in  wantonness. 

Merchants  were  protected  and  a  brisk  commerce  was 
done  with  Dubrovnik  (Eagusa).  The  produce  of  the 
mines  enabled  the  sovereigns  to  hire  mercenaries,  heavy 
cavalry,  from  France,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and  Germany. 
On  the  whole  the  picture  presented  is  by  no  means 
unattractive.  The  Zakonik  itself,  in  view  of  its  date, 
deserves  a  very  high  place  in  legal  records,  and  indicates 
a  high  degree  of  social  and  legal  organization — Tsar  Du§an 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB   HISTORY  51 

was  no  semi-barbarous  monarch  ruling  his  dominions  with 
oriental  caprice  and  despotism.  The  general  position  of 
the  mass  of  the  people  was  certainly  superior  to  that 
occupied  by  the  similar  classes  in  central  and  western 
Europe  with  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  our  own.  There 
was  no  feudal  oppression,  nor  feudal  justice,  or  rather  in- 
justice, such  as  ground  down  the  countryside  where  feudal- 
ism reigned  supreme  in  its  full  development,  as  it  never 
did  in  England,  and  the  French  peasant  of  the  eighteenth 
century  would  probably  have  very  willingly  changed  places 
with  his  Serb  brother  of  the  fourteenth.  Speaking 
generally  DuSan's  code  was  superior  to  the  contemporary 
systems  prevailing  in  western  Europe  even  in  the  more 
advanced  States,  and  surprising  though  this  may  seem  at 
first  sight  it  is  not  so  much  to  be  wondered  at  when  we 
remember  that  he  had  at  his  immediate  disposal  the  code 
of  Justinian  and  those  legal  principles  which  have  so 
profoundly  influenced  modern  western  legal  systems.  Doubt- 
less administration  of  this  code  would  vary  at  different  times. 
In  a  state  of  almost  constant  warfare  the  organs  of  govern- 
ment would  frequently  be  functioning  very  badly,  as  they 
did  in  our  country  under  the  weak  Lancastrian  adminis- 
tration which  led  to  the  demand  for  "more  abundant 
governance,"  yet  it  remains  that  the  great  Tsar  endued 
his  country  with  a  good  legal  system  in  advance  of  those 
generally  prevailing. 


II 

The  Fall  of  Serbia 

The  Serb  Empire  as  distinct  from  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia 
had  been  the  work  of  DuSan  and  fell  with  his  death.  He 
had  had  no  time  in  which  to  assimilate  its  new  acquisitions 
or  to  set  up  therein  a  tradition  of  organized  government 
under  Serb  auspices.  Even  in  the  Serb  provinces  the  old 
fissiparous  tendencies  manifested  themselves  anew.  The 
problem  of  all  medieval  States  of  any  size  was  the  difficulty 


52  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

of  maintaining  the  central  authority  in  their  outlying 
provinces,  the  governors  of  which  continually  strove  to 
establish  for  themselves  an  independent  position ;  the 
Roman  Empire  alone  with  its  close  central  authority  and 
organized  hierarchical  services  had  achieved  a  solution 
the  merits  of  which  alone  enabled  its  eastern  member  to 
endure  till  the  fifteenth  century.  Added  to  this  in  Serbia 
the  nature  of  the  country  itself,  divided  into  separate  river 
basins  with  difficult  intercommunication,  as  it  had  facilitated 
in  the  early  migrations  the  setting  up  of  small  clan  States, 
so  now  made  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Empire  into  its  com- 
ponent elements.  Immediately  the  strong  hand  of  Dugan 
was  removed  from  the  governors  these  began  to  agitate 
their  independence.  His  successor  was  the  young  Tsar 
Uro§  (Urog  V),  a  youth  of  nineteen  and  devoid  of  the 
vigour  and  decision  of  character  which  had  marked  out 
his  father  even  at  that  age.  Thessaly  became  independent, 
the  Albanians  regained  their  usual  condition  of  inde- 
pendence or  anarchy,  Bulgaria  ceased  to  be  the  vassal  of 
the  Tsar,  Belgrade  was  lost  to  the  Hungarians,  and 
Bosnia  under  Stephen  Tvrtko  fell  away  from  the  Empire, 
which  became  now  not  even  a  pan- Serb  Kingdom. 

Within  the  Kingdom  itself  the  same  process  proceeded 
apace,  and  is  intimately  connected  with  the  name  of  Vukasin 
Mrnjavcevic.  It  is  a  proof  that  the  Serbs  themselves  were 
keenly  conscious  of  the  cause  of  their  ruin  that  their 
popular  legends  hold  up  to  detestation  the  names  of 
the  great  rebels,  and  indeed  impute  to  them  crimes  of 
which  they  were  innocent,  guilty  as  was  their  general 
conduct.  Vukasin,  who  was  governor  of  Macedonia,  pro- 
claimed his  independence  of  the  Tsar  and  even  assumed 
the  title  of  King  of  Serbia  in  1366.  According  to  legend 
he  attacked  UroS  and  contrived  his  death  some  time  in 
1367 ;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  Tsar  survived 
his  rebellious  vassal.^  In  the  meantime  the  Turks  had 
occupied  Adrianople,   in  1360,   and  made  it  the  capital  of 

'  Lavisse  and  Rambaud,  Histoire  Generate,  Tome  iii,  chap  xviii,  p.  915. 
This  chapter  is  by  the  late  Stojan  Novakovic  and  A.  Maiet. 


A   SKETCH   OF   SERB    HISTORY  53 

their  Empire,  and  began,  under  Murad  I,  to  press  upon 
the  small  Serb  States  which  had  been  formed  beyond 
the  Struma.  In  1371  King  VukaSin,  at  the  head  of  a 
combined  army  of  Slavs,  Greeks,  Hungarians,  and 
Wallachs  marched  against  Adrianople,  and  suffered  on 
the  banks  of  the  Marica  a  disastrous  defeat  at  a  spot 
thereafter  known  as  Srb  Sindin — "  The  Serb  Rout ", 
Vuka§in  himself  is  said  to  have  been  drowned  in  the 
river,  or,  as  other  accounts  have  it,  was  murdered  after 
the  battle  for  the  sake  of  the  gold  ornaments  he  wore. 
In  what  remained  to  Tsar  Uro§  the  Baltic  of  the  Zeta 
(Montenegro),  and  the  Altomanovic  of  the  land  soon  to 
be  the  Hercegovina  had  broken  away  before  the  death  of 
the  Tsar  two  months  after  the  battle  of  Adrianople  in 
December   1371. 

Uro§  had   left   no  direct   heirs  and   his  dominions  were 
disputed    among     the     Serb     princes.       Of     these    Lazar 
Hrebeljanovic,    a   connection  of    the   Royal   House   whose 
name  has  become  the  very  symbol  of  the  tragedy  of  Serbia, 
was  recognized  as   the   ruler   of    Serbia  north  of    the  Sar 
mountains,  with  the  exception  of  the  territories  mentioned 
above.     Although  he  is  always  called  in  the  legends  Tsar 
Lazar,  and  is  commonly  considered  the  last  of  the  Tsars,  he 
never  assumed  the  title,  which  indeed  would  hardly  have 
consorted    with    his    actual    power,   but    entitled    himself 
merely  Knez  or  Prince.     Another  relative  of  the  Nemanjas 
Tvrtko  of  Bosnia  entertained  designs  on  the  higher  dignity, 
and    in    1376    proclaimed    himself    King    of    Serbia    and 
Bosnia,  but  no  warfare  ensued   between   the  two  princes. 
Macedonia  had   fallen  under  the  suzerainty  of  the   Turks 
which  was  acknowledged  by  its  ruler,  the  son  of  Vuka§in, 
the  far-famed  Marko  Kraljevic  (Marko  the  King's  son)  the 
great    hero   of    a   cycle   of    ballads    which   deal    with   his 
marvellous  exploits   and   those  of  his   magic  horse  Sarac. 
His  seat  was  at  Prilip,  where  he  was  to  sleep  till  the  hour  of 
national  resurrection  was  to  strike,  and  when,  in  the  first 
Balkan  War  of  1912,  the  Serbs  avenged  Kosovo,  many  of  the 
soldiers  ascribed  their  success  to  the  presence,  which  they 


54  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

affirmed,  of  Marko  on  Sarac  who  led  them  to  the  assault. 
In  sober  history  he  was  a  vassal  of  the  Turk,  and  it  is  a 
mystery  of  popular  legend  how  and  why  his  figure  assumed 
in  the  imagination  of  the  whole  of  the  Southern  Slav  race 
the  place  which  it  occupies.  Lazar's  strength  was  diminished 
by  the  necessity  of  beating  back  the  attacks  of  the  Hungarians, 
and  in  1386  the  Turks  captured  NiS  and  forced  the  prince  to 
pay  tribute  and  provide  mercenaries  for  the  Turkish  armies. 
Three  years  later  occurred  the  great  disaster  which  has 
burnt  itself  into  the  memory  and  historical  consciousness  of 
the  Serb  race  ever  since.  Lazar  had  fixed  the  capital  of 
Serbia,  which  at  various  times  had  been  located  at  RaSka 
(Novipazar),  PriStina,  Prizren,  and  Skoplje,  at  KruSevac  not 
far  from  the  junction  of  the  two  main  streams  of  the  Morava, 
where  he  built  the  beautiful  church  which  still  exists,  and  the 
"White  Tower",  now  in  ruins,  from  which  he  set  out  on 
his  last  fateful  campaign.  An  alliance  was  formed  between 
Serbia,  the  Zeta,  and  Bosnia  for  a  great  attempt  to  drive 
back  the  tide  of  Turkish  invasion.  The  two  armies  met  on 
June  15,  1389,  on  the  field  of  Kosovo  (the  "Field  of 
Blackbirds"),  and  then  was  settled  for  five  hundred  years 
the  fate  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  The  battle  was  long  and 
stubbornly  contested  and  the  result  was  only  decided, 
according  to  the  legend,  by  the  treachery  of  Vuk 
Brankovic,^  a  Serb  noble  who  was  in  command  of  one  wing 
of  the  Christian  host  and,  while  the  issue  was  still  in 
suspense,  rode  off  the  field  at  the  head  of  12,000  men  in 
accordance  with  a  previous  agreement  with  Murad,  who 
had   promised   him   the   throne   of    Serbia. ^      The    Serbs, 

'  The  legends  have  dealt  hardly  with  hig  name.  There  seems  to  be  no 
proof  in  fact  of  his  alleged  treachery,  and  his  family  became  the  leaders 
of  the  Serbs  in  their  subsequent  resistance. 

'  "  The  story  is  often  repeated  in  Bosnia  that  at  the  time  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  occupation  in  1878  an  old  Serb  Moslem  Bey  named 
Brankovid  was  taunted  by  a  Hungarian  officer  of  Hussars  who  said,  '  It 
was  one  of  your  name  who  ran  away  at  Kosovo,  and  gave  the  country  to 
the  Turks'.  'Yes,  yes,  we  know  that,  alas  1  '  said  the  Bey,  'but 
remember,  Major,  the  men  under  him  were  a  contingent  of  Hungarian 
mercenaries  '  ".  Prince  Lazarovic-Hrebeljanovic,  The  Servian  People, 
vol.  i,  p.  290  note. 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  55 

overwhelmed  by  weight  of  numbers,  gave  way :  the  Turkish 
victory  was  complete.  Both  sovereigns  lost  their  lives,  for 
Murad,  riding  over  the  scene  of  the  battle  whon  all  was 
over,  was  killed  by  a  Serb  knight,  Milo§  Obilic  or  Kobili6. 
The  catastrophe  impressed  itself  deeply  on  the  minds  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  and  has  become  the  centre  of  the  "  Kosovo 
cycle  '•'  of  Serb  popular  poetry  and  legend. 

In  these  poems,  where  fact  is  mingled  with  fiction,  all  the 
incidents  preceding  and  attending  the  *  battle  are  dealt 
with ;  the  departure  of  Lazar  the  "  Golden  Crown  of 
Serbia "  from  the  White  Tower  of  KruSevac ;  his  attend- 
ance by  his  father-in-law  Jug  Bogdan  and  his  brothers-in- 
law  the  nine  Jugovic  ;  the  choice  offered  him  by  the  Virgin 
of  a  heavenly  or  an  earthly  crown  and  his  acceptance  of  the 
former ;  the  taunt  levelled  by  Brankovic  against  the  courage 
of  Milog ;  the  proof  offered  to  the  latter  who  stole  to  the 
Turkish  camp  before  the  battle  and  slew  the  Sultan — this 
is  the  popular  version — the  fall  of  Lazar  in  the  thick  of  the 
press  (for  the  ballads  will  not  admit  that  he  was  taken 
prisoner  and  executed)  ;  the  news  of  the  death  of  her  hus- 
band and  brothers  brought  to  the  Tsarica  Milica  at  KruSevac 
by  two  ravens  ;  and  the  curse  of  the  Serbs  on  the  head  of 
Vuk  Brankovic  who  on  the  field  of  battle  had  betrayed  the 
all-glorious  Tsar.  Ever  since,  June  15th  has  been  a  day  of 
mourning,  while  the  red  and  black  cap  of  the  Montenegrins 
is  said  to  typify  the  blood  that  was  shed  at  Kosovo  and 
mourning  for  the  event.  These  legends  served  to  keep 
alive  the  national  consciousness  of  the  defeated,  and  at 
Kumanovo  it  was  to  shouts  of  "  Kosovo,  Kosovo  !  "  that  the 
Serb  infantry  charged  the  Turkish  line  when  the  long- 
delayed  day  of  vengeance  was  come  and  they  were  to 
enter  again  the  great  Dusan's  capital. 

"With  the  battle  of  Kosovo  ended  the  existence  of  Serbia 
as  a  sovereign  State,  but  for  some  years  it  maintained  its 
internal  autonomy  under  Turkish  suzerainty.  Bajazet,  the 
successor  of  Murad,  was  in  no  condition  to  push  matters  to 
extremes,  and  Stephen  Lazarevic  was  permitted  by  ;the 
conqueror  to  retain  his  father's  dominions  as  "  Despot  "  on 


56    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

payment  of  an  annual  tribute  and  the  furnishing  of  a  Serb 
contingent  to  the  Ottoman  forces  ;  his  sister,  also,  married 
the  Sultan — a  fact  which  gave  the  latter's  successors  a  claim 
to  the  throne.  The  new  ruler  set  himself  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  his  State,  procured  Belgrade  from  the  Hungarians  and 
made  it  his  capital,  a  change  significant  of  the  altered  posi- 
tion of  the  country.  Like  his  father,  and  indeed  all  the 
Nemanjici,  he  was  a  benefactor  of  the  Church,  and  founded 
the  great  monastery  of  Manassija.  After  proving  himself 
a  loyal  tributary  to  the  Sultans — and  it  must  be  said  in 
extenuation  that  he  may  well  have  considered  that  resist- 
ance would  bring  him  worse  evils  in  its  train,  while  the 
Hungarians  who  had  attacked  Uro§  V  and  Lazar  on  several 
occasions  and  had  done  nothing  previously  to  give  assistance 
against  the  Turks  could  not  complain  if  now  they  had  to 
fight  without  Serb  aid — the  Despot  died  in  1427. 

The  remainder  of  this  period  of  Serb  history  need  not 
detain  us  long  in  so  cursory  a  survey.  As  he  had  no  heirs 
Stephen  Lazarevic  nominated  as  his  successor  George 
Brankovic,  son  of  that  Vuk  who  had  betrayed,  according  to 
legend,  his  country  at  Kosovo.  His  title  was  disputed  by 
Murad  II  the  great-grandson  of  Tsar  Lazar,  but  he 
succeeded  in  maintaining  it  against  Turkish  intervention. 
The  reign  of  the  new  ruler  was  one  long-continued  struggle 
with  the  Turks,  waged  now  with,  now  without,  the  aid  of 
the  Hungarians  under  the  famous  John  Hunyad,  for  it  was 
inevitable  that  Serbia,  less  fortunate  in  some  ways  in  its 
geographical  position  than  the  Roumanian  principalities, 
should  be  bowed  down  completely  under  the  Turkish  yoke. 
The  Turks  were  now  pressing  on  into  Hungary,  and  Serbia, 
which  holds  the  gate  of  the  East  and  therefore  of  the  West, 
lay  directly  in  their  path,  and  suffered  the  fate  of  every 
State  which  holds  an  important  strategical  position  with 
inadequate  forces,  just  as  at  the  present  time  she  has  been 
subjected  to  the  reverse  pressure  of  the  German  Drang  nach 
Osten — only  when  there  is  a  strong  Southern  Slav  Kingdom 
will  there  be  a  tolerable  guarantee  of  peace  in  the  Balkans, 
and  all  efforts  by  whatever  motive  induced,  to  weaken  the 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB   HISTORY  57 

Serbo-Croats  will  be  direct  causes  of  further  struggles. 
After  a  long  life  replete  with  even  more  than  the  usual 
vicissitudes  of  Balkan  sovereigns,  George  Brankovi6  died  in 
1457  at  a  great  age.  To  him  is  due  the  great  castle  of 
Smederevo  (Semendria)  with  its  defiant  cross  worked  into 
the  structure  of  its  walls  now  in  ruins,  and  still  further 
damaged,  according  to  report,  by  the  Austro-German  bom- 
bardment. His  death  was  followed  by  fresh  dissensions, 
and  in  1459  the  Turks,  their  hands  freed  by  the  capture  of 
Constantinople,  put  a  definite  end  to  all  semblance  of 
independence,  and  what  remained  of  Serbia  became  the 
Turkish  pashalik  of  Belgrade. 

The  fate  of  the  sister  Serb  State  was  not  long  delayed. 
Stephen  Tvrtko  I  of  Bosnia,  as  has  been  seen,  had  pro- 
claimed himself  king  in  1376,  and  a  year  later  had  occupied 
the  land  of  Hum,  Zahumlija  or  Primorija  later  the  Herce- 
govina,  a  province  whose  medieval  history,  though  popu- 
larly it  is  now  generally  looked  upon  as  a  part  of  Bosnia, 
had  been  generally  linked  with  that  of  Serbia,  and  whose 
inhabitants  differ  in  some  traits  of  character  from  the 
Bosnians.  Bosnia,  however,  was  distracted  by  religious  strife 
between  the  Catholic  sovereigns  on  the  one  side  and  the 
majority  of  the  population  on  the  other.  The  latter  were 
largely  Orthodox,  and  perhaps  still  more  largely  Bogomil. 
The  Bogomils,  of  the  origin  of  whose  name  more  than  one 
account  is  given — the  meaning  is  perhaps  "  dear  to  God  " — 
had  embraced  a  form  of  Manichseism,  and  were  in  fact  the 
forerunners  of  the  Albigenses,  though  to  term  them  the 
forefathers  of  the  Reformation  is  to  strain  analogy  and  to 
ignore  decisive  differences.  Their  religion  seems  to  have 
been  free  from  those  darker  elements  of  devil-worship 
which  accompanied  pure  Manichseism,  and  which,  it  has 
been  suggested,^  formed  the  real  gravamen  against  the 
Knights  Templars  and  led  to  their  suppression  throughout 
Europe,  while  the  Hospitallers  were  left  unmolested. 
Their  religion  was  of  a  simple  Puritan  cast,  but  it  brought 

'  By  Mr.  Hilaire  Belloc  in  a  magazine  article  written  some  seven 
years  ago,  whose  title  I  forget. 


58    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

down  upon  them  the  thunders  of  Rome  whose  obedient 
servants  the  Bosnian  kings  were.  Add  to  these  internal 
discords,  oppressions,  and  risings,  the  struggle  with  the 
Hungarians  on  the  one  side  and  the  Turks  on  the  other, 
and  it  is  easy  to  see  how  depressing  is  the  tale  of  the 
last  years  of  Bosnian  freedom  without  even  the  relief — and 
the  inspiration — of  a  heroic  tragedy  such  as  Kosovo.  The 
integrity  of  the  new  kingdom  was  not  long  maintained,  for 
the  separate  traditions  of  Priraorija  found  expression  in 
1448  when  Stephen  Vuk5ic  became  Duke  of  Primorija.^ 
For  his  title  he  adopted  the  German  "Herzog"  Serbized 
into  Hercega,  hence  his  realm  became  known  as  the 
Hercegovina  "  the  Duchy  ",  the  name  which  it  has  always 
since  borne.  In  1463  Bosnia  fell  before  the  Turks,  who 
were  actually  welcomed  by  the  Bogomils  as  liberators  from 
Catholic  oppression.  A  few  years  later,  about  1482,  the 
Hercegovina  fell  likewise.  In  these  provinces  the  nobility 
largely  apostatized  to  Islam  in  order  to  retain  their  posses- 
sions led  also,  as  were  many  of  the  peasantry,  by  their 
Bogomilism  to  see  in  Mohammedanism  a  religion  with 
elements  akin  to  their  own,  so  that  ultimately  we  may  see 
in  the  religious  oppression  of  the  Roman  Curia  one  of  the 
causes  of  that  strange  anomaly  a  large  European  Moslem 
element  in  the  north-western  Balkans.  Such  names  as  those 
of  the  Kulenovic  and  Kapitanovic  among  the  present  Bosnian 
Begs  who  are,  many  of  them,  the  descendants  of  the  old 
nobility  take  us  back  to  the  earliest  days  of  Bosnian  history. 
One  State  alone  maintained  through  the  centuries  in  its 
rugged  mountains  the  standard  of  Serb  independence,  the 
ever-unconquered  Crnagora,  or  Montenegro,  whose  inhabi- 
tants, recruited  by  those  Serb  nobles  who  had  not  been 
killed  by  the  Turks,  for  they  disdained  apostasy,  have  never 
come  under  Turkish  rule. 

'  This  is  suggested  as  the  proper  title  by  Sir  Arthur  Evans.  The 
Dukes  were  popularly  known  as  the  Dukes  of  S.  Sava,  a  piecing 
together  of  their  first  title  with  another  "  Keeper  of  the  Sepulchre  of 
S.  Sava."  Vide  Evans,  Through  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina,  p.  xlvii 
note. 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  59 

With  the  final  conquest  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  by  the 
Turks  Serb  history  divides  itself  into  two  main  streams, 
that  of  the  Serbs  who  remained  in  their  old  homes,  and 
that  of  those  of  the  nation  who  migrated  into  southern 
Hungary.  The  record  of  the  former  is  one  of  almost 
unceasing  struggle  against  the  conquerors  linked  from  time 
to  time  with  the  story  of  the  efforts  made  by  the  House  of 
Habsburg  to  drive  back  the  tide  of  Ottoman  invasion. 
The  Turkish  Serbs  were  not  altogether  without  an  element 
of  national  unity,  for  the  Turks,  not  so  much  from  policy  as 
from  their  theocratic  conception  of  the  State,  allowed  the 
Orthodox  Church  a  great  deal  of  autonomy  not  only  in 
religious  but  in  secular  affairs  also,  the  ecclesiastical 
functionaries  acting  as  the  go-between  through  whom 
the  Sultan  acted.  The  settlement  of  the  Spahis  as  a 
territorial  aristocracy  was  attended  by  great  exactions  of  a 
financial  order,  while  the  inequality  of  Christian  and  Moslem 
before  the  law  denied  a  remedy  in  these  as  in  other  matters. 
Yet  the  most  grievous  exaction  of  all  was  the  "  devchurme  ", 
or  blood  tax.  Every  seven  years  the  children  of  the 
conquered  were  examined,  and  the  strongest  and  brightest 
were  carried  off  to  Constantinople  to  be  trained  in  the 
Moslem  faith  and  ultimately  to  be  enrolled  in  the  corps  of 
Janissaries  who  spread  the  terror  of  the  Turkish  name 
wherever  they  went.  Thus  the  nation  was  deprived  of  the 
promise  of  its  soundest  elements,  while  the  Ottoman  State, 
like  some  monstrous  vampire,  throve  on  the  blood  which  it 
sucked  from  its  victims  and  turned  the  vital  forces  of  the 
conquered  to  their  own  destruction. 

To  one,  however,  of  those  who  had  been  thus  seized  the 
Serbs  owed  a  great  debt.  One  of  the  greatest  of  all  the 
Grand  Viziers  was  Mehemet  Sokolovic,  the  minister  of 
Suleyman  the  Magnificent,  who  in  childhood  had  been 
seized  under  the  devchurme.  The  fall  of  the  Serb  kingdom 
had  entailed  the  fall  of  the  Serb  patriarchate  of  Pe6  and 
the  Church  was  included  in  the  Archiepiscopal  See  of 
Ochrida  which  had  been  in  Greek  hands  since  the  fall 
of  the    second    Bulgarian    Empire.     For    some    years    all 


60     THE   FUTURE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  efforts  of  the  Serbs  for  their  reHgious  autonomy  were 
unavaihng,  but  in  1557  Mehemet  Sokolovic,  after  an 
interview  with  his  brother  the  monk  Macarius  restored 
the  patriarchate  of  Pec  with  an  extensive  jurisdiction  over 
the  Serb  lands,  a  few  central  Macedonian  sees  alone  being 
reserved  to  the  See  of  Ochrida  as  suffragans,  as  that  chair 
could  not  be  destroyed  and  from  its  historical  associations 
had  been  respected  by  DuSan  himself.  Macarius  was  made 
patriarch  and  became  the  recognized  head  of  the  Turkish 
Serbs,  affording  them  a  certain  measure  of  protection  and 
supplying  a  focus  of  national  unity.  This  restored  patri- 
archate which  formed  part  of  the  great  scheme  of  re- 
organization carried  out  by  Sokolovic,  who  divided  the 
Empire  into  beglerbegliks  and  sanjaks,  endured  till  1767 
when,  together  with  the  See  of  Ochrida,  it  was  sacrificed 
to  the  jealousy  of  the  Greeks  and  the  fears  of  the  Turks. 
Sokolovic  was  by  no  means  the  only  high  official — apart 
from  those  recruited  from  the  Phanar — of  non-Turkish 
birth.  Six  other  Grand  Viziers  were  the  product  of  the 
blood  tax,  and  so  numerous  were  the  Serbs  in  the  Imperial 
service  that  it  is  stated  ^  that  till  the  eighteenth  century 
a  large  proportion  of  the  administrative  documents  in 
Constantinople  were  drawn  up  in  Serb.  "  It  has  been 
rightly  said  that  if  during  the  period  of  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries  the  Servian  people  had  been  willing 
to  abjure  their  Christian  faith,  the  Ottoman  State  would 
be  to-day  a  Servian  Empire  of  Mohammedan  faith ". 
That  may  be  an  exaggeration:  the  Serbs,  however,  re- 
mained in  the  great  mass  true  to  their  religion  in  spits 
of  all  temptation,  while  the  national  spirit  was  kept  alive 
by  the  recital  of  the  heroic  ballads  of  their  past  glories, 
the  memory  of  which  treasured  in  popular  song  land  story 
contributed  largely  to  the  keen  historical  consciousness 
of  the  race,  and  imbued  it  with  the  vital  and  enduring 
conviction  that  a  people  with  such  a  past  could  look 
forward  with  ultimate  confidence  to  a  future. 

Not  all  State  forms  perished,  for  while  the  bulk  of  the 
'  Lazarovic-Hrebeljanovid.     Op.  cit.  vol  i,  p.  322. 


A   SKETCH   OF   SERB   HISTORY  61 

nation  remained  in  its  old  homes  thousands  fled  before  the 
Turks,  and  establishing  themselves  in  southern  Hungary 
linked  their  fortunes  with  those  of  the  House  of  Habsburcr 
which  not  long  after  acquired  the  crown  of  S.  Stephen. 
Here,  for  two  centuries,  they  enjoyed  a  certain  measure 
of  self-government  under  their  Despots  of  the  family  of 
Brankovic,  the  object  of  the  Emperors  being  to  utilize 
them  as  a  defence  against  the  Turks.  All  that  is  here 
necessary  is  to  indicate  briefly  the  relations  between  the 
Habsburgs  and  their  Serb  subjects.  The  latter  took  part  in 
all  the  wars  waged  between  the  Imperalists  and  the  Turks 
in  the  sixteenth  century,  and  when,  in  1529,  Suleyman 
besieged  Vienna  it  was  the  action  of  the  Serbs  under 
their  leader  Paul  Bakic  which  made  it  possible  for  the 
Austrians  to  raise  the  siege.  The  Hungarian  Istvanfi  says  : 
"It  was  the  Serb  Bakich  who  saved  Vienna".^  After 
more  than  a  century  of  desultory  warfare  Serb  forces  shared 
in  the  campaign  of  the  Duke  of  Lorraine,  1685  to  1687,  and 
also  in  that  of  1689,  their  Despot  at  the  time  being  George 
Brankovic  III.  A  great  deal  of  the  Austrian  success  in  this 
last  campaign  was  due  to  the  whole-hearted  support  of  the 
Serbs  both  of  Hungary  and  Serbia,  and  General  Piccolomini 
acting  under  the  Margrave  of  Baden,  the  commander-in- 
chief,  was  able  to  carry  his  arms  into  the  heart  of  Old 
Serbia.  KruSevac  and  other  towns  of  historic  memory  fell 
into  his  hands,  and  the  national  hopes  of  the  Serbs  ran 
high.  The  spirit  thus  manifested,  however,  alarmed  the 
Emperor  Leopold  at  the  possible  growth  of  an  independent 
Serb  State.  Acting  under  his  orders  the  Margrave  of 
Baden  invited  the  Despot  to  confer  with  him  on  matters 
concerning  the  campaign.  On  his  arrival  at  the  camp, 
October  26,  1689,  Brankovic  was  seized  and  imprisoned 
at  Eger,  in  Bohemia,  where  he  remained  until  his  death 
in  1711.  "When  questioned  by  Russia  as  to  the  cause  of  the 
Despot's  incarceration  the  Austrian  Government  returned 
the  cynical  reply,   "Nihil  mali  fecit,  sed  sic  ratio  status 

'  Page  163  of  his  History  of  Hungary,     Cit,  Lazarovid-Hrebeljanovic, 
ut  aujpra,  vol.  ii,  p.  562. 


62  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

exposcit ",  an  answer  which  was  typical  of  the  perfidy  which 
has  throughout  actuated  the  House  of  Habsburg  in  its 
dealings  with  the  Serbs.  The  next  year  occurred  the  great 
migration  which  has  left  its  mark  on  Old  Serbia  to  the 
present  day. 

On  the  death  of  Piccolomini  the  Austrian  campaign 
collapsed,  and  the  Emperor  sent  a  rescript  to  the  Serb 
Patriarch  of  Pec,  Arsen  III,  inviting  him  to  head  an 
immigration  into  Austrian  territory.  He  promised  com- 
plete liberty  of  conscience,  and  full  rights  of  self-govern- 
ment. The  Patriarch  accepted  the  offer  and  fled  into 
Hungary  at  the  head  of  some  37,000  families.  In  reference 
to  this  migration  a  subsequent  Austrian  Minister,  Baron 
Bartenstein,  reported  to  Joseph  II  after  a  commission  of 
inquiry  :  "  It  was  not  a  case  of  offering  refuge  to  fugitives 
— allowing  them  to  go  on  to  waste  lands — but  one  of 
inducing  persons  to  leave  established  and  well-provided 
homes  where  they  had  been  undisturbed  in  the  exercise  of 
their  religious  faith,  and  to  pass  at  the  peril  of  their  lives 
and  estate  from  Turkish  domination  to  ours  ".^  The  Serbs, 
therefore,  had  well-defined  covenanted  rights,  one  of  the 
articles  of  agreement  being  that  they  might  elect  a  Vojvode 
(duke)  as  their  head,  while  the  Patriarch  was  established  at 
Karlovci  (Karlowitz).  The  title  of  Patriarch,  after  being 
discontinued,  was  revived  in  1848  and  still  continues.  The 
first  Vojvode  was  John  Monasterlija.  The  aim  of  the 
Emperor  was  of  course  to  keep  in  his  power  both  the  civil 
and  religious  heads  of  the  Serb  people.  The  Ottoman 
Government,  however,  filled  the  vacancy  in  the  See  of  Pec, 
and,  as  stated  above,  the  line  of  the  Patriarchs  of  Pec  con- 
tinued till  1767.  Under  Monasterlija  the  Serbs  took  part 
in  Prince  Eugene's  campaign  of  1697,  and  so  well  did  they 
acquit  themselves  that,  after  the  battle  of  Zenta,  the  famous 
general  described  them  as  "  ses  meilleurs  eclaireurs,  sa 
cavalerie  la  plus  legere,  les  defenseurs  les  plus  stirs  des 
places  conquises  ".     The  Treaty  of  Karlowitz  which  ended 

'  Baron  Bartenstein,  Report  on  the  Illyrian  Nation.  Cit.  Lazarovic- 
Hrebeljanovic,  ut  supra,  vol.  ii,  p.  595. 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  63 

this  war  restored  Transylvania  and  southern  Hungary  to 
the  Habsburgs.  They  served  also  in  Eugene's  victorious 
campaigns  of  1716  and  1718,  resulting  in  the  acquisition  of 
Belgrade  and  the  district  of  the  lower  Morava  which  were 
held  till  1739.  After  the  death  of  Monasterlija  the  Vojvode- 
ship  was  not  continued,  and  he  was  succeeded  as  head  of 
the  Hungarian  Serbs  by  the  Metropolitan  of  Karlovci,  the 
name  "  Serb  Vojvodina "  alone  remaining  as  a  token 
of  the  past.  One  by  one  the  privileges  of  the  Serbs 
were  taken  from  them  as  the  Turkish  menace  grew  less 
insistent  and  the  Habsburgs  had  less  need  of  their 
services  in  war,  and  so  intolerable  did  they  find  their 
position  that  in  the  years  1751  to  1753  an  emigration 
said  to  have  composed  100,000  individvals  left  Hungary 
for  Russia  where  they  settled  on  the  Dnieper.  The 
Government  of  Maria  Theresa  in  alarm  established  an 
Illyrian  Aulic  Council  to  supervise  Serb  affairs.  The 
new  Council  came  into  frequent  collision  with  the 
Hungarian  Court  Chancellery,  the  Hungarians  being 
bitterly  jealous  of  the  privileged  position  of  the  Serbs 
whose  greatest  and  most  implacable  foes  they  remain 
to  this  day.  On  the  other  hand  the  Viennese  Hof- 
skriegsrath,  for  military  reasons,  was  in  general  favour- 
able to  the  Serbs,  so  that  the  different  points  of 
view  of  Budapest  and  the  Vienna  "Greater  Austria" 
party  were  already  in  evidence  a  century  and  a  half 
ago.  In  1777  the  Illyrian  Aulic  Council  was  abolished, 
following  on  fresh  disputes,  and  a  Declaratorium  Illy- 
ricum  was  published  dealing  with  religious  and  educational 
matters.  Thirteen  years  later  Leopold  II  reestablished 
an  Illyrian  Aulic  Chancellery  only  to  abolish  it  again 
on  Magyar  instance  in  1792.  Thus  the  Serbs  suffered 
under  the  seesaw  of  the  more  statesmanhke  views 
of  Vienna  and  the  inflated  chauvinism  of  Hungary, 
Austria's  dme  damnee.  The  same  course  of  playing  fast 
and  loose  with  the  Habsburg  Serbs  (and  Croats)  according 
to  the  necessities  of  the  moment  was  continued  throughout 
the    nineteenth    century   till   to-day  neither    Vienna    nor 


64  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Budapest  possesses  hardly  a  friend  among  the  Southern 
Slavs. ^ 


III 

The  Resurgence  of  Serbia 

During  the  eighteenth  century  more  than  one  Austro- 
Russian  project  had  been  mooted  for  the  partition  of  the 
Balkans,  but  with  the  advent  of  the  great  Revolutionary 
wars  all  such  designs  were  of  necessity  laid  aside,  and 
the  preoccupations  of  the  Great  Powers  proved  the  oppor- 
tunity of  the  Serbs.  Yet  when  the  revolt  came  it  took  the 
form  of  a  "  loyal  "  revolt  of  Serbs  who  wished  to  enforce 
the  Sultan's  will.  At  this  time  Serbia  lay  under  the  heel 
of  the  Janissaries  and  their  leaders,  the  Dahi,  whose 
truculence  and  exactions  were  such  that  Haji  Mustapha 
the  Pasha  of  Belgrade,  a  mild  and  benevolent  ruler  whose 
name  is  still  revered  in  Serbia,^  prevailed  upon  the  reform- 
ing Sultan  Selim  III  to  order  their  removal  from  the 
country.  They  were  not  long  afterwards  permitted  to 
return,  whereupon  they  took  vengeance  upon  Mustapha, 
whom  they  put  to  death,  and  resorted  to  their  old  practices, 
murdering  the  most  prominent  Serbs  who  were  likely  to 
prove  dangerous  to  their  authority.     The  result  was  the 

'  A  full  account  of  the  Southern  Slavs  in  Austria  during  the  nine- 
teenth century  is  given  in  The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the 
Habsburg  Monarchy  by  E.  W.  Seton-Watson.  At  the  time  of  writing 
this  work — the  recognized  authority  on  the  subject — Dr.  Seton-Watson 
was,  as  he  has  acknowledged,  somewhat  prejudiced  against  the  Serbs  of 
the  Kingdom,  whom  he  regarded  rather  from  the  "  black-yellow  "  point 
of  view  as  an  adherent  of  the  "  Greater  Austria"  idea.  This  does  not 
in  any  way  affect  his  treatment  of  his  main  subject,  and  indeed  only 
appears  in  one  or  two  references  to  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia.  His 
services  to  the  cause  of  Southern  Slav  union  are  known  to  all.  See  also 
H.  W.  Steed,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy. 

'  A  descendant  of  his  was  Turkish  Delegate  at  the  Conference  of 
London  at  the  end  of  1912  when  the  first  attempt  was  made  to  make 
peace  between  the  Balkan  Allies  and  Turkey,  and  a  graceful  allusion  to 
his  ancestor  was  made  by  the  first  Serb  Delegate. 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  65 

great  rising  of  1804  which  at  first  was  a  movement  to 
restore  the  legitimate  authority  of  the  Sultan  and  to  punish 
the  Janissaries  who  had  set  themselves  to  oppose  his  will. 

The  leader  of  the  revolt  was  the  great  hero  of  modern 
Serbia,  George   Petrovic,  known  from   his   swarthy   com- 
plexion as  Kara  George  (Black  George — Kara  is  Turkish  :  in 
Serb  Crni  Gjorgje)  the  grandfather  of  the  present  King  Peter 
Karagjorgjevic.i     A  man  of  great  force  of  character,  daring 
in  fight,  ruthless  against  traitors  to  the  cause,  and  of  fierce 
temperament,  he  had  at  first  refused   the  post  of  leader, 
alleging  his    violent    character.      The   people   with   surer 
insight  insisted,  realizing  that  a  successful  revolt  against 
Turkish   power   was   not   likely   to  be   effected  save  by  a 
man   of  determination   and  violence.     To   the   last   in  his 
personal  habits  he  preserved  the  simplicity  of  the  peasant 
stock  from  which  he  was  sprung.     The  first  campaign  was 
successful,  the  Sultan  even  ordering  the  Pasha  of  Bosnia 
to  aid  the  Serbs,  with  the  result  that  the  Janissaries  were 
defeated  and  the  four  Dahi  beheaded.     The  scope  of  the 
rising  was  now  extended  and  the  Serbs  aimed  at  internal 
autonomy  under   the    Sultan's   suzerainty.     Thus   brouf^ht 
into    direct    conflict    with    the    Ottoman    State   the    Serbs 
continued  their  career  of  success,  and  by  1807  had  made 
themselves  masters  of  the  territory  subsequently  comprised 
in   the   principality  of   Serbia  as   it   existed   till  1878.     A 
Senate   of   twelve   members   was   appointed   to   assist   the 
Supreme   Chief,   schools   were    opened,    and   the   work   of 
internal  reorganization   set  in   hand,  while  the  Assembly, 
or  Skupgtina,  represented  the  germ  of  Parliamentary  insti- 
tutions.     The   next  five  years   were   marked   by  internal 
dissensions   due  to   the  jealousy    of   the   vojvodes   at   the 
power  of  Kara  George,  and  by  participation  in  the  war  of 
Kussia  against  Turkey.     The  Peace  of  Bucharest,  hovv^ever, 
concluded   by  Russia  under  the  influence   of  the   French 

'  So  spelt  in  the  Croatian  orthography.  Karageorgevid  is  more 
familiar,  but  is  really  indefensible  as  being  partly  in  Croatian  ortho- 
graphy and  partly  English.  Kara  George  is  too  famiUar  to  be  altered 
without  risk  of  pedantry. 

5 


66    THE   FUTURE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

menace,  left  Serbia  to  the  mercy  of  the  Turks  though 
Article  8  stipulated  for  their  internal  autonomy.  The 
country  was  invaded  from  all  sides,  and  in  1813  Kara 
George  suddenly  lost  heart  and  fled  into  Austria,  and  the 
country  fell  under  Turkish  rule.  The  sudden  loss  of  nerve 
on  the  part  of  Kara  George  must  always  remain  one  of  the 
psychological  puzzles  of  history,  so  unexpected  was  it,  and 
so  utterly  out  of  harmony  with  the  whole  character  of  the 
man  as  evinced  in  his  whole  career. 

Most  of  the  vojvodes  followed  Kara  George  into  Austrian 
territory,  but  one  among  the  most  influential  remained — 
Milos  Obrenovic.  Like  his  former  chief  of  peasant  stock, 
though  well-to-do  in  a  modest  way,  he  had  taken  a  promi- 
nent part  in  the  insurrection,  and  the  flight  of  his  companions 
left  him  the  most  influential  man  in  Serbia.  Whether  from 
deep  policy,  or  from  more  interested  motives,  he  bowed  to 
the  storm,  made  his  peace  with  the  new  Pasha,  and  even 
helped  to  suppress  an  incipient  rising.  On  Palm  Sunday 
1815,  however,  he  raised  anew  the  standard  of  revolt  under 
the  oak-tree  of  Takovo,  and  so  immediate  were  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  Serbs,  coupled  with  the  diplomatic  aid  of 
Russia  whose  hands  were  now  free,  that  in  October  the 
Turks  came  to  terms  and  granted  the  people  their  internal 
autonomy,  with  a  Council  representing  the  twelve  districts 
of  the  principality,  and  a  SkupStina  which  was  to  raise  the 
amount  of  the  tribute.  A  Turkish  pasha  continued  to 
occupy  Belgrade.  Two  years  later  Kara  George  returned, 
to  the  discomfiture  of  Milo§  who  thought  there  was  no 
room  for  two  kings  in  Brentford.  The  two  men  had  never 
been  on  friendly  terms,  being  indeed  in  some  ways  of  too 
similar  a  character.  There  followed  a  crime  which  must 
always  deeply  sully  the  character  of  Milo§  and  was  the  pre- 
cursor of  numberless  woes  to  come.  Milo§  betrayed  the  arrival 
of  Kara  George  to  the  Pasha  and  was  bidden  to  procure  hi3 
murder.  Kara  George  was  then  murdered  in  his  sleep  and 
his  head  forwarded  to  the  Pasha.  Thus  perished  by  a  foul 
assassination  the  hero  of  modern  Serbia,  her  first  leader  in 
the  national  revolt,  the  man  who  had  shown  the  way  to  the 


A  SKETCH   OF   SERB   HISTORY  67 

resurrection  of  the  nation.  This  was  the  origin  of  the  feud 
between  the  Obrenovic  and  the  Karagjorgjcvic  families,  which 
ended  only  with  the  murder  of  Alexander  in  1903  and  the 
extinction  of  the  Obrenovici. 

The  same  year  MiloS  was  proclaimed  Prince,  though  the 
title  was  not  formally  recognized  by  the  Porte  till  1830, 
when  a  final  settlement  was  arrived  at  between  the  prin- 
cipality and  its  suzerain.  Two  years  later  six  districts 
which  had  formed  part  of  the  Serbia  of  Kara  George,  1807- 
1813,  but  which  had  not  taken  part  in  the  last  rising,  were 
definitely  added  to  the  little  State  which  then  attained  the 
boundaries  which  it  possessed  till  1878.  A  Turkish  garrison 
was  still  maintained  in  the  fortress  of  Belgrade  which,  by 
a  strained  interpretation,  was  made  to  include  the  town  as 
well  as  the  citadel. 

No  full  account  of  the  events  of  the  last  century  can  be 
given  in  this  brief  outline  of  Serb  history,  and  it  is  only 
possible  to  illustrate  the  main  tendencies  of  its  politics, 
external  and  internal.  One  immediate  result  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Serbia  was  the  change  of  methods  rather  than 
aims  which  was  the  necessary  consequence  in  Austrian 
policy.  The  main  idea  of  the  Habsburgs  had  been  to  make 
use  of  the  Serbs  as  an  advance  guard  against  the  Turks, 
to  humour  them  when  their  services  were  required,  but 
vigorously  to  suppress  any  movement  which  might  lead 
to  the  restoration  of  an  independent  Serb  State,  and  to 
push  southwards  over,  yet  by  means  of,  the  Serb  race. 
The  successful  risings  of  the  Serbs,  however,  entirely 
altered  the  terms  of  the  problem,  for  the  centre  of  the 
political  and  national  aspirations  of  the  Serbs  was  now 
transferred  to  its  old  home  beyond  the  Danube.  As  long 
as  the  Serb  movement  had  its  source  in  the  Hungarian 
Serbs  it  could  be  controlled  by  the  Habsburgs,  and  was  in 
fact  confounded  in  the  southern  advance  of  the  dynasty,  but 
the  establishment  of  the  Principality  meant  the  rise  of  the 
very  political  formation  which  Habsburg  policy  had  con- 
sistently opposed,  seeing  the  danger  to  itself  involved  in  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  centre  of  Serb  nationality. 


68  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Between  the  Habsburgs  and  the  young  State  there  could 
be  no  real  friendship,  though  it  was  not  at  once  that  the 
fact  was  grasped  by  all  Serb  politicians.  Hitherto  the 
hopes  of  the  Serbs  had  been  centred  in  the  Imperial 
House,  in  which  alone  they  could  see  either  a  refuge  from 
the  past  or  a  hope  for  the  future,  and  trusting  as  they  did, 
in  spite  of  repeated  disillusionment,  to  the  Imperial  pro- 
fessions— for  it  is  curious  how  that  faithless  and  perfidious 
House  has  for  so  long  been  able  to  inspire  a  passionate 
loyalty  in  the  breasts  of  the  servants  towards  whom  it  has 
never  for  its  own  part  evinced  the  slightest  loyalty  or  shown 
the  least  gratitude :  its  falsity  has  been  beyond  measure — 
they  were  unable  at  first  in  their  simplicity  to  see  that 
under  the  altered  circumstances  Austria  was  in  the  nature 
of  things  their  most  formidable  foe.  The  Austrian  Drang 
nach  Osten  which  is  not  a  tendency  that  dates  from  1866, 
though  the  events  of  that  year  accentuated  it,  could  from 
now  on  only  be  accomplished  at  the  expense  of  the  Serbs 
and  in  opposition  to  them.  Serbia  lay  in  Austria's  way  and 
must  be  assimilated  or  crushed  ;  the  policy  of  the  eighteenth 
century  must  be  followed,  but  its  methods  and  formal  pro- 
fessions must  be  cast  in  a  new  mould. 

At  once,  therefore,  the  court  of  the  little  State  became 
a  hotbed  of  intrigue  in  which  England,  France,  and 
Austria  aUied  themselves  against  the  influence  of  Eussia. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  latter  was  looked  upon  as 
desiring  to  wield  an  omnipotent  influence  over  the  destinies 
of  the  principality,  while  England  and  France  professed 
their  desire — as  against  alleged  Russian  pretensions  hien 
entendu,  not  against  Turkey — for  its  real  independence, 
a  profession  in  which  Austria  for  motives  of  policy 
acquiesced.  The  absurd  dread  of  Pan- Slavism  it  will  be 
observed,  is  also  not  a  thing  that  dates  either  from  the 
Crimean  War  or  from  1876.  Milos  himself  worked  in 
concert  with  the  British  representative.  Colonel  Hodges, 
against  Russian  influence.^     These  intrigues  of  high  policy 

'  "Vi  basti  sapere  che  per  ordine  del  Principe  lavoro  col  colonello 
Hodges  per  sottrare  questo  paese   alia  dispotica  influenza  russa  per 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  69 

aggravated  the  internal  troubles  incidental  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  new  State  had  been  formed.  As  will  have 
been  seen  the  Serbs  were  the  first  of  the  Balkan  peoples 
to  establish  their  practical  independence,  leading  the  way 
in  this  regard  for  the  better  known  Greek  war  of  inde- 
pendence. Moreover,  unlike  the  Greeks,  who  owed  their 
independence  to  the  intervention  of  the  Great  Powers, 
and  the  Bulgarians  who,  without  striking  a  blow  in  their 
own  cause,  emerged  fully  equipped  from  the  will  of  the 
Russian  Tsar,  as  Athene  from  the  head  of  Zeus,  they  had 
gained  their  freedom  by  their  own  unaided  efforts  and 
indomitable  perseverance.  Thus  they  never  experienced 
the  fostering  care  which  has  made  their  eastern  neighbours 
the  spoilt  darlings  of  Europe.  From  this  cause  sprang 
further  consequences.  All  their  national  institutions  have 
been  evolved  on  their  own  soil  and  by  their  own  efforts, 
their  administration  in  all  its  branches  has  been  "home 
made "  as  has  been  their  administrative  and  military 
class.  They  never  had  the  services  of  foreign  organizers 
and  administrators  placed  at  their  disposal  to  set  their 
feet  in  the  way  of  progress  and  to  obviate  the  dangers 
attending  their  first  steps  in  national  life.  This  must 
always  be  remembered  when  the  progress  of  Serbia  is 
compared  with  that  of  the  other  Balkan  States.  Mistakes 
were  bound  to  be  made,  and  progress  under  such  condi- 
tions has  necessarily  been  slow.  On  the  other  hand  there 
have  been  compensating  advantages  of  no  mean  order. 
The  national  spirit  and  self-reliance  have  been  greatly 
fostered,  no  bureaucracy  of  alien  habits  of  thought  has 
been  foisted  on  the  people,  the  dynasty  is  national  and 
of  the  spirit  of  the  race,  and  the  whole  life  of  the 
nation  is  instinct  with  native  vitality  and  national  con- 
sciousness drawing  its  strength  from  its  own  inner 
resources.  Others  have  paid  dearly  for  a  more  rapid 
progress  having  its  roots  in  alien  elements. 

metterlo,  come  la  Grecia,  sotto  la  protezione  delle  grandi  Potenzo 
europee  ".  Extract  from  a  letter  of  Dr.  B.  S.  Cuniberti,  the  physician  of 
MiIo§.     F.  Cuniberti,  La  Serbia  e  la  dinastia  degli  Obrenovitch,  p.  109. 


70    THE  FUTURE   OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

The  government  of  Milos  was  a  despotism  made  more 
harsh  to  his  subjects  by  the  manner  in  which  he  secured 
to  himself  valuable  commercial  monopolies,  the  latter 
grievance  weighing  with  them  even  more  than  the  former, 
for  the  people  were  not  ripe  for  a  parliamentary  rSgime. 
Russia  espoused  the  cause  of  the  malcontents  and  in  1838, 
following  an  abortive  Constitution  of  nominally  "advanced" 
character  in  1835,  Milos  was  forced  to  grant  a  Constitution, 
the  chief  feature  of  which  was  a  State  Council  of  seven- 
teen members,  irremovable,  to  whom  the  four  Ministers 
(appointed  by  the  Prince)  had  to  make  their  reports.  It 
was  in  fact  the  substitution  of  an  oligarchy  of  "Revolution 
families  "  for  a  personal  despotism,  and  proved  even  less 
to  the  taste  of  the  democratic  Serbs  than  the  former 
rSgime;  an  autocrat  may  rule  over  a  people  fundamentally 
democratic  (not  in  the  political  sense  of  the  word),  or 
even  socialistic,  in  feeling  and  sentiment  as  can  be  seen 
in  the  example  of  Russia,  but  not  so  an  oligarchy  without 
any  historic  and  traditional  basis  of  aristocratic  service 
in  the  past  but  drawn  from  the  ranks  of  the  people.  As 
was  to  be  expected  friction  increased  and  in  1839  Milo§ 
was  forced  to  abdicate  by  his  oligarchic  opponents  to 
whom  in  turn  the  peasants  were  in  opposition. 

The  Prince's  eldest  son  Milan  succeeded  but  died  a 
month  later,  being  followed  by  Michael  his  younger  brother. 
Two  men,  Petronjevic  and  Vucic,  who  had  been  regents 
for  his  brother,  were  imposed  on  him  by  the  Porte  as 
Councillors.  Dissatisfaction  in  the  country  increased  and 
demands  were  made  for  the  removal  of  the  Councillors  and 
a  change  of  the  seat  of  Government  to  KruSevac.  The 
regents  fell,  and  Prince  Michael  gained  a  free  hand,  the 
people  preferring  to  fill  one  ditch  with  money  rather  than 
seventeen.  Michael  rushed  headlong  into  the  course  of 
Western  progress  accompanied  by  the  taxation  which  such 
progress  entails  in  Eastern  lands.  The  people  objected  to 
a  good  deal  of  the  progress,  and  even  more  strongly  to  the 
taxation.  Petronjevic  and  Vu5ic  returned  from  exile,  and 
in   1842  Michael   followed  his   father  into   exile.     As  his 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  71 

successor  the  country  chose  Alexander  Karafrjorgjevic  son  of 
the  great  hberator.  The  new  prince,  though  personally 
popular  and  a  good  administrator,  lacked  the  dynamic  force 
of  Kara  George,  and  concentrated  his  attention  on  the 
interior  development  of  his  country,  a  highly  necessary 
work  as  in  itself  the  only  real  foundation  for  a  "  spirited 
foreign  policy  ",  and  various  public  works  were  undertaken. 
In  1848,  while  not  abandoning  its  neutrality,  Serbia  lent 
its  unofficial  aid  to  the  Serbs  and  Croats  of  the  Habsburc 
Monarchy  then  fighting  under  the  great  Ban  Jela5ic  against 
the  tyrannical  Magyars,  who  had  skilfully  hoodwinked 
European  opinion,  as  they  have  largely  done  to  this  day, 
into  thinking  that  they  were  struggling  for  liberty  and  a 
constitutional  regime.  The  Crimean  War  added  to  the 
Prince's  difficulties  as  Russia  not  unnaturally  expected  his 
aid.  The  pressure  of  Austria  and  the  Western  Powers 
was,  however,  too  strong,  and  he  remained  neutral.  The 
mass  of  the  people  was  angered  at  what  was  considered 
his  dependence  upon  Austria,  for  their  instinct  did  not 
deceive  them  as  to  who  was  the  most  dangerous  enemy  of 
Serbia ;  the  oligarchs  exploited  this  resentment  and  in 
December  1858  Alexander  was  forced  to  go  the  way  of 
Milo§  and  Michael.  The  former  was  immediately  recalled, 
to  the  dismay  of  the  oligarchs,  and  reigned  till  his  death 
in  September  1860. 

The  second  reign  of  his  son  Michael  was  marked  by 
enormous  progress  both  in  the  internal  economic  and 
political  development  of  Serbia  and  in  its  international 
position.  The  State  Council  was  reformed  and  made 
amenable  to  the  law  courts,  while  the  SkupStina  was 
regularly  summoned  every  third  year.  The  army  was  also 
reorganized  and  a  French  officer  installed  as  Minister  of 
War.  All  this  time  the  Turks  had  remained  in  the  frontier 
fortresses,  but  in  1862  they  gave  the  Prince  an  opportunity 
of  which  he  quickly  availed  himself.  Following  upon  an 
insignificant  encounter  in  Belgrade  between  the  Serbs  and 
the  Turks  the  Pasha  bombarded  the  city  from  the  fortress. 
The  government  immediately  made  representations  to  the 


72  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Powers  demanding  the  evacuation  of  the  fortresses.  These 
representations  met  with  little  response,  and  Prince  Michael 
was  attacked  by  the  English  Press,  which  was  obsessed 
by  "the  superstitions  of  an  antiquated  diplomacy",  as 
Mr.  Balfour  once  described  the  Turcophil  policy  of  the 
past  fifty  years.  The  affair  dragged  on,  but  in  1867,  in 
the  then  condition  of  Europe,  the  Porte  thought  it  advisable 
to  give  way,  saving  its  face  by  the  formula  that  the 
fortresses  should  be  confided  to  the  care  of  the  Prince. 

In  the  domain  of  foreign  policy  the  reign  was  one  of 
great  activity  based  upon  the  idea  of  a  Balkan  bloc.  With 
Montenegro  an  agreement  was  reached  in  1866  that  if 
the  frontiers  of  the  two  States  should  ever  become  coter- 
minous the  smaller  would  enter  into  a  formal  union  with 
the  larger.  In  Macedonia  Serb  propaganda  was  pushed 
forward  and  many  schools  were  established  which  endured 
till  they  were  dissolved  by  the  Turks  after  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War.  Close  relationships  were  entertained  with 
Eoumania  and  in  1867  an  alliance  was  concluded  with 
Greece  and  an  agreement  arrived  at  with  the  Bulgarian 
Committee  in  Bucharest.  At  this  time  the  Bulgarians 
hardly  entertained  separate  nationalist  aspirations,  and  it 
was  agreed  that,  when  a  Bulgarian  State  should  be  formed, 
it  should  be  united  with  Serbia,  full  equality  being  given  to 
both  languages.  It  was  in  the  same  train  of  ideas  that  the 
Serb  government  lent  its  vigorous  aid  at  Constantinople  to 
the  project  of  a  Bulgarian  Exarchate ;  in  fact  the  Bulgars 
were  regarded  rather  as  a  local  division  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  proper  whose  future  was  bound  up  in  that  of  the 
Serbs.  The  object  of  all  this  activity  was  intervention  in 
Bosnia  and  Macedonia  and  an  anticipation  of  the  war  of 
1912.  Never  before  or  since  has  Serbia  occupied  so  com- 
manding a  diplomatic  position  in  the  Balkans.  All  these 
plans,  however,  were  cut  short  by  the  murder  of  the  Prince. 
A  conspiracy  was  set  on  foot,  as  has  been  alleged,  in  the 
interests  of  the  Karagjorgjevic,  though  there  is  reason  to 
doubt  it,  and  on  June  10,  1868,  the  Prince  was  assassinated 
in  the  park  of  TopSider  near  Belgrade,  the  bitter  fruit  of 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  73 

the  murder  of   Kara  George  by  his  father.    It  was  a  bad 
day  for  Serbia. 

The  political  ends  of  the  plot  miscarried,  and  in  default 
of  direct  heirs  his  cousin  Milan,  the  grandson  of  MiloS's 
younger  brother  Ephrem,  was  proclaimed  Prince  under  a 
regency,  the  new  ruler  being  only  fourteen  years  old.  A 
new  Constitution  was  drawn  up  on  more  modern  lines  than 
the  existing  one  and  promulgated  in  1869.  The  executive 
power  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  ruler,  while  a 
Skup§tina  which  was  to  meet  every  year  was  given  the 
legislative  power  but  without  the  faculty  of  initiation. 
One-third  of  its  members  were  nominated  by  the  Prince, 
and  as  in  our  "  unlearned  Parliament "  of  1404  no  official 
or  lawyer  was  eligible  for  election — a  provision  of  some 
utility  not  unworthy  of  being  copied,  perhaps  in  a  modi- 
fied form,  by  other  more  historical  legislative  assemblies. 
Prince  Milan  proved  to  be  as  worthless  a  ruler  as  he 
was  despicable  in  private  life.  Showy  in  his  gifts,  of 
'  undoubted  ability,  considerable  oratorical  power,  and  hand- 
some presence,  he  was  utterly  lacking  in  moral  stability 
and  steadfastness  of  character,  and  sacrificed  the  interests 
of  his  country  to  his  private  pleasures  and  caprices.  His 
reign  like  that  of  his  son  was  one  long  scandal.  In  1876, 
the  year  following  the  Bosnian  rising  of  1875,  Serbia  with 
Montenegro  declared  war  against  the  Turks,  but  Milan's 
armies  met  with  no  success  and  only  the  intervention  of 
the  Powers  saved  the  country.  The  following  year,  after 
the  fall  of  Plevna,  Serbia  joined  in  the  Russo-Turkish  War 
and  gained  considerable  successes,  but  the  Treaty  of 
San  Stefano  proved  a  great  disappointment  to  the  nation. 
Russia  favoured  only  Bulgarian  aims  and  stipulated  for  a 
great  Bulgaria  which  should  include  not  only  all  Macedonia 
but  districts  such  as  Vranja  which  were  incontestably  Serb, 
while  the  territorial  gains  of  Serbia  were  to  be  few  ;  in  fact 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  which  superseded  that  of  San  Stefano, 
was  more  favourable  to  Serb  aspirations  in  some  respects 
in  spite  of  the  occupation  of  Bosnia  and  the  Hercegovina 
by  Austria,   provinces  which  the  San  Stefano   treaty  left 


74  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

to  Turkey  though  by  the  secret  convention  of  Eeichstadt 
Russia  had  agreed  to  an  Austrian  occupation.  Thereafter 
Milan  threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  Austria  and  became 
practically  an  Austrian  satrap,  to  the  great  indignation  of 
the  Serbs  and  the  Radical  party,  which  was  supported  by 
the  great  majority  of  the  people.  The  proclamation  of 
Serbia  as  a  kingdom  in  1882  failed  to  mend  matters,  while 
a  further  shock  to  King  Milan's  position  resulted  from  the 
unsuccessful  war  against  Bulgaria  in  1885  which  followed 
the  Eastern  Roumelian  revolution  and  the  union  of  that 
province  with  the  principality  of  Bulgaria.  The  scandals 
of  Milan's  married  life  brought  him  into  general  contempt 
while  his  opposition  to  the  Radicals  resulted  in  a  conflict 
with  his  people  which  finally  made  his  position  untenable, 
so  that  in  1889,  after  granting  a  more  liberal  Constitution, 
he  abdicated  in  favour  of  his  son  Alexander,  a  minor,  who 
succeeded  to  a  State  which  in  1878  had  been  extended  by 
the  acquisition  of  the  districts  of  Pirot,  Ni§,  and  Vranja. 
Milan  and  his  Queen  Natalie  both  agreed  to  live  outside 
Serbia  in  the  interests  of  their  son  and  dynasty. 

The  Hgime  of  the  Regents  brought  no  alleviation  in  the 
internal  situation  for  M.  Ristic,  the  head  of  the  regency,  was 
bitterly  opposed  to  the  Radicals  and  their  leader  M.  Pa§i6, 
the  "  Grand  Old  Man  "  of  Serbia.  The  denouement  was 
startling,  for  on  April  13,  1893,  the  young  king,  not  quite 
seventeen  years  of  age,  arrested  the  regents  at  a  dinner  in 
the  palace  and  proclaimed  himself  of  age.  No  good  results 
followed  this  coup  d'etat  for  King  Alexander  was  not  a 
strong  man  as  was  hoped,  but  merely  self-willed  and 
obstinate,  and  his  reign  brought  Serbia  to  the  lowest  depths 
of  her  fortunes  and  made  her  a  byword  in  Europe.  Finding 
himself  unable  to  control  the  situation,  at  midnight, 
January  22,  1894,  he  installed  a  Cabinet  under  M.  Simic, 
recently  Minister  at  Vienna,  and  prepared  the  way  for  the 
return  of  King  Milan ;  at  midnight  on  April  2  of  the  same 
year  M.  Simic  was  replaced  by  M.  Nikolajevic ;  and  at  mid- 
night on  May  21  he  abolished  by  royal  ukase  the  Constitu- 
tion of  1888,  replacing  it  by  that  of  18G9,  after  which  he 


A  SKETCH   OF   SERB  HISTORY  75 

recalled  the  Cabinet  which  had  prudently  resigned  in  view 
of  the  penalties  involved.  The  return  of  King  Milan  did 
not  effect  any  improvement,  for  it  was  hardly  likely  that 
Milan,  who  had  failed  to  conduct  his  own  government, 
should  be  able  to  conduct  that  of  his  son.  In  view  of  the 
growing  peril  to  the  dynasty  Milan  and  Natalie  became 
reconciled,  but  nothing  could  stay  the  downward  course  of 
events.  Alexander  claimed  to  instal  in  power  neutral 
cabinets  of  his  own  choice  in  order  to  allay  the  strife  of 
political  parties,  and  give  stability  to  the  administration. 
The  old  worship  of  Parliamentarianism  has  largely  decayed 
of  late  years  ;  it  is  no  longer  generally  thought  that  the 
unique  and  complete  cure  for  human  ills  is  the  transplanta- 
tion of  the  existing  form  of  the  English  Constitution ; 
we  have  seen  a  good  deal  of  its  inefficiency,  and  talk  of 
political  liberty  is  not  so  alluring  now  that  we  have 
machine-made  politics  and  politicians.  The  boon  of  the 
franchise  in  the  absence  of  proportional  representation 
means  frequently  a  Hobson's  choice  between  Tweedledum 
and  Tweedledee — Arcades  ambo.  There  is  a  great  deal  to 
be  said,  especially  in  countries  less  developed  politically, 
for  a  "non-Parliamentary"  executive  with  a  strong 
monarchical  basis,  which  shall  be  above  political  partizan- 
ship,  and  the  tyranny  of  the  party  caucus,  of  political 
"bosses"  great  and  small,  of  the  machine  which  crushes 
out  individuals  who  do  not  conform  in  everything  to  the 
party  ticket,  preferring  to  exercise  an  independent  judg- 
ment, as  Mr.  Harold  Cox  and  Lord  Hugh  Cecil  were 
elbowed  out  of  our  own  House  of  Commons.  If  a  leader 
of  a  party  in  power  is  wellnigh  absolute  the  leader  of 
an  Opposition  is  often  only  allowed  to  lead  so  long  as  he 
follows  his  followers,  so  that  an  Opposition  has  resembled 
a  sportive  puppy  chasing  its  own  tail.  We  have  moved 
far  from  the  ideas  of  Bagehot  and  his  admiration  of  the 
House  of  Commons  which  to-day  sounds  so  "  remote ". 
"Where,  moreover,  there  are  several  parties  and  they  are 
divided  upon  personal  questions  rather  than  by  differences 
of  political    programme    the    idea  of  a  non-Parliamentary 


76  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

executive  acquires  the  greater  force.  All  systems  are 
liable  to  abuse,  and  if  the  action  of  King  Constantine  be 
objected  to  it  may  well  be  asked  what  was  the  result  of 
the  undiluted  Parliamentarianism  of  King  George  of 
Greece.  The  complaint  is  justly  made  that  King  Con- 
stantine has  reduced  Greece  to  the  condition  in  which  it 
found  itself  before  the  advent  of  M.  Venizelos.  Nor  can 
it  be  said  that  a  non-Parliamentary  executive  is  in- 
consistent with  the  sovereignty  of  Parliament ;  ^  the 
United  States  executive  is  non-Parliamentary,  and  so  in 
practice  is  the  Swiss.  In  the  case  of  King  Alexander, 
however,  no  attempt  was  made  to  play  the  part  of  a 
patriot  king.  "With  him  neutrality  was  a  catchword  to 
cloke  his  obstinate  and  foolish  refusal  to  accept  M.  Pasid 
and  the  Radicals ;  so  far  was  he  from  seeking  to  forward 
the  national  will  that  he  placed  himself  continuously  in 
opposition,  alike  in  foreign  and  domestic  politics,  to  the 
clearly  expressed  wishes  of  his  people ;  so  far  was  he 
from  giving  stability  to  the  administration  that  his 
capricious  changes  of  ministry  resulted  in  an  ever- 
increasing  instability ;  he  was.no  single-eyed  administrator 
raised  above  party  and  pushing  forward  a  work  of  national 
regeneration  in  accordance  with  the  national  will  despite 
self-seeking  politicians,  on  the  contrary  he  was  always 
himself  deep  in  political  intrigue. 

At  home  the  country  was  in  a  state  of  chronic  dis- 
content,    political     persecution     was     rampant,    and    the 

'  Vide  Professor  A.  V.  Dicey,  Law  of  the  Constitution,  p.  413, 
Appendix,  Note  III,  for  a  discussion  of  the  subject.  In  what  I  have 
said  above  there  is  no  advocacy  implied  of  a  "  crown-policy",  nor  is 
there  implied  a  necessary  antagonism  between  Crown  and  people,  or 
Parliament,  any  more  than  there  is  a  necessary  antagonism  between 
the  Executive  and  Congress  in  the  United  States.  A  wise  king  would 
choose  the  man  who  commanded  the  greatest  confidence,  and  if  King 
Alexander  had  been  truly  patriotic  he  would  have  put  M.  Pasic  in  power 
and  kept  him  there.  As  we  have  reason  to  know  neither  a  Parlia- 
mentary executive  nor  Parliament  itself  necessarily  reflects  the 
convictions  of  a  nation.  [Point  has  been  given  to  these  considerations 
by  the  nature  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  government.  See  Dicey,  p.  417,  for 
a  forecast  of  the  possible  advent  of  Presidential  government.] 


A  SKETCH   OF  SERB  HISTORY  77 

elections  were  "  made  "  shamelessly.  The  finances  were 
in  disorder,  no  public  works  were  undertaken,  the  Oriental 
line  remaining  Serbia's  solitary  railway,  the  army  was 
neglected,  eaten  up  with  politics,  without  rifles  or  artillery, 
and  only  some  first  tentative  steps  in  the  direction  of 
agricultural  development  could  be  placed  to  the  credit  of 
the  government.  Abroad  the  Bulgarians  were  having  their 
own  way  in  Macedonia,  Serbia  was  utterly  without  prestige, 
and  if  she  succeeded  in  1897  in  obtaining  a  Serb  appoint- 
ment to  the  See  of  Skoplje,  and  in  1900  in  securing 
recognition  of  a  Serb  millet  (politico-religious  community) 
in  Turkey,  that  was  chiefly  due  to  the  Porte's  desire  to 
play  off  one  nationality  against  another.  The  course  of 
shame  continued,  and  in  1900  the  king  married  Madame 
Draga  Masin,  the  widow  of  a  Serb  engineer  and  his  former 
mistress,  the  event  being  followed  by  a  final  quarrel  with 
King  Milan,  who  died  not  long  afterwards.  In  1901  King 
Alexander,  feeling  the  ground  slipping  from  under  him, 
granted  a  new  and  liberal  Constitution  with  two  Chambers 
— the  latter  feature  an  innovation.  Still  he  pursued  his 
headlong  course.  On  April  7,  1903,  he  suspended  the 
Constitution,  repealed  by  royal  ukase  several  laws,  abolished 
the  Council  of  State,  abrogated  the  freedom  of  the  Press 
and  the  ballot,  and  dismissed  the  judges  who  belonged 
to  the  Radical  party,  then  after  a  lapse  of  twenty-four  hours 
declared  the  Constitution  as  modified  to  be  again  in  force. 
At  this  time  it  was  reported  that  he  intended  to  settle 
the  succession  to  the  throne  upon  his  wife's  brother,  a 
Lieutenant  Lunjevica.  The  crisis  hastened  to  its  con- 
clusion. It  was  evident  that  the  country  could  not  continue 
under  a  regime  of  misgovernment  by  midnight  coup  d'etat, 
and  on  June  10,  1903,  the  King  and  Queen  were  assassi- 
nated as  a  result  of  a  military  conspiracy.  The  crime  was 
a  horrible  one,  but  without  undue  extenuation  it  may  be 
said  that  it  is  difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  either 
King  Alexander  or  the  nation  had  to  perish.  He  might 
have  been  sent  into  exile ;  but  a  Serb  pretender  in 
Austria .     The  matter  has  been  well  summed  up  by  a 


78  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

recent  French  historian :  "  L'histoire,  qui  a  le  devoir  de 
fletrir  les  assassins,  reserve  cependant  ses  condamnations 
supremes  pour  les  princes  qui  avaient  reduit  le  pays  a 
un  tel  degre  d'indigence  morale  qu'il  n'apercevait  de 
salut  que  dans  le  crime "/  and  I  fear  we  must  add 
correctly  perceived. 

The  Grand  Skupgtina  (the  special  body  four  times  as 
numerous  as  the  ordinary  Skupgtina  v^^hich  deals  with  con- 
stitutional changes)  immediately  elected  as  king  Prince 
Peter  Karagjorgjevic,  son  of  the  former  Prince  Alexander 
Karagjorgjevic,  and  grandson  of  the  Liberator.  The  new 
sovereign  had  served  with  distinction  as  a  young  man  in 
the  Franco-German  war,  and  subsequently,  in  1875,  in  the 
Hercegovinian  rising.  He  was  the  widower  of  a  daughter 
of  Prince  Nicholas  of  Montenegro,  and  had  been  living  in 
retirement  in  Geneva.^  His  first  years  of  rule  were  difficult, 
the  regicides  were  in  power,  and  the  Obrenovic  still  had 
a  small  following  though  it  bad  no  leader,  the  next  heir 
of  that  family  being  Princess  Mirko  of  Montenegro  nSe 
Natalie  Konstantinovi6.  Regarded  with  dislike  abroad 
owing  to  the  manner  of  his  accession  to  the  throne  he  had 
many  difficulties  to  face  at  home.  He  remained  true  to  his 
purpose  to  reign  in  constitutional  manner  and  to  follow  a 
policy  of  general  appeasement,  while  he  has  relied  chiefly  on 
M.  Pa§i6,  the  veteran  leader  of  the  Radical  party,  universally 
regarded  as  his  country's  foremost  statesman  and  always 
called  in  of  late  years  in  times  of  difficulty  for  the  con- 
fidence he  inspires.  The  relations  of  the  kingdom  with 
Austria  became  increasingly  difficult  as  the  country  gathered 
strength,  and  the  tariff  war  of  1905-1906  was  turned  to 
account  by  the  opening  of  new  markets,  and  a  beginning 
was  made  in  the  direction  of  economic  independence,  for 

'  E.  Denis,  La  Grand  Serbie,  p.  122. 

'  The  scandalous  story  given  by  Mr.  De  Windt  of  his  childish  and 
undignified  behaviour  on  receiving  the  news  of  his  succession  is 
negatived  by  the  fact  that  he  was  living  in  Geneva  not  in  Paris, 
ordered  his  crown  in  1904  not  in  1903,  and  that  it  was  made  of 
metal  from  a  Turkish  cannon  captured  by  Kara  George  and  not 
of  gold. 


A  SKETCH  OF  SERB  HISTORY  79 

hitherto  the  country  had  depended  almost  entirely  upon  the 
Austrian  market,  and  Austria  applied  the  screw  mercilessly 
for  political  ends.  In  1908  Austria  annexed  Bosnia,  the 
Serbs  awoke  to  a  vivid  sense  of  realities,  and  from  that  dark 
hour  dates  the  renascence  of  Serbia. 


CHAPTER   III 
THE   RENASCENCE  OF  SERBIA 


Before  considering  the  effects  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
in  1908  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  a  little.  The  Triune 
Kincrdom,  as  it  is  termed,  of  Croatia,  Slavonia,  and  Dal- 
matia  had  originally  owned  a  separate  national  sovereignty 
within  varying  territorial  limits,  but  in  1102  on  the  extinc- 
tion of  the  native  dynasty  the  king  of  Hungary,  Koloman, 
was  elected  as  the  successor  of  the  last  of  the  old  line. 
The  nature  of  the  union  was  personal,  the  bond  between 
the  two  States  being  the  common  sovereign,  but  as  was 
natural  the  legal  constitutional  position  has  formed  a  per- 
manent source  of  friction  between  Croatia  and  Hungary. '^ 
In  the  nineteenth  century  the  fortunes  of  the  Croats  became 
more  and  more  involved  in  those  of  their  Serb  neighbours, 
and  the  feeling  of  Southern  Slav  sohdarity  was  the  gradual 
result.  It  was  Napoleon,  whose  real  abiding  work  is  so 
often  lost  in  the  contemplation  of  the  means  which  he 
adopted  to  gain  his  ends,  who  gave  the  first  great  fillip 
to  this  sense  of  solidarity  in  his  short-lived  kingdom  of 
lUyria.  The  greater  part  of  Dalmatia  had  gradually  been 
acquired  by  the  Venetian  Eepublic  in  the  course  of  the 
Middle  Ages.  Northern  Dalmatia  was  wrested  from  the 
grasp  of  Hungary-Croatia  and  its  possession  finally  made 
good  against  the  Turks,  though,  as  will  be  seen  later,  the 

'  For  the  history  of  Croatia  see  R.  W.  Seton-Watson's  The  Southern 
Slav  Question  cmd  the  Habsburg  Monarchy. 

80 


THE  RENASCENCE  OF  SERBIA  81 

process  was  very  slow.  The  southernmost  portion  of  the 
province,  Kotor  (Cattaro),  Budva,  Bar  (Antivari),  was 
obtained  as  the  result  of  the  fall  of  the  Serb  Empire  to 
which  it  had  belonged,  being  indeed  no  part  of  the  original 
Triune  Kingdom,  which  stopped  short  at  the  Cetina  or 
Narenta.  The  region  from  Sabioncello  to  Castelnuovo 
formed  the  independent  republic  of  Dubrovnik  (Ragusa) 
throughout  the  medieval  period,  and  this  republic  as  a 
matter  of  fact  outlived  Venice,  falling  before  Napoleon  in 
1808,  eleven  years  after  the  fall  of  Venice  in  1797. 

Among  the  territorial  arrangements  which  Napoleon 
was  able  to  make  as  the  result  of  his  victory  at  Wagram 
in  1809  was  the  establishment  of  the  kingdom  of  lUyria, 
which  comprised  a  great  part  of  Croatia,  Kranjska  (Carniola), 
Carinthia,  GradiSka,  Gorica,  Istria,  and  Dalmatia.  This 
union  in  one  political  formation  of  the  Slovene  and  Croat 
branches  of  the  Southern  Slavs  had  a  powerfully  stimu- 
lating effect  on  the  national  consciousness  of  the  race, 
which  survived  the  reincorporation  of  the  kingdom  with 
the  Austrian  dominions  in  1815.  So  great  indeed  was  the 
impetus  given  that  the  very  use  of  the  words  Illyria 
and  lUyrian  were  subsequently  forbidden  by  the  Austrian 
Government.  The  ideal  of  Southern  Slav  unity  was  greatly 
aided  by,  indeed  was  largely  the  product  of,  the  literary 
renaissance  which  marked  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 
century  and  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth.  Its  origin, 
it  is  important  to  notice,  is  to  be  sought  in  Dalmatia,  the 
most  highly  cultured  of  the  Serbo-Croat  lands,  with  its 
memories  of  the  literary  activity  of  the  Eagusan  school 
of  writers  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  in  some  ways  the 
centre  from  the  literary  and  political  point  of  view,  from 
which  has  radiated  the  idea  of  Southern  Slav  solidarity. 
In  Dalmatia  Kacic  published  a  metrical  history  of  the  Jugo 
Slavs  in  1756,  but  the  practical  work  was  the  product  of 
two  Serbs,  Obradovi6  and  Karadzic  and  the  Croat  Gaj. 
Obradovid  (1739-1811),  who  was  sprung  from  southern 
Hungary,  was  self-taught,  and  travelled  largely  for  the 
purpose  of  educating  himself  for  the  fulfilment  of  bis  task 

6 


82  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

of  educating  his  people.  His  works  were  chiefly  those  of 
a  thinker  and  moralist  whose  aim  was  to  raise  the  intel- 
lectual standard  of  his  race  and  to  teach  it  its  essential 
unity.  He  wrote  in  the  popular  spoken  language.  Not 
less  important  was  the  work  of  Vuk  Karadzic  (1787-1864), 
which,  from  the  practical  point  of  view,  made  possible 
the  realization  of  the  hopes  of  Obradovi6.  He  found  the 
language  of  his  countrymen  (he  was  born  in  Serbia)  in  a 
state  of  chaos.  The  spoken  dialect  was  looked  down  upon 
as  a  vehicle  of  literary  composition  for  which  was  employed 
a  largely  artificial  medium  of  Serbo-Eussian  texture.  He 
set  to  work  to  grapple  with  hi?!  gigantic  task  of  raising 
the  spoken  idiom  to  its  rightful  place.  He  published  the 
national  poems  and  ballads  as  examples  of  the  language 
to  be  used,  and  himself  employed  the  spoken  tongue  in 
his  own  work.  It  was  necessary  to  standardize  the 
language,  and  for  this  purpose  he  compiled  a  dictionary 
and  a  grammar.  Finally  he  made  a  recension  of  the  Cyrillic 
alphabet  and  standardized  the  spelling  on  a  phonetic 
principle.  In  spite  of  great  opposition  he  achieved  his 
objects,  and  left  the  Serbs  with  a  language  identical  in 
writing  and  speaking,  apart  from  the  use  of  "  dialect " 
forms,  which  are  to  be  found  in  all  languages,  based  on 
a  logical  and  reformed  alphabet  and  spelling.  The  Serbs 
were  thus  spared  the  unhappy  results  which  follow  where 
the  men  of  literature  use  a  language  which  is  not  "  under- 
standed  of  the  people".  The  results  of  his  work  had  a 
repercussion  in  Croatia.  Here  Ljudevit  Gaj  carried  out  a 
similar  reform  in  the  Croatian  spelling  and  language,  and 
adopted  what  may  be  styled  the  reformed  Serb  literary 
language  as  the  standard  idiom  of  the  Croats  also.  As  a 
result,  the  provincial  literature  which  he  found  was  re- 
placed by  a  Serbo-Croat  literature,  and  on  its  literary  side 
the  way  was  now  clear  for  a  real  Serbo-Croat  unity.  The 
eddies  of  the  movement  spread  even  further,  and  influenced 
the  new  Slovene  school  of  writers  so  that  they  also  became 
conscious  of  their  fundamental  identity  with  their  Serbo- 
Croat  brethren. 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  83 

Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  the  quarrel  between 
the  Magyars  and  the  subject  nationahties  of  Hungary 
continued.  In  1848  the  Magyars  rose  against  the  dynasty 
in  what  they  called  a  struggle  for  freedom.  Western 
Europe  was  blinded  by  the  eloquence  of  Kossuth  and  the 
ability  with  which  the  Hungarian  case  was  pleaded,  but 
that  case  was  fundamentally  unsound.  If  the  Magyars 
desired  freedom  from  Vienna  they  were  no  less  passionately 
determined  upon  a  policy  of  racial  oppression  at  home. 
Hitherto  the  Hungarian  State,  though  aristocratic  in  con- 
stitution, had  been,  if  the  phrase  be  permissible,  only  mildly 
oppressive,  and  the  fact  that  Latin  was  the  official  State 
language  made  for  linguistic  equality  among  all  Hungarians, 
i.e.  citizens  of  the  polyglot  Hungarian  State,  who  included 
besides  the  Magyars,  a  minority  in  the  kingdom,  the 
Slovaks  of  the  north-west,  the  Ruthenes  (Red  or  Little 
Russians)  of  the  north-east,  the  Roumanians  of  the  east, 
and  the  Serbs  and  Croats  of  southern  Hungary  and  Croatia- 
Slavonia  (Dalmatia  is  an  Austrian  not  Hungarian  crown- 
land)  .  The  aim  of  the  Magyars  was  to  make  all  Hungarians 
Magyar,  and  they  began  to  use  the  two  expressions  as 
synonymous  terms.  All  means  of  repression,  political, 
social,  linguistic,  and  educational,  were  pressed  into  service 
with  the  result  that  "the  nationalities"  were  bitterly 
estranged.  When  the  revolution  of  1848,  therefore,  broke 
out,  the  nationalities  took  up  arms  against  the  Magyars 
and  for  the  House  of  Habsburg.  The  great  Ban  Jela6i6, 
the  saviour  of  the  Habsburgs,  led  his  Croats  against  them, 
and  the  Serbs  took  up  arms,  convened  a  national  assembly 
at  Karlovci,  the  seat  of  the  Serb  Metropolitan,  and 
demanded  the  restoration  of  the  Patriarchate  and  the 
appointment  of  a  Vojvode  in  accordance  with  their  old 
rights.  Colonel  Supljikac  was  named  to  the  latter  office 
and  accepted  by  Vienna,  which  also  restored  the  Patri- 
archate. The  net  result  of  all  this  was  nil.  Colonel 
Supljikac  dying  in  a  few  months  was  not  replaced,  and 
although  a  Serb  Vojvodina  was  delimitated,  it  was  purposely 
made  unworkable  by  the  inclusion  of  large  alien,  Magyar 


84  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

and  German,  elements.  The  House  of  Habsburg,  faithless 
as  ever  to  its  friends,  abandoned  both  Serbs  and  Croats, 
and  in  1867  crowned  its  perfidy  by  the  Ausgleich  with 
Hungary,  which  left  the  Serbs  entirely  at  the  mercy  of 
the  Magyar,  and  Croatia  in  a  very  unsatisfactory  position. 
The  empty  title  of  Grand  Vojvode  of  the  Serb  Vojvodina 
was  all  that  remained  to  remind  the  Southern  Slavs  of  their 
betrayed  loyalty.  After,  then,  a  period  of  general  oppres- 
sion from  1849  to  1867,  the  dual  system  was  introduced, 
the  position  being  that  the  Germans  should  do  as  they 
liked  in  the  Austrian  crown-lands  and  the  Magyars  in  the 
Hungarian,  This  was  the  reward  of  the  Croats  for  their 
loyalty  in  1848.  The  friction  between  the  nationalities  and 
their  masters  continued,  and  the  resources  of  modern 
civilization  and  banking  organization  enabled  a  more 
efficient  pressure  to  be  maintained  by  the  Magyars. 

In  1878  Austria-Hungary  was  empowered  by  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin  to  "  occupy  and  administer "  Bosnia  and  the 
Hercegovina,  whose  luckless  inhabitants  found  that  they 
had  merely  exchanged  one  master  for  another.  The  right 
of  occupation  had  originally  been  assented  to  by  Russia  in 
the  Reichstadt  convention,  secretly  arrived  at  by  the  two 
Powers  before  the  Russo-Turkish  war  as  the  price  of 
Austrian  neutrality,  though  it  found  no  mention  in  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  which  left  the  provinces  to  Turkey. 
Austria  was  torn  by  conflicting  motives  in  the  affair.  On 
the  one  hand  she  desired  to  continue  what  had  long  been 
her  settled  pohcy  of  Balkan  expansion  with  its  aim  the 
possession,  at  least,  of  Saloncia — the  Drang  nach  Osten. 
The  exclusion  from  Germany,  and  from  Italy  also,  left  the 
Balkans  as  the  only  possible  field  of  aggrandizement,  and 
the  Emperor,  on  grounds  of  personal  pride,  desired  some 
compensation  for  his  losses  in  the  west.  Germany  had 
also  a  double  motive  in  pushing  Austria  eastward.  The 
intrusion  of  Austria  into  the  Balkans  would  tend  to  make 
her  forget  her  lost  position  in  Germany,  and  it  would  also 
serve  German  ends  vis-a-vis  Russia,  for  such  a  pohcy  would 
inevitably  produce   an   acute   rivalry,  or  rather  exacerbate 


THE  RENASCENCE  OF  SERBIA  85 

the  existing  rivalry,  between  the  two  Powers,  leaving 
Germany  in  the  happy  position  of  duohus  Utigantihus 
tertius  gaudens.  She  would  be  in  a  position  to  play  off 
one  against  the  other,  and  by  threatening  closer  relations 
with  either  to  hold  them  both  in  leash.  Above  all  it  would 
tend  to  make  Austria  absolutely  dependent  upon  Germany, 
which  for  her  part  had  no  intention  in  those  days  of 
adventmring  her  newly  acquired  position  for  the  sake  of 
advancing  Austrian  Balkan  interests  at  the  cost  of  war  with 
Russia :  under  Bismarck  Germany  made  her  own  advice  of 
Pericles  to  the  Athenians — ra  virapKovra  aioZiiv,  preserve 
what  you  have.  Above  all,  neither  Austria  nor  Hungary 
desired  the  formation  of  a  strong  Serb  kingdom,  which 
they  looked  upon  as  a  menace  to  their  Southern  Slav 
possessions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Magyars  desired  no 
accession  in  the  Monarchy  to  the  number  of  Slavs,  which 
they  considered  to  be  already  dangerously  large. 

At  first  it  had  been  the  latter  motive  that  weighed  most 
heavily  with  Andrassy,^  but  Bismarck  endeavoured  during 
the  crisis  to  push  him  forward,  working  on  the  fear  of  a 
greater  Serbia.^  Andrassy  himself,  at  the  Congress, 
apparently  desired  rather  the  appearance  of  having  been 
forced  by  circumstances  to  take  the  fateful  step,3  and 
eventually  England,  then   busily  engaged  in  building  up 

'  "  In  reference  to  the  occupation  of  Bosnia  by  Austria,  Andrassy  had 
recalled  the  well-known  remark  of  Prince  Ligne,  who,  when  some  one 
said  to  him  that  his  wife  was  unfaithful  to  him,  replied,  '  Comment, 
quand  on  n'y  est  pas  oblige  '  ?  "  Memoirs  of  Prince  Hohenlohe,  ii,  157 
(English  edition).  Conversation  with  Von  Biilow,  imder  date  Berlin, 
November  3,  1875. 

*  "Bismarck  hopes  that  Andrdssy,  finding  no  other  choice  left  to  him, 
will  invade  Bosnia  and  keep  it.  Andrassy  is  unwilling  to  do  this,  but 
would  prefer  it  to  allowing  the  establishment  of  a  Kingdom  in  Serbia". 
Ibid,  ii,  182.     Under  date  Varzin  September  29,  1876. 

'  "  She  (Austria)  did  not  at  all  wish  that  Montenegro  should  be 
allowed  to  receive  Antivari,  and  that  the  Serbs,  with  Bosnia  and 
Montenegro,  should  proclaim  an  empire  under  Nikita.  But  the  latter 
would  be  the  case  if  Austria  did  not  take  measures.  Austria  wishes, 
however,  to  be  forced  to  invade  these  countries  ".  Ibid,  ii,  212.  Blowitz 
to  Hohenlohe.     Under  date  Berlin,  June  19,  1878. 


86  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  barriers  which  are  now  costing  us  untold  blood  and 
treasure,  formally  moved  the  invitation  to  Austria  in  the 
Congress.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  by  that  time 
Austria  had  very  definitely  made  up  her  mind,  however 
much  for  diplomatic  appearances  she  might  feign  reluctance. 
Indeed,  unless  she  were  to  abandon  her  Balkan  policy,  there 
was  no  other  way,  for  the  union  of  Bosnia  with  Serbia 
would  have  placed  a  difficult  obstacle  in  the  path  of  any 
advance  in  the  future.  The  Serbs  lay  in  the  road  of  her 
ambitions,  and  she  was  determined  to  strike  at  them 
whenever  and  wherever  she  could. 

The  reactions  of  the  occupation  on  the  internal  and 
external  politics  of  the  Monarchy  were  profound.  Up  to 
quite  recent  years  the  Southern  Slav  question  was  really 
composed  of  two  questions,  distinct  enough  though  closely 
related — the  Serb  question,  which  was  mainly  external  to 
Austrian  politics,  and  the  Croat  which  was  purely  internal. 
As  has  been  seen  the  two  kindreds  are  divided  by  differences 
of  religion,  and  they  have  also  been  divided  in  their  his- 
torical destinies,  the  history  of  the  Serbs  having  been  mainly 
Balkan  in  its  interactions  and  united  to  that  of  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Balkan  and  the  lower  Danube,  while  that  of  the 
Croats  has  been  chiefly  involved  in  the  politics  of  the  middle 
Danube.  The  Magyars  had  missed  no  opportunity  of  in- 
flaming these  differences  which  all  through  the  nineteenth 
century  rendered  abortive  all  the  efforts  of  the  Croats 
against  the  Magyars,  for  the  Croats,"  to  the  secret  joy  of 
the  Magyars  and  their  agents  provocateurs,  adopted  an 
intransigeant  attitude  towards  the  Serbs,  who  number 
about  a  third  of  the  inhabitants  of  Croatia- Slavonia  and 
are  numerous  in  southern  Hungary,  with  the  result  that 
the  latter  leaned  upon  the  ministry  at  Budapest  which  in 
turn  used  them  to  thwart  the  Croats.  Serbo-Croat  energy 
was  thus  turned  to  its  own  destruction.  The  great  Bishop 
Strossmayer  of  Djakovo,  a  Croat  in  spite  of  his  name,  but 
a  just-minded  and  a  great-hearted  Southern  Slav  patriot, 
preached  in  season  and  out  of  season  the  gospel  of  Southern 
Slav  reconciliation  and  solidarity,  yet  apparently  without 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  87 

effect  in  his  own  day,  for  he  did  not  live  to  see  the  realiza- 
tion of  all  his  strivings.  "  He  being  dead  yet  speaketh  ", 
and  perhaps  even  in  these  days  of  blood  he  may  "see  the 
travail  of  his  soul  and  shall  be  satisfied  ". 

Until  the  occupation  of  Bosnia,  then,  it  was  possible 
theoretically,  that  is  apart  from  Austrian  ambitions,  to 
envisage  two  separate  solutions  of  these  problems.  There 
might  have  been  south  of  the  Danube  a  greater  Serbia, 
purely  Serb  in  character,  consisting  of  the  Serbia  of  to-day 
together  with  Bosnia  and  the  Hercegovina  and,  if  Austria 
had  been  wishful  to  make  her  a  friend,  of  the  territory  of 
Dubrovnik.  That  was  a  possible  settlement  of  the  external 
Serb  problem.  The  Croat  problem  would  have  remained 
as  an  internal  Austrian  question.  At  this  time,  so  far  apart 
politically  were  the  two  divisions  of  the  race  that  such 
separate  solutions  would  have  seemed  natural  and  desirable 
to  themselves. 

By  the  occupation  of  Bosnia  Austria  had  gone  too  far  or 
not  far  enough.  She  had  not  united  within  herself  all  the 
Serbo-Croat  stock,  and  there  still  remained  the  kingdom  of 
Serbia  (as  well  as  the  Serb  portions  of  Turkey)  to  be  an 
independent  centre  of  Serb  nationalism.  The  act  in- 
flamed the  anger  of  the  kingdom  against  her  mighty 
neighbour  which  had  occupied  two  purely  Serb  provinces 
which  she  had  regarded  as  her  own  reversion,  and  the 
population  of  which  would  have  in  a  great  majority  wel- 
comed Serb  rule  since  the  traditions  even  of  the  Moslem 
Serbs  of  the  provinces  were  purely  Serb  and  told  of  the 
glories  of  the  ancient  Serb  Empire.  Henceforth  for 
patriotic  Serbs  there  could  be  no  longer  any  doubt  that 
if  the  Turks  were  the  Erbfeind  the  Austrians  were  the 
Erzfeind.  Unless  Austria  could  engage  the  dynasty  in 
its  favour  there  was  no  possibility  of  cordial  relations 
between  the  two  States,  and  though  the  Habsburgs  suc- 
ceeded in  attaching  Milan  and  Alexander  to  their  chariot- 
wheels  it  was  at  the  cost  of  increased  bitterness  in  the 
nation  which,  after  keeping  the  kingdom  in  a  turmoil  for 
a  generation  ended  in  the  dreadful  purge  of  1903.     So,  on 


88  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  other  hand,  Austria  had  gone  too  far  for  a  purely  Serb 
solution  of  the  Serb  problem,  for  she  had  cut  the  Serb 
stock  in  two,  and  even  the  purely  Serb  problem  required 
the  incorporation  of  Bosnia  and  Hercegovina  in  the 
kingdom.  Austria  had  gone  as  far  as  she  was  able  at 
the  time,  and  pending  a  further  advance  her  aim  was  to 
keep  the  kingdom  as  weak  as  possible.  Aided  by  the  organs 
of  the  Jewish  Press  both  within  and  without  the  Monarchy, 
for  the  Jews  have  for  occult  reasons  been  constantly  opposed 
to  Serb  expansion,  she  filled  Europe  with  tales  of  Serb 
disorders,  of  Serb  corruption  and  barbarism,  and  thus 
strove  to  prepare  the  way  for  acquiescence  in  a  further 
move  forward  on  her  part.  In  Hungary  the  Jews  were 
extremely  powerful  and  their  attitude  may  be  regarded  as 
an  expression  of  Magyar  chauvinism,  but  the  Jews  of 
Salonica  and  the  Levant  generally  worked  hard  either 
for  Turkey  or  Austria.  Jewish  high  finance  took  a  hand 
in  the  game,  hoping  perhaps  for  opportunities  of  exploita- 
tion in  Serbia  similar  to  those  which  it  received  in  Bosnia. 
Equally  great  was  the  influence  of  the  occupation  on  the 
internal  politics  of  the  Monarchy  owing  to  the  modification 
brought  about  in  its  Southern  Slav  question.  Up  to  the 
present  there  had  been,  as  has  been  said  above,  virtually 
two  problems,  Serb  and  Croat,  the  one  mainly  external  the 
other  wholly  internal.  After  1878  Austria  found  that  she 
had  added  the  Serb  question  to  the  Croat,  and  in  the  course 
of  years  a  still  more  fateful  result  was  gradually  manifested 
at  first  in  various  forms  but  eventually  taking  the  shape  of 
a  combined  Serbo-Croat  problem  internal  and  external.  The 
first  effect  was  apparently  to  drive  still  farther  the  wedge 
between  Serb  and  Croat.  The  Croats  had  throughout  the 
nineteenth  century  clamoured  for  the  incorporation  of  Dal- 
matia  in  the  Triune  Kingdom  of  which  it  was  legally  and 
constitutionally  an  integral  member,  and  this  claim  was 
reinforced  by  the  occupation,  for  Bosnia  formed  an  im- 
portant link  between  the  somewhat  straggling  portions  of 
the  kingdom.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  Croatia, 
Slavonia,  and   Dalmatia  form  two   long  peninsulas,  so  to 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  89 

speak,  of  territory,  one  pointing  east  and  the  other  south- 
east, and  that  these  two  tongues  of  land  are  joined  by  a 
very  narrow  neck,  whose  phj'sical  characteristics  of  the 
high  and  barren  mountains  of  the  Karst  made  it  almost 
as  much  a  barrier  as  a  point  of  union.  Bosnia,  however, 
conveniently  rounded  off  this  area  lying  between  the  two 
peninsulas  and  forming  with  them  a  solid  block  of  territory, 
while  it  opened  up  easier  lines  of  access  from  the  eastern 
parts  of  Croatia  to  the  ports  of  the  middle  Adriatic.  The 
Croats  now  demanded  the  incorporation  of  Bosnia  also  in 
the  kingdom  and  thus  came  into  violent  conflict  with  the 
Serbs  at  home  and  abroad.  For  the  Croats  the  demand  was 
a  scheme  of  aggrandizement  going  beyond  their  constitu- 
tional claims,  for  the  Serbs  it  was  an  unprovoked  attack 
upon  their  own  legitimate  aspirations  delivered  by  a  kindred 
people.  This  strife  worked  for  the  benefit  of  the  Magyars, 
who  promoted  it  in  every  way  possible.  In  Croatia  riots 
between  the  two  elements  were  of  frequent  occurrence  ;  the 
Serb  colours  would  be  burnt  or  trampled  on,  while  on  their 
side  the  Serbs  lent  their  aid  to  the  Hungarian  Bans  and 
derided  the  Croat  claims ;  even  the  great  Strossmayer  was 
refused  entry  on  one  occasion  to  Belgrade.  All  this  brought 
grist  to  the  Magyar  mill.  In  truth  the  position  of  the 
Magyars  was  precarious :  a  large  accession  had  been  made 
to  the  Southern  Slavs  of  the  Monarchy  not  because  their 
presence  was  desired,  for  it  was  loathed,  but  partly  in 
furtherance  of  the  policy  of  expansion  and  partly  to 
exorcise  the  danger  from  a  strong  Serb  kingdom,  but 
this  accession  might  prove  absolutely  fatal  if  once  the 
two  Slav  elements  came  to  terms.  The  political  forces 
and  cross  currents  were  subtle  and  intricate ;  Austria  had 
desired  to  prevent  a  greater  Serbia,  for  one  reason  because 
of  the  danger  that  such  a  Serbia  would  attract  the  Southern 
Slavs  of  the  Monarchy — a  result  which,  as  has  been  seen, 
would  have  been  by  no  means  certain  if  a  friendly  policy 
had  been  pursued  by  the  Magyars  to  the  Croats.  The 
danger,  however,  of  a  similar  result  so  far  from  being 
exorcised   would   actually   have   been   created,  and   within 


90  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  Monarchy  itself,  if  Serbs  and  Croats  joined  hands.  In 
short,  in  that  event  Austrian  policy  would  have  given  form, 
substance,  and  opportunity  to  the  very  danger  it  had  sought 
to  avoid,  and  which,  possibly,  might  have  been  avoided  if 
concihation  towards  the  Croats  at  home  had  been  accom- 
panied by  a  sympathetic  attitude  towards  the  creation  of  a 
greater  Serbia— a  policy  which  in  1865,  in  the  reign  of 
Prince  Michael  had  been  tentatively  accepted.^  There 
was  great  danger  that  Austria  would  find  herself  hoist 
with  her  own  petard.  Some  years  were  to  pass,  never- 
theless, before  the  actual  danger-point  was  reached,  for 
until  the  first  years  of  the  p^resent  century  the  Croats 
remained  loyal  to  the  dynasty. 

The  demand  for  a  greater  Croatia  was  by  no  means 
inspired  by  feelings  of  hostility  to  the  Habsburgs,  for  in 
spite  of  all  discouragements  the  Croats  had  always  been 
quite  curiously  devoted  to  the  ruling  House  and  "Vienna"  : 
their  quarrel  was  with  Budapest.  To  the  Magyars  the 
design  was  one  to  be  resisted  at  all  costs,  for  its  success 
would  have  deprived  them  not  only  of  their  position  in 
the  Monarchy  as  a  whole,  but  in  the  "Hungarian"  king- 
dom as  well;  it  would  have  reduced  them  to  the  position 
primi  inter  pares,  while  their  inordinate  and  stubborn 
pride  demanded  a  position  of  predominance.  The  success 
of  the  Croats,  also,  would  have  been  an  encouragement 
and  example  to  the  two  millions  of  Slovaks  and  the  four 
milhons  of  Roumanians.  The  Southern  Slav  movement 
would  not  be  checked — repression  no  longer  had  its 
ancient  force,  while  in  Dalmatia,  owing  to  the  milder 
methods  of  Vienna,  it  found  a  strong  point  d'appui 
whence  it  could  exert  its  influence  in  Croatia  untram- 
melled by  Magyar  police  methods.  The  next  step  showed 
how  Serbs  and  Croats  were  learning  the  lesson  of  adversity 
and  the  folly  of  internecine  warfare,  and  in  1905,  conse- 
quent on   the   resolutions   passed   at   Rijeka    (Fiume)   and 

'  It  has  been  frequently  stated  that  in  1865  Austria  herself  expressed 
to  Serbia  her  acquiescence  in  a  future  Serb  occupation  of  Bosnia  as  far 
as  the  Vrbas. 


THE  RENASCENCE  OF  SERBIA  91 

Zadar  (Zara),  the  Serbo-Croat  Coalition  was  formed, 
embracing  the  greater  part  of  the  independent  political 
parties  in  the  Croatian  and  Dalmatian  Sabors.  This  step 
alarmed  the  Magyars,  for  it  destroyed  at  a  blow  the 
basis  of  their  power  in  Croatia  and  was  the  hoisting  of  a 
danger-signal  not  to  be  disregarded.  Henceforth  there 
could  be  no  doubt  of  the  reality  and  strength  of  the 
Southern  Slav  movement. 

Not  even  yet  was  that  movement  anti-dynastic ;  it  was 
still  directed  only  against  the  overweening  pretensions  of 
the  Magyars.  The  leaders  still  desired  an  accord  with 
Vienna,  and  for  a  moment  even  hoped  for  one  with 
Budapest  at  the  moment  engaged  in  one  of  its  periodical 
struggles  against  Austria.  The  situation  moreover  in 
Serbia,  two  years  after  the  accession  of  King  Peter,  was 
not  such  as  to  lead  any  but  the  Serbs  proper  to  turn 
their  eyes  in  that  direction.  There  was  one  man  in  the 
Monarchy  who,  if  report  speaks  true,  for  he  had  the  gift 
of  silence,  grasped  the  position  and  saw  a  way  of  turning 
it  to  the  advantage  of  the  ruling  House  and  of  the  whole 
State,  and  that  was  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand. 
The  Archduke  was  supposed  to  give  his  adhesion  to  what 
was  known  as  the  Greater  Austria  policy,  a  policy  which 
was  not  content  with  the  passive  and  secondary  role 
which  the  Monarchy  had  been  playing  on  the  inter- 
national stage,  but  saw  that  a  thorough  reconstruction  at 
home  was  necessary  to  any  real  forward  movement 
abroad.  One  of  the  ideas  attributed  to  the  Archduke 
was  the  substitution  of  Trialism  for  Dualism — that  is  to 
say,  the  establishment  of  a  third  Southern  Slav  unit 
comprising  Croatia,  Bosnia,  Dalmatia,  and  possibly  the 
Slovene  country,  side  by  side  with  Austria  and  Hungary. 
This  is  perhaps  doubtful.  Another  plan  imputed  to  him 
was  more  thorough  and  far-reaching.  This  was  the  entire 
reconstruction  of  the  Monarchy  on  a  federal  basis. 
Under  this  scheme  all  the  national  units  would  have 
been  reconstituted  as  constituent  elements  of  the  State 
with   a  large   measure  of  internal   autonomy  and  with  a 


92  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

representation  in  a  common  federal  parliament  for  the 
whole  Monarchy.  Either  plan  would  have  deprived  the 
Magyars  of  their  predominant  position  in  Transleithania, 
and  would  have  met  with  the  bitterest  opposition  from 
them.  Indeed  it  is  doubtful  whether  either  idea  could 
have  been  carried  out  without  a  civil  war  which  might 
have  ended  in  complete  disruption,  and  it  was  part  of 
the  tragedy  of  the  Archduke's  life  that  the  man  who  saw 
the  only  chance  of  saving  the  House  of  Habsburg  should 
have  come  on  the  scene  when  it  was  already  too  late  for 
effect  to  be  given  to  his  ideas.  There  was  no  longer  a 
locus  pcenitentiae.  To  the  Magyars  he  was  openly 
antagonistic  as  to  the  great  obstacle  in  his  way,  and  the 
feeling  was  heartily  reciprocated.  Hardly  less  hostile  was 
the  German  element  whose  position,  in  the  larger 
scheme,  was  equally  menaced.  In  one  thing  he  was 
true  to  his  ancestry — he  planned  for  the  House  of 
Habsburg. 

Among  the  causes  to  which  is  due  the  failure  of  the 
Habsburgs  to  make  use  of  the  most  magnificent  oppor- 
tunities may  be  assigned  two  traits  of  character  which 
have  marked  the  House  almost  without  interval  from  the 
days  of  Maximilian  to  the  present  time — lack  of  tolera- 
tion, its  fervid  ultramontanism,  and  lack  of  imagination. 
To  the  first  they  have  frequently  sacrificed  their  interests, 
to  the  second  they  owe  the  failure  to  make  use  of  political 
openings  almost  without  number.  The  Archduke  was  not 
without  imagination — far  from  it ;  for  the  Greater  Austria 
idea  based  on  federal  reconstruction  showed,  if  not  the 
highest  imagination,  at  any  rate  an  imagination  superior 
to  that  either  of  his  immediate  ancestors  or  of  his  uncle's 
statesmen.  To  a  certain  degree  the  idea  may  be  said  to 
be  obvious — but  many  "statesmen"  lack  imagination  to 
grasp  the  obvious.  In  his  Southern  Slav  schemes  there 
was  one  fatal  flaw,  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  a  bigoted 
ultramontane  like  all  his  House.  He  thought  of  settling 
the  Southern  Slav  question  on  a  purely  CathoHc  Croat 
basis,  and  more,  he  is   credited  with  having  mingled  his 


THE  RENASCENCE  OF  SERBIA  93 

political  aims  with  a  mystical  dream  in  which  he  should 
be  the  instrument  chosen  to  bring  the  Orthodox  into  the 
Catholic  fold.  If  this  be  true — and  it  is  asserted  by  those 
who  claim  some  degree  of  intimate  knowledge — it  would 
have  been  more  than  sufficient  to  wreck  his  plans.  Even 
the  attempt  to  solve  the  Southern  Slav  question  on  a 
CathoHc  Croat  basis  was  impracticable.  In  former  years 
the  purely  Croat  problem  might  have  been  so  treated, 
but  never  the  whole  Southern  Slav  question.  Even  the 
Catholicism  of  the  Croats  is  not  ultramontane  in  char- 
acter so  far  as  the  people  itself  is  concerned.  The  day, 
however,  had  gone  by  for  partial  and  separate  solutions. 
The  leaven  had  been  at  work,  the  occupation  of  Bosnia 
had  quickened  its  action ;  the  Serbo-Croat  Coalition  had 
been  formed,  and  the  question  could  only  be  solved  on  a 
Serbo-Croat,  Orthodox  and  Catholic,  basis.  The  ultra- 
montane prejudices  of  the  Archduke  would  not  allow  him, 
his  imagination  did  not  soar  sufficiently  high,  to  envisage 
himself  as  Orthodox  Tsar  as  well  as  Catholic  King. 

He  found  an  able  but  unscrupulous  collaborator  in  the 
late  Count  Aehrenthal,  and  in  pursuance  of  his  ideas  in 
1908  Bosnia  was  annexed  to  the  Monarchy,  having  been 
hitherto  only  "occupied  and  administered".  A  sharp 
crisis  with  Serbia  followed,  in  which  the  latter  was 
forced  to  eat  humble-pie,  the  form  being  that  she 
was  forced  to  swallow  the  words  (that  the  matter  was 
of  European  concern  and  affected  her  also)  which  had 
been  placed  in  her  mouth  by  the  British  Government. 
Austrian  duplicity  overreached  itself  in  what  followed. 
Anxious  to  get  up  a  case  against  Serbia,  the  Ballplatz  set 
abroad  rumours  of  a  pan-Serb  plot,  and  in  1909  brought 
to  trial  the  leaders  of  the  Serbo-Croat  Coalition  in  what 
is  known  as  the  Agram  High  Treason  Trial.  The  accused 
were  condemned  by  a  scandalous  judgment.  The  follow- 
ing year  the  same  men,  having  been  in  the  meantime 
amnestied,  brought  a  libel  action  against  the  Austrian 
historian  Dr.  Friedjung,  who  in  his  polemic  against  them 
had  asserted  the  existence  of,  and  had  quoted  from,  certain 


94  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

incriminating  documents.  In  the  course  of  the  trial  at 
Vienna  these  documents  alleging  a  pan-Serb  conspiracy 
engineered  from  Belgrade  and  involving  the  Serbo-Croat 
leaders,  v/ere  proved  to  be  forgeries,  and  their  origin  w&a 
subsequently  traced  to  Count  Forgach,  Austrian  Minister  at 
Belgrade.'  Count  Aehrenthal,  of  course,  was  the  prime 
mover.  The  result  recoiled  on  the  Austrian  Government, 
since  it  not  only  failed  to  establish  its  case  against 
Serbia,  but  also  finally  estranged  the  Southern  Slavs  of 
the  Monarchy.  The  Archduke's  plans  had  definitely 
come  to  grief,  and  it  is  extraordinary  that  he  ever  per- 
mitted a  course  of  action  so  absolutely  fatal.  The 
successes  of  Serbia  in  the  Balkan  wars  produced  a  pro- 
digious effect  in  the  "  Slavonic  South"  (Slovenski  Jug); 
patriotism  was  inflamed  and  the  people  overcome  with 
joy,  for  they  set  at  rest  any  lingering  doubts  as  to  the 
ability  of  Serbia  to  play  the  part  of  a  Southern  JSlav 
Piedmont.  The  Southern  Slavs  turned  aside  from  any 
idea  of  a  Habsburg  solution  of  their  problem  and  based 
themselves  on  an  independent  footing  ;  their  redemption 
was  to  be  by  their  own  kith  and  kin.  So  high  did 
feeling  rise  in  Dalmatia  that  most  of  the  municipalities 
were  dissolved  and  the  towns  placed  under  martial  law, 
and  when  shortly  before  his  death  the  Archduke  visited 
Spljet  (Spalato)  the  populace  forced  the  band  to  repeat 
the  Serb  national  anthem  three  times.  The  Southern  Slavs 
had  found  themselves,  and  no  longer  distrusted  their  future, 
the  resources  of  their  race,  or  the  leadership  of  Serbia. 

II 

The  annexation  of  Bosnia  aroused  Serbia  to  a  sense  of 
her  peril.     Any   lingering  hope  that  she  might  still  have 

•  For  a  detailed  account  of  these  two  trials  see  R.  W.  Seton-Watson, 
The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  Less 
detailed  accounts  of  them,  together  with  summaries  of  subsequent 
treason  trials  to  the  present  time  (February  1917),  will  be  found  in 
Le  Bdgime  Politique  d'Autriche-Hongrie  en  Bosnie-Herzegovint  et 
lea  Procei  de  Haute  Trahison  and  in  Les  Persecutions  des  Yougoslaves, 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  95 

cherished  of  obtaining  access  to  the  Adriatic  through 
Bosnia  was  dispelled,  and  unless  she  bestirred  herself  her 
future  in  Old  Serbia  and  Macedonia  would  also  be  lost. 
More  than  that,  she  saw  herself  designated  as  the  next 
victim,  and  the  loss  of  her  independence  to  be  the  next 
step  in  Austria's  course  to  Salonica.  She  knew,  moreover, 
that  if  Austria  had  renounced  her  position  in  the  sanjak  of 
Novipazar,  it  was  because  the  General  Staff  had  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  sanjak  formed  no  practical  military 
road  to  the  ^gean,  and  that  the  only  possible  line  of 
advance  was  the  historic  road  up  the  Morava  valley  and 
down  that  of  the  Vardar.  She  lay  directly  in  Austria's 
path  and  her  danger  was  acute.  For  these  eventualities 
she  prepared  herself  with  feverish  energy,  and  the  work 
of  consolidation  which  had  marked  King  Peter's  reign  was 
pressed  forward  with  increased  resolution,  especially  in 
military  matters. 

The  army  was  reorganized  chiefly  under  the  foster- 
ing care  of  General,  now  Vojvode  (Field-Marshal) 
Putnik,  first  as  Minister  of  War  and  then  as  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff.  The  father  of  this  famous  officer 
had  come  to  Serbia  from  southern  Hungary  and  taken 
up  work  as  a  schoolmaster.  The  son  entered  the 
army  and  devoted  himself  entirely  to  a  military  career. 
Unlike  many  other  Balkan  soldiers  he  entirely  eschewed 
politics  and  was  noted  for  his  taciturnity.  If  Moltke  could 
be  silent  in  seven  languages  Putnik  is  silent  in  five,  and 
he  is  said  to  have  remarked  that  only  fools  become 
politicians  or  journalists.  The  Serb  artillery  was  rearmed 
with  French  guns  from  the  famous  Schneider-Canet  firm 
of  Creusot  similar  to  the  75's  of  the  French  Army, 
magazine  rifles  were  procured,  and  older  rifles  were  con- 
verted at  the  arsenal  of  Kragujevac.  Some  batteries  of 
howitzers  were  also  procured  to  an  extent  that  made 
Serbia  the  best  provided  of  the  Balkan  States  in  this  regard, 
though,  as  recent  events  have  shown,  not  to  the  extent 
necessary  in  modern  war  against  a  Great  Power.  The 
artillery  proved  itself  up  to  the  standard  of  the  best  armies 


96    THE   FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

and  was  greatly  superior  in  the  Balkan  wars  to  that  of 
foes  or  allies.  The  infantry  proved  dashing  in  attack  and 
stubborn  in  defence,  and  tireless  marchers.  The  Serb 
cavalry  was  also  noted  at  the  time  as  being  the  only 
cavalry  in  the  Balkans  trained  in  the  manner  of  that  of 
western  States  though  it  was  small  in  numbers.  The 
auxiliary  services  proved  equal  to  the  strain  of  the  Balkan 
wars  though  in  some  respects,  especially  medical,  over- 
powered by  the  demands  of  the  Great  War.  During  the 
Obrenovic  Hgime  the  army  had  been  scandalously  neglected, 
its  cadres  were  insufficient,  its  subsidiary  services  rudi- 
mentary, its  moral  shaken  by  neglect  and  interference  in 
politics,  and  in  the  'nineties  it  was  notoriously  the  least 
prepared  for  war  of  any  Balkan  force.  Since  then  the 
Serb  as  a  soldier  has  come  to  his  own  again,  and  no  more 
is  heard  now  of  the  foolish  disparagement  that  has  already 
been  noted  ;  indeed  the  tendency  has  rather  been  to  an 
opposite  exaggeration,  and  more  has  been  expected  of  the 
Serb  army  than  either  it  or  perhaps  any  other  army  could 
perform.  In  the  first  Balkan  war  the  great  victory  of 
Kumanovo,  leading  to  the  amusing  invention  of  the 
Bulgarian  victory  at  Kirk  Kilisse,  an  action  which  never 
took  place,  which  shattered  the  Turkish  power  in  northern 
Macedonia,  followed  by  the  battles  of  Prihp  and  Bitolj, 
showed  what  the  new  Serb  army  was  like.  In  the  hard 
test  of  the  second  Balkan  war  it  proved  its  efficiency  on 
the  Bregalnica  against  the  Bulgars  and  firmly  established 
its  position.  Of  the  victories  of  the  Jadar,  and  the 
great  rally  on  Mount  Eudnik  when  the  Austrians  were 
hurled  out  of  the  country  with  a  loss  of  40,000  killed  and 
wounded  and  60,000  prisoners,  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak. 
If  in  November  1915  it  went  down  before  the  shock  of  the 
combined  Austro-German-Bulgar  forces  it  was  because 
it  was  hopelessly  outnumbered  by  at  least  three  to  one 
in  men  and  ten  to  one  in  heavy  artillery.  The  fact  that 
the  enemy  considered  that  such  a  combined  move  was 
necessary  speaks  volumes  for  their  opinion  of  the  Serbs. 
Even  before  the  great  last  attack  the  Serbs  had  placed 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  97 

not  less  than  300,000  Austrians  hors  de  combat,^  a  figure 
equal  to  its  own  extreme  numbers.  Before  the  cUbdcle 
of  December  1914  Danzer's  Armee  Zeitimg,  the  Austrian 
military  organ,  said  in  reference  to  Austrian  reports  of 
Serb  demoralization  :  "  In  reality  we  are  fighting  an  enemy 
who  has  scarcely  his  equal  in  courage  and  energy,  and  who 
defends  every  inch  of  the  ground."  Well  equipped  and 
well  led  the  Serb  army  has  proved  itself  a  formidable 
fighting  machine,  even  when  faced  by  the  troops  of  a 
Great  Power. 

In  military  matters  the  wheel  has  come  full  circle,  and 
here  the  national  motto,  "  Tempus  et  meumjus  ",  has  been 
justified.  Not  only,  however,  in  military  affairs  has  there 
been  a  veritable  renascence.^  Military  progress  has  been 
accompanied  and  made  possible  by  political,  economic,  and 
financial  advance  of  no  mean  order,  and  it  is  well  to  know 
that  Serbia's  progress  is  broad  based  on  solid  grounds, 
giving  valid  hopes  of  future  stability.  She  is  our  ally ; 
we  shall,  after  the  war,  have  economic  and  commercial 
dealings  with  her,  and  her  satisfactory  internal  position 
should  be  duly  noted  by  our  men  of  affairs  as  well  as  by 
politicians. 

During  the  present  regime  there  has  been  great  progress 
in  all  departments  of  the  national  life.  Political  life  has 
followed  normal  courses,  and  the  present  King  has  known 
how  to  respect  the  Constitution  of  his  realm,  while  not 
hesitating  on  occasion  to  avail  himself  of  his  royal  preroga- 
tive in  such  matters,  for  example,  as  the  refusal  to  accept 
the  resignation  of  a  Ministry  when  he  considered  such  a 
course   in  the  interests  of   the   country.     There  has  thus 

'  The  Austrian  losses  in  the  Balkans  up  to  February  1,  1916,  are 
stated  by  the  Budapest  correspondent  of  the  Morning  Post  to  have 
amounted  to  117,900  killed,  265,900  wounded,  and  80,000  prisoners. 
The  calculation  is  the  work  of  a  Hungarian  statistician.  Morning  Post, 
March  17,  1916. 

="  In  this  section  I  deal  of  course  with  the  progress  made  up  to  the 
recent  wars.  The  latter  have  altered  the  economic  conditions  materially, 
yet  the  record  of  previous  recent  progress  stands  as  an  augury  of  the 
future. 

7 


98  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 


been  obtained  a  very  fair  measure  of  stability  in  adminis- 
tration, and  constitutional  crises  are  a  thing  of  the  past. 
This  is  a  very  different  state  of  afifairs  to  that  obtaining 
under  King  Alexander,  whose  poHtical  instability  and  fre- 
quent coups  d'etat  made  normal  progress  impossible. 

The  foundation  of  all  internal  reforms  and  social  progress 
is  good  finance,  and  here  the  advance  is  most  noteworthy. 
It  is  only  possible  to  carry  the  survey  up  to  the  period  ante- 
cedent to  the  Balkan  wars,  which,  of  course,  created  fresh 
obligations  (and  assets)  and  have  prevented  the  presentation 
of  a  normal  budget.  The  following  figures  show  the 
growth  of  the  budget : — 


Year. 

Total 
Receipts. 

Total 
Expenditure. 

Surplus  or  Deficit. 

Frs. 

Frs. 

Frs. 

1895     

58,540,700 

64,935,295 

—  6,394,595 

1900     

77,179,397 

78,710,708 

—  1,531,310 

1906     

91,270,374 

87,189,680 

+  4,080,693 

1907     

94,324,117 

86,689,952 

+  8,134,164 

1908     

95,293,792 

95,029,350 

+      264,442 

1909     

105,130,472 

103,831,367 

+  1,299,105 

1910     

116,581,133 

111,633,527 

+  4,947,605 

1911     

126,078,673 

111,990,364 

+  14,088,309 

Late  years,  it  will  be  seen,  have  yielded  a  steady  surplus, 
no  deficit  being  incurred  even  in  1908,  during  the  annexa- 
tion crisis.  The  reorganization  of  the  State  accounts  has 
been  carried  out  with  the  assistance  of  an  expert  lent  by 
the  French  Government.  The  service  of  the  debt  is  secured 
upon  the  monopoHes  of  tobacco,  salt,  petroleum,  matches, 
and  cigarette  paper,  the  customs,  and  certain  stamp  duties 
and  alimentary  taxes.  These  taxes  are  paid  in  to  the 
monopolies  direction,  which  is  sometimes  described  as 
autonomous.  It  does  not,  however,  imply  foreign  control 
of  these  revenues,  as,  while  the  bondholders  appoint  two 
members  to  the  administrative  council  of  the  monopoHes, 
the  government  itself  appoints  the  remaining  three.  The 
surplus  revenues  of  the  administration  after  meeting  the 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  99 

debt  service  are  handed  over  to  the  Treasury.  The  follow- 
ing figures  show  the  increase  in  this  surplus  in  spite  of  the 
increase  of  debt : — 


Year. 

Frs. 

Year. 

FrB. 

1896  ... 

...   1,556,143 

1908  ... 

...  12,078,744 

1900  ... 

...   7,635,608 

1909  ... 

...  11,489,225 

1904  ... 

...  11,742,906 

1910  ... 

...  10,268,074 

1906  ... 

...  14,404,340 

1911  ... 

...  15,482,725 

1907  ... 

...  14,627,678 

In  1903  was  instituted  the  gotovina,  or  Treasury  reserve 
fund,  fed  by  budget  surplus  and  certain  assigned  revenues. 
The  object  of  this  fund  is  to  provide  a  working  balance 
pending  the  encashment  of  the  revenue,  to  meet  supple- 
mentary estimates,  and  to  provide  for  extraordinary  expen- 
diture included  in  the  budget.  Thanks  to  the  reserve  fund, 
it  is  some  years  since  Serbia  has  issued  Treasury  Bills,  the 
only  recent  issue  being  in  1911,  advanced  to  the  National 
Bank  for  the  purpose  of  providing  extra  currency.  In  1908, 
during  the  annexation  crisis,  the  government  was  able  to 
draw  upon  it  to  the  extent  of  18,000,000  francs,  thus 
obviating  the  necessity  of  issuing  Treasury  Bills  or  con- 
tracting a  loan.  It  has  also  enabled  the  State  to  pay  off  the 
balance  of  certain  loans  of  no  great  amount,  the  presence  of 
which  swelled  the  number  of  outstanding  loans.  These,  to 
the  amount  of  14,644,514  francs,  have  been  paid  off,  as  well 
as  a  further  sum  of  700,000  francs  representing  the  last 
of  the  old  floating  debt.  Notwithstanding  all  these  pay- 
ments, the  fund  increased  in  the  six  years  1906-11  by  a 
total  of  11,000,000  francs.  This  result  contrasts  favourably 
with  the  former  chronic  deficits,  which  went  to  swell  the 
amount  of  unproductive  debt.  The  debt  in  1912  amounted 
to  659,056,000  francs,  representing  a  decrease,  as  compared 
with  1910,  of  17,500,000  francs.  The  increase  in  Serbia's 
credit  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  1895  4  per  cent, 
converted  loan  was  issued  at  69*5  and  in  1912  stood  at  90, 
an  appreciation  of  30  per  cent.  Coincidently  the  burden  of 
the  debt  service  on  the  revenue  has  decreased  notably.  In 
1889  the  annuities  accounted  for  no  less  than  50  per  cent,  of 


100  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the   Government  receipts,   in   1895  33  per  cent.,   in   1910 
25  per  cent.,  and  in  1912  23'5  per  cent. 

Serbia  is  predominantly  an  agricultural  State  of  small 
peasant  proprietors.  Of  the  total  population  of  the 
kingdom  as  it  existed  prior  to  the  Balkan  wars,  84*23 
per  cent,  were  engaged  in  agriculture,  6*68  per  cent,  in 
industry,  4'41  per  cent,  in  trade,  and  4" 68  in  the  professions 
or  Government  employment.  The  following  table  of  figures, 
the  most  recent  available  though  not  quite  up  to  date,  gives 
an  idea  of  the  even  excessive  subdivision  of  property  in  the 
former  kingdom  : — 


No.  of  Propertiea. 

Extent  of  Each. 
Hectares  (1  Hectare  =  2-4  Acres). 

Percentage  of 
Properties. 

98,253 

Up  to  3  (acres  7-2) 

33-49 

62,622 

3-5 

(7-2-12) 

21-16 

80,822 

5-10 

(12-24) 

27-55 

40,782 

10-20 

(24-48) 

13-87 

7,663 

20-30 

(48-72) 

2-60 

2,138 

30-40 

(72-96) 

•73 

846 

40-50 

(96-120) 

•29 

345 

50-60 

(120-144) 

•12 

198 

60-70 

(144-168) 

•07 

99 

70-80 

(168-192) 

•03 

63 

80-90 

(192-216) 

•02 

37 

90-100 

(216-240) 

•01 

41 

100-125 

(240-800) 

•01 

17 

125-150 

(800-360) 

•005 

17 

150-200 

(360-480) 

•005 

2 

200-250 

(480-600) 

•001 

3 

250-300 

(600-720) 

•001 

3 

Over  300 

(over  720) 

•001 

The  need  in  such  an  economy  for  co-operation  has  not 
only  been  felt,  but  has  largely  been  acted  upon.  There 
are  in  existence  several  hundred  co-operative  credit  societies 
on  the  Raffeisen  principle,  granting  loans  to  their  members 
for  such  objects  as  the  planting  of  vines  and  fruit  trees,  the 
purchase  of  beasts  of  burden  and  of  agricultural  implements, 
etc.    Each  association  has  also  an  adults'  and  children's 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  101 

savings  bank.  There  are  also  specific  associations  for  the 
purchase  of  agricultural  implements  to  be  used  in  common. 
In  virtue  of  the  common  guarantee  of  the  members,  funds 
are  advanced  by  the  Central  Caisse  of  the  agricultural  co- 
operative societies.  The  societies  possess  their  sowing 
machine,  reaping  and  threshing  machine,  etc.  As  an 
illustration  of  the  benefit  conferred,  it  is  stated  that  a 
small  cart  which  used  to  cost  72  francs  in  Belgrade 
now  costs  50  francs ;  and  that  a  Dutch  reaper  used  to 
cost  about  800  francs,  while  the  Central  Caisse  can 
now  get  it  delivered  in  Belgrade  for  550  francs.  The 
Central  Caisse  finances  the  local  societies  and  also  sells 
their  products ;  it  is  itself  financed  by  the  State.  The 
various  local  societies  can  become  members  as  share- 
holders, but  no  shareholder  can  hold  more  than  100  shares, 
and  voting  is  by  membership,  irrespective  of  the  amount  of 
shares  held.  It  should  be  mentioned  that  each  society  has 
its  own  tribunal,  composed  of  two  members  chosen  by  the 
conflicting  parties  and  a  third  co-opted  as  president.  This 
tribunal  settles  petty  disputes  among  the  members  con- 
nected with  such  matters  as  rights  of  way,  damage  done 
by  beasts  to  crops,  etc.  Finally,  all  the  co-operative 
societies,  departmental  unions,  and  the  Central  Caisse 
form  the  General  Union  of  the  agricultural  co-operative 
societies,  which  defends  their  interests,  undertakes  the 
creation  of  new  societies  and  the  direction  and  control  of 
those  already  existing.  Six  years  ago  there  were  already 
more  than  500  agricultural  co-operative  societies  and  about 
250  branches.  In  addition,  there  are  over  50  public  nurseries, 
ranging  from  12  to  57  acres,  conducted  on  "  model "  lines 
and  comprising  orchards,  vineyards,  poultry  farms,  etc. 
There  are  also  official  agricultural  instructors,  advising 
the  peasants  in  their  districts  and  working  under  the 
Ministry  of  Agriculture. 

Such  is  a  resume  of  the  means  adopted  to  raise  agri- 
culture and  to  free  the  peasants  from  the  operations  of 
the  "gombeen  man",  while  there  is  also  a  homestead  law 
by  which  an  area  of  about  five  acres,  with  the  necessary 


102  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

implements  and  beasts,  cannot  be  sold  for  the  satisfaction 
of  private  debts,  and  the  peasants  are  forbidden  to  give 
bills  of  exchange.  The  restriction  of  credit  thus  brought 
about  is  ameliorated  by  the  operation  of  the  Eaffeisen 
societies.  The  Serbs  take  kindly  to  co-operation  for  two 
main  reasons.  The  older  social  economy  of  the  people  v^as 
centred  in  the  Zadriiga,  or  family  group,  which  might 
even  comprise  as  many  as  300  members  and  include  a 
whole  village.  The  family  owned  their  land  in  common 
and  worked  it  in  common  under  the  direction  of  the 
staresina,  or  elder,  by  whom  the  products  were  apportioned. 
The  members  had  a  common  dining-hall  in  the  house  of 
the  staresina,  with  their  individual  cottages,  in  the  case 
of  married  sons,  grouped  round  the  central  homestead. 
Some  family  zadrugas  are  still  to  be  found.  They  have 
also  their  moha  and  sprega,  the  former  being  the  name 
given  to  mutual  co-operation,  as  in  times  of  harvest,  when 
neighbours  join  together  to  help  one  who  stands  in  need 
of  further  manual  aid,  the  latter  being  the  name  of  similar 
help  given  by  the  loan  of  draught  or  plough  animals,  etc. 
The  co-operative  society  takes  the  place  and  even  the  name 
of  the  former  zadruga,  of  which  it  may  be  said  to  be  the 
modern  form,  it  is  in  fact  the  new  zadruga.  In  Serbia 
co-operation  has  no  deep-rooted  prejudices  to  overcome,  as 
in  our  own  country,  and  the  habit  of  co-operation  augurs 
well  for  the  economic  future  of  the  country.  The  vitality 
and  growth  of  a  State  depend  not  merely  on  valour  in  the 
field,  which  is  truly  a  moral  test,  but  in  advance  in  those 
material  and  economic  aspects  of  the  national  life  which 
are  in  nations  as  necessarily  united  to  moral  soundness  as 
body  and  soul  in  the  individual. 

The  work  of  railway  construction  which  prior  to  the 
present  regime  had  been  confined  to  the  Oriental  lines, 
no  subsequent  construction  at  all  having  been  undertaken, 
has  also  been  pressed  forward  in  recent  years.  The  Brza 
Palanka-Ni§  line  of  normal  gauge  was  completed  just  at  the 
time  of  the  Austro-Bulgar  invasion,  it  forms  the  Serb 
portion  of  the  future  connection  with  Eoumania.     Several 


THE   RENASCENCE   OF  SERBIA  103 

narrow-gauge  lines  have  also  been  built  such  as  the  western 
Morava  valley  line  from  Stalac  to  Uzice,  a  line  from 
Obrenovac  on  the  Danube  to  Valjevo,  another  from  Mlade- 
novac  on  the  main  line  to  the  south  of  Belgrade  to  a 
junction  to  the  last  named  at  Lajkovac,  and  a  line  from 
ParaSin,  on  the  main  line,  to  Zajecar  on  the  Timok  valley 
line. 

The  results  of  all  this  work  of  reconstruction  were  seen 
in  the  Balkan  wars.  The  renascence  of  Serbia  had  been 
effected  silently  and  in  a  manner  that  belied  the  common 
accusation  that  the  Serbs  are  talkers  rather  than  doers. 
Even  the  measures  taken  to  emancipate  Serbia  from 
economic  servitude  to  Austria  following  on  the  "pig  war" 
of  1905-6  had  not  attracted  the  attention  that  might  have 
been  expected ;  fresh  outlets  of  trade  had  been  created 
vid  Salonica,  and  slaughter-houses  had  rendered  the 
country  less  dependent  on  the  export  of  live-stock.  To 
those  who  were  not  cognizant  of  the  work  that  had  been 
done,  the  results  of  the  Balkan  wars  were  astonishing,  and 
people  realized  that  Serbia  was  not  only  an  important 
mihtary  State,  but  that  its  statesmen  had  proved  them- 
selves organizers  of  no  mean  ability.  The  inception  of 
the  alliance  itself  was  a  tribute  to  the  altered  position  of 
the  country  in  the  eyes  of  its  neighbours  who  could  no 
longer  regard  it  as  a  negligible  quantity.  For  Serbia  the 
Turkish  war  was  a  desperate  attempt  to  reach  the  sea  and 
to  forestall  Austria's  next  step ;  success  might  bring  relief 
and  possibly  safety,  failure  would  but  anticipate  an  other- 
wise inevitable  fate.  She  bore  her  part  valiantly,  and  at 
Kumanovo  avenged  Kosovo;  "We  gained  the  country  by 
the  sword,  and  you  have  regained  it  by  the  sword,"  a  Turk 
of  Skoplje  is  said  to  have  remarked  to  a  Serb  officer.  At 
Adrianople  the  deciding  factor  was  the  Serb  artillery, 
though  the  Bulgars  endeavoured  to  belittle  the  aid  received 
and  showed  scant  courtesy  to  the  Serb  contingent  who 
were  not  even  thanked  in  general  orders. 

Austria  was  disconcerted  and  alarmed  at  the  results 
achieved,   for  she  had  reckoned  on  a  Turkish  victory  and 


104  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  possibility  of  her  stepping  in  to  "save"  the  Serbs.  She 
refused  Serbia  the  desired  access  to  the  Adriatic  and 
intrigued  with  Bulgaria  to  break  up  the  alliance.^  Disputes 
arose  over  the  partition  of  Macedonia,  and  the  second 
Balkan  v^^ar  broke  out — the  Balkan  bloc  V7as  broken  up. 
Again  the  result  belied  Austrian  anticipations,  and  Serbia 
emerged  victorious  and  still  further  aggrandized.  In 
August  1913  Austria  planned  a  war  against  Serbia,^  but  the 
project  was  put  off  for  the  time  being.  The  murder  of  the 
Archduke  in  June  1915  gave  her  the  opportunity  she 
desired  and  the  Great  "War  was  the  result. 

In  spite  of  the  ordeal  through  which  Serbia  is  passing, 
the  work  of  regeneration  outlined  above  gives  good  hope  for 
the  future  in  the  event  of  a  victory  for  the  Allies.  The 
renascence  of  Serbia  in  its  essential  and  spiritual  elements 
is  an  accomplished  fact,  the  recent  material  loss  is  heavy 
indeed  but  it  will  be  made  good;  Serbia  will  rise  again 
from  its  ashes. 

'  For  a  discussion  of  the  Macedonian  question  and  the  events  leading 
up  to  the  second  Balkan  war  see  below,  Chapter  VI. 
'  Revelation  of  Signor  Giolitti,  December  5,  1914. 


CHAPTEE  IV 
THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC 


The  programme  of  the  Southern  Slavs  for  their  future 
is  national  union.  As  has  been  seen  in  the  previous 
chapter,  all  three  branches  of  the  race  are  at  length  at  one 
in  the  demand  that,  as  the  Germans  and  Italians  in  the 
nineteenth  century  and  others  before  them  attained 
national  unity  within  the  limits  of  a  single  State,  so 
they  also  shall  be  allov^ed  to  attain  the  same  end  as  the 
result  of  the  present  war.  That  indeed  is  the  supreme 
aim  which  animates  their  courage  and  buoys  up  their  spirit 
in  adversity.  Of  the  difficult  questions  which  are  involved 
in  this  demand  the  most  difficult  in  fact,  as  it  is  perhaps 
the  least  difficult  in  abstract  speculation,  is  the  Adriatic 
question,  which  forms  the  most  outstanding  of  the 
problems  connected  with  that  political  reconstruction 
of  south-eastern  Europe  which  should  be  one  of  the 
solid  gains  of  the  war  in  the  event  of  a  complete  victory 
for  the  Allies,  which  is  the  supposition  necessarily  ante- 
cedent to  such  a  discussion  as  follows. 

In  its  essential  elements  the  problem  arises  from  the 
configuration  of  the  Adriatic  and  the  contrasting  character 
of  its  two  shores.  In  itself  the  Adriatic  is  a  long  arm  of 
the  Mediterranean  thrust  north-westwards,  separating 
Italy  from  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  opening  to  its 
parent  sea  by  the  Strait   of  Otranto  which   is  less  than 

105 


106  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

fifty  miles  wide,  the  strait  itself  being  commanded  /rom  ^ 
the  fine  bay  of  Valona  or  Avlona  with  its  entrance  guarded 
by  the  lofty  Acroceraunian  peninsula  and  the  islet  of 
Saseno.  The  ports  on  the  western  shore  are  outlets  of 
Italian  trade  as  the  eastern  ports  should  be  for  that  of  the 
Balkans,  while  Trieste  and  Rijeka  (Fiume)  at  its  extreme 
north-western  and  north-eastern  limits  are  the  ports  of 
entry  for  the  countries  of  the  middle  and  upper  Danube. 
The  Italian  shore  of  the  Adriatic  is  low  and  singularly 
devoid  of  good  natural  ports,  especially  of  ports  capable 
of  being  made  into  strong  naval  bases.  In  the  north  are 
the  ports  of  Trieste,  Pola,  aiid  Rijeka,  the  last  named 
naturally  the  least  good  of  the  three  while  Pola  forms  a 
splendid  naval  station.  The  eastern  shore,  in  marked  con- 
trast to  the  western,  affords  both  to  commerce  and  naval 
power  all  those  facilities  which  the  latter  lacks.  Formed 
by  the  subsidence  of  the  land  where  the  spurs  of  the 
Dinaric  Alps  run  down  to  the  sea  the  coast  line  is  broken 
up  into  innumerable  deep  indentations  running  far  into 
the  land,  occupying  the  place  of  former  valleys  and  forming 
a  series  of  magnificent  harbours  such  as  those  of  Sibenik 
(Sebenico),  Split  or  Spljet  (Spalato),  Gruz  (Gravosa),  and 
Kotor  (Cattaro),  which  are  not  only  admirably  adapted 
for  commerce  but  form  naturally  some  of  the  finest  naval 
bases  in  Europe.  The  coast  is  flanked,  moreover,  by 
numerous  islands  which  not  only  frequently  possess  good 
ports,  notably  Vis  (Lissa),  but  also  guard  a  marine  covered- 
way  leading  along  the  coast  between  the  sheltering 
islands  and  the  mainland,  which  enhances  the  value  of  the 
ports  and  allows  of  a  fleet  making  its  way  from  Pola  to 
Kotor  free  from  interference  by  a  hostile  force.  The  water, 
moreover,  is  everywhere  deep. 

During  the  nineteenth  century  from  1815  the  whole 
of  the  eastern  shore,  with  the  exception  of  Albania  with 
the  bay  of  Valona  and  the  inferior  roadsteads  of  Durazzo 
and  Medua,  and  of  the  short  Montenegrin  coast  formerly 
Turkish,  has  been  in  the  possession  of  the  House  of 
'  I  Bay  commanded  "  from  "  not  "  by  "  advisedly,  vide  infra  IV. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        107 

Austria.  The  result  since  the  unification  of  Italy  has 
been  a  constant  and  unconcealed  rivalry  between  that 
Power  and  her  Austrian  ally,  which  of  late  years  has 
become  more  acute  owing  to  the  growth  of  Austrian  naval 
power.  Powerful  units  were  added  to  the  fleet,  subsidiary 
bases  established  at  Teodo  in  the  Bocche  di  Cattaro  and 
at  Sibenik,  and  when  the  war  broke  out  Austria  was 
engaged  in  the  first  steps  towards  the  realization  of  an 
ambitious  programme  of  construction  which  was  to  include 
several  "  Dreadnoughts."  This  naval  growth  pressed  more 
and  more  hardly  upon  Italy,  which  felt  acutely  the  dearth 
of  natural  ports  on  her  eastern  coast  which,  against  an 
equal  naval  force,  was  difficult  of  defence  from  Venice 
or  Taranto,  the  latter  of  which  lies  outside  the  Adriatic. 
During  the  latter  years  of  the  last  century  a  new  factor 
appeared  on  the  scene  in  the  shape  of  the  Southern  Slav 
renascence.  To  the  conflicting  ambitions  of  Italy  and 
the  House  of  Habsburg  the  Southern  Slavs  opposed  the 
claim  of  their  nationality  and  the  demands  of  geography. 
When,  after  1866,  the  Habsburgs  had  no  further  object 
in  bolstering  up  the  Italian  element  in  their  dominions 
and  gave — until  recent  years — something  like  a  free  hand 
to  the  Serbo-Croats  of  Dalmatia  the  municipalities,  despite 
an  electoral  law  which  unduly  favoured  the  Italian  element, 
fell  one  by  one  into  Slav  hands  with  the  exception  of  Zadar 
(Zara).  Without  at  first  any  definite  political  programme 
the  Slavs  were  gradually  "  finding  "  themselves,  and  while 
the  Italians  lost  ground  politically  in  Dalmatia  to  the 
Serbo-Croats,  the  Germans  found  the  Slovenes  blocking 
their  path  to  a  sea  which  has  always  been  within  the 
scope  of  their  ambitions.  The  mutual  attitude  of  Italy 
and  Austria  to  each  other  was  illustrated  by  their  handling 
of  the  problem  of  Albania.  Owing  to  the  position  of  Valona 
at  the  very  mouth  of  the  Adriatic,  neither  would  permit 
the  acquisition  of  that  port  by  the  other,  since  its  occupa- 
tion by  Italy  would  have  meant  for  Austria  that  her  sea 
gateway  would  have  been  commanded  by  her  rival  and 
her  maritime   pretensions    throttled,   while    for    Italy   an 


108  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Austrian  occupation  would  have  given  complete  physical 
command  to  her  enemy  and  aggravated  her  own  existing 
position.  In  Albania,  therefore,  each  fostered  its  propa- 
ganda by  every  means  in  its  power,  education,  commerce, 
and  religion  all  being  pressed  into  the  national  service, 
with  results  that  on  the  whole  were  hardly  proportionate 
to  the  energy  expended,  the  Albanians  being  willing  enough 
to  take  all  that  was  offered  to  them  but  having  a  shrewd 
idea  of  the  purpose  that  lurked  behind  the  gifts.  In 
general  the  Italians  met  with  more  success  in  the  south, 
where  Valona  was  of  vital  importance  to  them,  while  the 
Austrians  were  more  successful  among  the  Catholic  tribes 
of  the  north,  where  they  were  able  to  keep  a  watch  on 
the  Serbs  and  Montenegrins.  Eventually  a  self-denying 
ordinance  was  entered  upon  by  both  and  served  to  stave 
off  the  day  of  open  conflict,  and  it  was  provided  that  any 
Balkan  acquisition  on  the  part  of  one  should  involve 
compensation  to  the  other  and  that  no  forward  Balkan 
move  should  be  undertaken  by  either  without  previous 
consultation  with  its  ally.  It  was  the  breach  of  this  last 
stipulation  which  formed  one  of  the  formal  grounds  of 
complaint  by  Italy  against  her  quondam  ally  in  1914. 
The  attempted  formation  of  an  Albanian  State  in  1912 
was  the  ultimate  form  taken  by  this  mutual  renunciation, 
as  the  open  rivalry  of  the  two  Powers  was  one  of  the 
reasons  that  the  State  was  still-born.  Schools  were 
founded  by  the  rivals  in  Scutari  and  Durazzo  and  banks 
in  the  former  town,  the  Austrians  finding  a  powerful  lever 
in  the  protectorate  which  they  enjoyed  over  the  Catholics 
who  are  strong  in  the  extreme  north,  while  the  Italians 
utilized  the  services  of  the  Albanian  colonists  who  for 
centuries  have  formed  part  of  the  population  of  Calabria.  It 
was  evident  that  neither  party  to  the  arrangement  considered 
it  as  anything  but  provisional  and  a  mere  modus  vivendi 
pending  the  time  when  the  course  of  events  should  give  to 
one  or  other  an  opportunity  of  effecting  its  own  purpose. 

The  flowing  tide  of  the  Southern  Slav  renascence  excited 
an   alarm   in   Italy  out   of   all   proportion   to  any  possible 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        109 

danger  to  Italian  interests.  Instead  of  looking  upon  that 
movement  as  an  invaluable  ally  against  the  pretensions  of 
the  House  of  Habsburg,  and  as  being  the  predestined 
instrument  by  means  of  which,  coincidently  with  a 
strengthening  of  Italy's  own  position,  a  new  and  friendly 
Power  might  be  installed  upon  the  ruins  of  Austria's 
Adriatic  dominions  to  take  the  place  of  the  latter  as  Italy's 
vis-d-vis,  Italian  publicists  affected,  and  apparently  felt,  a 
deep  fear  of  the  consequences  to  their  country  of  such  a 
bouleversement.  In  truth  Italy,  after  a  long  period  of 
recuperation  following  her  Abyssinian  disasters,  apparently 
entered  upon  an  imperialist  foreign  policy,  divorced  from 
her  liberal  and  nationalist  origin  and  past,  and  based  upon 
the  spirit  of  Prussian  realismus.  Determined  to  obtain  for 
herself  a  more  important  position  in  the  Mediterranean, 
and  to  strive  after  predominance  in  the  eastern  area  of  that 
sea,  she  seemed  now  nearer  to  her  allies  in  the  ethic  of  her 
international  reactions  than  she  had  ever  been  before.  In 
1911  she  annexed  Tripoli  from  the  Ottoman  Empire  and 
took  in  pledge  ten  of  the  islands  of  the  Dodekanese,^ 
together  with  Kos  and  Rhodes,  pending  the  fulfilment  of  all 
the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne,  while  Italian 
publicists  found  good  reasons  for  suggesting  the  permanent 
retention  of  these  Greek  islands,  raking  out  from  the  past 
the  historical  claims — so  varied  and  abundant  in  the  Near 
East,  and  mostly  worthless — of  the  House  of  Savoy  to 
Rhodes.  The  results  of  the  Balkan  war  of  1912  found 
Italy  in  close  agreement  with  Austria  as  to  the  means  to  be 
adopted  in  face  of  the  new  situation.  In  particular  she 
showed  the  greatest  jealousy  of  the  approach  of  the  Serbs 
to  the  Adriatic,  as  she  did  also  of  the  increased  strength  of 
Greece's  maritime  position.  With  Austria  she  took  a  strong 
line  in  denying  to  Serbia  any  outlet  on  the  Adriatic,  how- 
ever exiguous,  while  she  vetoed  the  extension  of  Greek  rule 

'  The  Dodekanese  (Twelve  Islands)  consist  of  Ikaria,  Patmos,  Leros, 
Kalymnos,  Astypalaia,  Nisyros,  Telos,  Syme,  Chalkeia,  Karpathos, 
Kassos,  and  Kastellorizzo.  The  Italians  hold  all  but  the  first  and  last, 
together  with  Rhodes  and  Kos. 


110  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

to  northern  Epirus.  As  has  been  said,  a  common  formula 
was  found  in  the  cry  of  Albania  for  the  Albanians,  the 
Nationalist  argument  proving  useful  for  the  nonce,  and  she 
strove  to  make  the  boundaries  of  the  nev7  State  as  extensive 
as  possible.  The  history  of  1913  negatives  the  plea  that 
Italy  was  conforming  reluctantly  to  an  Austrian  initiative  ; 
both  her  Press  and  her  Ministers  were  eager  for  a  large 
Albania  and  a  small  Serbia.  It  is  difficult  to  assign  any 
intelligible  reason  for  the  erection  of  the  Serb  bogey,  the 
strengthening  of  Serbia  being  on  any  rational  view  of  the 
situation  essentially  favourable  to  Italian  interests.  In 
the  second  Balkan  war,  which  followed  as  the  sequel  to 
Serbia's  exclusion  from  the  Adriatic,^  Italian  sympathies 
were  manifested  for  Bulgaria ;  in  fact,  the  Marquis  di  San 
Giuliano  followed  in  the  track  of  Austria's  Balkan  policy  in 
the  hope  of  reducing  Serbia's  power  and  prestige,  though  at 
the  same  time  he  was  in  no  mood  to  allow  Austria  to  step 
into  Serbia's  place,  as  he  showed  when  in  August  1913  Austria 
proposed  to  attack  her  Southern  Slav  neighbour.  It  was  a 
complicated  and  subtle  line  of  policy  designed  upon  the  main- 
tenance of  as  much  as  possible  of  the  status  quo  pending  an 
opportunity  for  Italy  to  alter  it  according  to  her  own  purposes. 
With  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  that  opportunity 
arrived,  and  brought  with  it  a  plenitude  of  possible  advan- 
tages beyond  anything  that  could  reasonably  have  been 
hoped  for.  The  probable  break  up  of  Austria  offered  Italy 
not  only  the  acquisition  of  Italia  Irredenta  but  the  possi- 
bility of  establishing  herself  on  the  eastern  Adriatic  if  only 
Southern  Slav  aspirations  could  be  baulked,  but  as  Serbia 
was  in  fact  an  ally  of  the  Entente,  though  never  treated  as 
such,  the  latter  possibility  was  not  devoid  of  difficulty.  In 
the  meantime  the  sorry  farce  of  the  Albanian  State  as 
hitherto  displayed  was  played  out,  and  Italy  was  not  long 
in  occupying  Valona,^  with  the  Islet  of  Saseno,  which  in 

'  See  below,  Chapter  VI. 

*  A  "sanitary  mission"  was  landed  at  Valona  on  October  25,  1914, 
Saseno  was  occupied  on  October  30,  and  Valona  by  a  military  force  on 
December  25. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        111 

1913  had  been  detached  from  Greece  (who  possessed  it  as 
one  of  the  Ionian  Islands)  as  belonging  naturally  to  Albania. 
Greece  coincidentally  occupied  northern  Epirus.   In  October 

1914  a  strong  Press  campaign  was  opened  against  the 
pretensions  of  Serbia  (as  the  representative  of  Southern 
Slav  unity)  to  Dalmatia,  which  was  claimed  for  Italy  on 
several  grounds — a  campaign  which  was  renewed  in  the 
spring  of  1915  coincidently  with  Italy's  negotiations  with 
Austria.  In  those  negotiations  Italy  demanded,  in  addition 
to  the  Trentino  and  a  line  to  the  east  of  the  Isonzo,  the 
establishment  of  Trieste  as  an  independent  State,  and  the 
southern  Dalmatian  islands  of  Vis  (Lissa),  Hvar  (Lesina), 
Korcula  (Curzola),  SuSac  (Cazza),  Mljet  (Meleda),  and 
Lastovo  (Lagosta),  the  last  two  of  which  had  formerly 
belonged  to  the  independent  republic  of  Dubrovnik  (Ea- 
gusa),  and  not  to  Venice.^  In  the  course  of  these  conver- 
sations Italy,  with  a  policy  not  without  skill,  put  forward 
the  demand  for  a  Serb  outlet.  The  cleverness  with  which 
she  took  upon  herself  to  speak,  unsought,  in  the  name  of 
Serbia  was  equalled  by  the  address  with  which  she  posed 
the  question  as  purely  commercial  in  character,  thus  by 
implication  denying  that  any  question  of  nationality  was 
involved.  Concurrent  negotiations  had  been  carried  on 
with  the  Entente  culminating  in  the  agreement  of  April  27  ^ 
and  the  entry  of  Italy  into  the  war. 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  was  followed,  as  the  opportunity 
served,  by  a  remarkable  growth  in  the  extent  of  Italian 
claims  in  the  Adriatic.  The  chance  of  asserting  and  en- 
forcing these  claims  was  not  likely  to  recur,  especially  if  the  end 
of  the  war  were  to  see  a  strong  Southern  Slav  State  estab- 
lished on  the  opposite  coast ;  it  was  a  chance  not  merely  for 
the  assertion  of  the  rights  which  Italy  has  always  main- 
tained, but  for  the  acquisition  of  advantages  for  which  she 
had  long  ceased  to  hope.  Hitherto  her  demands  had  been 
confined  to  the  reclamation  of  Italia  Irredenta  properly  so 

'  These  and  other  demands  were  formulated  by  Baron  Sonnino  on 
April  8,  1915. 
'  Vide  infra  VI. 


112  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

called,  i.e.  the  Trentino  and  the  line  of  the  Isonzo  ;  even 
Trieste,  despite  its  predominantly  Italian  character,  lay 
outside  the  scope  of  those  ambitions  which  Italian  statesmen 
regarded  as  practicable,  while  as  to  Dalmatia  the  feeling  was 
hardly  more  than  one  of  sentimental  regret  at  the  impossi- 
bility of  recreating  the  old  Venetian  dominion.  Thus  in  1907 
Dr.  Seton-Watson  could  write:  "  Thus  even  the  wildest  Irre- 
dentists have  come  to  recognize  the  hopelessness  of  reclaim- 
ing provinces  where  the  Italian  is  in  a  minority  of  one  in 
seven  [he  is  speaking  not  only  of  Dalmatia,  but  of  the  whole 
coast  from  Trieste  downwards] ,  and  confine  their  aspira- 
tions to  Trieste  and  its  Littoral,  and  to  the  Trentino  "J 
The  growth  of  Italian  claims  after  the  commencement  of 
the  war,  as  also  the  attitude  taken  up  towards  Serbia  and 
the  Southern  Slavs,  can  best  be  seen  by  the  contents  of  the 
Italian  Press,  and  it  is  better  moreover,  in  view  of  inter- 
tional  relationships,  that  the  tale  should  be  told  by  the 
writers  themselves  as  far  as  possible  rather  than  in  the 
form  of  a  foreign  commentary.  The  trend  of  opinion  was 
not  satisfied  with  the  probable  disappearance  of  Austria 
from  the  Adriatic  ;  it  desired  that  the  Southern  Slavs  should 
not  be  permitted  to  step  into  Austria's  shoes  even  in  the 
lands  which  are  incontcstably  Slav  by  nationality,  the  most 
efficacious  method  of  preventing  which  was  to  claim  the 
regions  concerned  for  Italy.  In  particular  Italian  claims 
were  extended  to  Dalmatia,  the  figures  of  the  Austrian 
census  were  questioned,  and  Signor  Gayda,  an  extremist, 
claimed  GO, 000  Italians  in  the  province,  though  even 
this  figure  amounts  to  less  than  10  per  cent,  of  the 
whole,  while  the  society  Fro  Dalmazia  was  founded  with 
the  object  of  arousing  public  opinion  on  the  subject.  The 
result  was  a  violent  polemic  in  the  autumn  of  1914  between 
the  Italian  and  the  Serb  and  liussian  Press.  Thus  the 
semi-official  Serb  paper,  Samouprava,  reprinted  from  the 
Serb  Politika  an  article  headed  "Let  us  save  Dalmatia": 
"  Serbia  ",  it  said,  "  will  not  consent  that  this  Slav  country 
should  pass  from  Austrian  domination  to  another  domina- 
'  li.  W.  Seton-Watson,  The  Future  of  Austria-Hungary,  p.  31. 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC        113 

tion,  that  of  Italy  ".  Serbia  "  will  have  the  courage,  with 
the  co-operation  of  the  Dalmatians  themselves,  to  defend 
it  to  the  last  against  any  attempt  made  in  Italy  to 
transform  its  liberation  into  a  new  servitude ".  The 
Italians  (as  represented  by  the  Press  and  politicians)  were 
willing  that  Serbia  should  have  a  commercial  outlet  on 
the  Adriatic  but  no  more,  and  they  disclaimed  any  feeling 
save  that  of  self-interest.  A  political  leader  remarked 
more  Prussico :  "  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  Russia's  pro- 
teges, have  ambitions  for  a  wider  outlet  on  the  Adriatic; 
but  Italy  with  her  40,000,000  of  people  can  hardly  be 
considered  in  the  same  light  as  Serbia  with  her  3,000,000, 
or  Montenegro".  While  Signor  Bissolati,  the  w^ell-known 
Interventionist  Socialist,  and  a  member  of  the  present 
Cabinet,  maintained  that  Italy  should  appear  as  the 
sincere  champion  of  the  principle  of  nationality,  which 
she  could  not  be  so  long  as  she  laid  claims  to  the 
Dalmatian  coast  which  was  overwhelmingly  Slav,  Pro- 
fessor Fiorese  had  been  previously  constrained  to  admit 
in  the  Giornale  d'ltalia  of  October  1,  1914,  that  "our 
collective  opinion  .  .  .  does  not  yet  think  broadly  of  the 
possibility  of  making  friends  with  the  Serbs ".  When, 
on  October  18,  Signor  Salandra  took  over  the  Foreign 
Office  pro  tern.,  he  said  to  the  departmental  chiefs,  in  a 
phrase  that  has  become  historic,  "  What  is  needed  is 
...  a  freedom  from  all  preconceptions  and  prejudices, 
and  from  every  sentiment  except  that  of  sacred  egoism 
for  Italy ".  So  on  December  3,  1914,  in  his  statement 
on  foreign  policy,  he  remarked :  "  Italy  has  vital  interests 
to  safeguard,  just  aspirations  to  affirm,  and  support  of 
her  position  as  a  Great  Power  to  maintain,  not  only 
intact,  but  such  that  it  shall  not  be  diminished  by  the 
possible  aggrandizement  of  other  States  ".^  Two  days 
later,  when  in  the  debate  Signor  Altobelli  said  that  his 
sympathies  were  with  the  Entente,  the  Premier  replied 
that  Italians  had  only  one  feeling,  that  for  Italy.  The 
controversy  dragged  on  along  the  same  lines  into 
'  at.  the  Morning  Post,  December  4,  1914. 
8 


114  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  spring  of  1915.  The  paramount  claims  of  nationality 
were  denied :  "  There  are  political  and  military  considera- 
tions which  are  above  any  question  of  nationality 
whatever,"  said  the  Giornale  d'ltalia  on  April  4,  and  it 
added,  "Let  the  Serbs  have  an  ample  outlet  to  the 
Adriatic,  but  do  not  let  them  aspire  to  conquer  a  pre- 
dominance in  that  sea  ",^  a  sentence  which  well  exemplifies 
what  seems  to  non-Italians  the  almost  grotesque  fear  felt 
for  a  State  which  can  never  be  a  first-class  Power,  for 
as  M.  Supilo,  the  well-known  Croat  leader,  remarked  in 
Petrograd  shortly  afterwards,  Italy  has  nothing  to  fear 
from  a  Southern  Slav  State  only  a  third  of  her  size. 
He  added  the  grave  warning  that  his  countrymen  would 
prefer  Austrian  to  Italian  rule. 

The  more  recent  speeches  made  by  the  late  Italian 
Ministers  can  hardly  be  described  as  being  other  than 
masterpieces  of  balanced  ambiguity.  Signor  Orlando,  for 
example,  at  Palermo  on  November  21,  1915,  alluding  to 
a  sentimental  and  political  reason  acting  strongly  on 
Italian  minds,  said :  "In  the  first  we  affirm  all  our 
admiration  and  all  our  solidarity  towards  the  heroic  Serb 
people ;  in  the  second  we  affirm  all  the  inestimable 
importance  to  Italy  of  the  position  of  the  Balkan  peoples  ".^ 
There  is  posed  here  an  antithesis,  or  at  any  rate  a  contrast, 
between  the  solidarity  towards  the  Serb  people  which  is 
a  sentimental  reason,  and  the  inestimable  importance  to 
Italy  of  the  "  position  of  the  Balkan  peoples "  (in  the 
plural)  which  is  a  political  reason.  This  contrast  is 
capable  of  more  than  one  interpretation  discussion  of 
which  is  profitless,  though  those  who  have  been  at  all 
behind  the  scenes  will  hardly  be  at  a  loss  for  an  explanation. 
Baron  Sonnino  on  December  1  alluded  to  Serbia  in  cordial 
terms  while  laying  it  down  that  it  was  a  vital  necessity 
to  bring  about  a  state  of  things  in  the  Adriatic  that  would 
compensate  Italy  for  the  unfavourable  configuration  of 
the  Adriatic  coast,  a  proposition  which  is  altogether 
legitimate.      Signor    Salandra,    however,  on    December  11 

'  at.  The  Times,  die  seq.  '  Cif.'the  Morning  Post,  die  acq. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC        115 

was  more  oracular :  "  The  unfortunate  conditions  which 
put  us  topographically  at  a  disadvantage  can  only  be 
altered  by  a  victorious  war,  bringing  us  in  the  Adriatic 
not  only  the  security  of  our  country,  but  also  the  civil 
hegemony  which  (without  excluding  the  peoples  who 
have  a  right  to  border  on  the  Adriatic)  belongs  to  us  by 
virtue  of  the  superiority  of  our  country,  our  territory, 
our  population,  and  our  civilization,  which  is  the  highest 
and  oldest  ".I  "Civil  hegemony"  is  ambiguous,  and 
superiority  of  country  and  kultur  is  a  familiar  phrase,  of 
which  the  rest  of  the  world  is  weary  :  the  wording  was 
not  happy.  Signer  Barzilai  at  Ancona  on  January  19, 
1916,  seemed  to  hint  that  the  Serb  debdcle  was  in  the 
nature  of  a  Providential  chastisement :  "  I  was  not 
talking  at  random,  as  you  begin  to  see,  when  I  hinted 
the  other  day  about  the  responsibility  of  the  Balkan 
States  for  the  fate  which  has  overtaken  them.  If  heroic 
Serbia,  whose  expansion  towards  the  Adriatic  we  have 
never  tried  to  thwart,  is  to-day  healing  all  its  strayings  from 
the  vision  of  its  own  interests  and  pledges  with  the 
sacrifice  wherefrom  will  assuredly  germinate  the  resurrec- 
tion of  its  future  .  .  .  ".^  Signor  Martini  at  Florence 
on  January  20  spoke  of  the  day  of  peace,  "  the  day 
when  Italy,  safe  in  her  seas,  will  have  the  frontiers 
which  Dante  traced  for  her,  when  the  Serb  people  will 
be  re-established  in  the  fulness  of  its  independence",  but 
it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  Colonial  Minister  had  for- 
gotten for  the  moment  what  were  the  frontiers  which 
Dante  traced  for  Italy.3 

The  declarations  of  the  present  Italian  ministry  have 
been  marked  by  a  like  ambiguity.  Signor  Bissolati  con- 
tinues to  speak  with  sympathy  of  the  Southern  Slav  cause 
and  to  plead  for  good  relations  between  the  two  peoples. 
Thus  in  an  interview  with  a  French  paper  4  he  remarked : 

'  at.  the  Morning  Post,  die  seq. 

^  at.  the  Daily  Chronicle,  January  21,  1916. 

3  Dante's  Italy  ended  at  Pola. 

4  Le  Matin,  October  1,  1916. 


116  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

"  The  Italian  race  has  suffered  too  much  from  oppression 
to  exercise  oppression.  We  will  not  allow  an  irredentism 
to  be  created  against  us."  The  Secolo  of  the  same  date 
remarked  :  "  She  [Italy]  detests  the  idea  of  creating  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Adriatic  a  counter-irredentism."  The 
Premier,  Signor  Boselli,  on  the  other  hand,  at  Milan  spoke 
of  his  salutation  of  the  flag  of  Dalmatia.  The  Nationalist 
Press  of  Italy  has  lately  adopted  a  line  which  cannot  but 
gravely  prejudice  the  cause  of  good  relations  between  the 
two  neighbours.  In  the  first  place  must  be  put  allegations 
more  or  less  specific  against  the  Southern  Slav  Committee. 
On  October  7,  1916,  the  Starnpa  published  a  telegram 
stating  that  Jugoslav  circles  in  Geneva  had  pronounced  in 
favour  of  a  Jugoslavia  under  Habsburg  auspices.  Three 
days  later  the  Idea  Nazionale,  republishing  the  telegram, 
stated  that  the  Jugoslav  Committee  at  Geneva  had  expressed 
itself :  "  The  present  war  has  shown  that  small  States  cannot 
live  independently  without  exposing  their  national  existence 
to  a  grave  danger.  That  is  why  the  Jugoslavs,  in  view  of 
the  impossibility  of  creating  an  independent  Serb  kingdom 
which  would  have  included  all  the  Jugoslav  regions,  would 
wish  to  see  the  union  of  the  Jugoslav  countries  realized 
under  the  form  of  Trialism  .  .  .".  This  elicited  a  reply 
from  certain  members  of  the  Committee  stating  that  there 
is  no  Jugoslav  Committee  of  Geneva,  although  certain 
members  of  that  Committee  happen  to  live  there ;  that 
with  the  exception  of  the  signatories  no  member  of  the 
Committee  had  been  living  at  Geneva  since  the  beginning 
of  the  year;  and  that  they  had  neither  collectively  nor 
individually  made  the  declaration  attributed  to  them,  nor 
any  declaration  like  it.  In  its  leading  article  the  Idea 
Nazionale  represented  the  Committee  as  being  an  instru- 
ment of  Austrian  poHcy.  An  exactly  similar  procedure  had 
been  adopted  by  the  same  paper  in  respect  of  the  Cechs,  for 
on  September  23  it  had  published  an  interview  with  "  a 
member  of  the  Cech  National  Council,  who  declared  that 
his  people  dissociated  themselves  completely  from  the  Jugo- 
slav movement.     To  this  the  Council  replied  :  "  No  member 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        117 

of  the  National  Council  of  the  Cech  Lands  was  in  Italy 
during  the  month  of  September  1916,  and  therefore  none 
could  have  spoken  in  its  name." 

Other  organs  of  the  Italian  Press  adopted  the  same  line. 
The  Popolo  d' Italia  a  little  later  stated  that  the  conviction 
was  general  that  the  Jugoslav  propaganda  was  supported 
financially  from  sources  outside  its  own  territories,  and 
precisely  in  Austria,  in  order  to  injure  Italy ;  and  Signor 
Caburi,  in  the  Giornale  d'ltalia  of  July  10,  had  previously 
declared  that  the  Jugoslav  programme  was  a  programme  of 
conquest  elaborated  by  the  clerical  Croats  in  the  service  of 
Vienna  and  Budapest,  and  that  the  Serbs  ought  not  to 
support  it.  In  any  case  Italy  would  never  consent  to  its 
realization.  The  Perseveranza  of  October  19  accused 
Professor  Lazar  Markovic,  editor  of  the  Serb  paper 
La  Serbie,  published  in  Geneva,  of  having  espoused  the 
Trialist  cause,  while  the  Giornale  of  Turin,  going  further, 
stated  in  terms  that  he  was  an  "  Austrian  agent,  a  traitor  to 
his  country,"  statements  which  drew  from  the  calumniated 
editor  an  indignant  response. ^  In  December  Signor  Boselli, 
in  the  course  of  an  ambiguous  statement  in  the  Italian 
Chamber  in  which  he  said  that  victory  "  will  assure  us  the 
mastery  of  the  Adriatic,  which,  for  Italy,  signifies  a  legiti- 
mate and  necessary  defence,  and  which,  without  forgetting 
the  just  needs  of  the  neighbouring  Slav  nationalities  and 
the  necessities  of  their  economic  development,  will  assure 
equally  its  imprescriptible  rights  on  the  opposite  coast  to  the 
Italian  nationahty,"  spoke  also  of  "the  active  propaganda 
of  which  it  is  necessary  to  seek  the  origins  in  the  compre- 
hensible manoeuvres  of  the  enemy."  He  thus  gave  the 
sanction  of  his  high  position  to  the  insinuations  referred  to. 

To  these  accusations,  the  methods  of  whose  authors  bear 
an  unpleasant  resemblance  to  those  generally  associated 
with  the  names  of  Counts  Aehrenthal  and  Forgach,  the 
Jugoslav  Committee  gave  an  indignant  denial  through  its 
president.    Dr.  Trumbic,^  in   the   course   of   which  it  was 

'  La  Serbie,  November  5,  1916. 

*  Vide  The  Southern  Slav  Bulletin  No.  25  ;  La  Serbie,  December  3, 
1916,  for  the  full  text. 


118  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

pointed  out  that  Committee  derived  its  funds  largely  from 
American  Jugoslavs  (some  of  the  South  American  Jugoslavs 
are  enormously  rich  men,  ten  of  them  are  said  to  control, 
each,  a  capital  of  over  £4,000,000),  and  that  the  members 
of  the  Committee  had  been  proceeded  against  in  Austria, 
had  suffered  confiscation  of  property,  had  been  struck  off 
the  professional  rolls,  and  in  some  cases  sentenced  to  death. 
The  Committee,  however,  "has  never  been  able  to  find  for 
its  defence  the  hospitality  of  the  Italian  Press,  because  our 
censorship  tolerates  no  discussion  on  this  subject  favourable 
to  the  accused."  ^ 

It  is  necessary  to  complete  this  survey  by  giving  a  few 
more  examples  a  titre  d' information.  The  facts  of  this 
unhappy  controversy  are  known  to  all  who  have  access, 
direct  or  indirect,  to  the  foreign  Press,  and  it  is  useless, 
and  indeed  harmful,  to  ignore  them,  for  if  a  correct  appre- 
ciation is  to  be  made  of  matters  which  will  have  to  come  up 
for  settlement  knowledge  is  certainly  a  desideratum.  They 
will  be  given  without  comment.  The  Corriere  della  Sera  for 
October  7,  1916,  gave  its  adhesion  to  the  programme  of  the 
Committee  Pro  Dalmazia,  and  said  that  it  was  necessary  to 
remember  that  one  part  of  the  Jugoslavs  was  fighting  for 
Austria,  and  the  other  part  trying  to  create  distrust  of 
Itahan  rights.  The  Giornale  d'ltalia,  important  because 
of  its  ownership,  spoke  of  the  Croats  as  "  the  most  furious 
enemies  of  our  race."  It  added  that  the  Croats  could  have 
their  economic  outlets  on  the  Croatian  coast,  and  the  Serbs 
theirs  in  southern  Dalmatia,  thus  treating  the  two  portions 
of  the  race  as  separate  entities  and  postulating  the  question 
as  one  of  commercial  access.  Signor  Caburi,  in  the  same 
paper  for  November  16,  17,  19,  qualified  the  Croats  as 
"Austrian  Cossacks",  and  the  Southern  Slavs  as  the 
"  Praetorians  of  the  Habsburgs  "  !  Other  Itahan  writers, 
such  as  Signor  Bianco,  have  insisted  on  dissociating  Croats 
and  Serbs,  and  persist  in  speaking  of  them  as  of  different 
peoples ;  they  even  urge  that  it  is  not  to  Serbia's  interest  to 

'  Statement  of  the  republican  deputy,  S.  Pirolini,  in  the  Italian 
Chamber.     Cit.  La  Serbie,  December  24,  1916. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        119 

achieve  Southern  Sla^v  unity,  as  the  simple,  brave  Serbs 
would  be  exploited  by  a  Croat  and  Slovene  oligarchy.  The 
underlying  motive  vi^as  plainly  stated  in  an  article  in  the 
Secolo  as  far  back  as  May  8,  1915,  in  which  it  wrote:  "If 
the  Serbs  were  to  succeed  in  including  the  Croats  in  their 
frontiers  they  will  then  become  too  powerful,  and  we  must 
envisage  all  the  possibilities.  It  is  better  for  us  to  raise  up 
two  other  nations  (the  Croats  and  the  Albanians)  and  thus 
to  divide  the  imperialist  Serb  bloc,  reducing  it  to  its  just 
proportions,  for  it  is  better  to  have  for  neighbours  two  small 
States  than  a  single  State  which  includes  them.  With  an 
Albania  anti-Slav  par  excellence  on  one  side  and  a  Croatia 
anti-Serb  and  Catholic  on  the  other,  we  should  establish  in 
the  eastern  Adriatic  an  advantageous  equilibrium,  dividing 
the  Slav  forces  which  have  too  great  a  tendency  to  increase 
but  little  to  coalesce."  ^  I  do  not  understand  this  super- 
stitious fear  of  Serbia  and  the  Southern  Slavs ;  evidently  we 
have  travelled  far  from  Mazzini. 

Not  all  Italian  writers  take  up  this  line ;  on  the  contrary 
there  are  notable  exceptions.  Signor  Mondaini,  for  example, 
in  the  Azione  Socialista  of  August  12,  1916,  published  an 
article  -  against  Adriatic  Imperialism ;  so  also  in  the  Secolo 
of  November  28,  Signor  Ghisleri,  writing  on  the  proper 
mission  of  Italy,  enters  a  plea  for  the  Southern  Slavs  and 
for  an  Italo-Slav  accord ;  while  Professor  Salvemini  has 
continued  to  express  himself  in  the  same  sense  as  in  his 
pamphlet  Guerra  o  Neutralita  ? 

Such  has  been  the  position  as  expressed  in  general  terms ; 
but  it  is  advisable  to  examine  in  detail  the  specific  claims 
advanced,  more  especially  in  respect  of  Dalmatia  and  its 
islands,  which  form  the  crux  of  the  question  as  between 
Southern  Slavs  and  Italians,  leaving  the  regions  at  the  head 
of  the  Adriatic  for  later  treatment.  It  will  be  well  to  con- 
sider the  conflicting  arguments  on  their  merits,  and  without 
reference  to  the  "Dalmatian  Agreement,"  whose  effect  will 
be  considered  in  the  last  section  of  this  chapter.     The  argu- 

'  at.  La  Serbie,  October  8,  1916. 

"  Reprinted  in  the  New  Europe  of  October  26. 


120  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

ment  centres  round  three  topics — historical,  ethnographic, 
and  strategic. 

II 

Before  passing  to  the  more  substantial  arguments  ad- 
duced in  support  of  Italian  claims  on  the  eastern  shore  of 
the  Adriatic  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  a  strange  contention 
which  has  been  seriously  advanced  by  the  more  extreme 
partizans  of  Italian  expansion,  namely  that  Dalmatia  forms 
a  geographical  part  of  Italy.  Professor  Cippico  ^  has  said  : 
"Dalmatia  and  Istria  have  never  neither  in  geography  nor 
in  history  belonged  to  the  Balkans".^  Signor  Gayda  has 
remarked  that  the  great  bastion  of  the  Dinaric  Alps  divides 
Dalmatia  from  the  Serb  country,  that  commercial  relation- 
ships are  impossible  between  them,  and  that  communica- 
tions are  lacking.  Another  writer  has  ascribed  the  last  fact 
to  the  difficulties  of  the  mountains  dividing  Dalmatia  from 
its  backlands.  That  the  Dinaric  Alps  do  in  a  sense  cut  off 
and  differentiate  Dalmatia  from  Bosnia  is  of  course  true, 
but  neither  in  the  degree  nor  with  the  consequences 
asserted.  All  through  the  Middle  Ages  there  was  active 
intercourse  with  the  interior  both  from  the  republic  of 
Dubrovnik,  which  owed  part  of  its  wealth  to  its  trade  with 
medieval  Serbia,  and  also  from  Spljet.  In  no  sense  are  the 
Dinaric  Alps  a  barrier  in  the  same  degree  as  the  Great  Alps, 
and  for  Italians,  with  the  example  of  the  great  Alpine 
tunnels  ever  before  them,  to  speak  as  though  the  Dinaric 
Alps  were  incapable  of  being  pierced,  or  of  affording  means 
of  communication,  is  absurd,  apart  altogether  from  the 
great  breach  opened  in  them  by  the  Narenta  valley.  Alike 
from  Knim  to  the  valley  of  the  Una  and  from  Sinj  vid  the 

'  "  II  rispetto  del  Cippico  per  i  dati  di  fatti  non  e  soverchio."  G. 
Prezzolini,  La  Dalmazia,  p.  34  note. 

*  A  Cippico,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic.  Fortnightly  Review,  August  1915, 
p.  300.  "  Non  dic6  nulla  di  Cippico  o  di  Dudan,  scusabili  per  la  lore 
incompetenza  come  per  la  passione  che  fa  loro  veder  bianco  il  nero  in 
questo  argomento  "  is  Prezzolini's  comment  on  the  attitude  of  which  the 
quotation  in  the  text  is  a  manifestation.    Ibid.  p.  66. 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC        121 

Ar^ano  pass  to  Livno,  there  are  practicable  railway  routes, 
infinitely  easier  than  the  great  trans-Alpine  lines,  while 
Dubrovnik  is  already  connected  with  the  interior  by  a 
narrow-gauge  railway  running  up  the  Narenta  valley,  while 
a  short  spur  runs  more  directly  inland  to  Trebinje.  If  these 
ways  of  communication  have  never  been  developed,  that  has 
been  due  to  Magyar  hostility  directed  against  future  rivals 
of  Eijeka  (Fiume)  and  to  dislike  of  a  development  which 
would  have  made  closer  than  hitherto  the  moral  and 
material  ties  binding  together  the  different  elements  of  the 
Southern  Slavs.  That,  with  Austrian  apathy,  has  been 
the  sole  reason  why  these  lines  of  railway  are  still  wanting 
despite  repeated  demands  from  the  Dalmatian  Diet. 

The  writers  who  claim  as  part  of  Italy  all  that  lies 
within  the  Alps  and  their  continuations  have  not  the 
courage  of  their  convictions,  for  the  line  of  the  Dinaric 
Alps  is  continued  by  the  southern  spurs  of  the  §ar  Dagh 
to  the  Pindus  and  thence  to  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  while 
the  Maritime  Alps  also  include  all  the  French  Eiviera. 
On  the  theory  above  stated  not  only  Dalmatia,  but  Albania, 
Epirus,  Acarnania,  and  ^tolia  are  "geographically" 
a  part  of  Italy.  It  is  not  necessary  to  consider  further 
an  idea  which  is  not  only  repugnant  to  common  sense 
but  is  contradicted  by  Italian  geographers  themselves. 
The  idea  has  been  subjected  to  an  unintentional  reductio 
ad  absurdum  by  a  cartographist  mentioned  by  Prezzolini, 
who  has  headed  a  map  showing  Dalmatia  down  to  the 
Narenta  as  part  of  Italy  with  the  inscription,  "  The  7ieio 
natural  boundaries  of  Italy  ".     Solvuntur  tabulae  risu. 

The  historical  claims  based  upon  the  facts  of  the  former 
Venetian  dominion  in  the  Adriatic  require  more  serious 
treatment,  both  as  earnestly  put  forward  by  Italian  patriots 
and  as  carrying  weight  with  foreign  observers.  Many 
"well-informed"  Englishmen  cognizant  of  the  bare  fact  of 
this  dominion  have  seen  in  it  a  proof  of  a  veritable  coloniza- 
tion in  the  English  sense,  and  the  impression  has  been 
heightened  by  the  accident  that  the  towns  of  the  Dalmatian 
seaboard  are   usually  known  to  us  by  their  Italian  names. 


122  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

It  is  needless  to  cite  the  numerous  instances  of  this  con- 
fusion which  are  to  be  found  in  our  daily  and  periodical 
Press.  It  suffices  to  point  out  that  the  actual  form  of  the 
nomenclature  carries  no  argument  with  it,  just  as  we  are  not 
entitled  to  deduce  that  Koln,  Mainz,  Trier,  and  Aachen  are 
French  cities  because  usually  known  to  us  as  Cologne, 
Mayence,  Treves,  and  Aix-la-Chapelle.  It  is  a  mere  matter 
of  the  source  through  which  our  general  acquaintance  with 
the  places  has  been  originally  derived. 

It  is  generally  unknown  how  scanty  was  the  foothold  of 
Venice  on  the  mainland  of  Dalmatia  until  a  comparatively 
recent  epoch  of  the  history  of  the  republic.  Till  the  end  of  * 
the  seventeenth  century  Venetian  territory  was  confined  to 
a  narrow  strip  a  few  miles  wide  along  the  sea  coast,  and  it 
was  not  till  the  Treaty  of  Karlowitz,  concluded  in  1699,  that 
the  republic  was  confirmed  in  the  possession  of  such  inland 
places  as  Knim,  Klissa,  or  Sinj,  by  the  "  Mocenigo  line." 
Only  by  the  Treaty  of  Passarowitz  in  1719  did  Venice 
extend  her  boundary  to  the  line  of  the  Dinaric  Alps.  As 
the  republic  fell  in  1797,  a  period  of  one  hundred  years 
therefore  covers  the  total  duration  of  Venetian  rule  over  the 
inland  parts  of  Dalmatia,  itself  as  a  whole  but  a  maritime 
province.  In  short,  historically  speaking,  the  Venetian 
dominion  was  restricted  until  the  last  years  of  her  indepen- 
dent existence  to  a  bare  foothold  on  the  actual  coast,  the 
coast  towns  and  the  connecting  shore.  Moreover,  it  has  to 
be  remembered  that  in  Dalmatia,  as  the  term  is  used  now, 
there  existed  from  early  times  an  independent  republic 
which  was  never  a  possession  of  Venice  but  on  the  contrary 
was  her  vigorous  rival.  Within  the  southern  hmits  of 
Dalmatia,  stretching  from  a  little  south  of  the  Narenta  to 
the  Bocche  di  Cattaro  and  including  the  islands  of  Lastovo, 
Mljet,  Sipan,  Lapud,  and  Calamotta,  was  the  territory  of 
the  republic  of  Dubrovnik,  Serb  in  race  and  popular  speech 
though  Italian  in  culture.  Her  merchant  ships  by  trans- 
position of  the  initial  letters  of  her  Italian  name  are  said 
to  have  given  us  the  word  Argosy  originally  Eagosie ;  her 
vessels  were   to   be    found  in  the   Spanish    Armada;  and 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        123 

she  was  the  home  of  the  early  Serb  Hterary  renaissance 
of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  producing 
works  instinct  with  the  national  consciousness  of  the  race, 
while  in  the  eighteenth  she  produced  the  mathematician 
Boskovic.  Reduced  in  wealth  by  earthquakes  and  the 
changing  current  of  commerce  she  yet  maintained  her 
independence  and  even  survived  her  mightier  rival  till  she 
too  had  to  yield  her  liberties  to  Napoleon  in  1808. 

The  character  of  the  Venetian  rule  over  Dalmatia  was 
not  such  that  its  supersession  by  that  of  the  Habsburgs 
brought  anything  of  loss  to  the  country,  though  it  was 
regretted  by  the  Itahan  element  of  the  towns.  That  rule 
exhibited  the  worst  features  of  the  "mercantile  system" 
without  the  redeeming  element  of  the  opening  up  of  new 
territories  which  operated  in  our  own  colonial  empire  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  Throughout  her  dealings  with  her 
subjects  Venice  was  actuated  by  her  own  selfish  interests, 
and  those  conceived  in  the  narrowest  spirit.  Her  dominion 
to  her  was  not  a  trust,  nor  an  instrument  of  civilization, 
but  merely  a  means  of  enriching  the  city  of  the  lagoons, 
and  what  money  she  spent  in  Dalmatia  was  spent  for  the 
sake  of  its  defence,  in  short,  on  behalf  of  those  "  strategical 
necessities  "  which  are  taking  Italy  to  its  shores  in  our  own 
day.  Her  first  aim  was  to  secure  the  monopoly  of  com- 
merce and  the  carrying  trade,  an  object  which  could  most 
completely  be  achieved  by  the  conquest  of  the  Dalmatian 
ports  and  the  regulations  which  she  could  thereupon 
enforce.  The  constant  wars  in  which  Venice  was  engaged 
with  Hungary  and  its  sister  kingdom  of  Croatia  were  due 
entirely  to  the  aggression  practised  against  those  kingdoms 
by  Venice.  They  could  not  acquiesce  in  the  foreign 
domination  of  their  seaport  towns,  and  the  consequent 
strangling  of  their  trade,  its  diversion  to  other  channels, 
and  its  exploitation  for  the  benefit  of  the  "  mistress  of  the 
Adriatic",  and  as  surely  as  like  causes  produce  like  effects 
so  a  repetition  of  Venetian  policy  by  Italy  will  lead  to  a 
repetition  of  the  old  struggle  to  be  carried  on  with  the 
future   Southern  Slav  kingdom;  the  new   position  will  be 


124  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

an  exact  counterpart  of  the  old  and  will  lead  to  the  same 
sense  of  rankling  injustice  and  determination  for  redress. 
The  history  of  the  past  should  be  studied  for  the  lessons  it 
brings  for  the  present  and  the  future,  and  though  diplomacy 
never  learns  yet  the  peoples  concerned  should  insist  that  old 
mistakes,  the  cost  of  which  will  fall  upon  them,  should  not 
be  committed  again.  The  lesson  of  Venice's  ceaseless  wars 
against  the  possessors  of  the  eastern  Adriatic  backland 
constitutes  a  grave  warning  for  those  who  will  have  the 
handling  of  the  Near  Eastern  settlement. 

The  policy  of  monopoly  postulated  the  economic  weak- 
ness of  the  colonies,  and  possible  competition  was  elimi- 
nated by  the  most  ruthless  economic  methods.  To  prevent 
the  rise  of  a  silk  industry  in  Dalmatia  Venice  did  not 
hesitate  to  take  the  drastic  step  of  cutting  down  all  the 
mulberry-trees,  and  it  has  been  stated  that  after  the  change 
of  masters  the  number  of  Dalmatian  fishing  and  trading 
vessels  was  doubled  in  a  single  year.  The  last  fact  is  easily 
accounted  for  when  we  remember  that  all  commerce  had  to 
be  carried  in  Venetian  bottoms  and  by  way  of  Venice.  The 
contrast  between  the  condition  of  the  towns  under  Venetian 
rule  and  the  free  republic  of  Dubrovnik,  which  conducted 
its  own  commerce  freely  and  by  means  of  its  own  ships, 
pointed  the  moral  and  assigned  the  cause  of  the  poverty 
of  the  former.  While  the  one  was  prosperous,  happy,  and 
orderly,  even  in  the  days  when  its  former  glory  had  de- 
parted, the  others  were  poor,  torn  by  factions  between  the 
townsmen  and  peasants,  and  sunk  in  feebleness,  a  condition 
which  was  reflected  in  the  state  of  agriculture.  The  mono- 
polist policy  of  Venice  required  and  effected  this  state  of 
affairs,  and  a  recent  Italian  writer  has  said  that  the  pros- 
perity of  Venice  depended  on  the  poverty  of  Dalmatia 
and  that  historically  the  Venetian  dominion  was  a  long 
suffocation  of  the  country.^ 

'  "  La  fortuna  di  Venezia  dipendeva  dalla  sfortuna  della  Dalmazia  e 
storicamente  il  dominio  veneto  non  poteva  rappresentare  ne  altro 
rappresentd  che  una  lunga  soffacazione  del  paese  ".  G.  Prezzolini,  La 
Dalmazia,  p.  8.     This  invaluable  brochure  should  be  in  the  hands  of 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC         125 

Apart  from  the  stifling  of  competition,  what  Venice  sought 
in  Dalmatia  was  wood  for  shipbuilding  and  sailors  for  the 
fleet.  It  was  the  enormous  demands  of  timber  for  the 
former  purpose  that  was  responsible  for  the  destruction  of 
the  ancient  forests  for  which  the  country  was  famous 
in  classical  times.  This  destruction  has  resulted  in  the 
denudation  of  the  soil  and  the  turning  of  large  areas  of  it 
into  practical  desert.  For  this  last  result  Venice  cannot  be 
held  morally  responsible,  for  it  is  only  in  our  days  that  the 
need  of  reafforesting  forest  areas  as  they  are  felled  has  been 
recognized,  and  our  neglect  of  forestry  in  own  country  and 
of  reafforestation  in  many  of  our  colonies  is  proof  of  how 
slowly  the  need,  even  when  recognized,  is  acted  upon  in 
practice.  Its  Venetian  rulers  did  not  desire  that  the 
Dalmatians  should  be  other  than  what  they  had  been  in 
times  past,  poor,  hardy,  simple,  and  a  defence  against  the 
Turks.  The  absence  of  road-making,  of  instruction,  and  of 
economic  development,  has  been  defended  on  the  strange 
ground  of  preserving  a  frontier  territory  whose  condition 
would  not  attract  the  cupidity  of  its  neighbours  and  the 
rude  condition  of  whose  inhabitants  preserved  the  fitness 
of  the  latter  as  a  semi-barbarous  race  of  caterans  useful  for 
the  defence  of  the  marches.  Any  other  government,  say  the 
apologists  for  the  system,  would  have  done  the  same,  and 
perhaps  have  been  less  successful !  Even  Tommaseo,  while 
defending  the  moral  character  of  Venetian  rule,  is  reduced  to 
pointing  out  that  to  leave  unremedied  a  defect  in  man  or 
nation  is  a  different  thing  to  introducing  it.^  The  damning 
fact  remains  that  Venice,  in  not  desiring  the  educational 
development  of  the  country,  so  far  from  spreading  Italian 
culture  actually,  by  the  measures  it  adopted,  prevented, 
though  of  course  not  with  that  purpose,  the  introduction  of 
learnmg.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  if  northern 
Dalmatia  is  to-day  a  Slav  and  not  an  Italian  land  it  is  due 

every  student  of  the  question.     It  disposes  of  the  case  for  annexation, 
and    gives    numerous   quotations   from    documents    not    accessible   to 
students  in  England. 
'  Git.  Prezzoliui,  ut  supra,  pp.  16-18  note. 


126  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

to  the  restrictive  policy  of  her  former  Italian  mistress.  No 
printing  press  was  to  be  found  in  Dalmatia  till  about  three 
hundred  years  after  the  setting  up  of  the  first  press  in 
Montenegro,  for  no  books  were  published  in  the  country  of 
a  date  prior  to  1774,  nor  was  there  any  public  school.  A 
humorous  illustration  of  the  regard  felt  for  her  subjects 
from  overseas  is  to  be  found  in  her  authorization  to  the 
University  of  Padua  of  the  conferring  of  the  doctorate  on 
such  subjects  on  presentation  of  a  certificate  of  proficiency 
given  by  two  doctors  of  medicine  or  jurisconsults,  the 
condition  attached  being  that  they  should  only  practise 
in  Dalmatia ! 

There  is  nothing  therefore  in  the  past  of  Dalmatia  that 
can  justify  any  historical  claim  on  the  part  of  Italy  to  its 
possession.  Neither  the  duration  of  Venetian  dominion 
over  the  interior,  nor  the  character  of  that  dominion,  is 
of  a  nature  to  confer  historical  rights  upon  the  heir  of 
Venice.  The  ports  of  Dalmatia  were  regarded  as  convenient 
trading  stations  as  were  other  cities  in  the  Levant,  while 
the  possession  of  them  stifled  any  possible  competition.  No 
right  can  be  alleged  in  Dalmatia  that  could  not  equally  be 
alleged  in  the  case  of  Crete  for  example,  though  it  is  not  to 
be  forgotten  that  history  has  been  invoked  in  the  case  of 
Rhodes,  and  Corfu  also  has  been  claimed  as  an  Italian 
island.  Dubrovnik  and  its  territories  at  any  rate  were  never 
Venetian,  Kotor  (Cattaro)  was  Serb  till  it  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Hungarians  in  1371,  Bar  (Antivari)  was  recognized 
by  the  Serb  monarchs  as  a  sort  of  republic  and  allowed  to 
coin  its  own  money,  Budva  was  also  a  Serb  port  and  is 
noteworthy  from  the  fact  that  its  law  is  said  to  have  been 
the  source  of  DuSan's  Zakonik.  These  two  towns  finally 
fell  to  Venice  in  1442  and  1444.  The  kingdom  of  Croatia 
possesses  prior  historical  rights  over  nothern  Dalmatia.  In 
fine,  the  Southern  Slavs  were  in  the  country  before  the 
Venetians — and  are  there  now. 

These  "historical  claims"  are  the  sport  of  propagandists 
all  over  the  Near  East,  and  the  history  of  these  regions 
is  such  that  almost  any  and  every  Power  can  advance  some 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        127 

sort  of  "historical"  right  to  anything  which  it  covets. 
Some  are  valid  enough,  others  are  comparable  to  our 
"rights"  to  Calais  or  Bordeaux.  The  continual  insistence 
on  these  "historical"  claims  is  one  of  the  worst  evils  which 
have  afflicted  and  still  afflict  the  problems  of  the  Balkans. 
There  is  no  other  quarter  of  the  world  where  contending 
parties  hark  back  to  "  rights  "  derived  from  so  long  distant  a 
past,  which  not  infrequently  represent  a  possession  quite 
ephemeral  in  its  character.  However  keen  may  be  the 
regret  of  patriotic  Frenchmen  for  the  loss  of  the  splendid 
colonial  empire  which  they  possessed  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  no  Frenchman  urges  the  historical  rights  of  France 
to  Canada  proper,  perhaps  the  most  outstanding  feat  of 
colonization  in  history  in  its  character  if  regard  be  had  to 
the  manner  in  which,  as  in  the  ancient  Greek  colonies,  the 
very  civilization,  culture,  and  atmosphere  of  the  metropolis 
has  been  transplanted  to  a  new  land,  though  doubtless  in 
the  case  cited  a  good  deal  of  this  resignation  must  be  set 
down  to  the  liberal  policy  pursued  by  England  which  has 
kept  the  French  Canadians  as  British  subjects  without 
requiring  them  to  abandon  their  national  outlook  or  re- 
ligion. In  the  Near  East,  however,  we  have  a  veritable 
riot  of  conflicting  historical  claims  of  a  nature  which  if 
applied  elsewhere  would,  as  Professor  Cvijic  has  observed, 
require  a  remodelling  of  the  map  of  Europe  which,  if  per 
impossihile  it  were  effected,  would  result  in  a  state  of  affairs 
infinitely  worse  than  that  which  prevails.  The  Magyars 
insist  on  the  claims  of  that  fetish  of  their  chauvinism,  the 
sacred  crown  of  S.  Stephen,  whose  worship  requires  that 
everything  that  ever  fell  under  its  sway  or  suzerainty  should 
return  again  to  its  allegiance  in  defiance  of  the  principles  of 
nationality  and  historical  growth  and  in  repugnance  to  the 
dictates  of  the  most  ordinary  common  sense.  Italy  achieved 
her  unity  in  despite  of  historical  claims.  The  kingdom  of 
the  Two  Sicilies  was  an  ancient  political  organism  with  its 
roots  deep  in  the  history  of  the  peninsula,  and  the  Italian 
Bourbons  and  the  House  of  Este  have  undeniable  "his- 
torical"  claims  to  their  former  territories.     These   claims 


128  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

are  rejected  on  the  ground  that  they  run  counter  to  the 
principle  of  nationality  and  the  right  of  every  people  to 
determine  its  political  life.  It  is  fortunate  for  Italy  that 
neither  English  nor  French,  especially  the  latter,  set  any 
store  on  ancient  historical  claims.  Do  Italians  accept  the 
historical  claims  of  the  Pope  to  the  Papal  States  ?  Mace- 
donia again  has  been  the  prey  of  claims  dating  from  the 
Middle  Ages,  and  in  some  cases  a  particular  town  or  district 
has  acquired  a  sentimental  importance  quite  incommen- 
surate with  real  values.  One  reason  for  this  has  already 
been  given — the  stamping  flat  of  the  Balkans  by  the 
Turkish  conquest,  with  the  result  that  the  independent  life 
of  its  peoples  has  been  resumed  from  the  late  medieval 
standpoint — and  it  is  a  reason  which  must  be  allowed  for 
and  is  in  fact  natural  enough.  The  only  real  resolvent 
of  these  problems  is  the  fact  of  nationality,  and  the  real 
political  frontiers  are  to  be  found  in  those  geographical  lines 
of  demarcation  which  correspond  most  closely  to  the 
ethnographical. 

Ill 

Dalmatia  is  a  Southern  Slav  country  from  the  point 
of  view  of  nationality.  The  Austrian  census  gives 
the  population  of  the  province  as  follows :  Serbo-Croats 
610,669  or  96  per  cent. ;  Italians  18,028  or  slightly  under 
3  per  cent. ;  Germans  3,081,  the  total  population  being 
634,855.  In  1900  out  of  a  total  population  of  584,823  the 
Italians  numbered  15,279.  Of  the  Serbo-Croats  the  Catholic 
Croats  muster  80  per  cent,  of  the  total  population  and  the 
Orthodox  Serbs  105,335,  or  16  per  cent.  Some  20,000  of  the 
Orthodox  are  to  be  found  in  the  extreme  south  in  the  district 
of  Kotor,  the  remainder  in  the  extreme  north  and  in  Sibenik. 
Of  the  Italians  no  fewer  than  8,000  are  to  be  found  in  the 
single  town  of  Zadar  (Zara).  Signer  Gayda  has  combated 
the  correctness  of  these  figures  and  prefers  a  calculation 
of  his  own.  He  alleges  that  6,000  votes  were  cast  for 
Italian  candidates  for  the  Beichsrath,  that  it  is  usual  in 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC        129 

Austria  to  reckon  one  elector  for  every  ten  citizens,  and 
that  consequently  the  number  of  Italians  should  be  60,000. 
The  immediate  answer  to  this  is  obvious.  In  the  first  place 
the  Italians,  such  as  they  number,  are  to  be  found  in  the 
towns  which  always  give  a  higher  percentage  of  votes  cast 
than  rural  constituencies,  and  in  the  second  place  he  gra- 
tuitously assumes  that  no  Italian  candidate  received  any 
but  Italian  votes.  The  contrary  is  known  to  be  the  case 
at  Zadar,  where  Croat  votes  have  been  cast  for  Italian 
candidates.  Moreover,  his  own  calculation  gives  the  Italian 
population  at  less  than  10  per  cent,  of  the  total.  He 
further  alleges  that  as  the  result  of  governmental  pressure 
many  Italians  are  terrorized  into  concealing  their  nation- 
ality, and  that  owing  to  the  same  cause  many  Italians  have 
become  denationalized.  As  to  government  pressure,  it  has 
been  pointed  out  by  Dr.  Seton- Watson  that  the  munici- 
pality of  Zadar,  which  is  in  the  hands  of  Italians,  is 
the  only  municipality  in  Dalmatia  which  has  not  been 
dissolved ;  it  has  therefore  received  preferential  treatment 
as  compared  with  the  Serbo-Croat  councils.  The  arguments 
alleged  require,  however,  more  detailed  treatment,  and  it 
will  be  necessary  to  see  how  far  the  latest  figures  are 
supported  by  previous  estimates,  and  what  is  the  historical 
testimony  as  to  the  ethnographic  character  of  the  country 
in  the  past.  The  inquiry  will  show  what  ground  there 
is  for  saying  that  Dalmatia  in  the  past  was  more  Italian, 
and  that  the  waning  of  Italianita  is  a  modern  process 
induced  by  illicit  pressure.  Here  also,  thanks  to  Professor 
Prezzolini,  it  will  be  possible  to  rely  almost  entirely  on 
Italian   evidence. 

In  1873  Maschek  gives  the  population  as  containing 
440,282  Serbo-Croats  as  against  27,305  ItaHans.^  In  1868 
Tommaseo  accepted  the  round  figures  of  400,000  Slavs 
and  20,000  Italians. ^  Sir  Gardner  Wilkinson,  in  his  book 
Dalmatia  and   Montenegro    published   in   1848,   gives   the 

'  L.  Maschek,  Manuale    del  regno  di  Dalmazia  per  Vanno  1873. 
at.  G.  Prezzolini,  ut  supra,  p.  43. 
*  at.  Prezzolini,  ihid. 

9 


130  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

population  of  1833  as  embracing  360,000  Serbo-Croats 
and  16,000  Italians.  So  far  then  as  the  statistical  estimates 
of  the  past  century  are  concerned  there  is  nothing  to 
invalidate  the  correctness  of  the  figures  of  the  last  census. 
The  proportions  vary,  but  not  to  any  striking  extent.  In 
view  of  the  growing  national  consciousness  of  the  Serbo- 
Croats,  we  should  expect  a  slightly  larger  percentage  of 
them  in  the  later  figures,  as  many  of  the  bilingual  popula- 
tion who  in  former  times  would  return  themselves  as 
Italians,  as  constituting  the  richer  and  more  aristocratic 
element  of  the  population,  would  latterly  return  themselves 
as  Slavs.  The  Austrian  census,  it  must  be  remembered, 
is  by  language,  and  a  man  speaking  Serb  at  home  but 
knowing  Italian  and  using  it  for  business  purposes  could 
return  himself  at  will  as  being  by  language  Serbo-Croat 
or  Italian. 

The  historical  testimony  of  the  past  is  quite  conclusive 
in  its  results.  Writing  in  1500  Lucio  states  that  the 
original  Dalmatian  population  which  spoke  a  corrupt  Latin 
dialect  had  greatly  decreased  as  the  result  of  war,  pestilence, 
and  other  causes,  and  that  gradually  the  Slavs  had  pene- 
trated not  only  the  mainland  and  the  islands  but  into  the 
cities,  so  that  the  "Dalmatians"  were  constrained  to  learn 
Slav  and  became  bilingual,  and  owing  to  the  prevalence 
of  the  Slav  language  were  counted  as  Slavs  by  foreigners. 
That  language,  he  says,  was  called  Croat  or  Serb.^  These 
Romance-speaking  people  were  not  of  course  Italians  but 
the  descendants  of  the  old  Latin-speaking  provincials  of  the 
Roman  Empire.  Nor  was  the  process  of  infiltration  a 
new  one  in  Lucio's  day.  The  Southern  Slavs  had  early 
penetrated  to  the  coast,  and  the  earliest  Croatian  kingdom 
had  its  nucleus  in  northern  Dalmatia,  Sibenik  for  example 
having  been  the  capital  of  King  Kresimir,  and  Spljet  of 
Zvonomir,  but  it  is  very  probable   that  in  the   towns  the 

'  Prezzolini,  ut  supra,  p.  27,  cit.  Lucio,  De  regno  Dalmatiae  et 
Croatiae,  vi,  p.  219 :  "  Dalmatae  tamen,  ipsique  contermini  Slavi, 
linguam  Slavam  non  dicunt,  sed  Heruatam  vel  Serblam,  prout  cuiusque 
dialectus  est". 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        131 

provincials  were  numerous,  and  that  a  further  process 
of  diminution,  as  Lucio  says,  was  the  result  of  frequent 
wars  and  the  great  pestilences  of  the  fourteenth  century. 
Even  in  1177  the  towns  had  been  invaded,  for  we  are  told 
that  when  Pope  Alexander  III  paid  a  visit  to  Zara  he  was 
conducted  in  procession  by  the  inhabitants,  who  recited 
praises  and  songs  "in  loro  lingua  schiava". 

In  1553  a  Venetian  noble,  Giustinian,  who  visited 
Dalmatia  with  a  mission  from  the  Government  gave  an 
account  of  his  travels.  At  Zadar  he  found  an  Italianate 
gentry,  but  the  populace,  though  speaking  the  lingua  franca 
were  Slav  in  their  customs.  At  Sibenik  he  observes : 
''  The  costumes  of  the  inhabitants,  the  speech  and  the 
customs  of  these  Sebenicans  are  all  Slav  in  their  character 
(all'usanza  schiava)".  Nearly  all  had  the  lingua  franca 
and  a  few  of  the  gentry  dressed  in  Italian  fashion.  "The 
ladies",  he  adds,  "all  dress  in  Slav  fashion  and  hardly  any 
speak  the  lingua  franca",  an  observation  which  is  very 
significant  of  the  real  nationality  of  the  people.  At  Trogir 
(Trau)  he  finds  the  same  state  of  affairs,  "  nelle  case  loro 
parlano  lingua  schiava  per  rispetto  delle  donne,  perche 
poche  d'esse  intendono  lingua  italiana,  et  si  ben  qualcuna 
I'intende,  non  vuol  parlare,  se  non  la  lingua  materna ", 
so  that  here  also  Italian  or  the  lingua  franca  was  only  the 
language  of  business  for  the  greater  part  of  the  inhabitants. 
He  speaks  in  almost  identical  language  of  the  neighbouring 
Spalatines,  whose  tongue  he  says  is  the  Tuscan  of  Slav. 
The  islands  are  more  Italian  in  character.^  A  similar 
account  is  given  by  another  traveller  of  the  independent 
republic  of  Dubrovnik.  Here  even  the  men  only  spoke 
Italian  "here  and  there".  "La  lingua  loro  nativa 
e  schiava,  con  la  quale  parlano  gli  altri  Dalmatini ".  Their 
Italian  is  corrupt. 

The  Diario  of  1571  gives  similar  testimony  of  a  Slav- 
speaking  population  at  Spljet  (Spalato),  men  and  women 
in  the  piazza  using  that  language. 

'  Monumenta  spectantia  historiam  alavorum  meridionaUum,  viii, 
pp.  197,  etc.     at.  Prezzolini,  ut  supra,  pp  28,  29. 


132  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

In  1574  the  Belazioyii  de'  rettori  is  full  of  the  same 
evidence.  The  Spalatines  complain  "in  their  language". 
The  Venetian  procurators  include  in  their  advice  to  know 
v^hat  the  Spalatines  say  if  they  speak  Slav.  A  significant 
incident  is  related  at  Trogir.  An  old  soldier  receives 
a  solatium  from  the  republic,  he  takes  it,  salutes,  and  goes 
off  "  singing  in  Slav  of  King  Marko,  and  all  the  people  and 
the  bystanders  sang  it  with  him,  as  with  one  accord.  For 
they  all  know  this  ballad  (canzone)". ^  Here  then  we  have 
a  people  which  knows  and  spontaneously  takes  up  some 
ballad  of  the  famous  Serb  hero  Marko  Kraljevic. 

One  consideration  emerges  plainly,  and  that  is  that  even 
in  the  sixteenth  century  not  only  the  country  districts 
but  the  towns  themselves  were  predominantly  Slav.  The 
people  speak  Serbo-Croat  in  their  own  homes,  they  com- 
monly dress  in  Slav  costume,  their  habits  are  Slav,  their 
popular  songs  are  Slav.  The  townsmen  however  are 
generally  bilingual,  knowing  also  Italian,  the  lingua  franca 
of  commerce.  It  is  this  circumstance  which  may  have 
created  the  impression  of  greater  Italianita  in  the  towns 
than  really  existed,  since  foreigners  knowing  Italian  but 
no  Serb  could  get  a  response  in  the  towns  while  they  were 
unable  to  obtain  an  answer  in  the  country,  thus  acquiring 
the  impression  of  an  Italian  town  population  as  contrasted 
with  a  Serbo-Croat  peasantry.  The  real  line  of  demarcation 
seems  to  have  been  one  of  wealth — the  wealthy  classes  were 
often  genuine  Italians  while  the  Slav  population  comprised 
the  poorer  section  of  the  community.  Hence  the  great 
bitterness  of  the  class  feeling,  breaking  out  in  1797  into 
an  open  Jacquerie,  of  which  there  is  abundant  evidence 
in  the  authorities  referred  to.  Fortis,  who  wrote  his 
Viaggio  in  Dalmazia  in  1794,  says  that  the  Slavs  spoke 
indifferently  of  "  f ede  di  cane  e  fede  d'italiano  ",  a  dog's 
word,  or  an  Italian's  word.  =     When  in  1797  the  Austrian 

'  V.  Solitro,  Documenti  siorici  sulV  Istria  e  sulla  Dalmazia,  1841 :  il 
Diario,  pp  131-172,  Lettere  di  Rettori,  pp.  173-250.  Cit.  Prezzolini,  ui 
supra,  pp.  29-30. 

•  Op.  cit,,  p.  50.     Prezzolini,  p.  21. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        133 

general  Rukavina,  a  Croat,  entered  Dalmatia,  he  and  his 
soldiers  were  well  received  on  account  of  their  nationality. 
He  addressed  the  people  in  Serbo-Croat,  and  at  Trogir, 
when  two  companies  of  Croatian  infantry  were  disembarked, 
the  populace  remarked  on  the  fact  that  the  soldiers  spoke 
their  own  language,  and  that  many  had  the  same  sur- 
names as  themselves. 

It  is  not  altogether  surprising,  in  view  of  the  evidence 
of  which  part  has  been  adduced  above,  to  find  that  the  most 
patriotic  Italian  writers  and  thinkers,  the  real  makers 
of  modern  Italy  in  the  moral  and  spiritual  elements  which 
marked  the  risorgimento,  have  no  doubt  that  Dalmatia 
is  a  Slav  and  not  an  Italian  land.  Tommaseo,  who  was 
himself  by  birth  a  Dalmatian,  wrote  in  1861:  "I  do  not 
think  that  Dalmatia  can  ever  form  an  appendage  of  Italy 
.  .  .  because,  if  it  has  always  been  difficult  to  rule  men 
speaking  another  language,  for  the  Italians  now  it  would 
be  impossible  if  they  wish  to  institute,  I  do  not  say  material 
equality,  but  civil  equity  .  .  .  her  future  destiny  intends 
her  to  be  the  friend  of  Italy  not  her  subject ".  ^  He  thought 
that  Dalmatia  should  be  joined  to  Serbia  and  the  Serb 
provinces  then  under  Turkish  dominion  i.e.  Bosnia,  etc. 
Croatia  he  regarded  as  being  morally  less  free  than  these 
provinces.  At  that  time,  of  course,  the  Croats  were  still 
under  the  glamour  of  the  House  of  Habsburg,  and  their 
political  ideas  were  vague  and  halting,  and  the  same 
thought  was  expressed  by  Sir  Arthur  Evans  in  his 
Illyrian  Letters.  Time  and  circumstances  have  changed 
that  attitude  and,  while  geographically  Dalmatia  forms 
the  complement  of  the  Serb  lands  of  Bosnia  and  the 
Hercegovina,  such  particularist  ideas  are  now  swallowed 
up  in  the  greater  ideal  of  a  Southern  Slav  unity  in  which 
they  have  no  place. 

Mazzini  definitely  assigned  Dalmatia  to  the  Slavs,  whom 
he  regarded — and  rightly — as  natural  allies  of  Italy.  "  Pro- 
cure the  election",  he  said,  "of  men  to  represent  in  one 

'  N.  Tommaseo,  Lettera  ai  Dalmati,  p.  6.  Cit.  Prezzolini,  ut 
supra,   pp.   35,  36. 


134  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

national  assembly  Carinthia,  Kranjska  (Carniola),  Dalmatia, 
Croatia,  Slavonia  .  .  .".  In  1866  he  said:  "For  ethno- 
graphic, political,  commercial  reasons  Istria  is  ours :  as 
necessary  to  Italy  as  the  ports  of  Dalmatia  are  necessary  to 
the  Southern  Slavs ".^  After  1866  he  considered  the  reten- 
tion of  the  island  of  Lissa  to  be  necessary,  influenced  doubt- 
less by  the  Italian  naval  defeat. 

Valussi  in  1871  distinguished  between  the  Friulian- 
Istrian  littoral  and  the  "  Hungarian-Dalmatian  ",  the  first 
of  which  is  within  the  natural  boundaries  of  Cisalpine  Italy, 
whereas  in  the  second  "the  Italians  are  a  colony  on  the 
maritime  coast  which  belongs  to  another  nationality  whose 
territory  extends  to  its  shores ".  He  remarks  again  of 
Dalmatia  that  it  is  "destined  henceforth  to  become  the 
maritime  coast  and  harbours  of  the  future,  and  now,  not 
far  distant,  Jugoslavia  ".^ 

Cattaneo  sees  the  natural  boundary  of  Italy  in  the  moun- 
tainous backbone  of  Istria  :  "  Di  la  Slavia,  la  Fiume  :  di  qua 
ritalia,  di  qua  Trieste  "  (Beyond  is  Slavia  and  Fiume,  on 
this  side  Italy  and  Trieste).  Prezzolinis  quotes  also  from 
a  speech  delivered  in  1896  by  a  Signor  Ziliotto,  a  champion 
of  Italianita,  in  the  Diet  at  Zara.  "  We,  separated  from 
Italy  by  the  whole  Adriatic,  a  few  thousands  scattered 
without  territorial  continuity  among  a  people,  not  of 
hundreds  of  thousands,  but  of  millions  of  Slavs,  how 
could  we  ever  think  of  union  with  Italy  ?  " 

The  result  of  this  inquiry,  pursued  in  Italian  sources,  is 
quite  conclusive.  We  have  continuous  testimony  to  the 
Slav  character  of  Dalmatia,  not  only  in  the  country  dis- 
tricts, but,  so  far  as  the  general  populace  is  concerned,  in 
the  towns  also.  This  was  remarked  upon  by  Venetian 
travellers  quite  early  in  the  history  of  the  Venetian  occu- 

'  G.  Mazzini,  Opere,  vol.  xiv,  passim.     Cit.  Prezzolini,  p.  37. 

"  "Essendo  ormai  la  Dalmazia  destinata  a  diventare  la  costa  marittima 
portuosa  della  futura,  ed  ormai  non  molto  piu  lontana  Jugoslavia". 
P.  Valosi,  L'Adriatico  in  relazione  agli  interessi  nazionali  delV  Italia, 
pp.  29-30,  107-108.     Cit.  Prezzolini,  p.  38. 

3  TJt  supra,  p.  44. 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE   ADRIATIC        135 

pation,  itself  until  the  end  of  the  century  confined  to 
a  narrow  strip  of  coast  line.  Venice  made  no  effort  to 
Italianize  the  people,  from  motives  partly  of  commercial 
jealousy  and  partly  of  military  expediency.  The  great 
patriotic  thinkers  of  the  risorgiviento  regard  Dalmatia  as 
Slav,  destined  to  form  part  of  a  united  Southern  Slav  king- 
dom the  friend  of  Italy.  There  is  no  trace  of  a  decreasing 
proportion  of  true  Italians  during  the  past  century,  though 
the  growing  national  consciousness  of  the  Slavs  led  to  the 
overthrow  of  the  political  Italianita  which  till  1866  and 
even  longer  had,  in  point  of  fact,  been  bolstered  up  by  the 
Austrian  government  both  by  the  official  use  of  Italian  and 
by  that  manipulation  of  the  franchise  which  still  subsists 
for  the  local  Diet.  There  is  no  reason  for  supposing  any 
material  inaccuracy  in  the  census  figures.  Ethnographi- 
cally  Dalmatia  is  a  Serbo-Croat  land. 

Not  only  is  Dalmatia  Serbo-Croat,  but  it  is  the  very  home 
of  the  movement  for  unity  between  the  two  branches  of  the 
race ;  it  has  given  birth  to  a  vigorous  national  literature, 
the  great  sculptor  Mestrovic  is  a  Dalmatian  from  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Sibenik,  its  politicians  have  been  the  foremost 
advocates  of  political  reunion  and  have  carried  their  prin- 
ciples into  practice,  a  united  Southern  Slav  kingdom  with- 
out Dalmatia  would  be  deprived  of  some  of  its  most  vigorous 
political  elements,  of  the  spiritual  home  of  some  of  its  fore- 
most champions. I  So  strongly  rooted  is  Slav  conservatism, 
even  among  the  Roman  Catholics,  that  in  many  parishes  of 
the  islands  and  the  mainland  the  old  GlagoHtic  rite  is  still 
in  use,  despite  former  discouragement  by  the  Vatican. 
Slav  philologists  resort  to  some  of  the  islands  of  the 
Quarnero  where  the  dialect  represents  the  earliest  known 

'  These  points  will  be  found  fully  treated  by  Dr.  R.  W.  Seton- Watson 
in  his  brochure  The  Balkans,  Italy,  and  the  Adriatic,  to  which  the 
reader  is  referred  for  information  upon  them.  Goracuchi,  in  his  work 
Attraits  de  Trieste,  written  in  1883,  speaks  with  enthusiastic  fervour  of 
the  great  names  contributed  by  the  Southern  Slavs  of  Dalmatia  to  the 
history  of  art,  literature,  and  science.  Himself  an  Italian,  he  acknow- 
ledges the  Slav  nationality  of  those  of  whom  he  speaks.  Vide  a  passage 
cited  in  La  Serbie,  October  15,  1916. 


136  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

form  of  the  Slav  tongue.  As  has  been  seen  in  the  previous 
chapter,  the  Serbo-Croat  Coahtion  in  Croatia  was  largely 
the  work  of  Dalmatian  politicians.  We  have  seen  also  the 
joy  with  which  the  Serb  successes  in  the  Balkan  wars  were 
received,  and  the  consequent  dissolution  by  Imperial 
authority  of  several  of  the  Dalmatian  municipalities — Sig- 
ner Gayda  himself  has  given  a  most  vivid  account  of  the 
demonstrations  of  joy,  of  the  spiritual  exaltation,  and  of  the 
excited  hopes  of  the  Dalmatian  populace. 


IV 

If  the  historical  and  ethnographic  claims  of  Italy  to 
Dalmatia  are  without  substantial  basis,  and  come  into 
conflict  with  the  principle  of  nationality,  the  demands 
advanced  on  the  ground  of  strategic  necessity  are  entitled 
to  a  respectful  hearing  in  so  far  as  they  are  concerned  only 
with  the  legitimate  needs  of  self-defence,  and  are  neither 
extended  to  cover  ideas  of  aggression  nor  pushed  to  a 
length  where  the  wrong  done  to  others  by  their  gratifica- 
tion would  be  out  of  proportion  to  their  benefit  to  Italy. 
The  origin  of  these  strategic  claims  has  already  been  stated 
as  due  to  the  configuration  of  the  Adriatic,  the  paucity  of 
harbours  on  the  Italian  side,  and  the  abundance  of  them  on 
the  eastern  shore,  which  could  become  a  menace  to  Italy  if 
held  by  a  strong  naval  Power.  So  far  as  the  demands  have 
a  legitimate  foundation  they  call  for  such  a  territorial  settle- 
ment in  the  region  of  the  Adriatic  as  may  give  reasonable 
security  to  Italy. 

"It  was  and  is  the  possession  of  the  eastern  shore  which 
gives  command  of  the  sea".^  In  this  sentence  we  have  the 
root  claim  of  Italy  to  territorial  possession  of  the  opposite 
coast  expressed  in  its  baldest  and  also  its  most  far-reaching 
sense.  If  the  dictum  were  true,  then  indeed  there  would 
hardly  be  a  "  problem  "  of  the  Adriatic  ;  cadit  qucestio,  and 
the  only  point  to  be  determined  would  be  whether  Italy  or 

'  J.  A.  R.  Marriott,  The  Problem  of  the  Adriatic.  Nineteenth  Century 
Review,  December  1915,  p.  1327. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC        137 

the  Southern  Slavs  were  to  be  put  into  this  command  as 
thus  expressed.  "Dalmatia",  says  an  Itahan  writer  in  the 
same  train  of  ideas,  "  dominates  the  Adriatic  "  ;  it  has  done 
so  in  the  past,  and  the  development  of  naval  warfare  by 
means  of  mines,  torpedo,  and  submarine,  will  enable  it  to 
do  so  much  more  in  the  future  ;  whoever  has  sought  to 
command  the  Adriatic  has  always  been  compelled  to  occupy 
the  Dalmatian  coasts.  But  is  this  true?  Underlying  these 
dicta  is  an  assumption  without  warrant  in  history,  plainly 
repugnant  to  the  art  of  naval  warfare  as  conceived  by 
sailors,  and  akin  to  those  "  heresies  "  which  have  more  than 
once  threatened  the  supremacy  of  a  naval  Power.  A  coast 
does  not,  and  cannot,  command  a  sea ;  it  does  not,  and 
cannot,  in  itself  command  naval  power  in  either  sense  of 
the  phrase.  If  it  be  possession  of  the  eastern  coast  that 
gives  command  of  the  Adriatic,  if  Dalmatia  dominates  the 
Adriatic,  how  is  it  that  the  Allies  from  the  first  day  of  the 
war  have  been  in  command  of  that  sea,  how  is  it  that  Italy 
at  this  moment  dominates  it  ? 

If  these  dicta  be  true  then  Austria  should  be  in  command 
of  the  Adriatic,  Austria  should  be  able  to  navigate  its  area 
freely,  transport  her  troops  at  will,  forbid  passage  to  the 
warships  of  her  enemies  and  a  fortiori  to  transports  carry- 
ing troops.  We  find,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  reverse  is 
the  case ;  the  appearance  of  Austrian  warships  is  rare  and 
furtive,  no  troops  have  been  or  could  have  been  transported 
across  the  Adriatic,  though  some  perhaps  have  been  moved 
down  the  coast  under  cover  of  the  island  barrier.  On 
the  other  hand  the  Italian  fleet,  with  some  allied  aid,  has 
convoyed  the  transport  of  260,000  men  across  the  Adriatic 
in  250  vessels,  and  300,000  cwt  of  materials  in  100  vessels, 
while  sovereigns  and  princes  have  crossed  six  times,  and 
military  and  political  officials  more  frequently.^  In  short, 
the  Allies  have  exercised  command  in  spite  of  the  continued 
and  unthreatened  occupation  of  Dalmatia  by  the  Austriaus. 
Evidently,  in  face  of  facts  which  directly  negative  the 
validity  of  the  dicta  above  quoted,  there  is  some  fatal  flaw 
'  Vide  Italian  Official  Note  of  February  24,  1916. 


138  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

in  them.  That  flaw  is  the  confusion,  which  is  often  found 
in  political  discussions  on  this  and  kindred  topics,  between 
power  itself  and  the  means  of  acquiring  power.  If  good 
ports  constituted  maritime  power  then  Norway  would  be 
one  of  the  most  foremost  naval  Powers  of  the  world,  for 
its  coast  is  a  series  of  magnificent  harbours,  deep,  well 
sheltered,  and  capable  of  easy  defence.  Greece,  too,  in 
that  case  would  be  the  leading  naval  State  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, which  it  would  command  by  virtue  of  the  same 
natural  advantages  as  are  possessed  by  Norway.  No  one, 
however,  would  pretend  for  a  moment  that  the  coast  of 
Norway  commands  the  North  Sea,  and  that  England 
cannot  dominate  that  water  unless  she  obtains  the  opposite 
coast.  It  is  fleets,  and  fleets  alone,  that  can  command 
the  sea,  and,  as  the  course  of  the  war  has  shown,  that 
command  cannot  be  divided  though  it  may  be  in  suspense 
— the  stronger  fleet  drives  its  rival  off  the  open  sea. 

To  say,  then,  that  Dalmatia  "dominates"  the  Adriatic 
is  plainly  incorrect.  Mr.  Marriott's  phrase  that  possession 
of  the  eastern  shore  "  gives  "  command  of  that  sea  marks 
an  approximation  to  the  correct  idea,  but  only  an  approxi- 
mation. The  truth  is  that  all  such  phrases  are  misleading. 
What  is  meant  by  them — or  ought  to  be  meant — is  that 
such  a  harbour,  position,  or  coast  is  of  a  nature  to  confer 
advantages  or  opportunities  on  its  possessor  greater  than 
those  afforded  to  its  possessor  by  some  other  point  or 
coast,  in  such  manner  that  in  certain  circumstances  the 
possessor  of  the  first  named  will  be  clearly  in  a  position 
to  make  good  by  naval  means  his  command  of  the  waters 
in  question.  Those  circumstances  consist  in  equality  of 
resources  for  a  naval  establishment.  The  resources  neces- 
sary in  modern  days  for  the  maintenance  of  a  great  navy 
are  only  to  be  found  in  a  first-class  Power,  a  navy  is  a 
most  expensive  instrument  to  build  up  or  maintain  and 
it  is  an  instrument  that  grows  yearly  more  expensive. 
It  requires  also,  if  the  fleet  is  to  be  built  and  provided 
for  by  its  possessor,  large  industrial  and  manufacturing 
resources.     These  are  the  reasons  for  the  practical  disap- 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC         139 

pearance  of  secondary  fleets  as  a  factor  in  maritime  war- 
fare. In  the  days  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  when  a  ship- 
of-the-line  could  be  built  for  ^6100, 000  and,  when  built, 
was  good  for  fifty  years,  the  smaller  States  such  as 
Denmark  could  maintain  respectable  fleets  equal  in  quality 
of  material  to  the  best.  Such  a  State  could  possess, 
say,  some  half-dozen  ships-of-the-line  besides  frigates  and 
smaller  craft.  The  equivalent  in  modern  days  would 
cost  £15,000,000  for  the  battleships  alone,  and  in  a  dozen 
years  they  would  be  obsolescent  and  in  twenty  years 
obsolete.  Harbours  and  coasts  do  not  command  a  sea  or 
constitute  naval  power,  they  only  afford  greater  or  less 
facilities  for  the  acquisition  of  such  power  provided  the 
possessor  can  also  command  the  necessary  resources  in 
men,  industry,  and,  above  all,  money.  If  then  the  possessor 
of  Dalmatia  be  a  Great  Power  it  can  command  the  Adriatic, 
but  even  so  only  if  it  employ  the  necessary  resources. 
Austria  is  a  Great  Power,  but  in  default  of  having 
employed  the  necessary  resources  she  does  not  comm.and 
the  Adriatic  in  spite  of  her  being  a  first-class  State.  If 
the  future  possessor  of  Dalmatia  do  not  command  the 
resources  of  a  Great  Power,  then  that  possessor  can 
no  more  command  the  Adriatic  than  Norway  can  com- 
mand the  North  Sea ;  Dalmatia  in  such  an  event  will 
largely  represent  unrealizable  potentialities.  Dalmatia 
would  of  course  confer  advantages  on  such  a  possessor, 
its  coast  could  easily  be  defended  against  attack,  which 
is  a  defensive  advantage,  such  naval  power  as  might 
be  possessed  by  the  State  in  question  would  be  more 
efficacious  than  if  exercised  from  a  poor  coast  devoid  of 
natural  harbours,  but  the  fact  remains  that  in  default  of 
the  necessary  resources  such  a  State  could  not  build  or 
maintain  a  large  fleet,  and  while,  therefore,  in  a  position 
to  annoy  her  neighbour  by  minor  warfare  she  could  not 
command  the  sea.  It  is  not  Portsmouth  that  commands 
the  Channel,  but  the  fleet  that  we  can  maintain  at  Ports- 
mouth; in  the  Mediterranean  it  was  not  Gibraltar  nor 
Malta  that  dominated   the  inland   sea,  but   the  fleet  that 


140  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

was  maintained  there.  Give  Gibraltar,  Malta,  and  Aden 
to  Monaco,  yet  Monaco  will  not  command  the  Mediter- 
ranean nor  maintain  for  twenty-four  hours  her  hold  on 
the  great  fortresses.  All  this  is  extremely  elementary,  yet 
it  is  constantly  overlooked  or  confused  by  speakers  and 
writers  both  in  reference  to  ourselves  and  others.  The 
future  Southern  Slav  kingdom,  as  will  be  seen,  cannot  be, 
even  if  the  Southern  Slavs  attain  full  national  unity,  more 
than  one  of  a  new  order  of  secondary  States  ;  it  will  not 
be  in  a  position  to  compete  with  Italy  or  to  maintain  a 
first-class  navy,  nor  will  it  desire  to  maintain  even  a  rela- 
tively strong  fleet  unless  forced  to  do  so  by  an  openly 
hostile  Italy. 

That  the  point  has  not  been  laboured  without  cause  is 
to  be  seen  in  the  exaggerated  language  frequently  held, 
not  only  by  Italians,  in  this  matter.  Thus  an  English 
writer  has  said :  "  Should  Europe  be  persuaded  by  the 
folly  of  the  Greek  and  the  greed  of  the  Slav  to  acquiesce, 
through  sheer  weariness,  in  the  eventual  partition  and 
destruction  of  Albania,  the  inevitable  result  will  be  that 
the  eastern  shores  of  the  Adriatic  will  fall  into  Slav  hands 
to  the  swamping  of  the  fatuous  Greeks  and  the  reduction 
of  Italy  to  a  second  or  third-rate  State.  With  the  opposite 
coasts  of  the  Adriatic  from  Trieste  to  Corfu  in  the  hands 
of  one  strong  Power,  Italy  knows  that  she  would  be  thrust 
down  to  the  position  of  a  dependency  .  .  .".^  It  says  little 
for  the  political  grasp  required  by  the  British  consular 
service  that  such  opinions  should  find  utterance  from  a 
consul  of  twenty  years'  standing  at  Skodra.  There  is  no 
question  of  Trieste  or  Valona,  of  which  the  latter  is  already 
in  Italian  hands  and  the  former  will  be  in  the  event  of 
an  Allied  victory.  For  the  rest  it  is  absurd  to  say  that 
a  State  of  less  than  one-third  of  her  population  and  smaller 
in  area  could  reduce  Italy  to  a  position  of  dependency 
by  the  mere  possession  of  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Adriatic, 
or  that  in  such  an  event  Italy  would  sink  to  a  second-  or 

'  Mr.  Wadham  Peacock,  Italy  and  Albania.  Contemporary  Beview, 
February  1915,  p.  362. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC         Ml 

even  third-class  Power.  Those  shores  have  been  for  years 
in  the  hands  of  a  first-class  Power,  but  Italy  has  not 
therefore  sunk  to  the  level  of  a  third-class  State,  and  if 
Austria  has  maintained  a  certain  ascendancy  over  Italy 
it  has  been  due  to  the  possession  of  a  greatly  superior 
army.  Apparently,  however,  the  writer  considers  12,000,000 
Southern  Slavs  to  be  worth  very  considerably  more  than 
40,000,000  ItaHans,  or  than  the  50,000,000  of  Habsburg 
subjects  including  the  greater  number  of  those  Southern 
Slavs.     It  is  absurd. 

Signor  Prezzolini  has  pointed  out  quite  correctly  that 
what  has  been  the  decisive  factor  in  the  dominion  of  the 
Adriatic  has  been  the  possession  of  a  more  powerful  fleet 
and  not  the  possession  of  Dalmatia,  and  he  adds  the  striking 
comment  that  as  a  fact,  with  the  exception  of  the  defeat 
suffered  in  1866  at  Lissa  by  Persano,  "  and  every  one  knows 
whose  fault  it  was  ",  the  victors  in  the  Adriatic  have  always 
been  those  who  sought  to  acquire  Dalmatia  and  not  those 
who  were  in  possession  of  it.  He  cites  the  case  of  the 
Roman  victory  over  the  Liburnians,  the  conquest  of  Zara 
by  the  Venetians,  the  victories  of  the  Genoese  over  the 
Venetians  in  1298,  1354,  1379  (they  were  defeated  the  fol- 
lowing year  off  Chioggia),  and  of  the  English  over  the 
French  at  Lissa  in  1811,  while  in  1859  the  Franco-Sar- 
dinian fleet  captured  Lussinpiccolo :  a  series  of  historical 
events  which  amply  bears  out  the  argument  which  has 
been  put  forward  above. 

It  has  been  seen  above  (Section  I)  that  in  the  negotia- 
tions with  Austria  Italy  claimed  certain  of  the  southern 
Dalmatian  islands.  At  the  same  time  various  projects  were 
ventilated  in  the  Italian  Press,  but  these  ideas  have  ceased 
to  be  of  interest  since  the  conclusion  with  the  Entente  of 
the  Adriatic  agreement,  which  has  settled  the  extent  of  the 
territorial  demands  put  forward  by  Italy.  In  accordance 
with  the  scheme  of  this  chapter  the  discussion  of  that 
agreement  is  relegated  to  the  last  section,  being  postponed 
to  the  discussion  of  the  problem  on  its  merits.  By  putting 
forward  claims  to  Dalmatia  and  its  islands  Italy  is  in  reality 


U2THE  FUTURE   OF     THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

proclaiming  a  great  distrust  of  the  future  Southern  Slavdom, 
for  if  the  result  of  the  war  be  a  complete  victory  for  the 
AUies  of  a  nature  leading  to  the  full  satisfaction  of  their 
demands,  the  result  will  be  that  there  will  only  be  two 
States  left  on  the  Adriatic,  Italy  and  greater  Serbia.  These 
territorial  guarantees,  then,  are  demanded  as  against  Serbia, 
they  have  no  other  raison  d'etre  ;  they  imply  either  that 
Italy  is  hostile  to  Serbia  or  suspects  the  latter  of  present 
or  future  hostility  to  her.  There  can  unfortunately  be  no 
doubt  of  the  feeHng  of  the  Italian  Press,  and  it  is  idle  and 
foolish  to  shut  our  eyes  to  facts,  but  these  feelings  are  mis- 
taken and  have  no  counterpart  among  Southern  Slav  states- 
men save  in  so  far — and  this  is  a  saving  clause  which  is 
tending  to  include  an  increasing  content — as  the  attitude 
of  Italy  provokes  an  inevitable  reaction  in  their  minds. 
Thus  the  attitude  of  Italian  publicists  is  tending  more 
and  more  to  evoke  the  very  danger  which  they  wish  to 
guard  against.  The  Southern  Slavs  cherish  no  feeling  of 
hostility  to  Italy  except  as  the  result  of  Italian  claims.  The 
position  is  paradoxical :  the  possession  of  Dalmatia  by  Italy 
would  tend  to  make  its  possession  necessary,  the  abandon- 
ment of  Italian  claims  would  make  its  possession  useless. 
That  is  to  say  that  the  effect  of  an  Italian  occupation  will 
be  the  unsleeping  hostility  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  a  hos- 
tility which  will  entail  upon  Italy  the  necessity  of  guarding 
against  its  effects,  while  the  abandonment  of  the  claim 
would  gain  Italy  the  friendship  of  her  oversea  neighbour 
and  render  precautions  needless. 

Italians  have  claimed  not  merely  a  supremacy  in  the 
Adriatic  but  an  absolute  dominion  of  the  most  uncon- 
ditional character.  The  Giornale  d'ltalia  (whose  two 
chief  proprietors  are  Baron  Sonnino  and  Signor  Salandra) 
remarked  on  April  19, 1915 :  "  The  principal  objective  of  Italy 
in  the  Adriatic  is  the  solution  once  for  all  of  the  politico- 
strategic  question  of  a  sea  which  is  commanded  in  the 
military  sense  from  the  eastern  shore,  and  such  a  problem 
can  be  solved  only  by  one  method — by  eliminating  from  the 
Adriatic  every  other  war  fleet.  .  .  .  From  the  military  point 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        143 

of  view  Italy  ought  not  to  make  a  compromise  .  .  .  neither 
a  fort  nor  a  gun  nor  a  submarine  that  is  not  Italian 
ought  to  be  in  the  Adriatic.  Otherwise  the  present  most 
difficult  situation  in  the  Adriatic  will  be  perpetuated,  and 
will  inevitably  grow  worse  with  time  ".  ^  This  demand 
aims  not  only  at  a  reasonable  security  for  Itahan  defensive 
interests  but  at  an  exclusive  command  of  the  Adriatic,  so 
that  it  should  become  in  reality  "  il  mare  nostro",  an 
Italian  lake,  though  there  is  no  reason  why  the  possessor 
of  the  western  shore  of  that  sea  should  claim  it  as  a  national 
property  rather  than  the  possessor  of  the  eastern  shore. 
Neither  party  has  any  right  to  an  exclusive  possession  of 
what  is  by  nature  common  to  both,  neither  party  can 
claim  more  than  reasonable  security  and  ordinary  mari- 
time rights  ;  the  claim  is  in  fact  the  result  of  an  inflated 
chauvinism  very  much  akin  to  the  claims  of  which  we  are 
accustomed  to  hear  from  Berlin.  Indeed  the  claim  of  Ger- 
many to  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  is  on  its  merits  incom- 
parably stronger  than  the  Italian  claim  to  Dalmatia. 

Even  moderate  Italian  opinion  which  is  not  in  favour 
of  the  extreme  claims  advanced  for  Italy  and  is  willing  to 
see  Dalmatia  in  the  hands  of  the  Southern  Slavs  shows  itself 
very  jealous  on  the  subject  of  a  possible  Southern  Slav  navy. 
Thus  Professor  G.  Salvemini  writes  :  "  Italy  will  have  the 
right,  and — for  its  future  security — it  ought,  to  profit  by 
the  transition  from  the  old  to  the  new  equilibrium  to  bind 
Serbia  to  itself  by  a  convention  not  only  military  (terrestre), 
but  also  naval  which  could  at  the  same  time  distribute  the 
burdens  of  land  (terrestre)  defence  and  forbid  Serbia  any 
beginning  of  naval  hopes. 

"  We  cannot  prevent  Austria  having  a  fleet  since  she 
already  possesses  one.  The  Serbia  of  to-morrow  we  can 
prevent  in  its  own  interests  arid  ours.  And  we  can  profit 
by  this  moment,  which  will  never  recur  in  history,  to  exclude 

'  at.  the  Times,  April  20  and  26,  1915.  M.  Charles  Vellay  quotes  the 
last  portion  in  a  slightly  different  form:  "  Ni  un  port  [?fort],  ni  un 
sous-marin,  ni  nne  torpille  ".  La  Question  de  VAdriatique,  p.  54.  The 
general  sense  is  the  same. 


144  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

from  the  Adriatic  Austria  lohich  has  a  fleet,  and  to  sub- 
stitute for  her  a  new  State  which  has  710  fleet  and  which 
ice  can  prevent  creating  one  ".^ 

This  is  the  view  not  of  an  intransigeant  but  of  a  moderate 
man  who  views  the  formation  of  a  united  Southern  Slav 
State  with  sympathy,  and  in  the  next  paragraph  adds  with 
a  wisdom  rare  in  his  compatriots — those  at  any  rate  of 
them  whose  views  find  expression — that  even  on  the 
worst  hypothesis,  the  foundation  of  a  great  Serbia  with 
a  fleet  and  alHed  to  Austria  (what  would  remain  of  it,  that 
is  to  say),  such  a  transitory  alliance  would  be  a  less  evil 
than  the  permanent  hostility  of  an  aggrandized  Austria. 

The  same  line  is  taken  by  Signor  Prezzolini,  whom  we 
have  seen  as  a  vigorous  opponent  of  that  trend  of  thought 
which  aims  at  the  incorporation  of  Dalmatia.  Like  Pro- 
fessor Salvemini,  he  is  willing  to  allow  complete  Southern 
Slav  unity,  save  for  an  Italian  occupation  of  Lissa  and  also 
of  Zara — the  latter  apparently  as  a  sort  of  museum,^  but 
on  the  other  hand  he  postulates  the  prohibition  of  a  Slav 
navy  or  naval  ports,  and  the  neutralization  of  the  Serb 
coast  line.  The  arguments  which  he  advances  are  not  due 
to  any  sentiment,  but  on  the  other  hand  lack  nothing  in 
"reality"  of  the  most  pronounced  type.  To  him  a  Serbia 
with  Cattaro  and  a  fleet,  even  though  Italy  should  have 
northern  Dalmatia  and  the  islands,  is  a  greater  danger 
than  a  completely  united  Southern  Slavdom  without  a 
fleet.  Here  again  we  note  the  almost  superstitious  fear 
of  what  this  people  will  be  able  to  achieve  on  the  water 
with  their  small  resources.  He  advances  his  argument 
with  admirable  candour, 

"  To  neutralize  the  Adriatic,  or  rather  to  prevent  the 
entrance  of  any  fleet,  to  prevent  the  fortification  of  any 
island  or  port  of  Dalmatia,  would  be  a  much  better 
guarantee  for  us  than  the  possession  of  two-thirds  of 
Dalmatia  from  which  Cattaro   was  excluded.      The   more 

'  G.  Salvemini,  Guerra  0  Neutralitd  ?  p.  17.     Italics  in  the  original. 
*  "  Zara  e  fuori  questione  .  .  .  Zara  restera  all'  incirca  un  museo  ". 
G.  Prezzolini,  op.  cit.,  p.  69. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        145 

so  because  whilst  neutralization  would  mean  for  Serbia 
that  she  would  have  no  fleet,  it  would  mean  for  us  that 
we  should  have  one  in  the  Mediterranean,  ready,  whenever 
hostilities  should  bring  about  a  rupture  of  the  treaty  to  enter 
the  Adriatic  [my  italics]  ;  the  more  so  because  neutraliza- 
tion would  signify  the  exclusion  from  the  Adriatic  of 
every  other  fleet,  and  especially  of  the  Russian,  for  which, 
once  free  ingress  into  the  Mediterranean  has  been  obtained, 
a  Serb  Cattaro  would  become  the  poiiit  d'appui.^ 

"  Nor  are  we  under  any  illusions  as  to  the  eternity  of 
neutralization.  All  agreements  are  subject  to  revision 
once  there  is  a  change  in  the  equilibrium  of  forces  from 
which  they  sprung.  But  we  maintain  that  Serbia  would 
have  no  interest  in  violating  the  neutralization  and  thus 
entering  into  conflict  with  us,  save  on  the  day  on  which 
it  would  be  equally  to  her  interest  to  contest  with  us  the 
possession  of  Dalmatia.  But,  whilst  neutralization  would 
mean  that  we  should  find  ourselves  ranged  against  a 
Serbia,  in  possession  indeed  of  Dalmatia,  but  without  a 
fleet,  and  therefore  of  a  useless  Dalmatia  [my  italics] , 
where  it  would  be  easy  to  disembark,  the  conquest  of 
Dalmatia  [i.e.  if  Italy  had  northern  Dalmatia  and  Serbia 
the  southern  part]  would  find  us  against  a  Serbia  in 
possession  of  Cattaro  and  of  a  fleet  which,  with  the 
addition  of  the  Russian  or  the  Greek,  would  not  be 
despicable.  Without  being  profound  strategists,  the 
first  hypothesis  seems  to  us  preferable  to  the  second  ".^ 


'  The  writer  here  contradicts  his  own  observation  made  two  pages 
previously  that  a  united  Southern  Slav  State,  having  no  more  to  get 
from  Eussia  would  pursue  an  independent  policy. 

'  "  Neutralizzare  I'Adriatico,  ossia  impedire  I'entrata  a  qualunque 
flotta,  impedire  la  fortificazione  di  qualunque  isola  o  porto  della 
Dalmazia,  sarebbe  per  noi  una  guaranzia  assai  migliore  del  possesso 
di  due  terzi  della  Dalmazia  dai  quali  fosse  escluso  Cattaro.  Tanto 
piu  che  mentre  la  neutralizzione  significherebbe  per  la  Serbia  non  avere 
flotta,  per  noi  significherebbe  averla  in  Mediterraneo,  pronta,  qualora  le 
ostilit4  rompessero  il  trattato,  a  penetrare  nell'  Adriatico ;  tanto  piu  che 
la  neutralizzione  significherebbe  I'esclusione  dall'Adriatico  di  ogni  altra 
flotta,  e  specialmente  di  quella  russa,  per  la  quale,  vma  volta  ottenuto  il 

10 


146  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

The  arguments  which  are  here  adduced  in  favour  of 
the  prohibition  to  the  future  Southern  Slav  kingdom 
of  the  creation  of  a  fleet,  whether  combined  or  not  with 
the  occupation  of  northern  Dalmatia,  are  sufficient  to 
bring  out  the  essential  unfairness  of  any  such  proposal, 
and  it  is  well  therefore  to  have  had  them  stated  by  a  man 
of  such  moderation  in  his  general  handling  of  the  problem. 
The  policy  of  prohibiting  a  Southern  Slav  navy  is  based 
avowedly  on  the  fact  that  such  a  prohibition  would  leave 
the  Southern  Slavs  in  their  maritime  activities  more 
at  the  mercy  of  the  Italians,  even  though  the  latter  relin- 
quished all  claims  to  Dalmatia,  than  would  the  occupation 
of  a  large  part  of  the  province  without  any  such  pro- 
hibition. It  is  pointed  out  with  truth  that  Italy  would 
still  have  her  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  (there  being  under 
ordinary  circumstances  no  occasion  for  stationing  it  in 
the  Adriatic),  ready  to  enter  the  latter  sea  at  a  moment's 
notice,  without  the  Serbs  being  in  a  position  to  take  any 
safeguards  whatever.  The  Serbs  would  hold  a  "useless" 
Dalmatia  on  which  the  Italians  could  land  troops  at 
will.  In  a  word,  while  surrendering  physical  possession 
of  Dalmatia  Italy  would  in  fact  hold  the  destinies  of  that 
province  in  the  hollow  of  her  hand,  and  with  it  absolute 
power  over  any  and  every  form  of  Serb  maritime  activity. 
Serb  merchant  vessels  would  navigate  at  Italy's  good 
pleasure,    the    fishermen   would    fish    by   her    permission, 

libero  ingresso  nel  Mediterraneo,  Cattaro  diventera  il  punto  di  appoggio. 
Ne  ci  facciamo  lillusioni  sulla  perennita  della  neutralizzione.  Tutti  i 
patti  son  soggetti  a  revisione  una  volta  che  sia  mutato  I'equilibrio  di 
forze  dal  quale  nacquero.  Ma  noi  sosteniamo  che  la  Serbia  non 
avrebbe  interesse  a  rompere  la  neutralizzionne  e  quindi  a  entrare  in 
lotta  con  noi,  che  quel  giorno  in  cui  lo  avesse  egualmente  per  contes- 
tarci  U  dominio  della  Dalmazia.  Ma,  mentre  la  neutralizzione  ci 
farebbe  trovare  contro  una  Serbia,  sia  pure  in  possesso  della  Dalmazia, 
ma  senza  flotta  e  dunque  di  una  Dalmazia  inutile,  dove  sarebbe  facile 
sbarcare,  la  conquista  della  Dalmazia  ci  porrebbe  contro  a  una  Serbia 
in  posseaso  di  Cattaro  e  di  una  flotta  che,  con  I'aggunta  di  quella  russa 
o  di  quella  greca,  non  sarebbe  spregevole.  Senza  essere  profondi 
strateghi,  la  prima  ipotesi  ci  pare  preferibile  alia  seconda."  G.  Prezzolini, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  62,  63. 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        147 

exportation  would  proceed  under  her  practical  surveillance, 
and  the  inhabitants  of  the  coast  towns  would  be  able 
to  call  themselves  Serb  subjects  just  so  long  as  it  did  not 
please  Italy  to  annex  them,  for  any  sort  of  fortification 
would  be  forbidden  and  not  merely  the  formation  of 
fortified  naval  bases.  I  know  of  no  such  limitation  in 
modern  history  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  an  independent 
State  over  its  own  shores  :  no  such  requirement  that  they 
should  lie  open  to  enemy  attack.  The  Black  Sea  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  forbade  the  presence  of  war  fleets 
in  the  Euxine  to  all  alike,  and  theoretically  the  configura- 
tion of  its  entrance  would  have  enabled  the  guaranteeing 
Powers  to  prevent  the  violation  of  the  provisions,  save 
indeed  in  the  case  of  a  surprise  movement  of  a  Turkish 
-5llgean  squadron  through  the  Straits.  In  any  case  Turkey 
lay  open  to  easy  coercion  in  case  of  violation.  In  all 
these  points  the  Black  Sea  clauses  are  fundamentally  and 
essentially  differentiated  from  the  proposals  before  us. 

Britain  is  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  and  upon  her  mastery 
depends  not  only  her  empire  but  almost  her  very  existence, 
at  any  rate  her  existence  as  a  first-class  Power  and  cer- 
tainly her  existence  in  times  of  war.  Yet  she  has  never 
made  any  such  demands  as  these  upon  Holland,  The 
importance  of  the  Dutch  ports  to  us  is  enormous ;  it  is  a 
maxim  that  whoever  touches  Holland,  and  especially  who- 
ever touches  Rotterdam  or  Flushing,  touches  England,  and 
one  of  the  reasons  for  which  we  are  at  war  is  that  Germany 
has  touched  Belgium  and  Antwerp.  Yet  we  have  never 
demanded  that  Holland  should  possess  no  navy,  we  have 
never  denied  the  right  of  the  Netherlands  to  fortify  their 
ports  and  their  coasts.  Even  in  the  case  of  the  fortifica- 
tion of  Flushing,  with  its  bearing  upon  the  freedom  of  the 
Scheldt  and  our  treaty  right  to  succour  Antwerp,  we  made 
no  protest,  we  allowed  full  Dutch  sovereignty  over  the 
mouth  of  the  Scheldt,  and  drew  the  conclusion  that  we 
could  not  succour  Antwerp  by  the  sea,  advantageous  as 
such  a  course  would  have  been.  It  is  difficult  then  to 
see  by  what  moral  right  Italy  could  assume  the  attitude 


148  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

here  proposed  for  her  by  some  of  her  publicists ;  she  may 
be  in  a  position  to  dictate  such  a  prohibition,  but  it  will 
only  be  on  the  principle  that  might  is  right — the  very 
principle  against  which  the  other  Allies,  at  any  rate,  are 
fighting.  Nor  would  greater  Serbia  be  left  only  at  the 
mercy  of  Italy,  but  equally  at  the  mercy  of  any  other 
Power  which  possesses  a  navy  of  even  the  smallest 
dimensions,  for  who  will  care  to  guarantee  international 
respect  for  the  neutralization  of  Dalmatia?  Any  such 
prohibition  would  in  fact  be  of  the  nature  of  an  "  uncon- 
scionable "  agreement  which  would  only  lead  to  endless 
friction  and  the  reopening  of  the  question  on  the  first 
convenient  opportunity.  The  history  of  the  Black  Sea 
clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  already  cited  is  full  of 
warning.  They  created  in  Russia  a  resolution  to  put  a 
term  to  their  validity  on  the  earliest  possible  occasion, 
and  unhappily  for  one  of  the  authors  of  them  that  occa- 
sion proved  to  be  the  Franco-German  war,  when  Bismarck 
was  enabled  to  offer  to  Russia  as  a  bribe  for  her  com- 
plaisance the  abrogation  of  them.  It  would  not  be 
altogether  far-fetched  to  see  in  the  present  world  war  a 
not  too  remote  consequence  of  that  portion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  ;  at  any  rate,  but  for  their  existence  the  attitude 
of  Russia  in  1870  might  easily  have  been  different,  and  in 
consequence  the  subsequent  history  of  Europe.  Limitations 
of  national  sovereignty  in  the  case  of  a  proud  and  indepen- 
dent people  always  and  inevitably  lead  to  the  same  result, 
a  vehement  desire  to  be  rid  of  the  shackles  imposed. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  what  has  been  said  already 
as  to  the  limited  means  available  to  Serbia  (I  use  the 
word  as  a  short  term  for  the  future  Southern  Slavdom) 
for  the  creation  of  a  large  war  fleet,  but  the  absence  of 
any  desire  on  her  part  to  engage  in  such  a  task  will 
bear  repetition.  If  Italy  does  not  antagonize  her  but 
shows  herself  a  friend,  the  Southern  Slavs  will  be  eager 
to  reciprocate  her  attitude,  and  in  such  reciprocity  will 
be  under  no  temptation  to  undertake  so  expensive,  and 
under  the  circumstances  so  useless,  a  burden.     In  a  word, 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC        149 

Serbia  will  be  unable  to  create  a  great  navy  if  she  would, 
and  if  Italy  proves  a  friend  would  not  if  she  could.  It 
is  the  reaction  to  Italian  hostility  or  suspicion,  above  all 
the  candid  admission  ithat  Italy  desires  for  Serbia  a 
"  useless "  Dalmatia  at  Italian  mercy,  that  alone  will 
cause  Serbia  to  create  such  naval  forces  as  will  lie  within 
her  competence ;  apart  from  that  attitude  on  the  side 
of  her  neighbour  her  ambitions  will  be  limited  to  a  very 
modest  form  of  naval  defence.  Even  if  it  be  admitted 
that  submarines  and  mines  will  enable  small  States  to 
play  a  more  important  part  in  naval  affairs  in  the  future, 
as  has  been  seen,  that  would  only  mean  a  reversion  to 
an  older  state  of  affairs ;  so  far,  moreover,  the  submarine 
has  failed  as  an  offensive  weapon. 

Of  the  idea  of  neutralization  little  need  be  said  apart 
from  the  naval  consequences  just  discussed.  There  are 
still  to  be  found  publicists  who  talk  of  a  possible  "neu- 
tralized "  State  of  Constantinople,  for  example.  If  after 
the  events  of  the  past  two  years  there  are  those  who  still 
believe  that  the  word  contains  a  valid  international  sie:- 
nificance  in  point  of  fact,  that  is  a  striking  testimony  to 
their  idealism.  For  myself  I  do  not  consider  the  "  neu- 
tralization "  of  Dalmatia  or  of  anything  else  to  be  worth 
discussing.  A  hundred  years  hence  international  engage- 
ments may  carry  with  them  some  assurance  of  sub- 
stantial existence,  and  neutralizations  may  be  left  till 
then.  It  will  be  long  before  any  faith  will  be  placed 
in  the  public  law  of  mankind,  and  no  Southern  Slav  can 
be  expected  to  place  any  faith  in  neutralization — ironically 
enough  Corfu,  the  training-place  of  the  remnants  of  the 
Serb  army  for  future  employment,  is  neutralized. 

The  legitimate  claims  of  Italy,  then,  on  strategical 
grounds  cannot  be  held  to  extend  to  the  incorporation 
in  her  dominions  of  the  Serbo-Croat  province  of  Dalmatia. 
Moreover  in  no  event,  whether  Italy  obtains  a  portion 
of  Dalmatia  or  not,  is  there  any  justification  for  the  demand 
that  Serbia  should  not  be  allowed  to  possess  any  fleet. 
It  is  not  only  against  Italy  that  a  coast  defence  fleet  might 


150  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

be  required,  and  as  we  all  know  the  neutralization  of 
Dalmatia  would  give  no  guarantee  to  the  Serbs.  Serbia, 
then,  will  have  the  right,  like  every  other  State,  to  build 
such  a  fleet  as  she  may  deem  necessary  whether  she  obtains 
all  Dalmatia  or  not,  and  the  more  friendly  Italy  shows 
herself  the  more  insignificant  will  be  any  fleet  that  Serbia 
may  desire  to  construct. 


The  strategical  conditions  in  the  Adriatic  constitute, 
nevertheless,  a  source  of  legitimate  anxiety  for  Italy  which 
is  abundantly  entitled  to  demand  that  in  any  general 
resettlement  she  shall  be  placed  in  possession  of  adequate 
guarantees  for  the  sufficiency  of  her  naval  defence,  and 
that  her  position  shall  receive  due  recognition  so  that 
she  may  be  able  to  face  the  future  with  confidence.  Such 
guarantees  can  be  given  to  her  without  any  undue  infringe- 
ment of  the  principle  of  nationality,  without  creating  on  the 
side  of  others  a  sense  of  grievance  akin  to  her  own,  and 
without  inflicting  on  others  injuries  out  of  proportion  to 
the  real  benefits  received  by  Italy.  She  is  entitled  to  urge 
that  however  friendly  may  be  the  Southern  Slavs  at  the 
present  time  no  government  can  conduct  its  policy  upon 
the  supposition  that  future  enmity  is  never  to  be  feared 
from  the  friends  of  to-day ;  that  though  the  Southern  Slavs 
number  less  than  a  third  of  her  population  yet  their 
territory  is  large,  some  three-fourths  of  the  extent  of  the 
Italian  peninsula,  and  being  at  present  comparatively 
thinly  populated  as  compared  with  her  own  territory  will 
be  able  to  support  in  the  future  a  population  much  more 
nearly  approaching  her  own,  even  when  due  allowance 
has  been  made  for  the  large  unproductive  Karst  region 
and  the  absence  of  any  such  fertile  area  of  great  extent 
as  the  valley  of  the  Po  and  its  tributaries,  a  deficiency 
in  part  counterbalanced  by  a  probable  considerably  higher 
mineralization  ;  and  that  consequently  she  is  entitled  in  the 
settlement  to  consider  not  only  the  conditions  of  to-day 
but  those  which  may  be  present  in  a  not  too  distant  future. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC        151 

Italy  is  already  in  occupation  of  Valona  and  its  district, 
and  it  is  certain  that  her  continued  occupation  of  the  "  gate 
of  the  Adriatic  "  after  the  war  will  not  be  called  in  question 
by  any  of  the  Allies.  The  occupation  of  this  place  in 
itself  alters  the  whole  strategical  position  in  that  sea. 
Its  importance  has  been  alluded  to  already,  and  was  so 
highly  valued  by  both  Austria  and  Italy  that  neither  would 
permit  of  its  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  other.  It  is  idle 
for  any  one  to  seek  to  diminish  its  strategical  value  at  the 
present  time,  for  any  assertions  to  that  effect  are  belied 
by  the  policy  of  the  two  Adriatic  Powers  in  the  past.  They 
have  set  the  seal  of  their  military  and  naval  judgment  upon 
its  position  as  giving  the  possibility  of  the  command  of  the 
entry  into  the  Adriatic,  Italy  placed  so  high  a  value  upon 
it  that  its  retention  formed  a  demand  si?ie  qud  non  in  the 
course  of  her  negotiations  with  her  rival  previous  to  her 
entry  into  the  war,  and  it  cannot  be  pretended  now  that 
it  is  a  position  not  of  such  value  that  its  possession  by  Italy 
may  be  taken  as  going  a  long  way  towards  meeting  her 
legitimate  claims.  Guarding  the  forty-mile  wide  Strait 
of  Otranto  with  its  vis-d-vis  Brindisi  already  in  Italian 
hands,  and  Taranto  in  its  gulf  "round  the  corner"  a  great 
naval  arsenal,  Valona  will  enable  Italy  to  close  or  open 
the  Adriatic  at  her  will,  and  that  the  more  easily  owing 
to  the  development  of  the  mine  and  submarine.  Its 
possession  will  enable  Italy  to  exercise  a  permanent 
surveillance  over  all  Southern  Slav  maritime  activity 
other  than  merely  local,  and  will  give  its  owner  a  position 
of  unquestioned  mastery ;  the  jealousy  of  Austria  in  the 
past  on  this  question  is  a  proof  of  the  fact. 

At  the  head  of  the  Adriatic — to  anticipate  some  of  the 
conclusions  of  the  next  chapter — Italy  can  claim  the  great 
commercial  port  of  Trieste,  Monfalcone,  and  the  enormously 
strong  naval  base  of  Pola.  Installed  thus  at  Valona, 
Brindisi,  and  Taranto  at  the  entrance  of  the  Adriatic, 
and  at  Venice,  Trieste,  and  Pola  at  the  head  of  the  sea, 
Italy  will  be  its  veritable  mistress,  and  will  turn  it  into 
an  Italian  lake  to  as  large  an  extent  as  is  compatible  with 


152  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  just  rights  of  the  Southern  Slavs  as  owners  of  the 
eastern  shore,  for  after  all  they,  as  owners  of  one  side 
of  the  Adriatic  in  virtue  of  nationality,  have  certain  rights 
in  that  sea,  the  more  so  as  it  is  their  only  coast,  while  Italy 
has  her  frontage  south  and  west  to  the  Mediterranean  also. 
It  is  asserted  that  the  island  of  Losinj  (Lussin)  forms  a 
*'  back  door  "  to  Pola  and  is  in  a  sense  complementary  to 
that  naval  arsenal.  If  that  be  so,  and  if  Italy  set  store  upon 
its  occupation,  that  demand  also  may  be  conceded  without 
any  great  violation  of  the  principle  of  nationality,  since  it 
possesses  a  large  Italian  element  in  its  population,  a  fact 
which  distinguishes  it  from  the  other  islands  of  the  Quarnero. 
Beyond  the  above  it  is  difficult  to  see  that  Italy  can  put 
forward  any  well-grounded  pretensions  if  her  aim  be  merely 
the  security  of  her  own  coasts.  Other  demands  have  the 
appearance  of  aiming  not  at  securing  her  own  position 
but  of  dominating  that  of  her  neighbours.  These  other 
demands  are  asserted,  it  is  true,  in  the  name  of  defence, 
but  if  defence  be  construed  in  this  fashion  then  nothing 
will  satisfy  it  but  complete  physical  possession  of  the 
Adriatic.  It  is  difficult,  or  impossible,  to  set  a  term  to 
what  can  be  demanded  in  the  name  of  defence,  for  the 
only  complete  defence  is  sole  possession.  Readers  of 
Beaconsfield's  speeches  in  connection  with  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  may  remember  the  indignant  communication  which 
he  said  that  he  had  received  from  a  correspondent  in 
Cape  Town.  The  latter  pointed  out  that  Kars  was  the 
key  of  Asia  Minor,  the  latter  in  turn  was  the  key  of 
Egypt,  as  Egypt  was  of  the  Sudan,  and  so  the  chain  of 
keys  was  lengthened  till  it  ended  at  Cape  Town.  The 
Russian  occupation  of  Kars,  to  which  Beaconsfield  had 
agreed,  constituted  therefore  a  menace  to  Cape  Town. 
We  may  suspect  that  this  correspondent  had  no  existence 
outside  Beaconsfield's  dialectic,  but  the  alleged  letter  was 
no  exaggerated  satire  on  a  certain  mode  of  reasoning  which 
finds  favour  not  only  with  the  amateur  strategist.  Of 
such  a  texture  are  Italian  demands  beyond  the  great  and 
valuable   concessions   outlined  above.     In  particular  it   is 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE   ADRIATIC        153 

difficult  to  see  how  any  case  can  be  made  out  for  an  Italian 
occupation  of  Vis  (Lissa).  It  has  been  called  the  key  of 
the  central  Adriatic,  and  without  a  doubt  it  is  one  of  the 
extremely  numerous  keys  of  that  well-locked  gulf,  but  this 
key  at  any  rate  might  be  left  to  its  more  natural  possessors 
— no  man  would  care  to  live  in  a  house  of  which  he 
possessed  not  a  single  key.  Some,  at  any  rate,  of  the 
importance  it  assumes  in  the  eyes  of  Italians  is  due  to 
the  defeat  of  Persano  off  its  harbour  in  1866,  an  event 
which  has  always  rankled  in  their  minds,  while  the  value 
of  its  position  is  enhanced  by  the  possession  of  a  fine 
harbour.  It  lies,  however,  close  to  the  eastern  shore,  and 
is  rather  an  outlying  defence  of  that  coast  than  of  the 
western.  It  is  in  fact  a  pistol  pointed  at  the  heart  of  Serb 
Dalmatia,  and  if  it  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Italians  the 
latter  would  be  in  a  position  not  only  to  threaten  Spljet  and 
Gruz,  but  to  dominate  the  whole  of  the  Serb  Adriatic 
coast  and  to  exercise  a  close  surveillance  over  even  the 
coastwise  trade  of  greater  Serbia.  Login]  in  their  hands 
would  enable  them  already  to  close  the  Quarnero,  and 
therefore  Bijeka,  and  Vis  would  perform  the  same  function 
for  southern  Dalmatia.  In  a  word,  Valona  and  the  entrance 
to  the  Adriatic  would  be  Italy's,  as  also  Trieste,  Pola,  and 
Istria  at  the  head  of  the  sea ;  the  western  shore  is  hers 
already  ;  and  finally  the  Slav  eastern  coast  would  be  com- 
manded in  the  north  by  LoSinj  and  the  centre  and  south 
by  Vis,  so  that  Eijeka,  Spljet,  and  Gruz  would  be  useful 
to  their  owners  only  so  long  as  Italy  wished.  It  is  difficult 
to  escape  the  conclusion  that  it  is  this  and  not  legitimate 
anxiety  for  self-defence  that  forms  the  real  underlying 
motive  of  the  claim  to  Vis.  As  an  outpost  of  the  eastern 
coast  without  which  sovereignty  over  that  coast  would  be 
wellnigh  nugatory,  "  useless  ",  jto  use  Prezzolini's  phrase, 
and  as  being  Slav  by  race,  the  island  should  go  to  the 
Southern  Slavs  free  of  those  naval  limitations  which  have 
been  already  considered. 

It   was   said   by   Mr.    Paton    that    Bosnia   was   a   head 
without  a  face,  and  Dalmatia  a  face  without  a  head,  and 


154  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

it  is  true  that  the  future  of  Dahnatia  is  bound  up  with 
its  backland.  The  separation  of  the  two  provinces,  when- 
ever they  have  been  separated,  has  always  been  unnatural, 
and  the  possessor  of  the  one  has  inevitably  sought  the 
dominion  of  the  other  also.  In  the  Middle  Ages  till  the 
fall  of  the  Slav  States  they  were  not  so  separated,  and 
their  reunion  achieved  in  a  limited  sense  by  the  Austrian 
occupation  of  Bosnia  should  be  extended  and  consolidated  ; 
their  permanent  severance  is  unthinkable.  The  ports  of 
Dalmatia  are  the  natural  outlets  of  the  trade  of  the 
interior.  Sibenik  and  Spljet  by  the  continuation  of  the 
existing  railway  to  form  junctions  with  the  interior  systems, 
in  the  north  by  the  valley  of  the  Una  and  in  the  centre 
via  the  Arzano  pass  and  Bugojno  will  be  the  natural 
ports  for  the  greater  part  of  Bosnia,  and  to  the  latter 
leads  one  of  the  traces  of  the  proposed  Danube-Adriatic 
line  which  would  find  its  terminus  here  rather  than 
farther  south.  This  so-called  Danube-Adriatic  line  is  of 
course  merely  a  portion  of  a  much  more  extensive  and 
important  connection  being  designed  to  bring  Eoumania 
and  Russia  into  direct  contact  with  that  sea  by  the  shortest 
through  route.  Dubrovnik  to  the  south  though  eventually, 
when  the  narrow-gauge  line  is  widened  and  a  more  direct 
route  with  the  interior  opened  up  by  the  extension  of  the 
short  Trebinje  spur,  important  for  the  trade  of  Danubian 
Serbia  and  the  Hercegovina,  is  not  the  natural  outlet  for 
the  larger  part  of  Bosnia  or  of  eastern  Slavonia,  as  a 
glance  at  the  map  will  show.  Separated  from  the  interior 
Dalmatia  would  languish,  it  would  be  bereft  of  its  natural 
trade,  and  the  connection  with  Italy  would  offer  no  com- 
pensation, for  mutual  trade  postulates  mutual  prosperity, 
and  of  the  latter  Dalmatia,  cut  off  from  the  resources  of 
the  inland  and  deprived  of  the  transit  trade,  would  have 
no  share:  its  ports  cannot  thrive  on  purely  local  traffic. 
In  Serb  hands  they  would  as  a  fact  benefit  Italian  trade, 
for  through  them  would  pass  manufactures  from  northern 
Italy,  whose  artizans  in  return  would  receive  the  agri- 
cultural products,  the  wheat  and  the  meat,  of  Serbia. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   ADRIATIC         155 

The  settlement  of  this  question  on  just  hnes  and  with 
a  due  consideration  of  the  claims  of  both  parties  is  of 
interest  not  merely  to  the  countries  immediately  concerned. 
The  Southern  Slav  problem  as  a  whole  is  a  matter  of  vital 
concern  to  Europe  and  the  cause  of  European  peace,  and 
the  solution  of  the  Adriatic  question  as  a  crucial  part  of 
that  problem  affects  in  its  consequences  the  other  European 
States  which  are  deeply  involved  in  the  future  course  of 
Serbo-Italian  relations.  The  past  relations  between  Italy 
and  Austria  have  been  very  largely,  if  not  entirely,  the 
result  of  a  settlement  partial  and  incomplete  instead  of 
final  and  conclusive,  and  a  settlement  of  similar  character 
between  Serbia  and  Italy  would  inevitably  be  followed  by 
similar  consequences.  If  the  eventual  settlement  of  the 
Dalmatian  question,  for  this  is  the  kernel  of  the  matter, 
be  just  and  fair  the  result  will  be  a  permanent  peace,  as 
political  permanency  goes,  in  the  Adriatic  and  a  fruitful 
friendship  between  Italy  and  the  Southern  Slavs.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  Serbia  be  left  with  a  festering  sore  in  its 
territorial  and  national  relationships,  then  the  result  after 
a  period  of  suppression  and  inflammation  will  be  that  it 
will  discharge  in  renewed  bloodshed.  The  result  of  the 
annexation  of  a  large  area  of  Slav  territory  to  Italy  would 
be  the  creation  of  a  Serbia  Irredenta,  and  the  ultimate  con- 
sequence, not  necessarily  to-day  or  to-morrow,  would  be  the 
outbreak  of  a  fresh  war,  for  to  the  Southern  Slavs  this 
unredeemed  land  would  be  what  Italia  Irredenta  has  been 
to  Italy.  "It  is  terrible  to  think",  a  well-known  Croat 
leader  remarked  to  me,  "that,  after  all  this  horrible  war 
in  which  the  divided  Southern  Slavs  have  suffered  so 
much,  we  should  have  to  look  forward  in  the  future  to 
yet  another",  and  his  manner  expressed  the  pain  which 
he  felt  at  the  prospect.  It  is  necessary  to  look  facts  in  the 
face,  we  have  too  long  ignored  the  opinions,  rights,  and 
interests  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  we  have  suffered  grievously 
as  the  result,  and  worse  lies  before  if  we  do  not  conduct  our 
relations  with  them  upon  a  basis  of  sympathy  and  know- 
ledge.    The  mishandling  of  the  whole  Balkan  affair  con- 


156  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

tains  abundant  instruction  and  warning  to  all  who  do  not 
wilfully  or  foolishly  blunt  their  appreciations. 

If  the  war  in  its  deeper  aspects  is  teaching  us  anything 
it  is  the  hideous  failure  of  soullessness  in  diplomacy  and 
national  policy.  The  prime  object  of  statesmanship  in  the 
remodelling  of  Europe  should  be  to  settle  old  questions 
without  creating  fresh  ones  of  the  same  kind,  but  if  the 
Adriatic  settlement  should  involve  the  handing  over  of 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  Southern  Slavs  to  Italian  rule 
the  result  would  be  nothing  less  than  a  European  disaster. 
For  the  present  Austro-Serb  question  would  be  substituted 
an  Italo-Serb  problem  of  the  same  character  and  malignity, 
a  problem  which  would  evoke  the  sullen  anger  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  and  eat  like  a  canker  into  the  peace  of 
south-eastern  Europe.  "  If  you  imprison  a  Slav  idea  in 
the  deepest  dungeon  of  a  fortress  it  will  end  by  blowing 
up  the  whole  fortress  in  its  effort  to  escape  ",  but  Slav  per- 
tinacity and  memory  should  be  devoted  to  more  fruitful 
aims  than  the  relentless  preparation  for  yet  another  day 
of  reckoning.  "  The  Balkans  will  be  Austria's  grave  ",  said 
Prince  Gorcakov,  and  he  has  proved  a  true  prophet ; 
there  is  warning  here  for  others.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
frank  and  friendly  policy  on  Italy's  part  would  redound 
to  her  advantage,  free  her  from  diplomatic  and  strategical 
preoccupations,  and  enable  her  to  develop  relations,  com- 
mercial, political,  and  cultural,  that  would  benefit  both  her 
and  Serbia. 

The  reaction  of  an  unsatisfactory  settlement  may  not 
improbably  drive  one  or  other  of  the  two  States  into  the 
arms  of  Germany  in  the  future.  It  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  Germans  have  for  long  looked  upon  Trieste  as 
their  future  window  on  the  Adriatic,  an  aspiration  which 
has  brought  them  into  conflict  with  the  Slovenes  who 
block  the  way — always  we  return  to  the  fact  that  the 
Southern  Slavs  are  the  bulwark  against  the  eastward  and 
southward  trend  of  Germanism,  the  Drang  nach  Osten  and 
the  Stoss  sudwdrts.  So  long  ago  as  1876  Sir  Arthur  Evans, 
in  his  book  Through  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina,  gave  an 


I 


THE  PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        157 

instructive  quotation  from  a  German  traveller  who  six  years 
previously  had  been  travelling  through  the  Southern  Slav 
lands:  "We  must  not  spare  ourselves  the  realization  of 
the  bitter  truth  that  the  greater  part  of  Styria  and 
Carinthia  [thus  Sir  A.  Evans's  author,  but  the  "greater" 
part  is  incorrect  as  applied  to  these  two  provinces],  and  the 
whole  of  Carniola,  Gorizia,  Gradisca,  and  Istria,  with  the 
avenue  to  the  Adriatic,  are  lost  to  us.  Even  supposing 
the  whole  of  Southern  Germany  to  have  been  fused  with 
Northern,  and  the  German  element  in  Austria  either  under 
compulsion  or  of  its  free  will  to  have  followed  the  already 
torn  away  Bohemia  and  Moravia  [!]  even  then  we  should 
have  neither  the  might  nor  the  right — though  it  matters 
less  about  the  right — to  break  forcibly  through  Illyria  to 
the  Adriatic  ".^  It  was  said  to  me  by  a  Croatian,  "If  our 
cause  is  deserted  by  the  Entente  then  by  and  by  we  may 
have  to  look  for  friends  elsewhere — in  Austria  or,"  with 
a  shrug,  "  in  Germany ".  The  bearing  of  the  words, 
though  the  topic  was  not  pursued,  was  sufficiently  evi- 
dent, and,  while  I  should  not  wish  to  press  unduly 
anything  said  under  the  influence  of  the  chagrin  caused 
by  the  then  recently  concluded  Dalmatian  agreement,  the 
remark  is  symptomatic  of  the  feelings  which  might  be 
engendered  by  a  mishandling  of  the  question,  and  the 
possible  tendency  indicated  calls  not  for  surprise  but  for 
the  most  serious  consideration.  On  the  other  hand  it 
might  be  Italy  which  would  enter  upon  the  path  indi- 
cated :  her  ties  with  Germany  are  very  strong.  Neither 
resultant  of  the  extraordinarily  complicated  cross-currents 
involved  is  desirable  for  Europe.  Italy,  with  a  knowledge 
of  German  ambitions  for  Trieste,  may  be  reckoning  on  the 
alliance  of  the  Southern  Slavs  willy  nilly  in  the  event  of 
a  future  advance  in  that  direction  by  Germany,  since  the 
latter  could  only  reach  Trieste  conveniently  through  part 
of  the  Slovene  country,  not  only  through  Gorica  and 
GradiSka    but    also    through    the    most   western    part   of 

'  Sir  A.  Evans,  op.  cit.,  p.  3,  quoting  Franz  Maurer,  Eeise  (lurch 
Bosnien,  etc.,  p.  45. 


158  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Kranjska  (Carniola)  where  the  railway,  after  reaching 
Tolmino  from  Trieste,  passes  through  the  north-west 
corner  of  Kranjska  to  Villach,  while  the  retention  of 
Trieste  would  entail  as  well  the  possession  of  at  least 
a  part  of  Istria.  It  may  be  thought,  therefore,  that  a 
German  advance  southwards  would  of  necessity  bring 
Germany  up  against  the  Southern  Slavs,  concerned  to 
defend  Kranjska  against  invasion  and  possible  spoliation, 
and  possibly  unwilling  to  sacrifice  a  portion  of  that 
province  even  for  Dalmatia  and  the  islands — a  very 
doubtful  proposition.  Thus  Kranjska,  a  wedge  of  Southern 
Slav  territory  between  Istria  and  German  Austria,  would 
become  a  bulwark  of  Italian  Trieste,  and  the  Southern 
Slavs  might  be  compelled  on  this  supposition  to  side  with 
Italy  against  a  German  push  to  the  Adriatic,  thus  becoming, 
to  the  ironic  amusement  of  their  allies,  the  champions  of 
the  alien  lords  of  Dalmatia. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  more  Slav  territory  Italy  acquires 
the  less  convincing  does  such  a  line  of  reasoning  become. 
If  Italy  obtains  all  Istria  and  Gorica-Gradiska  as  well  as  a 
large  part  of  Dalmatia  with  the  islands  together  with  south- 
western Kranjska  then  the  interest  of  the  Southern  Slavs 
to  come,  pro  domo  sud,  to  Italy's  aid  becomes  sensibly  less 
and  a  German-Slav  accord  easier.  Kranjska,  though 
desirable  for  a  German  possessor  of  Trieste,  is  not  absolutely 
essential  if  that  possessor  hold  all  the  county  of  Gorica 
(apart  from  any  possible  acquisition  of  the  line  through 
Udine)  and  Gorica  will  already  belong  to  Italy.  Thus  it 
would  be  open  to  Germany  to  offer  the  bribe  of  Dalmatia 
and  the  islands  and  to  engage  herself  to  respect  Kranjska 
while  pointing  out  that  it  should  be  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  the  Southern  Slavs  whether  Istria  and  Gorica  were  in 
Italian  or  German  hands.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to 
understand  in  what  manner  Italian  politicians  envisage  the 
future  in  these  regions.  What  is  evident,  however,  is  that 
a  policy  which  should  estrange  the  Southern  Slavs  opens 
up  a  vista  of  extreme  peril  to  Italy,  unless  indeed  she 
contemplates  a  reinsurance  treaty,  and  with  the  Italians  the 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE   ADRIATIC        159 

Southern  Slavs  might  be  dragged  down  also,  for  the  pity 
of  the  whole  controversy  involved  in  this  tangled  Adriatic 
problem  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  essential  interests  of 
Italians  and  Southern  Slavs  are  identical,  and  they  should 
be  the  closest  allies.  Italy  can  hardly  oppose  front  both  to 
Germany  and  the  Southern  Slavs.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  in  any  case  the  Germans  will  remain  a  strong  nation 
and  that  the  time  may  come  when,  if  favourable  circum- 
stances offer,  they  may  be  tempted  to  renew  their  attempt 
to  push  not  only  eastwards  but  southwards.  In  such  an 
eventuality  it  would  obviously  not  be  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  the  other  members  of  the  Grand  Alliance  whether  the 
Adriatic  settlement  which  they  would  be  called  upon  to 
defend  were  intrinsically  just  or  not.  Moreover,  under  those 
circumstances  the  Southern  Slavs  should  be  the  natural  and 
fervent  allies  of  the  Italians,  and  their  aid  will  grow  in 
importance  with  the  years.  A  settlement  which  should  risk 
throwing  them  into  the  arms  of  Germany  would  represent 
to  Italy  a  double  loss. 

The  alternatives  ultimately  narrow  themselves  down  to 
two ;  on  the  one  hand  a  hostility  between  the  two  peoples 
which  will  eventually  result  in  war  whenever  a  favourable 
opportunity  occurs,  which  admittedly  may  not  be  for  many 
a  long  year  though  it  may  occur  sooner  than  is  thought ; 
on  the  other  hand  a  fair  settlement  resulting  not  merely 
in  friendly  relations  but  in  a  definite  alliance.  Under  such 
circumstances  Serbia  and  Italy  left  alone  on  the  Adriatic  to 
their  mutual  satisfaction  would  have  every  interest  in 
combining  against  any  Power  which  should  threaten  the 
newly  established  status  quo,  since  any  such  aggression 
would  be  equally  to  the  disadvantage  of  both.  Neither 
would  wish  to  see  Germany  installed  in  Trieste  and  neither 
would  desire  any  weakening  in  the  territorial  position  of 
the  other.  Indeed  to  remove  Italian  suspicion  it  might 
be  laid  down  as  a  condition  for  the  adoption  of  the  Southern 
Slav  contention  that  the  new  State  should  enter  into  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Italy  for  a  term  of  years,  fourteen  or 
twenty,  by  which  each  would  be  bound  to  resist  in  common 


160  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

any  attempt  to  alter  the  new  status  quo  in  the  Adriatic  or 
the  territories  adjoining.  The  advantage  of  the  aid  of  Italy 
to  the  Southern  Slavs  is  obvious,  v^hile  the  task  of  the 
Italian  General  Staff  V70uld  be  enormously  lightened  by  the 
knowledge  that  the  forces  which  a  united  Southern  Slavdom 
could  put  in  the  field  would  be  found  arrayed  on  their 
side  and  would  not  have  to  be  regarded  as  potential 
foes. 

There  are  some  Italians  who  already  see  the  advantage 
of  cultivating  good  relations  with  the  Southern  Slavs. 
"The  truth  .  ,  .  is",  says  Professor  Salvemini,  "  that  the 
establishment  of  a  great  Serbia  can  in  no  case,  that  is  to 
say  even  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  very  great  aggrandizement 
of  Serbia,  represent  a  loss  for  us  ".  ^  He  concludes  his 
remarks  on  the  subject  of  Italy  and  Serbia  by  saying  [his 
Italics]  :  "In  fine  even  on  the  supposition  that  Serbia 
should  acquire  all  the  Austrian  Adriatic  provinces  and  that 
Italy  should  remain  within  its  present  boundaries,  Italy  in 
this  conjuncture  has  nothing  to  lose  and  much  to  gai7i'\^ 
Signor  Bissolati,  the  Reformist  Socialist,  is  another  who 
has  pleaded,  and  still  pleads,  the  cause  of  good  relations 
between  the  two  peoples,  while  the  attitude  of  Signor 
Prezzolini  has  been  abundantly  illustrated  above.  The 
last-named  perhaps  lays  his  finger  on  the  root  of  the 
mistrust  when  he  says  that  "We  are  ignorant  of  Serbia  ". 
The  Southern  Slavs  on  their  side  have  given  frequent 
expression  to  their  feeling  of  friendship,  a  notable  example 
of  a  plea  for  good  feeling  being  the  speech  of  M.  Pasic 
in  the  Skupstina  on  April  28,  1915. 

An  attitude  on  the  part  of  Italy  which  would  indicate  a 
policy  of  Mediterranean  imperialism  would  not  be  without 
interest  for  other  States. 

In  any  case  it  is  no  mere  question  of  an  outlet  for 
Serbia  or  of  "  compensations",  it  is  a  question  of  national 
unity  pure  and  simple. 

'  G.  Salvemini,  Guerra  o  Neutralita  ?  p.  16. 
'  Ibid.  p.  18. 


THE    PROBLEM   OF  THE   ADRIATIC        IGl 

VI 

To  a  certain  extent  it  might  seem  that  some  of  the 
foregoing  remarks  are  of  somewhat  academic  interest  in 
view  of  the  conclusion  of  the  "  Adriatic  "  or  "  Dalmatian  " 
agreement  between  Italy  and  the  Triple  Entente;  but  not 
only  is  it  necessary  to  examine  the  whole  of  the  questions 
involved  on  their  merits  if  an  adequate  appreciation  of 
that  agreement  is  sought,  but  the  affectation  of  secrecy 
maintained  on  the  subject  since  its  conclusion  invites 
this  course. 

The  Treaty  was  concluded  on  April   27,  1915,   but   the 
secret   of   it   had   been   so   ill   kept   that  it   was   not  long 
before  its  existence  and  the  general  tenor  of  its  terms  were 
pretty  generally  known.     I  myself  was    made   cognizant 
of  it  in  May,  ^   a  few  days  after  Sir  Arthur  Evans,  in  his 
letter  of  May  10  to  the  Manchester  Guardian,  had  given  an 
outline  of  the   Italian   demands,   of  which  I  also  gave   a 
sketch   in   one   of   the   Reviews   in    September.      The  in- 
formation   then   received    has   proved  to    be   substantially 
accurate,  requiring  modification  chiefly  in  the  matter  of  the 
southern  islands.     Some  of   the  terms   of   the   agreement 
have   been    given   by  Dr.    Seton- Watson  in    the  English 
Beview  for  February  1916. ^     Italy  receives  by  its  provisions 
the    Trentino,    Gorica,    and    Trieste,    and    the    whole    of 
Istria  and   its   islands,    the   continental    boundary  in   this 
area   starting   from  the  neighbourhood  of  Rijeka  (Fiume) 
and   running   along  the   line   of    the    Julian   Alps.     Italy 
further  receives  the  whole   of  northern   Dalmatia  and   its 
islands   to   a  line   drawn  between   Trogir   and   Spljet  and 
thence   to  the  Dinaric  Alps  in  the   neighbourhood  of  the 
Arzano  Pass,  and  also  the  islands  of  Vis,  Hvar,  and  Korcula, 

'  In  giving  a  short  account  of  it  in  the  British  Review  for  September 
1915,  I  inadvertently  gave  the  month  of  signature  as  May  instead 
of  April.  It  was  on  May  28  that  I  received  information  of  the 
agreement. 

'  R.  W.  Seton- Watson,  The  Failure  of  Sir  Edioard  Qreij.  Eiujlish 
Eevieiv,  February  1916,  p.  148. 

11 


162  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

etc.  This  Treaty  was  not  only  concluded  without  any 
consultation  with  the  Serb  Government,  but  without  that 
Government  being  informed  that  any  such  project  was 
entertained,  its  only  information  being  derived  from 
common  rumour.  The  whole  manner  of  its  conclusion 
was  in  the  highest  degree  injurious  to  our  ally,  and  in  the 
plainest  contradiction  of  those  rights  which  our  statesmen 
have  so  often  proclaimed.  The  Dalmatians  are  of  the 
same  nationality  of  the  Serbs,  Serbia  was  an  ally  who 
for  months  had  been  detaining  and  defeating  large  Austrian 
armies,  it  was  under  the  cover  of  the  Serb  army  as  a 
flanking  guard  that  we  were  engaged  on  the  Gallipoli 
expedition,  and  we  had  proclaimed  ourselves  the  champions 
of  small  nations  and  of  the  rights  of  nationalities,  yet  on 
practically  the  first  occasion  on  which  our  principles  were 
put  to  the  test  they  were  betrayed.  Our  ally  in  a  matter 
deeply  affecting  her  interests  in  the  war  was  ignored  and 
kept  in  the  dark,  in  fact  she  was  not  given  the  status  of 
an  independent  ally  at  all,  while  the  rights  of  nationalities 
were  bartered  away  by  the  Great  Powers  concerned  in 
Metternichian  fashion.  It  is  noteworthy  that  while 
Belgium  has  received  ^  an  assurance  that  she  will  be 
called  upon  to  take  part  in  the  peace  negotiations  (i.e. 
that  she  will  take  her  place  as  a  sovereign  contracting 
State  and  not  merely  be  admitted  to  be  heard  in  the 
anteroom)  no  such  assurance  has  ever  been  given  to 
Serbia,  which  has  throughout  been  treated  as  a  dependent 
until  the  Paris  conference  in  March  1916  to  which  she 
was  admitted.  This  attitude  was  deliberate  and  evidently 
due  to  the  knowlege  that  Serbia  would  not  have  given 
her  consent  to  the  concessions  made.  At  the  same  time 
the  Itahan  Press  indulged  in  a  campaign  of  falsification, 
with  the  obvious  desire  to  throw  dust  into  the  eyes  of 
the  public  at  home  and  abroad,  and  English  correspondents 
were  telegraphing  to  their  newspapers  extracts  from  Italian 
papers  dealing  with  alleged  Serbo-Italian  negotiations  and 
a  complete  agreement  between  the  two  States  for  days 
'  On  February  14,  1916. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE   ADRIATIC        163 

after  even  the  present  writer  was  aware  on  the  best 
authority  that  no  such  negotiations  were  taking  place. 
Evidently  there  was  a  feeling  that  the  clandestine  method 
of  procedure  would  not  meet  with  general  acceptance. 
It  is  perhaps  significant  that  up  to  the  moment  of  writing 
the  English  Press  has  consistently  ignored  the  treaty, 
while  the  majority  of  our  publicists  at  the  most  have  made 
an  occasional  vague  allusion  to  some  "  alleged  agreement", 
an  attitude  which  is  obviously  assumed  in  view  of  the 
disclosures  made. 

On  the  ethical  side,  then,  the  agreement  connotes  an 
abandonment  pro  tanto  of  the  moral  basis  of  the  war  and 
a  return  to  the  ideas  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  while  on 
its  material  side  it  lies  open  to  the  objections  which  have 
already  been  made  to  proposals  of  the  nature  contained  in 
the  agreement.  It  can  in  no  sense  be  reconciled  with  the 
doctrine  of  nationality,  for  by  its  terms  nearly  one  million 
Southern  Slavs  will  be  included  in  the  Italian  Kingdom, 
namely  some  450,000  of  the  population  of  Dalmatia,  and 
the  Slav  inhabitants  of  _Trjeste,  60,000 ;  ^  Istria,  224,000 ; 
Gorica  155,000 ;  and  some  100,000  of  the  population  of 
KJranjska.  As  regards  the  latter  regions  a  more  detailed 
examination  of  the  figures  and  the  deductions  to  be  drawn 
from  them  will  be  given  in  the  next  chapter.  It  is  suffi- 
cient to  say  here  that  though  in  any  case  an  appreciable 
number  of  Slavs  would  have  to  be  included  in  the  new 
boundaries  of  Italy  the  necessity  falls  considerably  short 
of  what  is  here  conceded,  for  the  boundary  between  Slavs 
and  Italians  is  in  a  general  way  fairly  definite  and  does 
not  depart  largely  from  the  natural  boundaries  indicated 
by  the  geographical  features  of  the  country.  In  the  case 
of  Dalmatia  the  violation  of  the  national  rights  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  is  flagrant  and  incontestable,  and,  as  has 
been  seen  in  the  section  devoted  to  the  strategical  aspect 
of  the  problem,  quite  unnecessary  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  legitimate  requirements  of  Italy.     The  whole  of  the 

'  Census  figures,  in  round  numbers,  of  1910.  The  figures  in  detail 
will  be  found  in  the  following  chapter. 


164  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Dalmatian  element  in  the  above  figures  has  been  sacrificed 
without  any  valid  necessity.  While  the  incorporation  of 
the  province  in  a  Southern  Slav  State  would  have  affected 
only  18,000  Italians  in  a  population  of  630,000,  the  annexa- 
tion of  a  large  area  of  the  Dalmatian  mainland  and  of  the 
islands  affects  some  450,000  Slavs  on  a  strictly  moderate 
and  reasonable  estimate. 

The  occupation  of  almost  all  the  islands  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  of  the  Ragusan  group  very  effectually  serves 
the  purpose  of  rendering  as  "  useless  "  as  possible  the  coast 
line  which  is  left  to  the  Slavs,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will 
show.  The  islands  in  the  Quarn^ro  will  enable  the  Italians 
to  dominate  absolutely  all  traffic  to  and  from  Rijeka,  and 
moreover  will  cut  off  that  port  from  the  southern  Dalma- 
tian coast  left  to  the  Serbs.  Passing  to  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  new  Italian  Dalmatia  it  will  be  seen  that 
it  passes  close  to  Spljet  (Spalato),  the  opposite  side  of  the 
bay  being  in  fact  in  Italian  hands,  while  the  islands  of 
Solta  and  Brae  (Brazza)  perform  for  the  Italians  here  the 
function  of  the  Quarnero  islands  in  the  north.  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  how  the  Serbs  can  in  the  circumstances  make 
any  use  of  Spljet.  Indeed  it  would  be  an  act  of  supreme 
folly  if  they  should  endeavour  to  make  it  the  terminus  of 
a  line  to  the  interior  and  the  outlet  of  a  great  part  of  their 
trade.  The  whole  harbour  and  town  can  be  commanded 
absolutely  by  batteries  placed  on  the  opposite  Italian  shore, 
so  that  within  half  an  hour  of  the  opening  of  hostilities 
every  ship  in  the  port  could  be  sunk,  the  wharves,  cranes, 
and  warehouses  destroyed,  and  the  port  rendered  useless, 
nor  could  such  a  consummation  be  prevented  by  the  forti- 
fication of  the  Slav  shore  except  on  the  impossible  assump- 
tion that  the  latter  batteries  were  so  immeasurably  superior 
that  the  Italians  would  be  almost  instantaneously  over- 
whelmed before  they  could  do  any  damage.  Without  a 
doubt  under  the  circumstances  the  Serbs  will  have  to 
concentrate  their  attention  on  Dubrovnik  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  its  position  makes  it  unsuited  to  be  the  trade 
outlet  of  a  great  deal  of  Bosnia.    The  development  of  Spljet, 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  THE   ADRIATIC        165 

if  the  present  arrangements  hold  good,  would  be  nothing 
less  than  a  sign  of  incapacity  on  the  part  of  the  Serbs,  and 
if  this  language  be  thought  an  exaggeration,  the  map  again 
will  prove  a  corrective.  Below  the  delta  of  the  Narenta 
the  coast-line  is  broken  by  the  long  projection  of  the 
peninsula  of  PeljeSac  or  Sabioncello,  off  which  lies  the  island 
of  Korcula,  and  farther  off  Vis.  These  islands  will  be  in 
Italian  hands,  and  as  the  Quarnero  islands  isolate  Rijcka, 
so  these  southern  Dalmatian  islands,  besides  giving  the 
command  of  the  Spljet-Narenta  coast  line  to  Italy,  will 
cut  off  that  stretch  of  shore  from  southernmost  Dalmatia. 
The  two  strips  of  coast  left  to  the  Slavs  will  thus  be  divided 
into  three  portions  by  the  islands  held  by  the  Italians,  who 
will  be  in  a  position  to  cut  them  off  from  communication 
with  each  other  by  sea.  Only  when  we  come  to  the 
extreme  south,  to  Dubrovnik  and  Kotor,  do  we  find  a  coast 
where  the  Serbs  will  be  masters  in  their  own  house.  Even 
here  a  certain  calculation  has  been  probably  made,  but 
destined,  as  I  believe,  to  be  defeated.  Imagine  the  inner 
as  well  as  the  outer  Hebrides  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign 
Power  possessed  also  of  a  block  of  the  mainland,  say  of 
Argyll,  and  we  have  an  adequate  comparison  of  the  situa- 
tion to  be  established  on  the  eastern  Adriatic.  In  Article 
VIII  of  their  reply  to  President  Wilson  the  Allies  spoke 
of  a  "  reorganization  of  Europe  guaranteed  by  a  stable 
regime  and  based  at  once  on  a  respect  for  nationalities  .  .  . 
and  at  the  same  time  upon  territorial  conventions  and 
international  settlements  such  as  to  guarantee  land  and 
sea  frontiers  against  unjustified  attack  ".  These  principles 
should  be  applied  to  the  Adriatic,  and  such  guarantees 
afforded  to  the  future  Southern  Slav  kingdom. 

The  conclusion  of  this  treaty  has  created  a  most  painful 
effect  on  the  Southern  Slavs,  and  has  aroused  a  feeling  of 
keen  resentment  and  profound  disillusionment.  They  feel 
that  for  them  the  European  struggle  has  largely  altered 
its  character,  and  that  immense  sacrifices  have  been  and 
are  being  undergone  by  them  in  order  that  hundreds  of 
thousands   of   their  fellow-countrymen   may   exchange    an 


166  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Austrian  for  an  Italian  dominion,  sacrificed  in  the  cause  of 
"  sacred  egoism".  The  result  is  noticeable  enough  though 
undisclosed  by  a  discreet  Press.  There  is  no  longer  the 
same  enthusiasm  among  the  Serbo-Croats  of  former  Habs- 
burg  allegiance,  the  joyous  hope  of  independence  and 
national  unity  has  largely  deserted  them,  while  the  Serbs 
of  the  Kingdom  are  left  in  doubt  as  to  whether  even  now 
they  may  not  be  forced  to  pay  blackmail  to  Bulgaria.  East 
and  west  the  Southern  Slavs  see  their  interests  sacrificed 
or  menaced  and  their  national  heritage  turned  into  a 
common  fund  out  of  which  large  bribes  are  to  be  given — 
by  their  Allies — with  which  now  this  State  now  that  may 
be  gained  over.  The  House  of  Habsburg,  quick  to  see  its 
advantage,  has  sent  large  numbers  of  Southern  Slav  troops 
to  its  Itahan  frontier,  where  they  are  taking  a  valiant  part 
in  the  defence. 

These  results  were  easily  to  be  foreseen  except  by 
those  who,  unwilling  to  face  realities,  prefer  to  take  their 
fancies  for  facts,  and  their  hopes  for  accomplishments, 
but  the  expression  of  this  opinion  has  largely  been  denied 
publicity. I  Unfortunately  a  "delicate  situation"  does 
not  cease  to  be  delicate  because  the  difficulties  of  it  are 
shirked.  The  situation  has  to  be  dealt  with  at  some  time, 
and  the  sooner  all  the  facts  are  realized  the  sooner  will 
people  be  able  to  arrive  at  a  correct  appreciation  of  the 
position.  Writing  in  the  early  part  of  1915  Professor 
Denis  gave  utterance  to  a  warning  which  has  fallen  upon 
deaf  ears.  He  said  :  "  La  question  de  la  cote  orientale  de 
I'Adriatique  n'interesse  pas  seulement  I'ltalie  et  la  Serbie. 
C'est  une  question  d'ordre  universel,  et  il  n'y  a  aucune 
exageration  a  dire  que  I'avenir  du  monde  peut  dans  une 
large  mesure  en  dependre.  Car,  enfin,  si  une  puissance  so 
regie  uniquement  sur  ses  convenances  momentanees,  il  est 
absurde  d'exiger  des  autres  un  renoncement  qui,  au  milieu 
de  I'egoisme  universel,  ne  serait  plus  qu'une  niaiserie.  .  .  . 

'  Letters  to  the  Press  forecasting  the  untoward  effects  of  possible 
ItaUan  action  of  the  nature  indicated  were  refused  publication  in 
November  1914. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  ADRIATIC        1G7 

Partir  en  guerre  pour  supprimer  la  guerre  et  preparer  de 
nouveaux  conflits  ;  inscrire  sur  son  drapeau  le  respect  des 
nationalites  et  la  liberte  des  peuples,  et  aboutir  k  un 
nouveau  congres  de  Vienne ;  etre  les  heritiers  legitimes  des 
humanistes  du  XVP  siecle  et  des  nationalistes  du  XVIII  ° 
pour  chausser  les  bottes  de  Metternich  et  de  Guillaume  II, 
quelle  decheance  et  quelle  banqueroute  !  "  ^  That  which  he 
posed  as  supposition  is  now  fact. 

Nothing  that  has  here  been  v/ritten  has  been  written  in 
in  any  spirit  of  hostihty  to  Italy.  The  writer  was  brought 
up  to  believe,  and  still  believes,  that  the  accomplishment  of 
Italian  unity  was  one  of  the  finest  and  grandest  things  that 
happened  in  the  nineteenth  century,  nor  was  the  name  of 
any  foreigner  so  familiar  to  him  in  childhood,  not  by 
contemporary  knowledge  but  in  political  conversation  of  the 
past,  as  that  of  Garibaldi,  who  became  to  him  an  almost 
"  legendary  "  hero.  What  has  made  the  attitude  of  Italian 
politicians  so  painful  to  those  who  remember  her  past, 
and  the  generous  enthusiasms  which  it  evoked,  is  that  their 
attitude  in  Southern  Slav  affairs  is  a  flat  negation  of  the 
whole  historical  and  ethical  basis  of  the  Italian  Kingdom. 
They  would  seem  to  have  turned  their  backs  on  the 
generous  ideals  of  nationality  to  which  Italy  owes  her 
existence  in  the  pursuit  of  an  imperialist  policy.  That 
Italy,  the  product  of  those  ideals,  the  result  of  the  union 
of  a  formerly  disunited  people,  compounded  of  several 
States,  some  independent,  some  enslaved,  which  had  the 
House  of  Habsburg  for  her  hereditary  enemy,  which  made 
her  appeal  to  liberal  Europe,  should  place  herself  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  Southern  Slavs  whose  present  position  is  a 
picture  of  her  own  past,  as  her  present  position  is  the  goal 
at  which  they  aim,  inspired  like  her  by  the  teaching  of 
Mazzini,  the  exploits  of  Garibaldi,  is  one  of  the  saddest 
things  possible  for  those  who  still  retain  any  hopes  of 
national  idealism.  Surely  the  Italian  people  must  bo 
nobler  and  more  generous  than  those  who  speak  in  its 
name.  Let  that  people  hear  the  words  of  Signor  Tittoni,  a 
'  E.  Denis,  La  Grande  Serhic,  p.  320. 


168  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

former  Foreign  Minister  and  lately  Ambassador  in  Paris, 
uttered  in  a  speech  delivered  on  December  18,  1906,  which 
as  I  have  them  only  in  a  French  rendering  I  will  not 
submit  to  a  further  process  of  translation.  His  reasoning 
applies  with  equal  force  to  the  present  situation.  "  Je 
repousse  done  le  conseil  qui  m'est  attribue,  de  proposer 
a  I'Autriche-Hongrie  des  partages  de  territoires  ou  de 
pousser  a  des  occupations  que  ne  prevoit  pas  le  traite  de 
Berlin,  afin  d'exiger  ensuite  pour  nous  des  compensations 
territoriales.  Un  semblable  precede  serait  en  contradiction 
avec  les  principles  sur  lesquels  est  basee  I'unite  de  I'ltalie ; 
il  ne  serait  pas  compatible  avec  les  principes  qui  nous  ont 
diriges  jusqu'ici ;  il  nous  jetterait  dans  les  perils,  parce  qu'il 
serait  un  precedent  qui,  a  I'avenir,  nous  serait  souvent 
oppose.  En  un  mot,  il  obscurerait  les  huts  evidents  de 
notre  politique  en  I'Orient ". 


CHAPTER  V 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS 


The  actual  area  of  the  national  territory  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  which  can  be  included  in  the  future  State  depends 
naturally  upon  the  extent  of  the  Allied  victory  and  the 
terms  which  the  Allies  can  therefore  enforce  upon  the 
vanquished,  and  in  particular  upon  the  continued  existence 
or  disappearance  of  Austria-Hungary.  As  the  extent  of 
the  victory  cannot  be  foretold,  and  because  in  any  event 
it  is  necessary  to  have  in  mind  an  ideal  solution  of  the 
question  which  should  be  aimed  at  in  proportion  to  our 
success  in  the  field,  it  is  necessary  and  in  any  case  best  to 
assume  that  such  an  ideal  solution  will  lie  within  our  grasp, 
and  to  examine  the  problem  on  the  basis  of  that  assumption. 
The  Dalmatian  question  having  been  treated  of,  the  next 
and  cognate  element  that  calls  for  consideration  is  the 
future  status  of  the  lands  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  that 
is  to  say,  Istria,  Trieste,  the  county  of  Gorica-GradiSka, 
Kranjska  (Carniola),  Carinthia,  and  the  southern  portion 
of  Styria.  The  following  table  gives  the  population  of  these 
countries  according  to  the  last  Austrian  census  of  1910. 


Slavs. 

Italians. 

Germans. 

Total 
population. 

Istria 
Trieste 

Gorica-GradiSka 
Elranjska     ... 

224,400 

59,974 

155,039 

492,043 

147,417 

118,959 

90,119 

369 

12,735 
11,856 

4,486 
27,915 

386,463 
190,913 
249,893 
520,327 

In  Carinthia   there   are   some   120,000  Slavs   and   300,000 
Germans,  and  in  southern  Styria  some  400,000  Slavs.     Of 


169 


170  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  Slav  population  that  of  Istria  is  divided  between  the 
Croats,  168,184,  and  Slovenes,  55,134,  the  remaining 
Slavs  in  these  regions  are  chiefly  Slovenes.  In  Istria  the 
Italians  are  found  in  a  majority  in  the  western  portion 
of  the  peninsula,  while  the  central  and  eastern  parts  are 
predominantly  Slav.  In  the  county  of  Gorica  the  Italians 
inhabit  the  country  to  the  west  of  the  lower  Isonzo,  while 
they  form  also  the  majority  in  the  district  of  Monfalcone 
and  in  the  town  of  Gorica.  To  the  north  of  that  town 
the  ethnographical  boundary  crosses  the  existing  frontier 
of  Italy,  which  here  already  includes  in  its  dominions  a 
Slovene  population.  From  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Pon- 
tebba  Pass  the  racial  line  dividing  Slovenes  from  Germans 
runs  roughly  to  the  river  Drave  above  Villach,  thence 
it  follows  the  course  of  the  river  to  the  boundary  of  Styria. 
From  this  point  it  runs  north  of  the  river  to  the  town  of 
Eadkersburg  or  Eadbona  on  the  Mur.  Immediately  to  the 
east  of  Eadkersburg  a  wedge  of  Slovene  country  runs  north 
as  far  as  S.  Gotthard  on  the  Eaab  in  Hungary,  the  boundary 
returning  south  to  the  Mur,  and  thence  the  frontier 
between  Slovenes  and  Croats  follows  the  boundary  of 
Croatia  and  Kranjska. 

In  parts  of  this  region  the  interests  of  Italy  are  great 
and  incontestable.  Western  Istria  with  Pola  are  of  prime 
importance  to  her  naval  position,  and  as  has  been  seen  are 
predominantly  Italian  in  population.  Venice  is  no  longer, 
in  view  of  modern  requirements  and  the  increased  size  of 
shipping,  the  naval  base  that  it  was  in  past  years,  and 
the  Italians  have  not  in  recent  years  based,  I  believe, 
their  eastern  squadrons  on  the  aforetime  mistress  of  the 
Adriatic,  preferring  for  the  purpose  Taranto,  which  is  out- 
side that  sea.  With  Pola  in  her  hands  the  position  would 
be  fundamentally  altered  in  her  favour ;  she  would  have  in 
these  northern  waters  the  base  which  she  requires,  connected 
by  rail  with  the  peninsular  railways,  well  sheltered,  and 
naturally  strong.  In  the  previous  chapter  it  has  been  sug- 
gested that  Lo§inj  (Lussin)  should  also  be  assigned  to  Italy  if 
she  desires  it,  thus  assuring  her  the  mastery  of  these  waters. 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  171 

Trieste   occupies  both   historically   and   commercially    a 
peculiar    position.     For    over    five    centuries   it   has   been 
a  possession  of  the  House  of  Habsburg ;  it  is  the  port  of 
entry  and  egress  for  a  vast  backland  inhabited  by  various 
races,  and,  as  the  Germans  have  frequently  pointed  out, 
is   only   two    hundred   miles   from   the   Bavarian   frontier. 
Racially,   in   spite   of   the    recent   grovfth   of   the   Slovene 
element,  it  is  predominantly  Italian,  even  if  the  contention 
of    the    Slovenes    be    true    that    their    element   is   under- 
estimated  in  the   census   by   some    20,000    persons.     The 
municipality  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Italians,  and  it  seems 
to  be  substantiated  that  the  scholastic  needs  of  the  Slovenes 
have  been  purposely  neglected,  the  Italians,  perhaps   not 
unnaturally,   having   been   greatly   alarmed    at   the  height 
reached   by  the   fiovi^ing   tide  of    Slavs,  so  that   the  town 
has  become  one   of   the   focus   points  of  racial  strife  and 
propaganda.      Despite,    hov^ever,   the    contentions    of    the 
more  extreme  propagandists,  there  can  be  no  hesitation  in 
assigning  Trieste  to  the  Italians,  who   on   the  ground  of 
nationality  have  an  incontestable  claim,  while  the  culture 
of    the    town    has   always  been   Italian.     It  is   true  that 
Trieste  is  the  port  of  a  great  deal  of  the  Slovene  backland, 
but  it  is  the  port  likewise  of  the  German  backland,  and 
it    is    unwise    to    advance    an    argument    that    elsewhere 
might   be    turned    against    its    authors.     The    commercial 
position   of   Trieste    undoubtedly  complicates  matters.     If 
the  port  were  included  in  the  Italian  customs  area,  then 
part  of  the  Slovene  country  would  be  deprived  of  its  natural 
outlet,  as  also  the  whole  of  German  Austria,  and   beyond 
that   the   Bohemian  country  (Bohemia   and   Moravia).     It 
is  by  this  trade  that  Trieste  lives,  and  if  it  were  diverted 
the  result   would   be   commercial  ruin  for  the  port  and  a 
grievance  for  the  interior.     The  difficulty  is  by  no  means 
insuperable,  and  could  be  overcome  by  the  suggestion  of 
Dr.  Seton- Watson  that  it   should  be    made   a  free   port. 
Traffic    then    from    the   interior   would    pass    through   its 
harbour   as   at  present,  without   imposition  of  a  customs 
tariff,  only  goods  destined  for  consumption  in  Italy  being 


172    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

subject  to  the  Italian  tariff.  The  duty-free  trade  could 
be  carried  in  what  may  be  called  "  bonded  "  trains  through 
Italian  territory  to  its  destination.  Such  a  proposal  is  not 
less  in  the  interests  of  Italy  than  of  the  port  and  of  the 
interior,  and  would  not  in  any  way  derogate  from  Italian 
sovereignty  over  the  town  and  harbour. 

In  the  county  of  Gorica-Gradi§ka  it  is  inevitable  that 
a  certain  Slovene  population  should  pass  under  Italian  rule. 
The  Italians  in  no  case  would  be  now  satisfied  with  the 
line  of  the  Isonzo,  and  would  require  in  the  south  a  good 
connection  between  their  peninsular  territory  and  Istria. 
The  heights  to  the  east  of  the  river  would  form  a  natural 
and  defensible  frontier,  and  would  give  to  Italy  the  positions 
for  which  she  is  now  fighting.  Monfalcone  would  be  hers, 
Gradiska,  Gorica,  the  positions  of  Doberdo,  Plava,  Podgora 
(all  three  Slav  names),  and  more  to  the  northward  Tolmino, 
Plezzo,  and  the  Predil  Pass,  beyond  which  (Malborghetto, 
etc.)  the  future  frontier  of  Italy  does  not  concern  the 
Southern  Slavs.  Entrenched  on  this  line,  with  lateral 
communication  behind  along  the  valley  of  the  Isonzo, 
Italy  could  contemplate  with  assurance  the  defence  of 
this  portion  of  her  frontier  against  even  the  strongest 
assailant.  In  effect,  Italy  would  thus  secure  more  than 
half  the  area  of  the  province,  and  probably  would  take 
under  her  rule  not  less  than  75,000  Slovenes,  as  well 
as  all  the  Italians,  so  that  the  suggestion  can  hardly 
be  described  as  niggardly,  or  as  characterized  by  lack  of 
appreciation  for  her  strategical  necessities,  going  as  it  does 
far  beyond  her  pre-war  aspirations.  The  frontier,  more- 
over, would  be  a  natural  one. 

The  suggested  land  frontier  then  would  start  at  the 
estuary  of  the  Arsa,  and  gain  the  mountain  backbone 
of  the  Istrian  peninsula  which  traverses  the  country  nearer 
to  the  eastern  than  the  western  shore,  and  to  the  east 
of  the  railway  which  connects  Pola  with  Trieste.  It  would 
follow  the  course  of  this  range  northward,  and  eventually 
strike  the  boundary  of  Kranjska  at  the  point  in  the  lati- 
tude of  Trieste   where  the  boundaries  of  Istria,  Kranjska, 


PROPOSED   FRONTIERS  173 

and  the  district  of  Gorica-Gradigka  meet.  Thence  it  would 
coincide  with  the  boundary  of  Kranjska  to  the  point  where 
the  latter  turns  northward  not  far  from  S.  Daniel,  from 
which  point  the  line  would  continue  its  north-westward 
course  in  the  direction  of  the  town  of  Gorica,  leavinir 
the  inland  railway  Gorica-Trieste  in  Italian  hands  as  well 
as  the  coast  route,  until  it  struck  the  mountains  which 
border  the  east  bank  of  the  Isonzo,  and  so  along  the 
range  which  forms  its  watershed  to  the  north  to  the 
Predil  Pass  and  Tarvis.  As  already  stated,  this  would 
leave  in  Italian  hands  all  the  strong  positions  for  which 
they  are  fighting  at  the  time  of  writing — the  positions 
round  Gorica,  Tolmino,  the  Kern  heights,  the  Cal  Pass 
and  Plezzo,  the  Predil  Pass  and  Tarvis.  In  addition  to 
some  75,000  Slovenes  in  Gorica-GradiSka,  the  territory 
would  include  the  60,000  Slavs  of  Trieste  and  approxi- 
mately 100,000  of  the  Slovenes  and  Croats  of  Istria, 
a  total  of  about  235,000,  together  with  practically  the 
whole  Italian  population,  some  350,000,  of  these  provinces. 
The  suggested  frontier  would  not  altogether  meet  the 
wishes  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  but  I  have  reason  to  believe 
that  if  their  claim  to  Dalmatia  were  met  no  serious 
opposition  would  be  manifested  towards  it. 

The  secret  treaty  with  Italy  gives  the  latter  considerably 
more  than  the  above  territories.  The  boundary  starts  a 
little  to  the  west  of  Eijeka,  and  follows  approximately  the 
frontier  between  Croatia  and  Istria,  then  entering  Kranjska 
follows  the  Julian  Alps,  cutting  off  the  south-western 
portion  of  that  homogeneous  province,  the  centre  of 
Slovene  nationality,  till  it  reaches  the  boundary  of  Gorica 
in  the  northern  part  of  that  county.  This  trace  in- 
cidentally severs  the  direct  railway  line  from  Ljubljana 
(Laibach)  to  Bijeka,  and  the  former  town  would  thus  be 
reduced  for  communication  with  the  port  to  the  roundabout 
route  via  Karlovac.  All  Istria  therefore  goes  to  Italy  with 
its  224,000  Slavs,  all  Gorica  with  155,000,  Trieste  with 
60,000,  and  a  slice  of  Kranjska  with  about  100,000 
Slovenes.     The  population  of  the  ceded  area  will  therefore 


174  THE  FUTUBE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

comprise  some  539,000  Southern  Slavs  and  357,000  Italians, 
as  a  reference  to  the  table  previously  given  will  show. 

The  whole  future  of  this  region  is  naturally  dependent 
upon  the  extent  of  the  Allied  victory  and  the  demands 
which  can  be  made  upon  Austria,  for  while  the  Monarchy 
could  lose  Galicia,  Transylvania,  Croatia,  and  Dalmatia, 
without  ceasing  to  exist  as  a  considerable  State  with  its 
own  seaboard,  the  loss  of  the  territories  now  under  con- 
sideration would  connote  the  disappearance  of  the 
Habsburg  realm  as  a  distinct  entity.  To  put  it  in  another 
form,  if  the  Allies  should  be  in  a  position  to  force  the 
House  of  Habsburg  to  cede  these  territories  in  addition 
to  the  others  mentioned,  they  would  in  the  nature  of  things 
be  equally  in  a  position  also  to  enforce  the  complete  dis- 
memberment of  the  Monarchy,  In  an  article  contributed 
to  the  British  Review  for  April  1915  I  said  that  the  more 
desirable  event  would  be  the  formation  of  a  Habsburg 
federal  State,  consisting  of  a  Cech-Slovak  kingdom,  a  purely 
Magyar  Hungary,  an  Austrian  German  State,  and  a 
Slovene  State,  the  latter  of  which  would  of  necessity 
include  Istria  and  Trieste.  The  formation  of  such  a 
Habsburg  Monarchy  would  incidentally  limit  Italian 
accession  of  territory  in  the  northern  Adriatic  to  the 
actual  line  of  the  Isonzo  river,  and  the  future  Southern 
Slav  territory  would  in  a  similar  manner  be  limited  in 
this  direction  by  the  western  frontier  of  Croatia.  The 
argument  that  weighed  with  the  writer  was  that  the 
alternative  would  entail  the  absorption  of  the  old  Austrian 
German  duchies  into  the  German  Empire,  and  the  conse- 
quent near  approach  of  the  latter  to  the  Adriatic.  Further 
consideration,  however,  and  the  increased  subserviency  of 
Austria-Hungary  to  Germany,  which  has  marked  the  pro- 
gress of  the  war  and  will  evidently  characterize  the  ensuing 
peace,  have  led  me  to  reject  the  opinion  expressed  in  that 
article.  It  is  now  evident  that  such  a  State  would  become 
politically,  economically,  and  in  military  matters,  a  mere 
satellite  of  Germany,  for  the  Cechs  and  Slovenes  would  be 
outnumbered  by  the  Germans  and  Magyars  and  forced  to 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  175 

follow  in  their  wake.  The  effective  strength  of  Germany 
would  consequently  be  increased  by  the  resources  of  a 
monarchy  numbering  some  35,000,000  inhabitants. 

The  more  the  problem  is  considered  the  more  funda- 
mentally erroneous  appears  the  view  to  which  expression 
was  given  in  the  article  mentioned.  If  Germany  has  been 
able  to  maintain  herself  in  arms  against  the  greater  part  of 
Europe,  it  has  been  owing  to  her  control  of  the  resources 
of  Austria-Hungary — that  is  to  say,  of  a  State  which  is 
predominantly  non-German  and  non-Magyar.  Southern 
Slav,  Italian,  Roumanian,  Cech,  Pole,  Euthene,  all  have 
provided  cannon  fodder  for  the  German  High  Command, 
and  without  these  supplies  Germany  would  have  been  lost 
long  ago.  Any  future  Habsburg  monarchy  will  inevitably 
gravitate  within  the  German  orbit  and  bring  its  resources 
to  the  aid  of  Prussianism,  and  hence  the  absolute  necessity 
of  shearing  off  from  the  Habsburg  dominions  all  that  is  not 
German  or  Magyar.  In  practice  that  would  mean  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Bohemia,  to  include  all  the 
Cechs  and  Slovaks,  the  creation  of  a  purely  Magyar  Hun- 
gary, and  almost  certainly  the  incorporation  of  the  Austrian 
Germans  in  the  German  Empire.  It  is  the  latter  fact  that 
causes  hesitation  with  some  people,  but  evidently  with  very 
little  cause.  The  Austrians  would  bring  to  Germany  an 
accretion  of  some  8,000,000  of  population,  but  such  an 
accretion  is  greatly  less  than  the  30,000,000  to  35,000,000 
of  a  reduced  Austria  which  would  equally  be  at  the  service 
of  Germany ;  it  would,  in  short,  represent  the  lesser 
evil  of  the  two.  Such  a  Germany,  deprived  of  all  other 
means  of  support,  could  never  make  head  again  in  face  of 
the  Grand  Alliance,  or  even  of  Russia  and  France,  sup- 
ported as  these  would  be  by  Bohemia  and  the  Southern 
Slav  kingdom.  To  some  it  is  repugnant  to  think  of  the 
final  prostration  of  the  Habsburgs  before  the  Hohenzollerns, 
but  that  sentiment  rests  on  no  solid  basis.  The  Habsburgs 
have  always  been  disloyal,  intolerant,  perfidious,  and  reac- 
tionary ;  and  Gladstone  was  right  in  saying  that  nowhere 
had  Austria  (i.e.  the  House  of  Habsburg)  done  good.    There 


176  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

are  few  things  more  curious  in  history  that  the  glamour 
which  this  House  has  managed  to  cast  over  all  sorts  of  men 
in  various  countries,  but  now  at  last  it  is  open  to  all  to  see 
it  in  its  true   colours.      That   some   who   call   themselves 
Liberals  should  come  forward  as  the  champions  of  Austria  is 
something  truly  astonishing,  and  can  only  be  due  to  that 
kink  which  causes  some  men  always  to  be  apparently,  and 
in  good  faith,  on  the  side  of  their  country's  enemies.     Far 
truer  was  the  teaching  of  Gladstone  and  of  Professor  Free- 
man, to  the  latter  of  whom  so  deep  a  debt  is  due  for  his 
clear  teaching  on  this  subject.     If  the  writer  of  this  in  the 
article  quoted  spoke  in  favour  of  a  reduced  Austria,  it  was 
not  for  love  of  the  Habsburgs  or  of  Austria,  for  the  burning 
words  of  the  great  Professor  had  left  their  mark  years  before, 
but  for  the  reason  assigned  in  the  text,  a  reason  now  clearly 
seen  to  be  superficial.     Indeed,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  the  question  of  the  dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary 
is  the  question  of  whether  we  want  to  win  the  war  or  lose 
it,  or  more  correctly  of  whether,  having  won  the  war,  we 
wish  to   win   the  peace.      It   is   noteworthy   that   French 
opinion,  which  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  showed  some 
tenderness    to   Austria,  shows   signs   of   hardening   in   the 
opposite   direction.     While    M.    Bainville    considered    the 
destruction  of  Austria  as  a  European  disaster   (in  which 
case  it  is  curious  that  he  should  have  made  it  an  accusation 
against  the  Jugoslav  Committee  that  it  was,  according  to 
him,  subsidized  by  Austria),  M.  Herbette  looked  to  a  group- 
ing of  the  Austrians  proper  with  the   Southern  Germans. 
This  latter  idea  is  not  incompatible  with  the  destruction  of 
Austria-Hungary  as  at  present  existing,  but  is  based  upon 
a  misconception  of  German  feeling.     Readers  of  the  Hohen- 
lohe  Memoirs  will  remember  that  the  great  impulse  towards 
unity  came  precisely  from  the  South  Germans,  and  that  their 
particularism  is  directed  also  against  each  other.     On  the 
other  hand  M.  Cheradame  is  explicitly  for  dismemberment. 
Thus  he  wrote:  "All  who  have  studied  on  the  spot  the 
problem  of  Central  Europe  are  unanimous  in  declaring  that 
the  liquidation  of  Austria-Hungary  is   an  absolute  neces- 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  177 

sity  ".^  M.  Dubosc  has  stated  the  reasons  with  admirable 
precision  and  conciseness:  "In  short,  if  we  are  of  'those 
who  speak  of  demohshing  Austria  and  do  not  speak  of 
demolishing  Germany  ',  it  is  because  (1)  the  demolition  of 
the  one  appears  to  us  definitive,  while  that  of  the  second 
appears  ephemeral ;  (2)  because  the  demolition  of  Germany 
seems  to  us  superfluous  on  the  day  when  Prussia  will  be 
cast  down ;  (3)  because  the  demolition  of  Austria  will  be  the 
ruin  of  the  bloc  of  Central  Europe,  which  was  hostile  to 
us,  and  in  particular  of  the  mutual  aid  of  German  and 
Hungarian  assured  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  compromise 
of  1867  ".2  The  Temps  and  Matin  in  leading  articles,  and 
other  writers  such  as  M.  Gauvain,  have  adopted  the  same 
line  of  reasoning,  and  have  pointed  also  to  the  doctrine  of 
nationality  as  necessitating  a  final  liquidation  of  the  Danu- 
bian  Monarchy.  The  Allies'  note  to  Mr.  Wilson,  and  Mr. 
Balfour's  letter,  if  words  mean  anything,  have  endorsed  the 
policy  as  being  the  aim  of  the  Grand  Alliance.  Henceforth 
the  matter  should  be  chose  jugee,  unless  we  are  to  go  back 
upon  our  word,  upon  our  moral  obligations  to  our  Allies, 
upon  the  definite  treaties  with  some  of  them  and  upon  our 
own  interests.     Austria  delenda  est. 

The  complete  disruption  of  the  Monarchy  would  be 
attended  by  the  cession  to  the  Southern  Slavs  and  to  Italy 
of  the  territory  which  has  just  been  considered,  and  the 
formation  of  independent  kingdoms  of  Bohemia,  including 
Moravia,  Austrian  Silesia,  and  the  Slovak  districts  of  Hun- 
gary, and  of  Magyar  Hungary.  The  German  Austrian 
provinces  would  then  inevitably  enter  the  German  Empire, 
which  in  their  8,000,000  inhabitants  would  find  some  com- 
pensation for  its  losses  elsewhere.  The  accession  of  strength 
would  nevertheless  be  considerably  less  than  that  which 
would  fall  to  her  lot  in  the  alternative  considered  above. 
Even  if  an  independent  Hungary  gravitated  towards  Ger- 
many, and  such  a  course  is  perhaps  less  likely  in  an  inde- 
pendent  Hungary   than    in   a    Hungary   tied  to    German 

'  Bappel,  July  10,  1916. 
»  Faris-Midi,  July  15, 1916. 
12 


178  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Austria,^  there  would  be  a  counterbalance  in  a  Cech-Slovak 
Bohemia  of  some  10,000,000  inhabitants,  while  the  Slovene 
and  Italian  country  would  also  be  lost.  If,  then,  the  Allies 
should  be  in  a  position  to  demand  the  cession  of  the  Slovene 
and  Italian  Adriatic  lands,  that  demand  should  be  main- 
tained, with  the  consequent  disruption  of  the  Monarchy 
into  its  constituent  elements,  the  latter  event  being,  as  said 
above,  a  necessary  result  of  the  former  in  poHtical  conse- 
quence, as  it  would  ex  hypothesi  lie  equally  within  the 
power  of  the  Allies  to  enforce. 

The  less  complete  the  victory  of  the  Allies,  the  less, 
obviously,  shall  we  be  in  a  position  to  demand,  but  it  must 
be  remembered  that  these  cessions  of  territory  alone  will 
give  an  adequate  and  permanent  solution  to  the  Southern 
Slav  and  ItaHan  questions.  It  is  not  a  mere  question  of 
a  province  more  or  less,  as  in  the  case  of  the  dynastic  wars 
of  the  eighteenth  century  on  the  Continent,  but  of  utiHzing 
a  unique  opportunity  of  recasting  the  map  of  Europe  on 
national  and  rational  lines. 

As  regards  the  northern  boundary  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  in  this  region  it  could  be  drawn  along  the  river 
Drave,  following  the  ethnographic  line  of  cleavage  from 
the  neighbourhood  of  Villach  to  the  Styrian  frontier, 
thence  in  a  more  or  less  direct  line  to  Eadkersburg 
on  the  Mur.  There  is,  as  stated  above,  a  northerly 
wedge  of  Slovene  territory  running  from  this  point  to 
S.  Gotthard  on  the  Eaab  containing  some  100,000  inhabi- 
tants, but  I  do  not  think  that  this  wedge  could  be  included 
in  the  Southern  Slav  State.  It  is  impossible  to  make  the 
political  boundary  follow  in  every  detail  the  linguistic  or 
ethnographic,  as  the  result  of  such  an  attempt  would  lead 
to  many  inconveniences  and  anomalies.  The  principle 
should  be  the  natural  or  geographical  boundary — if  such 
exists — which  coincides  most  nearly  with  the  racial,  pro- 
vided that  the  application  of  this  principle  does  not  exclude 

'  Such  a  complete  disruption  would  probably  bring  in  its  train  a 
considerable  modification  in  the  internal  condition  of  Hungary  in  the 
direction  of  the  loss  of  their  power  by  the  Magyar  magnates. 


PROPOSED   FRONTIERS  179 

large  racial  areas  from  their  co-national  State.  In  general, 
also,  in  estimating  what  should  fall  within  a  racial  area 
regard  should  be  paid  to  the  manner  in  which  the  races 
are  juxtaposed.  Small  racial  "islands"  in  a  surroundinf^ 
sea  of  another  race  must  be  lost  to  the  racial  stock.  This 
last  consideration  does  not  apply  to  the  Slovenes  in  question, 
as  the  area  adjoins  the  main  block  of  Slovene  and  Croat 
territory,  still  its  inclusion  -would  make  an  awkward 
boundary.  The  frontier  from  Eadkersburg  should  run 
along  the  Mur  to  its  junction  with  the  Drave.  Croatia 
would  thus  receive  again  the  little  territory  of  the  Medju- 
murje  of  some  735  square  kilometres,  which  lies  here 
between  the  two  rivers.  Of  its  population  of  90,357  82,829 
are  Croats.  The  territory  belonged  to  Croatia  till  1861, 
when  it  was  filched  by  Hungary,  and  its  possession  has 
always  been  claimed  by  its  former  owners.  It  was  the 
seat  of  the  great  family  of  the  Zrinjski. 

The  future  of  Croatia  has  been  much  canvassed  and 
various  rumours  have  at  different  times  been  in  circulation 
on  the  subject,  and  even  now,  as  has  been  seen  in  the 
previous  chapter,  some  Italian  papers  are  not  yet  reconciled 
to  the  idea  of  Serbo-Croat  unity.^^  The  secret  treaty 
with  Italy  lays  it  down  that  the  future  status  of  the 
country  shall  be  declared  by  the  Croatians  themselves. 
The  result  of  any  plebiscite  is  a  foregone  conclusion — the 
Croats  will  declare  for  union  in  some  form  or  another 
with  the  Serbs  and  the  formation  of  a  united  Southern 
Slav  State.  Owing  to  the  presence  among  the  Allies  of 
many  Southern  Slav  refugees  drawn  from  each  province 
inhabitated  by  the  race  we  have  had  abundant  opportunities 
of  learning  the  sentiments  of  the  people,  the  more  so  as 
these  refugees  are  thoroughly  representative  of  the  political 
and  economic  life  of  their  people.  They  include  members 
of  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  Parliaments,  and  of  the 
Dalmatian,   Croatian,   and  Bosnian    Sabors    (Diets),   town 

'  That  unity  is  recognized  in  the  ofBcial  Austrian  census  statistics, 
which  speak  always  of  Serbo-Croats.  The  Austrian  census  is  by 
language. 


180  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

councillors,  priests,  lawyers,  bankers,  journalists,  and  men 
of  letters.  The  testimony  they  give  is  unambiguous  and 
decisive.  The  Serbo-Croats  in  America  at  the  congress 
held  at  Chicago  endorsed  the  national  programme  of 
unity,  and  they  also  puWished  in  a  Southern  Slav  news- 
paper of  New  York  a  violent  manifesto  in  reply  to  the 
Austrian  consul's  request  that  Austrian  Southern  Slav 
emigrants  should  return  to  Europe  for  military  duty. 
The  Croatian  Committee  in  Rome  has  stated :  "  The 
official  acts  of  the  Croatian  Diet  at  Zagreb  testify, 
in  fact,  to  the  will  of  the  Croatian  people  to  consider 
itself  as  forming  a  single  nation  with  the  Serb  people, 
to  which  it  is  united  by  the  sacred  ties  of  the  soil, 
of  blood,  and  of  language".  In  May  1915  M.  Trumbic, 
a  member  of  the  Dalmatian  Sabor  and  a  former  mayor 
of  Splj'et,  said  to  M.  Delcasse  when  presenting  his  collea- 
gues :  "  As  the  Croats,  Serbs,  and  Slovenes  form  one 
[la  meme]  Jugoslav  [Southern  Slav]  nation  we  desire 
the  liberation  of  all  our  co-nationals  now  under  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  yoke  and  their  union  with  our  Serb  brothers 
of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  in  a  single  State.  ...  In 
order  that  the  Jugoslav  nation  may  be  able  henceforth 
to  accomplish  its  noble  national  and  civilizing  task,  it  is 
indispensable  that  all  its  members  should  be  joined  together 
in  a  compact  and  united  State  ".^  "  The  Southern  Slav 
people  aspires  to  unite  its  territories  in  a  single  independent 
State",  says  the  Jugoslav  Committee  in  its  appeal  to  the 
British  nation  and  parliament. 

In  a  conversation  on  this  subject  which  I  had  with 
Dr.  Hinko  Hinkovic,  the  well-known  advocate  of  the 
accused  in  the  Agram  High  Treason  Trial  and  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  Serbo-Croat  Coalition,  he  said  that  the  old 
bitter  Catholic-Croat  anti-Serb  feeling  was  dead  in  Croatia 
except  among  a  few  politicians  and  their  followers  of  the 
older  school,  the  younger  generation  would  have  nothing 
to  do  with  such  ideas.  Nor  was  there,  in  his  opinion,  he 
remarked  in  answer  to  a  specific  question,  any  danger  of  a 
'  at.  C.  Vellay,  La  Question  de  VAdriatique,  p.  75  note. 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  ISl 

revulsion  of  sentiment  after  the  war  when  Magj'ar  oppres- 
sion would  be  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  feeling  of  solidarity 
was  not  a  mere  reaction  to  alien  tyranny,  however  powerful 
an  agent  that  had  been  in  awakening  national  self-con- 
sciousness. The  Croats,  it  must  be  remembered,  though 
Catholic,  were  by  no  means  ultramontane,  following  in  this 
the  example  of  the  great  Strossmayer.  This  latter  point 
was  confirmed  from  another  source,  the  Serb  monk.  Father 
Nicholas  Velimirovic,  to  whose  reputation  in  his  own 
country  has  been  added  the  consideration  he  has  gained 
for  himself  in  England.  Discussing  the  future  relations 
of  Croats  and  Serbs  he  bade  me  remember  that  the  Croats 
are  not  particularly  fond  of  "the  Vatican".  In  his 
pamphlet  on  Beligion  and  Nationality  in  Serbia  he  has 
borne  testimony  to  the  great  part  played  in  the  furtherance 
of  the  programme  of  Southern  Slav  unity  by  the  Catholic 
priests,  many  of  whom  have  suffered,  and  are  suffering,  for 
their  racial  patriotism.  Some,  as  also  Orthodox  priests, 
have  given  their  lives  to  the  cause.  The  point  is  of  extreme 
importance  when  it  is  remembered  how  in  the  Near  East 
religion  has  proved  a  solvent  of  nationality,  and  in  the  past 
hardly  anywhere  more  conspicuously  than  in  the  case  of 
the  Southern  Slavs.  "It  may  be  objected  that  this  may 
be  so  in  the  day  of  trouble,  but  that  all  may  be  different 
to-morrow,  with  the  return  of  peace.  ...  On  this  point 
I  venture  to  say  that  history  will  not  repeat  itself ;  what 
has  been  will  never  be  again.  .  .  .  All  we  Jugoslavs  are 
sure  that  there  will  be  harmony  and  unanimity  between 
the  two  priesthoods,  the  two  confessions,  and  the  two 
Churches  in  the  future  Serbian  State  ".^  This  feeling  of 
solidarity  has  been  a  long  time  in  coming,  and  perhaps  will 
be  all  the  more  enduring  and  surely  based  because  the 
lesson  has  been  learned  in  the  hard  school  of  adversity, 
of  frustrated  hopes,  of  spurned  loyalty,  and  of  common 
suffering,  and  it  has  completely  altered  the  terms  of  the 
problem   as   it  formerly  existed.     There  can   be   no  doubt 

*  Father  Nicholas  Velimirovic,  Beligion  and  Nationality  in  Serbia, 
pp.  19,  22. 


182  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

as  to  the  result  of  a  consultation  of  the  Croat  people  as  to 
its  future :  they  will  elect  to  stand  with  their  Serb  brothers. 

The  position  of  Rijeka  is  a  close  counterpart  commer- 
cially of  that  of  Trieste  in  that  it  serves  a  large  backland 
of  various  national  elements.  The  loss  of  Croatia  would  cut 
off  Hungary  from  the  sea,  and,  though  there  might  be  some 
poetic  justice  in  that  in  view  of  her  action  towards  Serbia, 
she  would  be  entitled  to  a  guarantee  of  the  right  of  free 
exportation  and  importation  through  Bijeka  and  a  fair 
railway  tariff  to  the  port. 

Croats  and  Serbs  occupy  a  considerable  area  in  southern 
Hungary  in  the  districts  of  Baranja,  Ba5ka,  and  the  Banat 
of  Temesvar,  the  two  latter  corresponding  roughly  to  the 
former  Serb  Vojvodina  (Duchy),  and  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  Southern  Slav  claims  in  these  regions  and  to 
arrive  at  an  estimate  of  what  may  rightly  be  included 
in  the  future  Southern  Slav  State.  Baranja  is  one  of 
the  southerly  counties  of  Hungary,  bounded  on  the  south 
by  the  Drave  and  on  the  east  by  the  Danube,  with  an  area 
of  5,105  square  kilometres.  The  number  of  Serbo-Croats 
in  the  county  according  to  the  census  of  1910  is  36,000. 
The  figure  is  disputed  by  the  representatives  of  the  race, 
who  assert  that  the  returns  have  been  falsified  by  the 
Magyar  authorities,  and  the  real  number  of  Southern  Slavs 
is  70,000.  Apart,  however,  from  the  Magyar  population 
the  number  of  German  settlers  amount  to  103,000,  so  that 
the  Serbo-Croats  do  not  form  the  most  numerous  section 
of  the  population.  Unfortunately  the  local  distribution  of 
the  racial  elements  is  thoroughly  mixed,  and  it  would  be 
difficult  to  carve  out  of  the  country  any  considerable 
area  of  homogeneous  character.  "While  some  Serbo-Croat 
colonies  are  to  be  found  in  the  northern  portion  even  to 
the  south  and  east  of  Pecuh  (Pecs),  where  the  bulk  of  the 
Slavs  live,  they  are  mingled  with  large  German  and  Magyar 
elements.  Under  the  circumstances  it  seems  hardly  prac- 
ticable, and  in  the  interest  of  the  Southern  Slavs  them- 
selves undesirable,  that  the  future  State  should  here  cross 
the  natural    boundary   of    the    Drave,   even    though    the 


PROPOSED   FRONTIERS  183 

reluctance  to  leave  any  portion  of  the  race  under  Magyar 
misrule  is  natural  enough  in  view  of  all  that  it  has  suffered 
at  the  hands  of  Magyar  chauvinism. 

There  are  certain  considerations  affecting  the  distribu- 
tion of  territory  in  southern  Hungary  which  should,  I  think 
influence  the  result  of  any  concrete  inquiry  and  proposals, 
which  apply  not  only  to  Baranija,  but  also  to  the  Backa, 
and  the  Banat,  which  may  be  stated  at  this  point.  It 
would  be  a  bad  thing  for  the  Southern  Slav  kingdom 
if  it  sacrificed  its  intension  for  the  sake  of  extension. 
Serbia  has  owed  a  great  deal  to  its  homogeneity,  and  the 
consequent  concentration  of  its  political  aims  and  national 
feeling  ;  it  has  been  her  intension  which  has  given  her  her 
relatively  great  strength,  and  the  same  considerations  would 
apply  to  a  wider  Southern  Slav  State.  Nor  is  it  at  all 
desirable  in  the  interests  of  the  Southern  Slavs  themselves 
that  the  territorial  frontiers  of  their  kingdom  should  be 
so  extended  as  to  make  its  borderlands  a  miniature  Austria- 
Hungary  in  the  variety  of  its  ethnical  elements ;  it  would 
lose,  not  gain,  by  having  for  its  frontier  provinces  a  sort 
of  ethnological  museum.  The  guiding  principle  should, 
therefore,  be  to  include  all  the  compact  masses  of  the  race, 
but  to  eschew  annexations  which  would  bring  with  them 
the  complications  of  an  alien  population.  Such  comphca- 
tions  cannot  altogether  be  avoided,  but  they  should  be 
reduced  within  the  narrowest  possible  limits.  Especially 
should  Southern  Slavdom  avoid  the  needless  inclusion 
of  German  elements.  The  Germans,  as  the  war  has  shown, 
are  extremely  indigestible ;  even  in  the  United  States,  that 
great  melting-pot  of  nationality,  we  have  seen — in  some 
ways  more  markedly  than  elsewhere — how  the  German 
has  placed  the  interests  of  his  country  of  origin  altogether 
above  the  interests  of  his  adopted  country  and  his  own 
duties  as  a  citizen.  Political,  financial,  commercial,  and 
journalistic  action  have  not  exhausted  his  activities,  but 
arson,  murder — as  witness  the  loss  of  life  in  the  various 
dynamiting  outrages — and  outrage  have  also  been  called 
into  service.    Doubtless  the  German  inhabitants  of  southern 


184  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Hungary  are  compacted  of  milder  stuff  ^  and  are  relatively 
less  numerous,  still  the  Southern  Slavs  would  be  better 
without  them.  As  regards  some  of  the  German  colonies, 
which  necessarily  will  be  included  in  the  new  State,  I  have 
not  hesitated  in  a  later  chapter  to  suggest  some  drastic 
steps.  Without  anticipating  what  will  be  suggested  later, 
it  may  be  pointed  out  here,  that  not  only  will  the  Serbs 
be  well  within  their  rights  in  repatriating  the  strategic 
colonies  which  have  been  deliberately  planted  in  certain 
parts  of  Bosnia  and  Srem  (Syrmia),  but  that  somewhat 
similar  steps  may  have  to  be  taken  in  regard  to  other 
Germans.  Any  rearrangement  of  frontiers  will  probably 
lead  of  itself  to  a  certain  amount  of  cross  migration,  and 
that  process  will  be  all  to  the  good  even  if  not  unattended 
by  a  certain  hardship.  Such  hardship  will  add  but  little 
to  the  vast  sum  of  human  misery  caused  by  the  war, 
while  the  results  of  the  process  will  make  for  peace 
in  the  future  and  a  more  settled  condition  of  affairs  in 
the  various  racial  frontier  regions.  So  far,  however,  as  any 
governmental  suasion  is  to  be  employed,  that  will  only 
be  legitimate  if  the  frontiers  are  so  drawn  as  to  include 
the  minimum  of  alien  elements.  If  the  frontiers  are  so 
traced  as  to  include  only  compact  blocks  of  Serbo-Croat 
nationality,  with  no  more  than  islands  of  foreign  elements, 
then  some  such  measures  as  suggested  may  justifiably 
be  employed, — I  am  speaking  only  of  the  Germans.  If, 
however,  the  frontiers  are  traced  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  include  all  the  Serbo-Croats,  even  where  it  is  they  them- 
selves that  are  islands  in  an  alien  sea,  then  any  such 
measures  would  be  in  the  highest  degree  without  justifica- 
tion, for  the  Serbo-Croats  could  not  claim  to  include  solid 
blocks  of  aliens  and  then  to  treat  them  as  intruders,  nor 
is  there  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  that  any  such 
unjust  course  would  suggest  itself  to  them.  In  fine,  a 
studious   moderation   in  the   trace   of   the   frontiers  in  the 

'  According  to  Budapest  reports,  however,  they  have  shown  a  marked 
pan-German  feeling  during  the  passage  of  German  troops  in  the 
campaign  against   Serbia  which  has   given  concern  to  the   Magyars. 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  185 

manner  indicated  would  carry  with  it  a  certain  latitude 
of  conduct  towards  the  engulphed  Germans,  while  e  con- 
verso  the  Serbs  would  be  estopped  from  such  a  course 
by  needless  territorial  extension.  Finally,  the  place  of  the 
rejected  elements  could  be  taken  by  immigrants  of  their 
own  nationality. 

For  these  reasons  I  do  not  think  that  a  good  case  can 
be  made  out  for  the  annexation  of  Baranja  or  even  for 
any  considerable  portion  of  it,  and  the  wiser  course  would 
be  to  rest  content  with  the  Drave  frontier. 

The  adjacent  region  is  the  Backa,  which  is  bounded 
on  the  east  by  the  Theiss  and  on  the  south  and  west 
by  the  Danube,  which  makes  a  right-angled  turn  below 
its  confluence  with  the  Drave ;  it  corresponds  to  the 
Hungarian  county  of  Bacs-Bodrog.  The  population  of 
the  county  is  composed  chiefly  of  Serbo-Croats,  Magyars, 
and  Germans,  with  a  few  thousand  Slovenes  and  Kuthenes. 
The  statistics  of  the  Hungarian  census  are  disputed,  and 
it  is  probable  that  they  underrate  the  number  of  Serbo- 
Croats  and  exaggerate  those  of  the  Magyars,  for  the  latter, 
unlike  the  government  of  Vienna,  have  a  direct  interest 
in  the  manipulation  of  the  nationality  returns.  Unfor- 
tunately, not  only  is  the  population  mixed,  considered 
as  a  whole,  but  the  different  elements  are  commingled 
in  an  inextricable  manner.  The  eastern  part  is  predomi- 
nantly Serbo-Croat  beyond  a  line  drawn  roughly  north 
and  south  from  Novisad  (Neusatz)  on  the  Danube  to 
Sentoma§  on  the  Backi  canal,  which  runs  in  an  easterly 
direction  from  the  Danube  to  the  Theiss.  The  former 
of  these  towns  is  an  old  Serb  centre,  in  fact  before  the 
resurrection  of  independent  Serbia  it,  together  with  its 
near  neighbour  Karlovci,  was  the  cultural  centre  of  the 
Serb  stock,  and  most  of  the  educated  Serbs  of  the  early 
days  of  the  Principality  owed  their  education  directly  or 
indirectly  to  Novisad,  many  too  of  the  Serbs  of  this 
southern  region  of  Hungary,  Ba6ka,  and  the  Banat,  emi- 
grated to  the  Principality  when  it  gained  its  autonomy, 
and    this    applies    especially    to     the    educated    element. 


186  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Obradovi6,  who  made  spoken  Serb  the  literary  language, 
also  was  a  native  of  southern  Hungary,  and  in  more  recent 
times  the  father  of  the  Vojvoda  (Field-Marshal)  Putnik 
was  an  immigrant  from  the  same  region.  Of  late  years 
Novisad  has  been  forced  to  yield  its  place  as  the  Serb 
cultural  centre  to  Belgrade,  while  that  of  the  Croats  is  at 
Agram,  and  the  Germans  have  made  considerable  progress 
in  the  town.  Another  considerable  block  of  Serb  inhabited 
territory  is  to  be  found  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Subotica 
(Maria  Theresiopol).  The  intervening  areas  along  the 
Danube  to  the  west  of  the  line  Novisad-Sentomag,  and 
to  the  north  of  the  Backi  canal  are  inhabited  by  a  confused 
medley  of  Serbo-Croats,  Magyars,  and  Germans,  interspersed 
with  each  other  in  a  manner  which  forbids  the  drawing 
of  a  frontier  which  should  correspond  closely  with  the 
lines  of  racial  demarcation.  Thus  the  Serbo-Croats  of  the 
Subotica  region,  and  those  also  of  Sombor,  are  separated 
from  the  fairly  homogeneous  south-eastern  Ba6ka  by  these 
polyglot  areas.  As  the  Serbs  are  probably  the  most 
numerous  nationality  it  is  natural  that  the  whole  of  the 
Ba6ka  should  be  claimed  for  the  new  Southern  Slavdom. 
Here  again,  however,  the  considerations  to  which  I  have 
adverted  above  call  for  examination.  It  is  doubtful,  as 
already  stated,  whether  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  to  burden  themselves  with  an  area  of  such 
diverse  ethnic  elements.  It  would  add  enormously  to  the 
tasks  of  the  administration  and  might  easily  be  a  source 
of  trouble  and  international  complications.  It  has  always 
to  be  remembered  also  by  the  Southern  Slav  leaders  that 
it  is  far  easier  to  deal  by  way  of  legislation  with  the 
foreigner,  to  circumscribe  his  commercial  activities  and 
exploiting  proclivities,  to  curtail  the  extent  of  his  banking 
operations  and  so  forth,  than  to  deal  with  the  man  of  alien 
race  who  is  a  native-born  ^subject,  as  these  Germans  and 
Magyars  would  become,  unless  they  were  given,  and 
exercised,  permission  to  opt  for  Hungarian  nationality, 
in  which  case  the  confusion  would  be  worse  confounded. 
Hard  as  it  might  be  to  the  Southern  Slavs  to  renounce 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  187 

claims  to  a  region  rich  in  historic  memories  of  national 
struggle,  I  think  (and  those  Serbs  who  know  me  know  that 
it  is  the  thought  of  a  sincere  friend)  that  it  would  be 
wiser,  if  they  have  the  choice,  to  exercise  a  severe  modera- 
tion. The  south-easterly  corner  within  the  limits  already 
defined — south  of  the  Backi  canal  and  cast  of  the  line 
Novisad-Sentomag — might  perhaps  be  claimed  for  the 
Southern  Slav  State,  and  the  claim  might  include  Novisad 
itself  for  historical  reasons  and  for  the  practical  reason 
that  to  it  crosses  the  railway  bridge  over  the  Danube  from 
Petrovaradin,  but  beyond  that  in  their  own  larger  interests 
I  think  that  they  would  do  well  not  to  press  tlieir  claims.* 
The  last  region  of  southern  Hungary  with  which  we 
are  concerned  is  the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  which  includes 
the  greater  part  of  the  former  Serb  Vojvodina  and  comprises 
the  counties  of  Torontal,  Temes,  and  Krasso  Szoreny  (Serb, 
KraSovo-Severin).  The  southern  boundary  is  the  Danube, 
and  it  extends  east  and  west  from  the  borders  of  Roumania 
and  Transylvania  to  the  Theiss,  while  on  the  north  it 
reaches  to  the  Maros.  The  Banat  also  is  a  country 
of  mixed  nationality,  its  population  comprising  Serbs, 
Roumanians,  Magyars,  and  Germans,  while  other  races 
are  represented,  particularly  the  Slovaks.  The  western 
portion,  including  the  major  part  of  the  county  of  Torontal 
and  part  of  Temes,  is  predominantly  Serb.  This  portion 
includes  the  towns  of  Velika  Kikinda  and  Veliki  Be5kerek, 
and  extends  some  distance  eastward  in  the  southern  part 
to  YrSac,  Bela  Crkva  (Weisskirchen,  Fehertemplon),  aud 
Bazjas.  The  population  even  here  is  by  no  means  homo- 
geneous, but  includes  large  bodies  of  Roumanians  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Alibunar  and  of  Germans  and  Magyars 
in  that   of  Pancevo.     The   eastern  portion   of   the   Banat, 

'  If  in  pursuance  with  the  remarks  made  above  a  scheme  of  cross- 
migration,  directed  chiefly  with  a  view  to  the  Germans  and  possibly  to 
Magyar  "islets,"  be  adopted  (of  which  more  is  said  in  Chapter  IX),  then 
the  south-west  of  the  Backa  should  be  attributed  to  Serbia  as  well  as  the 
south-east.  This  would  give  the  whole  line  of  the  Backi  canal  as  the 
northern  boundary.  In  any  case  tens  of  thousands  of  Serbs  will  be 
excluded. 


188  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

comprising  the  county  of  Krasso  and  part  of  Temes  to 
the  east  of  the  line  Temesvar-VrSac  is  predominantly 
Roumanian.  Besides  Germans  and  Magyars  this  portion 
includes  numerous  Serb  islands  as  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Temesvar  and  Pardany.  In  former  days  the  Serbs 
occupied  a  more  important  position  than  they  do  now,  as 
they  have  lost  a  lot  of  ground  to  the  Roumanians  in  the 
east.  Here  many  Serb  districts  remain  only  as  islands 
in  a  Roumanian  sea,  and  Serb  ecclesiastical  foundations, 
far  removed  from  Serb  settlements  of  the  present  day, 
have  passed  into  Roumanian  hands.  The  northern  portion 
of  the  Banat  is  very  mixed  in  population,  and  a  wedge  of 
German  and  Magyar  colonies  with  a  Serb  and  Roumanian 
admixture  is  thrust  southward  to  Veliki  Beckerek  between 
the  main  masses  of  Serbs  and  Roumanians. 

The  detailed  study  of  this  region  carried  out  by  Dr.  Seton- 
Watson  in  his  book  Boumania  and  the  Great  War,^  as  part 
of  the  study  of  all  the  Roumanian  districts  of  Hungary, 
enables  one  to  arrive  at  a  fair  conclusion  as  to  the  future 
lines  of  demarcation.  The  eastern  county  of  Krasso 
Szoreny  is  so  far  Roumanian  as  to  lie  outside  the  purview 
of  legitimate  Serb  aspirations,  which  can  only  be  concerned 
with  the  counties  of  Torontal  and  Temes.  In  the  county 
of  Torontal  the  districts  of  Torok  Kanizsa  and  Nagy 
Szent-Miklos  in  the  north-west  are  Magyar  though  the 
former  contains  a  large  Serb  population,  while  the  district 
of  Perjamos  in  the  north  centre  is  mainly  German,  the 
Roumanian  being  the  next  most  numerous  element,  the 
Serbs  being  in  very  small  minority.  Dr.  Seton-Watson 
assigns  seven  districts  to  the  Serbs  :  Vehka  Kikinda,  Torok- 
Be6se,  Veliki  BeCkerek,  Zsombolya,  PanSevo,  and  Pan6evo 
Town.     The  total  population  of  these  districts  is  298,823, 

'  This  book  contains  an  invaluable  series  of  appendices,  chiefly  of 
statistical  tables  showing  the  population  of  Transylvania  and  eastern 
Hungary  in  great  detail,  to  which  I  am  deeply  indebted  throughout 
this  particular  section.  See  especially  for  my  purpose  pp.  81,  82,  86, 
and  87.  I  do  not  quite  follow  portions  of  his  summary  on  page  89,  but 
this  does  not  affect  the  matters  with  which  I  deal. 


PROPOSED   FRONTIERS  189 

and  it  includes  114,595  Serbs,  32,170  Roumanians,  54,502 
Magyars,  and  77,855  Germans.  The  details  of  the  districts 
disclose  the  fact  that  in  the  district  of  Zsombolya  the  Serbs 
form  a  very  small  minority — 3,687  Serbs,  4,643  Roumanians, 
12,026  Magyars,  and  25,552  Germans.  For  the  reasons 
more  than  once  given,  I  think  that  were  I  a  Serb  states- 
man I  should  willingly  renounce  any  claim  to  this  district. 
The  Roumanians  advance  considerable  claims  in  the  Banat 
(the  necessity  of  harmonizing  Serb  and  Roumanian  pre- 
tensions is  the  reason  for  the  detailed  consideration  here 
given  to  this  region),  and  apparently  are  not  afflicted  by 
any  doubts  as  to  the  number  of  aliens  who  may  be  in- 
cluded in  the  Roumanian  Kingdom — some  Roumanians  have 
gone  so  far  as  to  claim  the  line  of  the  Theiss,  i.e.  all 
the  Banat  and  much  else.  This  perhaps  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  satisfaction  of  their  legitimate  claims  will 
necessarily  result  in  the  inclusion  of  the  large  Saxon  and 
Szekel  islands  (234,085,  and  501,930)  which  are  situated 
near  to  the  Roumanian  frontier,  so  that  a  few  thousands 
more  or  less  of  Germans  and  Magyars  will  not  greatly 
affect  them.  The  Serbs  are  in  a  happier  position  and 
should  take  advantage  of  it.  The  district  of  Zsombolya, 
then,  should  be  renounced  by  them  to  the  Roumanians, 
the  more  so  as  its  cession  will  not  materially  break  the 
continuity  of  Serb  territory  though  making  its  northern 
portion  rather  a  narrow  tongue  of  land.  If  this  be  done 
the  population  of  the  remaining  districts  ^  under  considera- 
tion will  work  out  as  follows :  Serbs  110,908,  Roumanians 
27,527,  Magyars  42,476,  Germans  52,303.  It  will  be 
observed  that  the  result  is  greatly  to  increase  the  ratio  of 
Serbs  to  both  Magyars  and  Germans.  The  process  could 
be  carried  a  step  further.  A  solid  block  of  German  and 
Magyar  territory  extends  right  up  to  Veliki  BeSkerek,  and 
if  the  new  boundary  were  taken  close  to  the  east  of  that 
town,  but  so  as  to  leave  the  Beckerek-Pancevo  railway  in 
Serb  hands,  the  number  of  Germans  and  Magyars  would 
be  still  further  reduced. 

'  Of  the  county  of  Torontal. 


190  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Mixed  Serbo-Roumanian  districts  are  Csene,  Pardany, 
Modos,  Banlak,  and  Alibunar  extending  roughly  in  a 
crescent  with  horns  pointing  west  with  the  centre  to  the 
south-east  of  VeUki  Beckerek.  Of  these  the  first  is  mainly 
German,  and  should  share  the  lot  of  Zsombolya,  in  fact 
if  the  latter  (and  the  region  last  mentioned)  be  assigned  to 
Eoumania,  Csene  would  of  necessity  from  its  position  go 
also.  In  Pardany  the  Serbs  are  the  most  numerous 
element  closely  followed  by  the  Germans  who  in  Modos 
and  Banlak  take  first  place  while  in  the  latter  Magyars 
and  Roumanians  are  more  numerous  than  the  Serbs.  In 
these  districts  it  is  possible  to  work  out  a  redistribution 
by  communes  by  which  the  Serb  and  Roumanian  ele- 
ments will  be  disentangled,  but  the  result  leaves  the 
Serb  districts  with  a  large  leaven  of  Magyars  and 
Germans.!  Here  also  the  Serbs  would  be  wise  to  resign 
to  the  Roumanians  all  but  a  few  communes  in  the  west 
which  are  mainly  Serb  and  adjoin  the  main  block  of 
Serb  territory.  The  district  of  Alibunar  stands  in  a 
different  case.  It  is  possible  so  to  disentangle  the  com- 
munes as  to  give  two  regions,  one  predominantly  Roumanian 
and  the  other  predominantly  Serb  with  only  small 
minorities  of  other  nations.  The  difficulty,  however,  is 
that  Alibunar  projects  deeply  into  Serb  country,  and  unless 
the  boundary  is  to  be  extremely  in  and  out  the  whole 
district  should  go  to  the  Serbs.  This  is  the  less  important 
because  not  only  does  the  distribution  outlined  above  give 
large  Serb  islands  to  the  Roumanians,  but  the  two  races 
are  remarkable  among  Balkan  peoples  in  that  their  rela- 
tions are  generally  characterized  by  mutual  liking  instead  of 
mutual  hatred :  they  are  noted  for  getting  on  well  together. 

In  the  county  of  Temes  the  Serbs  are  in  a  small  minority 
in  most  of  the  districts  though  their  number  in  these 
districts  amounts  to  30,129,  but  that  is  out  of  a  total 
population  of  416,998.     In  VrSac  Town  they  are  numerous 

'  Vide  R.  W.  Seton-Watson,  op.  cit.  p.  87.  In  Pardany,  after  sub- 
tracting Roumanian  districts,  9,196  Serbs  are  left  in  a  population  of 
26,029 ;  in  Modos  6,899  out  of  23,468 ;  in  Banlak  3,658  out  of  19,777 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS 


191 


(8,602  out  of  27,370,  but  13,556  Germans),  but  the  town 
must  follow  the  fortunes  of  the  district  in  which  the 
Serbs  only  number  5,531  out  of  36,978  (18,174  Roumanians, 
8,605  Germans).  Kevevara  is  Serb,  and  so  is  Bela  Crkva 
with  the  exception  of  three  communes. 

The  boundary,  then,  of  Serb  territory  in  the  Banat  might 
be  traced  roughly  as  follows '  :  Leaving  the  river  Theiss 
somewhat  to  the  north  of  'Zenta  it  would  run  eastward 
to  a  point  between  Mako  on  the  Maros  and  Velika  Kikinda, 
then  it  would  run  southward  slightly  to  the  east  of  Velika 
Kikinda  and  continue  its  course  to  a  point  shghtly  east  of 
Veliki  Beckerek,  leaving,  as  said,  the  railway  V.  Be6kerek- 
Pancevo  in  Serb  hands.  Thence  with  a  slight  southward 
bulge  it  would  run  to  the  river  Temes  north  of  Botos  and 
continue  up  the  river  to  above  Srpska-Boka.  It  would 
then  run  with  a  northward  bend  to  the  Brzava  canal 
between  Partes  and  Kanak  and  follow  the  canal  south- 
westerly to  the  junction  with  the  Theresien  canal.  From 
this  point  it  would  run  south  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
railway  between  Szamos  and  Ilanesa,  and  follow  the 
railway — a  little  to  the  east  of  it — till  just  east  of  Alibunar 
it  would  cross  the  railway  Alibunar- VrSac,  This  railway 
it  would  follow — slightly  to  the  south  of  it — to  a  point 
between  Ulma  and  VrSac,  whence  it  would  take  a  south- 
easterly course  to  Bela  Crkva  and  Bazja§  on  the  Danube. 
The  island  of  Moldova  on  the  Danube  below  BazjaS  would 
also  go  to  the  Serbs.  If  this  trace  were  followed  the 
result  would  be  represented  in  the  following  table : — 


Serbs. 

Boumanians. 

Magyars. 

Germans. 

Total. 

Torontal  (district  of  V. 
Kikinda,  T.  Becse,  V. 
Beikerek,  Antafalva, 
Panoevo) 

Alibunar  district 

Temes,  Kevevara  district 

Bela  Crkva  diBtrict 

110,908 
11,743 
16,795 
20,863 

27,2'37 

14,082 

5,705 

1,160 

42,476 

588 

5,355 

circa      700 

52,303 

755 

6,587 

circa  4,600 

251,9J9 
29,292 
35,482 
29,227 

160,309 

49,374 

49,119 

64,!225 

345,950 

Stieler's  AUas  will  enable  the  line  to  be  followed  easily. 


192    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

From  these  figures  an  appreciable  reduction  must  be 
made  in  respect  of  the  Germans  and  Magyars  inhabiting 
the  excluded  portion  of  Veliki  Beckerek  and  a  slight 
addition  to  the  number  of  Serbs  in  respect  of  the  communes 
alluded  to  above  of  Modos,  Pardany,  and  Banlak  districts. 
If  three  Roumanian  communes  of  Alibunar  were  excluded 
there  would  remain  in  that  district  9,938  Serbs  and  only 
126  Roumanians,  out  of  a  total  of  12,193  inhabitants,  but 
these  communes  could  hardly  be  excluded  for  geographical 
reasons.  These  figures  could,  and  probably  would,  be 
modified  considerably  by  cross-migration  after  a  resettle- 
ment of  frontiers.  Some  90,000  Serbs  would,  upon  the 
above  distribution,  be  left  in  Roumanian  territory,  accept- 
ing the  total  figures  of  the  Hungarian  census  of  the 
counties  of  Torontal  and  Temes  which  exceed  by  several 
thousands  the  sum  of  the  detailed  figures  of  the  districts. 
Many  of  these  would  doubtless  be  willing  to  emigrate  into 
the  new  Serb  territory  to  take  the  place  of  Roumanians 
equally  desirous  of  emigrating.  Any  such  movement  should 
be  encouraged  but  not  in  any  way  forced,  for  the  employ- 
ment of  pressure  would  create  a  grievance  which  would 
react  on  the  political  relations  of  two  States  whose  interests 
are  identical  and  will  remain  so  and  whose  people  are 
mutually  sympathetic.  The  same  remarks  apply  to  the 
Magyars  also,  many  of  whom  would  be  likely  to  refuse  to 
pass  under  the  government  of  the  despised  "nationalities". 
The  case  of  the  Germans  is  considered  in  Chapter  IX. 

If  the  boundary  here  suggested  be  compared  with  that 
proposed  by  Dr.  Seton-Watson  in  his  book  already  cited 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  chief  difference  is  to  be  found  in 
the  exclusion  of  Zsombolya  from  the  Serb  area.  The 
line  here  given,  roughly  speaking,  leaves  Dr.  Seton- 
Watson' s  line  near  Velika  Kikinda  and  rejoins  it  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Vr§ac.  Though  it  gives  to  the  Serbs 
slightly  less  in  area  yet  it  has  the  advantage,  which  is 
very  considerable,  of  including  far  fewer  Germans  and 
Magyars  while  the  number  of  Serbs  it  excludes  is 
comparatively    small.      Discussing    the    question    of    the 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  193 

Banat,  a  well-known  Serb  geographer  and  publicist  traced 
roughly  for  me  on  a  map  a  line  with  which  he  said  he 
had  reason  to  believe  the  Roumanian  Government  would 
be  satisfied.  That  line — I  have  kept  the  map — corresponds 
generally  with  Dr.  Seton- Watson's  line,  though  drawn 
slightly  to  the  east  of  it.  I  gathered  that  the  Serbs  also 
would  not  be  dissatisfied  with  the  line  given  to  me,  and 
I  trust,  therefore,  that  the  trace  which  I  have  suggested 
would  meet  with  no  insuperable  objections  from  them 
while,  by  giving  a  slightly  increased  area  to  Roumania, 
it  might  be  acceptable  there  also. 

The  future  of  Macedonia  at  the  time  of  writing  is  still 
uncertain,  though  loyalty  to  an  ally  and  the  necessities 
of  plain  honesty  should  have  deprived  the  situation  in 
that  region  of  all  ambiguity  in  the  event  of  victory  for 
the  Allies.  I  assume  here  for  my  immediate  purpose  that 
King  Ferdinand  and  the  Bulgars  will  at  the  end  play  the 
Germans  false  as  they  have  previously  played  us  false : 
that  an  appeal  will  be  made  to  England,  whose  infatuation 
for  Bulgaria  has  already  cost  us  so  dear  in  the  Balkans  ; 
that  an  immediate  response  will  be  evoked,  and  that  at 
least  a  portion  of  Macedonia  will  be  demanded  for  our 
enemies  to  console  them  for  their  non-success  against  us. 
I  am  bound  also  to  assume  that  even  such  modified  treason 
to  our  ally  will  be  repudiated,  in  spite  of  powerful  pro- 
Bulgar  influences.^ 

Without  a  doubt  some  sort  of  union  will  eventually 
be  achieved  between  Montenegro  and  the  remainder  of 
Southern  Slavdom,  though  the  exact  nature  of  that  union 
and  even  the  hour  of  its  accomplishment  is  in  doubt,  and 
will  depend   in   part  on  how  far  the  Powers  show   them- 

'  A  discussion  of  the  Macedonian  problem  and  of  the  nature  of 
the  settlement  which  should  be  made  with  Bulgaria  will  be  found 
in  the  two  following  chapters.  The  district  of  Strumica  should  be 
included  in  Serbia  which,  in  view  of  Greece's  attitude,  should  receive 
also  the  Fiorina  district  which  has  a  Slav  population.  The  latter 
cession  would  give  her  a  mountain  frontier  instead  of  an  arbitrary 
line  across  the  Pelagonian  plain.  The  chain  runs  south  from 
Kajmakcalan  west  of  Lake  Ostrovo, 

13 


194  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

selves  capable  of  taking  long  national  views  to  the 
exclusion  of  immediate  dynastic  and  diplomatic  matters. 
Just  before  the  outbreak  of  war  negotiations  were  in 
progress  with  a  good  hope  of  success  for  a  union  between 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  in  matters  of  common  concern. 
The  proposal  was  for  a  single  army,  a  single  Foreign 
Office,  and  a  customs  union.  In  former  years  King 
Nicholas  was  an  ardent  advocate  of  Serb  union,  and  even 
wrote  that  he  would  be  content  to  be  the  sentinel  before 
the  King  of  Serbia's  tent,  and  it  has  been  asserted  that 
in  the  days  of  Prince  Michael  of  Serbia  there  was  an 
actual  agreement  that  in  the  event  of  the  two  States 
becoming  coterminous  there  should  be  a  sort  of  federal 
union  between  them,  Montenegro  becoming  a  principality 
within  the  Kingdom.  How  far  there  has  been  an  alteration 
in  the  old  King's  personal  sentiments  it  is  difficult  to 
know,  but  the  brilliant  marriages  of  his  daughters  and 
the  union  of  the  Crown  Prince  to  a  German  princess 
have  greatly  increased  the  dynastic  feeling  of  the  family 
and  exalted  its  notions  of  its  courtly  position — from  being 
the  household  of  a  tribal  chief  it  has  become  a  recognized 
Eoyal  family.  It  was  asserted — though  I  do  not  know 
with  what  truth — that  King  Nicholas  himself  was  averse 
to  taking  the  title  of  King,  and  that  it  was  urged  upon  him 
by  his  family,  and  even  more  significantly  by  the  Austrian 
Emperor,  who  wished  thus  to  effect  a  breach  between 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  since  it  would  be  more  difficult 
for  a  King  to  concede  what  would  be  comparatively  easy 
for  a  Prince.  A  great  deal  of  mystery  surrounds  the 
alleged  surrender  of  the  Montenegrin  government  to 
Austria  at  the  time  of  the  loss  of  Lov5en.  It  seems 
perhaps  not  improbable,  though  the  suggestion  is  offered 
with  diffidence,  that  the  court  camarilla  which,  as  has 
been  said,  paid  of  recent  years  greater  heed  to  dynastic 
than  Southern  Slav  national  considerations,  and  which  is 
stated  to  be  headed  by  the  Princess  Vera,  did  induce  the 
King  to  offer  a  surrender,  but  that  the  latter  was  met  with 
a  refusal  by  the  army  (it  is  important  to  remember  that, 


PROPOSED  FRONTIERS  195 

as  I  was  pointedly  informed,  the  Montenegrin  General 
Staff  was  composed  of  Serb  officers)  and  that  the  King 
thereupon  reversed  his  decision.  The  position  of  the 
dynasty  was  weakened  by  the  events  of  the  Balkan  wars. 
The  Montenegrins  were  dissatisfied  with  the  conduct  of 
the  princes  who  do  not  seem  to  have  shared  the  hardships 
of  the  soldiers,  while  the  latter  contrasted  the  results 
achieved  with  those  obtained  by  the  Serbs.  When  in  the 
second  Balkan  war  Montenegrins  and  Serbs  fought  side 
hj  side  the  contrast  in  resources  was  further  brought  home 
to  the  former  who  saw  that  Montenegro  was  too  small 
and  too  poor  even  to  organize  efficiently  the  resources  they 
possessed.  There  was  consequently  a  general  feeling  both 
among  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  that,  while  no  great 
change  might  take  place  in  the  lifetime  of  old  King 
Nicholas  who  has  played  a  great  and  noble  part  for  his 
country,  after  his  decease  there  should  be  a  union  of  the 
two  States  the  Montenegrin  princes  receiving  appanages 
from  the  civil  list.  During  the  lifetime  of  King  Nicholas 
there  should  be  at  any  rate  a  federal  union  which  would 
have  the  incidental  advantage  of  placing  beyond  doubt 
the  consummation  of  complete  union  in  the  future  and 
of  eliminating  the  danger  of  any  intrigue  directed  against 
that  consummation. 

During  the  war  rumour  has  been  busy  with  the  subject 
of  Montenegro  and  its  ruling  House,  and  with  intrigues 
real  or  alleged  in  which  the  little  country  has  figured, 
and  there  can  be  little  doubt  apart  from  details  that  there 
has  been  substantial  basis  for  some  at  least  of  these 
rumours.  In  the  spring  of  1915  I  was  told  the  story  of 
an  intrigue  which  has  not  hitherto  been  published  whose 
authenticity  was  accepted  in  Southern  Slav  circles.  It 
is  asserted  that  at  that  time — April-May  1915 — a  certain 
Power  had  urged  Montenegro  to  stipulate  from  the  Entente 
for  the  cession  to  her  of  all  the  Hercegovina  to  the  south 
of  the  Narenta,  an  area  which  would  include  Dubrovnik 
(Eagusa).  The  result  would  be  twofold.  In  the  first 
place,  such  a   cession  would   reduce  the  future   outlet   of 


196  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Serbia  proper  on  the  Adriatic  to  the  very  narrowest 
proportions.  The  second  result  would  be  to  make  less 
likely  the  union  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  The  acquisi- 
tion of  such  an  area  including  Dubrovnik  would  further 
exalt  the  dynastic  pride  of  the  ruling  House,  while  the 
Montenegrin  people  also,  in  view  of  the  increase  of  its 
resources,  might  change  its  opinion  that  the  country  was 
too  small  and  too  poor  to  stand  alone  and  should  join  its 
larger  neighbour.  The  comment  on  this  subtle  idea  made 
to  me  by  a  Southern  Slav  was  emphatic:  "We  wish  no 
harm  to  old  King  Nicholas  who  used  to  be  a  great  patriot, 

but  if  he  intrigues  with  against  Southern  Slav  unity 

he  will  have  to  go." 

No  one  can  feel  anything  but  compassion  for  the  old 
chieftain  of  the  Black  Mountain  forced  in  these  dark  days 
to  leave  his  home  and  the  little  country  which  he  has  so 
dearly  loved,  and  every  one  must  hope  that  his  life  may 
be  spared  to  see  the  dawn  of  a  happier  day  not  only  for 
Montenegro  but  for  all  that  Southern  Slav  race  whose 
union  inspired  all  his  policy  in  former  years  and  formed 
the  theme  of  his  play  Carica  Ballianska  (the  Empress  of 
the  Balkans).  There  can,  however,  be  not  the  slightest 
doubt  as  to  what  should  be  the  future  of  his  country. 
Whatever  provisional  arrangements  may  be  made  for  the 
lifetime  of  King  Nicholas,  Montenegro  after  his  death 
should  be  completely  fused  with  Serbia.  His  family  does 
not  command  the  respect  and  allegiance  which  belong  to 
the  old  King,  and  its  attitude  of  recent  years  has  made  it 
suspect  of  being  lukewarm  in  the  cause  of  national  unity 
— that  unity  which  more  than  ever,  as  stern  events  point 
to  its  absolute  necessity  if  the  race  is  to  have  a  future,  is 
the  goal  for  which  every  Southern  Slav  passionately  strives, 
treachery  to  which  is  the  one  sin  that  has  no  forgiveness. 
That  union  is  equally  in  the  interest  of  the  Montenegrins ; 
their  country  is  small  and  it  is  poor,  even  the  great  forests 
of  the  Brda  cannot  be  exploited  by  its  own  resources, 
and  fusion  with  the  rest  of  the  race  would  enable  it  to 
enter  into  a  larger  life,  would  dispense  with  the  expense 


PROPOSED   FRONTIERS  197 

of  a  separate  administration,  and  would  enable  it  to  share 
in  the  resources  of  the  whole  country,  and  to  obtain 
subventions  for  educational  and  other  purposes  which  it 
cannot  supply  itself.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  such  a  con- 
summation will  not  be  hindered  by  the  dynastic  ties  which 
unite  other  ruling  families  to  the  House  of  Petrovic.  The 
position  of  the  latter  would  be  no  worse  than  that  of 
many  German  and  Italian  Houses  which  had  to  yield  place 
in  the  cause  of  national  unity,  and  the  statesmen  of  the 
Allies  should  see  the  matter  from  the  broad  view  of  inter- 
national policy  and  the  national  desires  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  rather  than  from  that  of  the  editor  of  the  Almanach 
de  Gotha,  or  of  those  who  forget  that  if  there  is  a  King 
of  Italy  it  is  because  one  king  and  several  lesser  potentates, 
not  to  mention  the  Pope,  have  had  to  make  way  for  him. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  the  not  too  popular  heir- 
apparent  is  married  to  a  German  princess  and  has  no 
children,  and  that  the  next  heir  is  Prince  Mirko,  whose 
role  in  recent  events  has  been  more  than  equivocal.  He 
remained  behind  in  the  country  after  the  great  retreat,  and 
is  now  in  Austria,  where  rumour  has  been  busy  with  his 
name  as  a  possible  "  tame "  sub-king  of  an  Austrian 
Jugoslavia.  There  can  be  but  little  doubt  of  the  fusion  of 
Montenegro  with  the  rest  of  the  Southern  Slavs  whatever 
arrangements  may  be  made  at  the  peace.  If  they  are  for 
a  time  separated  it  will  only  mean  a  revolution  the  more, 
similar  to  that  which  chased  from  their  thrones  the  King 
of  Naples  and  the  Dukes  of  Tuscany,  Parma,  etc.,  and 
with  a  similar  result,  for  no  Holy  Alliance  is  likely  to 
attempt  to  stay  the  progress  of  events  and  there  are  limits 
to  the  extent  to  which  any  single  State  can  flout  public 
opinion.  Political  wisdom,  however,  endeavours  to  obviate 
the  necessity  for  revolutions. 

There  are  two  or  three  shght  rectifications  which  should 
be  effected  in  the  Serbo-Albanian  frontier,  though  the 
amount  of  territory  affected  is  small.  The  first  of  these 
is  that  the  hne  of  the  Bojana  should  be  secured,  the 
present  frontier  leaving   the  river  just   below   Gorica  and 


198  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

passing  north-west  to  the  lake  of  Skodra.  A  small  river 
is  not  usually  a  good  frontier  except  on  the  map,  but  in 
this  case  the  character  of  the  two  banks  is  different  and 
the  line  of  the  Bojana  is  in  reality  the  line  of  the  hills 
which  come  down  to  its  western  bank.  In  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Gusinje  the  present  frontier  cuts  across  the  upper 
valley  of  the  Lim  part  of  the  valley — both  sides — being 
Montenegrin  and  part  Albanian.  The  difficulty  here  is 
that  the  upper  part  of  the  valley  is  inhabited  by  an 
offshoot  of  the  Klementi  tribe  from  over  the  mountains, 
but  at  any  rate  the  boundary  could  be  so  modified  as  to 
include  in  Montenegrin  territory  the  headwaters  of  the 
affluent  which  joins  the  Lim  at  Andrijevica,  which  would 
give  a  continuous  mountain  frontier  in  this  neighbourhood. 
The  new  boundary  would  follow  the  hills  which  divide  the 
headwaters  of  the  Andrijevica  tributary  from  those  of  the 
Lim.  The  total  area  involved  would  not  be  more  than 
some  fifty  square  miles,  but  the  result  would  be  a  natural 
frontier.  A  more  important  rectification  is  necessary 
between  Djakovica  and  Prizren.  The  present  frontier 
leaves  the  mountains  to  the  south  of  Djakovica  and  strikes 
north-east  to  the  junction  of  the  Erenik  with  the  White 
Drin  and  then  follows  the  course  of  the  latter  to  the 
west  of  Prizren.  As  a  consequence,  in  this  portion  of  its 
course  the  valley  of  the  river  is  divided  between  Serbia 
and  Albania.  As  has  just  been  remarked,  a  small  river 
is  not  a  good  frontier,  for  the  reason  that  the  social  and 
economic  life  of  its  banks  is  the  same.  Moreover,  in  this 
case  the  strip  of  Albanian  land  is  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
Albania  by  the  mountains  which  bound  the  western  side 
of  the  valley.  A  modification  of  the  frontier  would  be 
expedient  by  which  the  new  line  should  follow  the 
mountains  just  mentioned  to  the  narrow  gorges  west  of 
Prizren  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Vranica  where  it  would 
cross  the  river  where  the  valley  is  confined  and  thence 
rejoin  the  present  frontier  to  the  south  of  Prizren.  Here 
also  the  result  would  be  a  practically  continuous  mountain 
frontier.     To    the    south    of    Prizren    at    the    point    last 


PROPOSED   FRONTIERS  199 

mentioned,  the  present  frontier  makes  a  loop  eastward 
of  almost  three-quarters  of  a  circle  pointing  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Tetovo,  and  abandoning  the  main  line  of  the 
southern  extension  of  the  Sar  Mountains.  The  new  line 
should  follow  the  main  chain  and  thus  cut  the  neck  of 
the  loop,  giving  once  more  a  natural  frontier.  The  sum 
total  of  these  last  two  losses  to  Albania  would  not  be 
above  some  three  or  four  hundred  square  miles  at  the 
outside.  In  the  event  of  Albania  being  re-established  in 
a  real  independence,  i.e.  without  any  right  of  occupation, 
administration,  protectorate,  or  tutelage  being  granted  to 
any  single  Power,  she  could  be  amply  compensated  by  the 
valley  of  the  Eadika,  at  present  Serb,  and  even  by  the 
town  of  Debar  itself,  which  would  be  worth  much  more  to 
her  than  the  areas  relinquished  to  Serbia.  In  the  event  of 
any  other  future  being  marked  out  for  Albania,  then  an 
entirely  new  set  of  circumstances  would  arise  which  it 
would  be  useless  to  discuss  here.  The  failure  of  the  late 
experiment  in  Albania  lay  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
it  was  conceived,  the  agents  by  whom  it  was  worked,  and 
the  jealousies  which  strove  to  wreck  it.  This  virile  people 
should  not  be  despaired  of.  Progress  will  be  slow — the 
Highlands  were  not  tamed  in  a  day — but  there  seems  no 
reason  why  a  really  honest  attempt,  made  without  arrUre 
pensSe,  to  found  an  independent  Albania  should  not  succeed. 
If  an  administrator  of  the  calibre  of,  e.g.,  Lord  Milner  ^ 
were  to  be  sent  out  for  ten  years,  the  way  would  then 
be  clear  for  a  princely  government.  A  "  Constitution " 
would  of  course  be  the  last  work,  not  the  first. 

'  Written  before  party  politicians  had  re-discovered  him.    Presumably 
we  shall  henceforth  use  his  talents  for  ourselves. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MACEDONIA:  THE  SERBO-BULGARIAN  TREATY 

OF   1912 


It  is  necessary  that  some  reference  should  be  made  in 
a  book  deahng  with  the  future  of  the  Southern  Slavs 
to  the  Macedonian  question,  however  great  may  be  the 
impatience  of  many  Englishmen  at  the  mention  of  that, 
to  them,  wearisome  topic.  It  might  have  been  thought 
that  the  question  of  the  future  of  Macedonia  has  been 
settled  by  the  course  of  events :  Serbia  has  been  our  faithful 
ally,  which  has  repulsed  all  overtures  for  the  negotiation  of 
a  separate  peace  when  such  were  made  to  her,  while  Bul- 
garia has  been  to  us  as  well  as  to  Serbia  a  treacherous 
enemy,  so  that  to  those  unacquainted  with  the  methods  of 
modern  British  diplomacy  it  might  seem  that  no  other 
course  could,  or  would  be,  followed  save  that  of  restoring 
the  province  to  our  ally  in  the  event  of  victory.  The  facts, 
however,  are  otherwise,  and  consequently  the  main  outlines 
of  the  problem  must  be  restated  in  the  barest  possible  form. 
There  are  one  or  two  common  misconceptions,  widely  held 
in  England  and  fostered  by  the  ever-active  Bulgarian  pro- 
pagandists, which  require  at  any  rate  passing  notice. 
Reference  has  been  made  more  than  once  to  the  frequency 
with  which  historical  claims  dating  from  the  Middle  Ages 
are  advanced  to  various  Near  Eastern  lands  and  provinces, 
and  Macedonia  in  particular  has  been  the  object  of  such 
claims  based  upon  the  conquests  made  by  the  contending 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY   OF   1912  201 

parties  in  medieval  times.  Professor  Cvijic,  the  Eector  of 
the  University  of  Belgrade,  has  pointed  out  in  his  mono- 
graph on  the  Nationality  of  the  Macedonian  Slavs  that 
if  historical  arguments  were  to  have  full  sway,  the  entire 
map  of  Europe  would  have  to  be  recast  with  most  unsatis- 
factory results,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  these 
"historical"  claims  are  frequently  in  plainest  contradiction 
to  arguments,  such  as  the  ethnological,  to  which  much 
greater  deference  should  be  paid.  The  fact,  however,  that 
these  arguments  are  frequently  advanced  and  have  had 
undoubtedly  so  large  an  influence  entails  a  brief  glance  at 
the  history  of  Macedonia  subsequent  to  the  irruption  of 
the  Slavs. 

A  very  common  misconception  in  England  is  that  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  Middle  Ages  Macedonia  was  almost 
continuously  a  Bulgarian  province,  which  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Serbs  for  a  short  time  during  the  reign  of 
Stephen  Dugan,^  before  passing  under  the  rule  of  the  Turks. 
This  is  an  entire  mistake  as  will  be  seen,  however  little 
bearing  the  historical  question  has  upon  the  racial  character 
of  the  inhabitants  or  their  political  desires,  if  they  possess 
any  desires  beyond  the  wish  to  be  allowed  to  cultivate  their 
lands  in  peace  and  quietness.  Unimportant  in  itself,  a 
sketch  of  Macedonian  history  becomes  necessary  when  the 
alleged  facts  of  this  history  are  seriously  advanced  as  a 
contribution  to  the  present  political  solution  of  the  problem 
of  Macedonia's  destinies.  Another  common  misconception 
is  a  confusion  between  the  great  importance  of  the  Archi- 
episcopal  see  of  Ochrida,  whose  occupant  bore  the  title 
of  Primate  of  Justiniana  Prima  and  Bulgaria,  in  the  ecclesi- 
astical history  of  the  Orthodox  Church  and  its  ephemeral 
importance  as  the  capital  for  a  few  years  of  a  Bulgarian 
Empire.  The  two  things  have  been  consistently  confounded 
by  those  whose  object  was  to  make  pohtical  profit  out  of 
the  confusion.  With  this  latter  [matter  it  is  not  my 
intention  to  deal,  as  the  facts  can  be  found  elsewhere  in 

'  See  for  example  an  article  on  The  Macedonian  Problem,  by  Mr. 
Ledward  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  August  1915. 


202  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

greater  detail  than  is  warranted  by  the  purpose  of  this 
volume. I 

The  "first  Bulgarian  Empire"  was  founded  by  Simeon, 
893-927,  who  proclaimed  himself  Tsar,  and  held  Macedonia, 
Albania,  and  part  of  Serbia,  including  Ni§  and  Belgrade. 
Subsequently  the  empire  split  into  two  portions,  of  which 
the  eastern  fell  before  the  Greek  Emperor  Zimisces,  in  972. 
The  western  empire  was  founded  in  963  by  Sisman  of 
Trnovo,  who  held  Macedonia  and  Albania.  His  son,  Stephen 
Samuel  also  held  Macedonia,  Albania,  Ni§,  and  Belgrade. 
His  troops  suffered  a  disastrous  defeat  at  BelaSica  at  the 
hands  of  Basil  II,  the  "  Bulgar  Slayer,"  in  1014,  which 
he  did  not  long  survive.  A  short  period  of  anarchy  and 
internecine  strife  was  followed  by  the  extinction  of  the 
Western  Bulgarian  Empire  in  1018,  and  the  whole  territory, 
though  the  ecclesiastical  organization  survived,  was  incor- 
porated into  the  Eastern  Empire  and  parcelled  out  into 
governorships.  It  so  remained  for  a  period  of  160  years, 
from  1018  to  II86.2 

In  1186  a  revival  of  Bulgarian  power  took  place  under 
John  Asen,  who,  it  is  to  be  noted,  was  a  Vlach  and  whose 
dominion  is  frequently  described  as  Vlacho-Bulgarian.  John 
Asen  II  prided  himself  in  a  document  addressed  to  the  Pope 
on  being  a  Roman.  This  revival  had  its  origin  in  northern 
Bulgaria,  Macedonia  at  the  time  being  under  an  independent 
ruler  named  Strez,  variously  described  as  a  Serb  and  a 
Bulgar.  Tsar  Kalojan,  son  of  Asen,  1197-1207,  took  posses- 
sion of  northern  Macedonia,  and  the  revived  empire  had  its 
greatest  extension  under  John  Asen  II,  1218-1241,  whose 
dominions  touched  the  Black  Sea,  the  ^gean,  and  the 
Adriatic,  including  Albania  up  to  Durazzo.     Macedonia  and 

'  Vide  a  sketch  of  Macedonian  history  by  Professor  P.  Popovic  in  the 
Near  East  for  September  10,  1915,  which  has  since  been  repubhshed  as 
a  pamphlet,  for  some  interesting  information  on  the  subject  on  the  see 
of  Ochrida. 

*  It  is  maintained  by  Professor  Popovid,  ut  supra,  that  the  "  Western 
Bulgarian  Empire"  should  be  regarded  as  a  separate  "Macedonian" 
State  of  non-Bulgarian  character.  He  cites  Jirecek,  Geschichte  der 
Serben,  as  now  adhering  to  this  view. 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY  OF   1912  203 

Thrace  were  lost  by  Koloman,  son  of  John  Asen  II,  the 
date  of  the  loss  being  given  as  1254-1257,  during  the  last 
years  of  his  reign, ^  while  Constantino  Asen,  or  Tic,  a  Serb 
by  race,  1258-1277,  was  the  last  Tsar  who  occupied  upper 
Macedonia,  and  then  only  for  a  short  time.*  The  second 
period  of  Bulgarian  possession,  then,  lasted  only  some  fifty 
years,  on  the  most  generous  estimate,  if  we  compute  the 
time  from  the  occupation  of  upper  Macedonia  by  Kalojan. 
The  Greeks  had  immediately  to  defend  it  against  the 
Serbs,  who,  under  Stephen  Milutin,  1281-1321,  penetrated 
to  the  Struma  and  the  Lakes,  and  maintained  his  hold  on 
northern  Macedonia.  Under  his  grandson,  Stephen  DuSan, 
all  Macedonia  and  much  else  fell  to  the  Serbs  as  a  capture, 
not  from  the  Bulgars  but  from  the  Greeks.  On  his  death 
in  1356  Macedonia  fell  to  one  of  his  nobles  Vukasin,  and 
subsequently  became  the  principality  of  the  famous  Marko 
Kraljevic.  It  continued  under  Serb  rulers  till  the  Turkish 
definite  conquest  in  1396,  having  acknowledged  Ottoman 
suzerainty  since  the  battle  of  the  Marica  in  1371. 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  there  was  nothing  like  a  con- 
tinuous Bulgarian  occupation  in  the  Middle  Ages.  On 
the  contrary,  after  the  fall  of  the  first  Bulgarian  Empire, 
which  had  held  Macedonia  for  160  years,  including  the 
duration  of  the  "  Western  Bulgarian  Empire,"  during 
the  370  years  from  1088-1396  the  Bulgars  only  held  the 
province  for  some  fifty  years,  the  Serbs  holding  it  in 
sovereignty  or  under  suzerainty  for  about  a  century  at  the 
close  of  the  period,  and  the  Greeks  for  periods  of  some 
160  years  and  fifty  years.  Another  point  which  becomes 
evident  is  that  no  revival  of  Bulgarian  power  had  its 
origin  in  Macedonia,  in  spite  of  the  difficult  nature  of  the 
country;  the  province  fell  to  Bulgaria  as  a  result  of  later 
conquest,  and  at  times  had  its  own  princes  of  Bulgar  or 
Serb  race.     I  lay  no  great  stress  on  this  confused  medieval 

'  at.  Lavisse  and  Eambaud,  Histoire  Generate,  Tome  iii,  p.  909. 
Professor  Popovic  gives  the  date  of  acquisition  as  1230  (this  would  refer 
to  all  Macedonia),  and  of  its  loss  as  1246. 

*  at.  William  Miller,  Travel  and  Politics  in  tlie  Near  East,  p.  874. 


204  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

history,  but  if  it  be  cited  it  should  be  cited  correctly,  which 
is  rarely  the  case  with  the  Bulgar  propagandists,  native 
or  foreign.  Historically  the  Serbs  have  a  good  claim,  and 
M.  Vesnic,  the  Minister  of  Serbia  in  Paris,  has  told  me 
that  such  public  works  as  remain  from  the  medieval 
period  date  from  the  years  of  Serb  supremacy.  In  our 
own  days  Serb  influence  was  paramount  during  the 
nineteenth  century  till  1878,  when  it  waned  as  the  result 
of  various  causes — the  abortive  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  the 
operations  of  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  Turkish  fear  of 
Serb  nationalism  which  led  to  the  suppression  of  the 
Serb  schools,  and  the  operations  of  the  "Macedonian  Com- 
mittee "  which  seems  to  have  killed  considerably  more 
Macedonians  than  Turks. 

As  for  the  ethnology  of  the  Macedonian  Slavs  the  best 
opinion  is  that  it  is  not  unlike  what  we  might  expect  from 
this  previous  history.  The  original  Slavs  must  have  been 
of  the  same  general  stock  as  their  Serb  neighbours  and  the 
original  Slav  inhabitants  of  Bulgaria,  and  that  original 
stock  has  at  different  times  received  an  infiltration  of 
Bulgarians.  East  of  the  middle  Vardar  valley  they  may 
be  described  as  Bulgarians,  and  north  of  the  line  Stip- 
Gostivar  as  Serbs,  the  remainder  living  in  the  Slav  portions 
of  the  former  vilayet  of  Monastir  are  neither  pure  Serb 
nor  pure  Bulgar.  I  may  cite  two  English  authorities, 
the  quotations  forming  part  of  the  discussion  of  the 
subject  by  the  authors  cited.     Sir  Charles  Eliot  says  : — 

The  result  of  this  investigation,  then,  is  that  it  is  not  easy  to  dis- 
tinguish Servians  and  Bulgarians  beyond  the  boundaries  of  their 
respective  countries.  We  have  in  reality  three  categories  :  pure  Slavs, 
Slavised  Bulgarians  (the  original  un-Slavised  Bulgarians  having  long 
ago  disappeared),  and  pure  Slavs  who  have  been  influenced  by  Slavised 
Bulgarians.  ...  Of  the  remaining  Slavs  [i.e.  between  the  Struma  and 
the  Sar  Mountains]  an  impartial  observer  can  only  say  that  they  are 
intermediate  between  the  Serbs  and  Bulgarians;  but  I  think  that 
traces  of  Mongolian — that  is,  Bulgarian — physiognomy  can  be  seen  as 
far  west  as  Ochrida.  The  practical  conclusion  is  that  neither  Greeks, 
Servians,  nor  Bulgarians  have  a  right  to  claim  central  Macedonia.' 


Sir  Charles  Eliot,  Turkey  in  Europe,  pp.  337,  338. 


MACEDONIA:   TREATY   OF   1912  205 

Mr.  Brailsford,  whose  Bulgarophil  sentiments  arc  well 
known,  writes  : — 

Are  the  Macedonians  Serbs  or  Bulgars  ?  .  .  .  The  lesson  of  history 
obviously  is  that  there  is  no  answer  at  all.  They  are  not  Serbs  for  their 
blood  can  hardly  be  pure  Slavonic.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  they  can 
hardly  be  Bulgarians,  for  quite  clearly  the  Servian  immigrations  and 
conquests  must  have  left  much  Servian  blood  in  their  veins  and  the 
admixture  of  non-Aryan  blood  can  scarcely  be  so  considerable  as  it  is 
in  Bulgaria.  They  are  probably  very  much  what  they  were  before 
either  a  Bulgarian  or  a  Servian  Empire  existed — a  Slav  people  derived 
from  rather  various  stocks  who  invaded  the  peninsula  at  different 
periods.  But  they  had  originally  no  clear  consciousness  of  race,  and  any 
strong  Slavonic  Power  was  able  to  impose  itself  upon  them.  One  may 
safely  say  that  for  historical  reasons  the  people  of  Kossovo  and  the 
North-West  are  definitely  Serb,  while  the  people  of  Ochrida  are  clearly 
Bulgarians.  The  affimties  of  the  rest  are  decided  on  purely  political 
grounds.  Language  teaches  us  very  little.  The  differences  between 
literary  Servian  and  Bulgarian  are  not  considerable  but  they  are  very 
definite.  The  Macedonian  dialect  is  neither  one  nor  the  other,  but  in 
certain  structural  features  it  agrees  rather  with  Bulgarian  than  with 
Servian.  This,  however,  means  little ;  for  modern  Servian  is  not  the 
language  of  Dushan,  but  the  dialect  of  Belgrade.  A  southern  Mace- 
donian finds  no  difficulty  in  making  himself  understood  in  Dushan' a 
country  (Uskub  and  Prizrend)  though  he  will  feel  a  foreigner  in 
Belgrade.  One  must  also  discount  the  effect  of  propaganda.  A  priest 
or  teacher  from  Sofia  or  Belgrade  who  settles  in  a  village,  will  modify 
its  dialect  considerably  in  the  course  of  a  generation.  .  .  .  The  Servians 
have  a  respectable  historical  and  ethnographical  claim  to  be  reckoned  a 
Macedonian  race.' 

It  is  true  that  he  claims  them  very  definitely  for  the 
Bulgarians  and  decisively  rejects  Serb  claims,  but  it  is 
on  grounds  of  political  affinity.  M.  Berard,  in  his  book  on 
Macedonia,  differs  with  regard  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Ochrida  region  :  "  Les  Slaves  des  Dibres  et  des  Lacs  se 
disaient  volontiers  Serbes."  Professor  Cvijic  is  also  of 
opinion  that  they  are  of  intermediate  type,  but  considers 
that  the  central  Macedonians  as  far  east  as  the  Vardar- 
Struma  waterparting  have  Serb  characteristics  in  their 
customs,  songs,  and  some  of  the  elements  of  the  language. 
It  is  curious  that  the  Bulgars  and  their  backers  insist  so 
'  H.  N.  Brailsford,  Macedonia,  pp.  101, 105. 


206  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

strongly  on  their  alleged  ethnographical  claims  to  Mace- 
donia while  claiming  in  Thrace  a  large  area  which  is 
Greco-Turkish  by  race,  as  well  as  Kavala,  etc.,  which  is 
undoubtedly  Greek.  The  geographical,  commercial,  and 
strategic  reasons  which  they  advance  in  these  latter  cases 
are  equally  operative  for  the  Serbs  in  Macedonia. 

Mr.  Brailsford  found  no  native  traditions  of  the  old 
Bulgarian  Empire,  such  traditions  as  the  people  possess 
being  rather  of  the  days  of  Serb  rule.  Bulgarians  them- 
selves have  admitted  it.  It  is  this  indeterminate  character 
of  the  population  that  has  so  embittered  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
struggle  for  Macedonia.  The  Macedonian  speaks  a  patois 
which  is  identical  with  the  literary  language  of  neither 
Serb  nor  Bulgar,  but  is  mutually  intelligible  with  both. 
When  he  is  educated  he  learns  either  the  one  or  the  other 
literary  language,  and  becomes,  as  the  case  may  be,  Serb 
or  Bulgar.  If  the  Bulgars  have  made  great  progress  in  the 
past,  that  is  due  largely  to  political  causes  and  the  methods 
of  the  Macedonian  Committee,  and  whichever  State  could 
hold  Macedonia  for  a  generation  would  succeed  in  convert- 
ing its  inhabitants  to  its  own  nationality.  Neither  side 
could  rest  secure  in  the  belief  that  eventually  the  people 
would  remain  in  its  fold  in  spite  of  a  passing  foreign 
domination.  It  is  a  testimony  to  the  correctness  of  this 
view  that  most  ethnologists  are  agreed  that  prior  to  1878 
the  population  of  the  country  between  Ni§  and  Sofia  was 
of  the  same  intermediate  character,  and  it  is  a  fact  that 
villages  on  what  is  now  the  Bulgarian  side  of  the  line 
asked  to  be  included  in  Serbia.  Yet  at  the  present  day 
the  political  boundary  has  become  a  genuinely  national 
one.  At  one  time,  if  the  Bulgars  claimed  Ni§,  the  Serbs 
claimed  Sofia.  All  this  explains,  if  it  does  not  excuse, 
the  bitter  struggles  for  the  Macedonian  heritage.  In 
reply  to  Bulgarian  efforts  the  Serbs  in  later  years  pushed 
a  vigorous  propaganda  in  Macedonia  not  only  in  ecclesias- 
tical matters,  which,  as  we  shall  see,  were  themselves 
political,  but  by  the  foundation  of  schools,  etc. 

A  note  must   be   made   of  the    great   influence   of   the 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY  OF  1912  207 

Exarchist  Church  in  promoting  Bulgarian  influence.  Up  to 
1870  the  Orthodox  inhabitants  of  European  Turkey  were 
forced  to  submit  to  the  ministrations  of  priests  who  were 
Greek  by  race,  and  a  general  confusion  was  made  between 
Greeks  (Hellenes)  and  "Greeks"  by  religion.  The  Slavs 
demanded  priests  of  their  own ;  the  Patriarch  refused  the 
request.  Then  in  1870  was  formed  the  Exarchist  Church 
by  an  act  of  formal,  though  not  material,  schism,  rendered 
necessary  by  that  refusal.  The  Serbs,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, took  an  active  part  at  Constantinople  in  forwarding 
the  movement  and  even  brought  diplomatic  pressure  to 
bear  at  the  Porte  in  its  favour.  The  original  sphere  of 
the  operations  of  this  body,  which,  it  must  be  remembered 
always,  differs  in  no  matter  of  doctrine,  ritual,  or  religious 
observance  from  the  Patriarchist  Church,  was  in  Bulgaria 
proper.  Its  operations  were  gradually  extended  to  Mace- 
donia, where  it  became  a  Bulgarizing  agency.  The  Serbs 
of  the  Principality  had  their  own  autocephalous  Church 
in  communion  with  the  Patriarch,  and  this  body  was 
unable  to  send  a  mission  into  Macedonia  without  com- 
mitting an  act  of  schism.  The  result  was  that  the 
Exarchist  Church  had  matters  all  its  own  way,  since  the 
only  method  by  which  the  Slavs  could  obtain  the  services 
of  a  Slav  clergy  was  by  adhesion  to  the  Exarchist  body. 
It  was  not  till  1897  that  the  Serbs  were  able  to  obtain 
the  appointment  of  one  of  their  own  race  as  Patriarchist 
Metropolitan  of  Skoplje,  and  only  in  1900  that  the  Serbs 
of  Turkey  were  recognized  as  a  separate  millet  or  politico- 
religious  community.  From  the  Serb  point  of  view, 
therefore,  action  against  the  Exarchist  clergy  is  purely 
political,  since  an  Exarchist  Church  in  Serb  territory  can 
have  only,  in  present  circumstances,  a  political  raison  d'etre ; 
namely,  to  teach  the  inhabitants  of  Macedonia  that  they 
are  Bulgars,  and  therefore,  if  they  want  a  Slav  clergy, 
should  have  Bulgar  and  not  Serb  priests. 

That  in  spite  of  its  terrorist  methods  the  Macedonian 
Committee  did  not  obtain  so  large  a  hold  over  the  Slav 
Macedonian   population  as  is  often   supposed  is  shown  by 


208  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  fiasco  of  the  much-advertised  "great  rising"  of  1903. 
During  that  rising,  according  to  Mr,  Brailsford,  no  more 
than  4,800  insurgents  were  under  arms,  a  number  which 
is  very  small  if  comparison  be  made  with  the  total  popula- 
tion of  the  districts  affected  and  in  great  contrast  to  the 
great  popular  insurrections  which  at  different  times  have 
had  their  origin  in  the  Balkans.  Even  when  allowance 
be  made  for  lack  of  arms  and  for  the  discouraging  effects 
of  previous  abortive  rebellions  the  number  seems  inadequate 
to  sustain  the  contention  that  it  was  a  genuine  popular 
revolt  of  the  central  Macedonian  people.  Moreover,  the 
very  methods  to  which  the  Bulgarian  Committee  had 
recourse,  the  frequent  assassinations,  the  raiding  of  villages 
for  supplies  not  willingly  afforded,  the  taking  of  hostages, 
the  terrorism  exercised  not  less  upon  the  villagers  than 
upon  the  Turkish  officials,  argue  an  inherent  v/eakness 
in  the  cause  it  sustained.  Not  thus  was  it  with  the  frequent 
Greek  and  Serb  insurrections  of  earlier  days,  when  supplies 
were  willingly  accorded  and  there  was  no  need  for  the 
insurgents  to  take  measures  against  those  upon  whose 
behalf  they  were  fighting,  since  these  latter  recognized 
their  mission  and  assisted  the  hajduks  or  klephts  to  the 
best  of  their  ability.  The  Committee  throughout  the 
history  of  its  operations  was  always  compelled  to  take 
the  severest  measures  against  the  peasantry,  not  only  Greek 
or  Vlach  but  also  Slav,  which  argues  that  at  least  a  large 
proportion  of  the  villagers  had  but  little  sympathy  with 
their  self-styled  champions ;  indeed  it  was  frequently  only 
by  force  that  villages  could  be  induced  to  enrol  themselves 
in  the  cause  of  the  Committee.  Everything  then  points 
to  the  same  conclusion  of  a  peasantry  Slav  by  race,  but 
in  the  mass  largely  untouched  by  nationalist  propaganda, 
probably  confining  their  conscious  desires  to  security  for 
life  and  freedom  from  extortion  and  excessive  taxation, 
and  capable  of  being  moulded  into  Serbs  or  Bulgars 
according  as  their  destinies  lead  them.  I  am  speaking 
of  the  people  of  central  Macedonia. 


MACEDONIA:   TREATY  OF   1912  209 

II 

Undoubtedly  the  Serb  cause  has  been  prejudiced  in 
England  by  the  view  taken  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  of  1912  which  preceded  the  first 
Balkan  war.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  Serbs  by  agreeing 
to  the  territorial  delimitation  contained  in  that  Treaty 
acknowledged  the  ethnographical  rights  of  Bulgaria  over 
the  region  assigned  to  her,  and  were  therefore  morally 
debarred  from  demanding  any  revision  in  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  so  far  as  the  territorial  arrangements  contained  in 
it  were  concerned,  and  could  not  put  forward  any  claim 
to  central  Macedonia  without  thereby  disavowing  those 
rights  of  nationality  upon  which  is  based  the  whole 
Southern  Slav  case.  It  is  contended  further  that  in 
consequence  of  the  foregoing  arguments  Serb  rights  in 
central  Macedonia  are  based  purely  upon  the  successful 
issue  of  the  second  Balkan  war,  i.e.  upon  force,  and  that 
in  any  general  Balkan  settlement  a  return  must  be  made 
to  the  provisions  of  the  1912  Treaty  as  representing  the 
considered  moral  judgment  of  the  two  States  themselves 
upon  the  question  at  issue.  It  is  urged  even  further  that 
in  pursuit  of  the  aim  of  a  Balkan  accord  in  spite  of 
Bulgaria's  treacherous  stab  in  the  back  these  views  must 
find  concrete  expression  in  the  proposals  of  the  Allies 
notwithstanding  Serbia's  position  as  an  ally  and  Bulgaria's 
hostility,  and  although  these  same  Allies  have  already 
signed  away  large  areas  of  territory  which  are  as  indis- 
putable in  their  Southern  Slav  character  as  the  nationality 
of  the  central  Macedonians  is  disputable. 

There  are  here  evidently  two  main  points.  The  first 
is  matter  of  fact  and  historical  argument,  the  second, 
partly  dependent  upon  the  first,  is  largely  matter  of  policy 
and  honest  dealing  with  an  ally.  The  first  is  concerned 
with  the  genesis,  the  aims,  the  underlying  causes,  and 
the  rupture  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty  of  1912,  and  the 
second  with  the  policy  which  ought,  in  view  of  all  that 
has  happened,  to  be  pursued  by  the  Allies  in  the  Balkan 

14 


210    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

settlement.  In  this  section  I  will  endeavour  to  set  forth 
the  truth  about  the  1912  Treaty. 

A  commonly  received  view  is  that  the  first  real,  as 
apart  from  formal,  breach  of  the  Treaty  was  made  when 
Serbia  demanded  a  redistribution  of  the  spheres  allotted 
to  the  two  States  by  the  set  terms  of  the  Treaty,  and 
this  view  necessitates  the  consideration  of  the  motives 
that  underlay  that  distribution.  The  Bulgarians,  as  we 
have  seen,  have  long  laid  claim  to  practically  the  whole 
of  Macedonia  and  of  what  the  Serbs  call  Skoplian  Old 
Serbia,  i.e.  the  districts  of  Skoplje,  Kumanovo,  etc.  The 
general  history  of  those  claims  has  already  been  reviewed. 
In  these  pretensions  of  the  Bulgars  the  Serbs  never  ac- 
quiesced, even  though  prior  to  1878  they  concerned 
themselves  more  immediately  with  their  prospects  in 
Bosnia  and  the  Hercegovina.  They  claimed  that  the 
inhabitants  of  central  and  southern  Macedonia  were  at 
least  as  much  Serb  as  Bulgar,  and  that  their  own  historic 
claims  were  as  good  as  those  of  their  rivals.  Unless  it 
is  recognized  that  the  Serbs  never  acknowledged  Bulgarian 
claims  to  Macedonia  on  ethnological  grounds,  we  shall 
fail  to  understand  the  reasons  which  led  them  at  a  later 
date  to  reassert  their  own  claims  by  the  demand  for  a 
revision  of  the  1912  Treaty. 

The  main  object  of  Serbia  in  concluding  the  Treaty  was 
to  secure  an  outlet  to  the  Adriatic  under  her  own  control- 
It  is  unnecessary  to  deal  with  the  conditions,  economic 
and  political,  which  pressed  heavily  on  the  State  and 
made  this  desire  imperative,  as  they  are  sufficiently  well 
known.  Under  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  Bulgaria  was  to 
furnish  100,000  men  for  operations  in  Macedonia  and 
200,000  against  Austria  if  Serbia  were  to  be  attacked 
by  that  Power.  There  was  also  a  territorial  delimita- 
tion of  the  future  acquisitions  to  be  made  in  Macedonia, 
assigning  by  far  the  greater  part  of  Macedonia  to 
Bulgaria. 

The  reason  why  Serbia  made  these  large  concessions 
was,  as  has  been  said  above,  the  need  of  a  port  on  the 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY   OF   1912  211 

Adriatic,  for  the  possession  of  which  she  was  wiHing  to 
pay  a  high  price ;  and  this  was  perfectly  understood  by 
the  Bulgarian  statesmen  with  whom  the  Treaty  was  con- 
cluded. The  Macedonian  concessions  to  Bulgaria  were 
made  to  her  in  return  for  her  support  in  the  matter  of 
an  Adriatic  outlet,  which  for  Serbia  was  the  governing 
motive  throughout  for  entering  upon  the  Treaty  at  all. 
"  Why,  under  these  circumstances  ",  I  asked  a  well-known 
Serb  in  a  position  to  know  the  facts,  "  was  not  the  question 
of  a  port  definitely  included  in  the  terms  of  the  Treaty? 
Your  attitude  then  could  not  have  been  liable  to  misrepre- 
sentation". "We  made  a  mistake  in  not  doing  so",  was 
the  reply,  **  a  great  mistake  which  we  bitterly  regret. 
But  we  did  not  want  to  alarm  Europe ".  Forced  by  the 
jealousies  of  the  Powers  to  conceal  their  plans  under 
the  usual  guise  of  a  demand  for  Macedonian  reform,  the 
Balkan  States  desired  no  disclosure  of  the  fact  that  in 
reality  they  intended  a  root-and-branch  settlement  of  the 
Balkan  question.  "  The  extent  of  the  concessions  ",  it  was 
added,  "  was  due  to  the  fact  that  we,  like  the  Bulgarians, 
did  not  think  that  we  were  so  strong  as  we  were  ".  When, 
therefore,  at  a  later  date  the  Bulgarians  argued  that  there 
was  no  mention  of  Albania,  i.e.  of  the  Adriatic  outlet,  in 
the  Treaty,  they  were  literally  accurate,  but  at  the  same 
time  they  knew  that,  though  not  mentioned  in  terms, 
the  matter  was  fundamental — was,  in  fact,  virtually  a 
suppressed  clause. 

It  is  this  that  gives  real  importance  to  a  visit  paid  in 
November  1912  to  Budapest  by  M.  Danev,  an  ex-Premier 
and  at  the  time  President  of  the  Bulgarian  Sobranje.  He 
went  avowedly  as  the  representative  of  his  Government. 
On  November  10  he  was  received  by  Count  Berchtold 
(the  Delegations  were  sitting  at  Budapest  at  the  time), 
and  in  Hungarian  official  quarters  he  is  stated  to  have 
intimated  that  Bulgaria  was  not  bound  unconditionally  to 
support  Serb  claims  in  controverted  territorial  questions. 
Yet  on  the  day  following  the  Bulgarian  semi-official  Mir 
itself    acknowledged   that   the   question   of    a   Serb   outlet 


212  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

was  a  sine  qud  non.^  For  Serbia  this  action  of  Dr.  Danev, 
the  first  of  an  ill-fated  series  connected  with  the  name  of 
that  unhappy  statesman,  constituted  nothing  less  than  a 
breach  of  the  Treaty.  If  Austria  had  attacked  Serbia  in 
arms  Bulgaria  was  bound  to  come  to  her  aid  with  200,000 
men, 2  and  a  fortiori,  if  the  attack  took  a  diplomatic  form, 
she  was  bound  to  aid  her  diplomatically.  It  cannot  be 
argued  that,  though  bound  to  military  aid  if  required,  she 
was  free  to  withhold  her  diplomatic-  assistance.  Yet  here 
Bulgaria,  far  from  doing  diplomatic  service,  actually  did  her 
Ally  a  disservice,  and  so  far  as  the  diplomatic  field  was 
concerned  abandoned  her.  To  Austria  the  information  was 
important.  It  must  be  remembered  that  at  this  date — 
early  November  1912 — the  decision  as  to  the  Adriatic 
outlet  had  not  yet  been  given  definitely  against  Serbia, 
though  Austria  was  loudly  declaring  the  impossibility  of 
conceding  it.  She  knew,  after  Dr.  Danev's  declarations, 
that  on  this  point  the  Allies  were  divided  and  that  she 
had  nothing  to  fear  from  Bulgaria,  which  would  certainly 
not  support  her  Ally  in  arms  in  a  question  which  she 
had  already  declared  was  no  affair  of  hers.  It  is  true 
that  in  any  event  the  military  situation  was  such  as  to 
preclude  any  help  from  Bulgaria  reaching  Serbia,  since 
the  former  State  had  some  50,000  to  70,000  men  locked 
up  around  Adrianople,  while  the  rest  of  her  army  was 
before  the  lines  of  Tchatalja.  This,  however,  really  means 
that  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  had  become  impossible  of 
fulfilment  on  the  military  side  as  they  had  already  been 
repudiated  on   the   diplomatic.     Doubtless  the  position  of 

'  So  also  Dr.  Danev :  "  I  should  explain  to  you  that,  during  the  crisis 
of  1912,  the  most  important  question  for  the  future  of  Serbia  was  her 
outlet  on  the  Adriatic  Sea.  Austria  was  opposed  to  that.  If  the  Allies 
ever  meant  to  execute  the  clause  of  which  we  speak  [Article  III  of  the 
Military  Convention  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria],  no  better  opportu- 
nity could  have  been  presented.  But  no  one,  much  less  Serbia  herself, 
thought  of  it ". — Speech  in  the  Sobranje,  May  1914.  Cit.  "  Balkanicus  ", 
The  Aspirations  of  Bulgaria,  p.  85.  Dr.  Danev  was  trying  to  disprove 
the  obligation  of  Article  III,  but  the  admission  remains. 

'  Article  III  of  the  Military  Convention. 


MACEDONIA:   TREATY   OF   1912  213 

Bulgaria  was  a  difficult  one,  but  at  the  same  time  Serbia 
was  entitled  to  urge  that  by  default,  apart  from  stress 
of  circumstances,  her  Ally  had  failed  to  give  her  the 
quid  pro  quo  for  the  Macedonian  partition  boundary,  and 
was  consequently  in  no  position  to  demand  those  con- 
cessions the  return  for  which  she  had  failed  to  render. 

The  next  point  that  calls  for  consideration  is  the  position 
of  affairs  at  the  time  when  the  first  peace  negotiations 
between  the  Allies  and  Turkey  were  broken  off.  The 
question  of  the  Adriatic  outlet  had  been  settled  against 
Serbia;  the  whole  of  Macedonia  and  Southern  Epirus 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies ;  the  Bulgarians  were 
before  Adrianople  and  Tchatalja.  The  negotiations  had 
been  broken  off  on  the  question  of  Adrianople  at  the 
demand  of  Bulgaria,  though  in  fact  the  Great  Powers 
had  signified  that  they  would  themselves  see  to  it  that 
the  town  should  pass  into  Bulgarian  hands.  The  other 
Allies  had  obtained  all  that  they  required,  and  there  was 
no  mention  in  the  Treaty,  implicit  or  explicit,  of  Adrianople 
or  Thrace,^  both  of  which  by  race  are  predominantly 
Greco-Turkish,  yet  they  loyally  continued  the  war.  The 
action  of  Bulgaria  appears  to  be  the  more  self-willed  as  she 
now  declares  that  Thrace  is  of  only  secondary  interest  to 
her  and  not  worth  bothering  about.  If  that  attitude 
represents  her  real  opinion,  then  her  action  in  1913 
becomes  almost  incredibly  foolish.  It  has  been  a  matter 
of  dispute  as  to  when  Serbia  first  made  known  her  desire 
for  the  modification  of  the  Treaty.  So  far  as  Russia  was 
concerned  she  was  informed  in  December  1912,  as  appears 
from  a  dispatch  of  M.  Sazonov  to  M.  Hartwig,  Russian 
Minister  at  Belgrade,  under  date  December  16,  1912,  in 
which  the  former  states : — 

"Dans  la  conversation  qu'il  a  eue  avec  notre  ambassa- 
deur  h,  Paris,  M.  Novakovitch  lui  a  dit  qu'en  cas  d'un 
refus   des  grandes   puissances   de   lui   laisser  en   propriet6 

'  "Now  when  in  the  month  of  May  ...  we  have  got  an  enviable 
part  of  Thrace  which  we  did  not  hope  to  get  ".—Speech  of  Dr.  Genadiev 
May  22,  1914,  referring  to  the  position  the  previous  year. 


2U  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

souveraine  un  port  de  I'Adriatique,  la  Serbie  sera  contrainte 
de  demander  des  compensations  en  Macedoine,  au  del^ 
des  fronti^res  fixees  dans  le  traits  serbo-bulgare  ".^ 

He  added  that  he  could  give  no  support.  At  Paris 
also  M.  Danev  learnt  that  Serbia  would  ask  for  a  rectifi- 
cation of  the  Macedonian  delimitation.  The  Bulgarians, 
unable  to  make  sufficient  progress  in  front  of  Adrianople, 
asked  Serbia  for  help.  It  has  been  suggested  ^  that 
Serbia  did  not  at  this  juncture  demand  an  alteration  in 
the  Macedonian  terms  of  the  Treaty.  I  am  in  a  position 
to  set  that  right.  Serbia  replied  that  she  was  sending 
forward  two  divisions,  50,000  men,  with  practically  the 
whole  of  her  siege  artillery,  but  in  view  of  the  altered 
circumstances  must  demand  compensation.  This  compensa- 
tion, of  course,  could  only  be  had  in  Macedonia.  Bulgaria 
tacitly  accepted  the  aid,  but  made  no  reply  to  the  note. 

The  last  point  for  consideration  is  the  situation  that 
immediately  preceded  the  outbreak  of  war  between  the 
former  Allies,  and  the  attendant  negotiations.  Bulgaria 
claimed  practically  the  whole  of  Macedonia  in  virtue  of  the 
Treaty  with  Serbia ;  Thrace  she  claimed  in  virtue  of  con- 
quest ;  Kavala  by  occupation  and  as  a  commercial  outlet ; 
and  finally  Salonica,  which  was  not  hers  by  treaty  nor 
nationality  nor  conquest,  because  she  wanted  it.  To  the 
last-named  port  she  had  early  asserted  her  claims.  On 
December  15,  1912,  M.  Isvolski  reported  from  Paris  to 
M.    Sazonov,   inter  alia  : — 

"  A  une  question  que  je  lui  posais  sur  les  difficultes 
k  prevoir  a  ce  sujet  [division  of  territory]  M.  Danef 
repondit  que  la  Bulgarie  en  aucun  cas  at  k  aucun  prix 
n'abandonnera  la  ville  de  Salonique  et  me  pria  de  porter 
k  votre  connaissance  que  c'etait  une  question  de  vie  ou  de 
mort  pour  la  Bulgarie  et  que  le  gouvernement  bulgare 
ne  pouvait  consentir  k  la  soumettre  a  I'arbitrage  ".  3 

'  Vide  Russian  Orange  Book,  Becueil  de  documents  di^lomatique$ 
concernant  les  evenements  des  Balkans. 

•  Mr.  Frank  Fox,  Bulgaria's  Attitude,  Fortnightly  Beview,  March 
1915,  p.  488.  3  Yide  Russian  Orange  Book,  ut  au^ra. 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY  OF   1912  215 

Easily  recognizable  here  is  the  inflexible  temperament 
and  brusquerie  of  the  minister  who — in  so  far  as  he  was 
not  the  agent  of  others — has  to  bear  so  large  a  responsibility 
for  the  misfortunes  of  his  country.  Bulgaria  had  not 
conquered  Salonica,  her  troops  were  only  there  e;i  droit 
d'allies,  and  yet  before  any  negotiations  have  been  entered 
upon  she  demands  the  town,  while  asserting  in  advance 
that  she  will  not  submit  the  matter  to  arbitration.  Later 
on  Bulgaria  refused  a  general  arbitration  on  the  matters 
in  dispute  with  Serbia  on  the  ground  that  the  Treaty 
provided  only  for  specific  arbitration  on  a  particular 
point,  but  this  predetermined  refusal  of  arbitration  on 
a  point  not  covered  by  any  treaty  throws  doubt  on  the 
bona  fides  of  her  plea  in  the  other  case :  evidently  she 
preferred  to  "hack  her  way  through".  Wherever,  then, 
Bulgaria  could  advance  a  plea  of  treaty  or  nationality 
or  conquest,  that  particular  plea  was  advanced,  and  where 
such  pleas  were  wanting  she  fell  back  upon  her  desires 
backed  by  force.  When  to  this  general  attitude  is  added 
the  oft-repeated  boast  that  the  Bulgars  were  the  Prussians 
of  the  Balkans  (a  boast  not  without  elements  of  justifica- 
tion), it  is  no  wonder  that  Serbia  and  Greece  took  alarm, 
and  asked  themselves  whether  they  were  cast  for  the  parts 
of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg.  Evidently  they  were  face 
to  face  with  the  design  of  a  Bulgarian  Balkan  Empire. 
The  occupation  of  the  whole  of  Macedonia  by  Bulgaria 
coupled  with  a  return  to  an  Austrophil  attitude  on  her 
part,  as  indicated  by  various  symptoms,  would  mean 
absolute  ruin  for  Serbia. 

Serbia  was  willing  to  submit  the  whole  Treaty  to  the 
arbitration  of  the  Tsar,  not  the  delimitation  clause  only.^ 

*  Article  II  of  the  Secret  Annexe  to  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Treaty 
contains  the  "  delimitation  clause "  and  provides  for  the  arbitrations 
of  the  Tsar  within  the  limits  contained  therein.  Article  IV,  however, 
is  a  general  arbitration  clause  providing  for  the  definite  submission 
to  Russia  of  every  dispute  which  might  arise  concerning  the  inter- 
pretation or  execution  of  any  stipulation  of  the  Treaty,  the  Secret 
Annexe,  or  the  Military  Convention.  It  would  follow  that  a  dispute 
solely  concerned  with  the  delimitation  pt  territory  would   be  decided 


216  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Her  plea  was  that  the  reciprocal  obligations  should  be 
examined  and  the  degree  in  which  they  had  been  ful- 
filled. Thus  the  non-fulfilment  of  Bulgarian  aid  in  the 
Adriatic  affair  would  carry  with  it  a  reconsideration  of 
the  delimitation  agreed  upon  as  consideration.  Bulgaria, 
dominated  by  Austrian  counsels,  claimed  her  price  though 
the  consideration  had  not  been  forthcoming.  Two  methods 
of  easing  the  crisis  commended  themselves  to  Russia  : 
a  partial  demobilization  and  a  meeting  of  the  Balkan 
Premiers.  On  May  20,  1913,  M.  Sazonov  proposed  a 
reduction  of  forces  to  a  third  or  a  quarter — a  proposition 
which  a  little  later,  on  the  initiative  of  Russia,  was  adopted 
by  the  conference  of  Ambassadors  in  London,  and  on 
May  31  Petrograd  was  able  to  announce  that  the  pro- 
posal had  been  accepted.  Bulgaria,  however,  adopted 
an  equivocal  attitude,  and  on  June  7  M.  Sazonov  in- 
tructed  M.  Nekliudov  to  put  the  pointed  question  to 
Bulgaria : — 

*'  d'ou  vient  maintenant  le  retard  de  la  Bulgarie  a  proceder 
k  cette  mesure  simultanement  avec  les  allies.  Cette  pro- 
position nous  a  ete  formulee  par  la  Bulgarie,  qui,  a  ce 
qu'il    parait,    evite   maintenant   de   la    remplir,   ainsi   que 

by  the  arbitration  provided  for  by  Article  II  and  within  the  limits 
of  that  Article.  If,  however,  the  dispute  were  concerned  with  the 
whole  question  of  the  applicability  of  Article  II,  with  its  proposed 
delimitation  of  territory  and  the  specific  arbitration  provided  in  that 
regard,  to  the  changed  circumstances  then  such  dispute  would  fall  under 
the  general  Arbitration  clause  of  Article  IV  being  a  matter  concerning 
the  stipulations  of  Article  II  of  the  Secret  Annexe.  Russia  would 
thus  have  to  decide  first  on  this  latter  dispute.  It  was  for  the  arbitra- 
tion under  Article  IV  that  the  Serbs  stipulated,  the  Bulgars  for  the 
specific  arbitration  of  Article  II.  The  text  of  these  conventions 
with  a  full  discussion  will  be  found  in  "  Balkanicus  ",  The  Aspirations 
of  Bulgaria.  The  Bulgarian  case  is  given  by  Dr.  Gesov  in  The  Balkan 
Alliance.  The  demand  of  the  Serbs  was  justified  by  the  text  of 
Article  IV,  for  otherwise  the  subject-matter  of  Article  II  (the  delimita- 
tion and  specific  arbitration)  would  have  been  expressly  excluded 
from  the  purview  of  the  general  arbitration  provided  for  by  Article  IV. 
The  matter  in  dispute  was  the  applicability  of  Article  II  in  toto  to  the 
changed  circumstances,  and  that  would  certainly  seem  to  be  fit  matter 
for  the  general  arbitration  proposed  by  Article  IV. 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY  OF   1912  217 

de    prendre    part    a   I'entrevue   des    quatre    presidents   du 
conseil  a  Salonique". 

The  Bulgarians  made  conditions  of  a  joint  occupation  of 
Macedonia,  and  the  proposal  fell  through,  although  again 
directly  advanced  by  Serbia. 

The  second  measure  proposed  by  Kussia  was  a  meeting 
of  the  Premiers.     It   is  incorrect   to   represent   Russia  as 
stiffening   the  attitude  of    Serbia  or   as   lukewarm    in  the 
cause  of  peace.     "While  Count  Tisza  was  championing  the 
right  of  the  Balkan    States  to  engage  in  internecine  war, 
Russia  strove  for    peace  in  every    way  and  was  ready  to 
approve  of  anything  that  would  tend  towards  securing  it. 
In    April  M.    Nekliudov  reported   the  warlike    feeling   in 
Sofia,  and  added  that  M.  GeSov  was  evidently  powerless  to 
control  events.     On  the  22nd  of  that  month  the  Russian 
Foreign    Minister    proposed    a     meeting     of    the    Balkan 
Premiers,    but    was    informed   from    Sofia   that    the    idea 
found    no    sympathy    there.      Throughout    Bulgaria    was 
opposed  to  a  round-table  conference,  since  her  object  was, 
after  obtaining   a   settlement  of  the  dispute  with  Serbia, 
to  be  left  face  to  face  with  Greece.     Russia,  while   advo- 
cating  a   general   reliance  on  the   Treaty,  was   in   favour 
of  reasonable  concessions  by  Bulgaria  as   being   likely   to 
contribute  to  the   solidity  of   the  alliance.     She  naturally 
had    no    liking    for    the     invidious    task    of     arbitration 
which   M.    Sazonov    confessed  would   be   tres  pSiiible  for 
her,    and    she    therefore    welcomed   the   meeting  between 
the  Serb   and  Bulgar   Premiers  and  counselled  a  meeting 
with  M.  Venizelos  also.     In  the  event  of  these   meetings 
proving   fruitless,    she  would    welcome    the   Premiers    to 
Petrograd.       Time    pressed,    and   the   idea    of    a  general 
preliminary   meeting   was   abandoned,   and    Russia    asked 
for  a  meeting  in  her   capital,   which  M.  Pa§ic   considered 
more  likely  to  lead   to  the   desired  end.      Bulgaria  again 
adopted  an  equivocal  attitude  :    she  was  willing  to  accede 
to  the  idea  if  her  point  of  view   were  adopted  previously, 
to   which   the   Russian   Minister    replied    that   if   all    the 
matters  in  dispute  were  cleared  up  beforehand  there  would 


218  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

obviously  be  no  need  for  the  meeting  itself.  On  June 
17,  ten  days  after  the  Tsar's  telegram,  he  wrote  to 
M.  Nekliudov  : — 

"  Nous  insistons  done  pour  obtenir  de  M.  Danef  la 
reponse  la  plus  prompte :  desire-t-il,  oui  ou  non,  venir 
a  S.  Petersbourg  "  ? 

Finally  M.  Danev  caused  M.  Sazonov  to  be  informed 
that  the  Bulgarian  condition  that  the  arbitration  should 
be  confined  to  the  specific  territorial  stipulations  of  the 
Treaty  was  his  last  word.  This  was  on  June  25,  and 
early  on  June  30  the  Bulgarian  attack  was  made. 

There  has  been  printed  ^  a  private  letter  from  the 
Bulgarian  Minister  to  Russia,  M.  Bobcev  to  M.  Todorov, 
the  Bulgarian  Finance  Minister,  which  throws  a  vivid 
light  on  how  the  situation  was  regarded  by  the  former. 
It  is  dated  June  20,  and  in  it  occur  the  following  words  : — 

"...  Le  refus  de  notre  premier  ministre  de  se  rendre 
ici  a  la  conference  produira  le  plus  terrible,  le  pire  effet. 
On  le  prendra  comme  une  offense  a  I'Empereur  lui-meme. 
Que  la  guerre  doive  avoir  lieu  ou  non,  j'estime  que  nous 
ne  pouvons  pas  nous  refuser  a  prendre  part  a  la  conference. 
.  .  .  L'Empereur  et  la  gouvernement  sont  decides  a 
I'arbitrage  conformement  au  traite  et  dans  son  cadre.  .  .  . 
Que  le  premier  ministre  vienne  ici  et  qu'il  dise  sa  pensee  ; 
mais  qu'il  vienne.  .  .  .  M.  Delcasse  .  .  .  m'a  dit,  '  Gar- 
dez-vous  des  conseils  secrets  qu'on  vous  donne,  car  ils  ne 
visent  que  les  interets  de  leurs  auteurs  .  .  .'  ". 

It  was  not  for  want  of  good  advice  that  Bulgaria  fell ;  she 
had  been  warned  by  Russia  of  the  Turkish  and  Roumanian 
dangers,  and  the  result  bore  out  the  words  of  M.  Sazonov 
that  it  was  clear  to  him  that  Bulgaria  was  acting  on 
the  suggestion  of  others  who  were  holding  out  hopes 
which  would  only  lead  to  bitter  disillusionment.  The 
poignant  words  of  the  Bulgarian  Minister  passed  unheeded. 

The  nature  of  the  Bulgarian  attack  is  well  known,  as 

'  M.  Yakchitch,  La  seconde  guerre  BalJcanique,  La  Revue  Politique 
Internationale,  April  1914.  This  article  gives  extracts  from  the 
Eussian  Orange  Book  for  which  I  am  indebted. 


MACEDONIA:  TREATY   OF   1912  219 

also  General  Savov's  truly  extraordinary  reasons,  that  it 
was  necessary  to  raise  the  moral  of  the  troops  and  make 
them  consider  their  ex-allies  as  enemies,  to  make  the 
allies  more  conciliatory  as  a  result  of  the  "  violent  blows  " 
that  would  be  dealt  to  them,  and  to  put  Russian  policy  in 
face  of  the  danger  of  a  commencement  of  a  war!  The 
Bulgarians  subsequently  explained  that  they  did  not 
regard  the  attack  as  a  beginning  of  war  and  were  apparently 
astonished  that  their  violent  blows  had  failed  in  their 
conciliatory  object.^ 

Even  Serb  forbearance  was  distorted  into  a  confession 
of  weakness  by  the  Bulgarian  command,  which  paid  an 
unconscious  tribute  to  their  enemy's  desire  for  peace. 
General  Kova6ev,  commanding  the  Fourth  Bulgarian 
Army,  in  an  order,  No.  29,  dated  June  17,  said : — 

"  Our  men  must  be  told  that  the  Greek  and  Serb 
soldiers,  so  courageous  against  defenceless  populations, 
are  only  cowards  whom  our  approach  alone  has  terrified. 
.  .  .  By  allowing  the  various  echelons  of  our  army,  at  the 
moment  of  concentration,  to  pass  before  the  front  of  the 
Serb  troops  without  acting  against  them,  our  enemies 
have  clearly  shown  their  moral  state,  and  the  fear  they 
have  of  measuring  themselves  against  us.  If  it  were 
otherwise,  they  would  never  have  allowed  our  concentration 
to  be  effected  without  hindrance  in  conditions  altogether 
unknown  hitherto  in  history  ". 

It  is  useless  and  harmful  talk  to  hark  back  to  the  Treaty 
of  1912  as  a  basis  of  proposals.  The  Treaty  is  as  dead 
as  Jacob  Marley,  it  belongs  to  conditions  that  are  past, 
was  entered  upon  by  Serbia  for  a  consideration  not  received 
and  for  motives  no  longer  operative,  and  has  finally  been 
ruptured  by  Bulgaria's  second  declaration  of  war.  It  is 
true  that  as  a  result  of  the  war  she  will  obtain  an  Adriatic 
coast  line,  but  that  will  not  be  thanks  to  Bulgaria,  and  the 

•  The  documentary  evidence  produced  by  "Balkanicus"  in  The 
Aspirations  of  Bulgaria  proves  conclusively  that  the  treacherous 
Bulgarian  attack  had  been  deliberately  prepared  for  by  both  the  civil 
and  military  administrations. 


220  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

former  concessions  can  therefore  no  longer  be  in  question. 
Before  the  war  we  recognized  Germany's  rights  in  the 
Bagdad  railway,  and  were  about  to  negotiate  with  her  on 
the  basis  of  recognizing  further  rights  of  German  com- 
mercial exploitation  in  Asia  Minor.  Does  any  one  suppose, 
however,  that  if  successful  we  shall  hand  over  the  Bagdad 
railway  to  Germany  and  Asia  Minor  also  for  pacific  pene- 
tration? Why  then  should  we  deal  otherwise  with  the 
interests  of  our  ally  ?  In  both  cases  the  war  has  funda- 
mentally altered  the  conditions  of  the  problem.  The  same 
holds  good  of  the  otherwise  well-founded  claim  of  Germany 
to  the  possession  of  a  colonial  empire  :  we,  I  imagine,  will 
not  return  South-West  Africa,  or  German  East  Africa.  If 
it  be  argued  that  the  cases  are  differentiated  on  the  ground 
that  the  principle  of  nationality  is  involved,  and  that  Serbia 
in  1912  recognized  the  Bulgarian  character  of  central 
Macedonia,  that  point  has  been  dealt  with  above. 


CHAPTER    VII 

THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA 

In  the  previous  chapter  the  conflicting  claims  to  Macedonia 
derived  from  the  past  history  of  the  province  and  from  its 
ethnographical  characteristics  have  been  examined,  and  the 
result  was  to  establish  the  fact  that  in  the  Middle  Ages 
there  was  no  continuous  Bulgarian  rule  over  that  country, 
but  that  it  passed  to  Bulgar,  to  Greek,  or  to  Serb,  accord- 
ing to  which  of  the  three  States  was  able  at  the  moment 
to  exercise  supremacy  in  those  regions,  and  that  in  fact 
from  1018  onwards  the  Bulgarians  only  held  Macedonia 
for  a  period  of  fifty  years  on  a  liberal  estimate,  and  assum- 
ing the  Bulgarian  character  of  the  rule  of  the  Asen  family. 
It  was  seen,  also,  that  the  racial  character  of  the  people  is 
indeterminate  so  far  as  central  Macedonia  is  concerned,  the 
inhabitants  belonging  to  a  primitive  Slav  stock  without 
definite  national  consciousness  and  capable  of  being  moulded 
into  Serbs  or  Bulgars  as  each  may  be  able  to  subject  them 
to  a  generation  of  rule  and  schooling.  The  Treaty  of  1912 
was  also  considered  in  its  inception,  the  motives  which 
underlay  the  territorial  distribution  contained  in  it,  and 
the  events  which  led  to  the  second  Balkan  war.  It  was 
observed  that  there  was  no  implied  recognition  of  the 
validity  of  Bulgarian  ethnographical  claims,  but  that  the 
delimitation  proposed  was  set  forward  as  consideration  for 
access  to  the  Adriatic  by  Serbia,  was  in  fact  the  price  which 
Serbia  was  prepared  to  pay  in  order  that  she  might  make 
use  of  the  opportunity  which  offered  of  securing  her  econo- 
mic emancipation.     It  remains  now  to  be  considered  what 


222  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

should  be  the  line  of  policy  to  be  pursued  by  the  Allies 
in  the  present  situation,  in  view  of  all  that  has  passed,  and 
having  regard  to  the  actual  attitude  of  the  different  parties 
to  the  Allies  and  to  the  objects  and  aims  pursued  by  them, 
account  being  duly  taken  of  the  facts  established  in  the 
previous  chapter. 

While,  then,  in  view  of  the  events  of  the  last  few  months, 
it  would  seem  that  no  question  as  to  the  future  of  Mace- 
donia can  arise,  seeing  that  Serbia  has  been  for  nearly  two 
years  a  loyal  ally  in  arms,  and  that  she  has  been  treacher- 
ously attacked  by  Bulgaria,  who  has  thus  become  our 
enemy  as  well,  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  the  disastrous  course  of  sacrificing  Serbia  to 
Bulgaria  has  even  yet  been  abandoned.  So  far  our  Balkan 
policy  has  had  Bulgaria  as  its  pivot,  and  our  relations  to 
Greece  seem  to  have  been  based  on  the  idea  that  if  we 
could  not  win  over  Bulgaria  to  our  side  by  any  means,  then 
we  did  not  want  any  other  Balkan  ally — at  any  rate  Greek 
aid,  when  proffered,  was  refused,  and  an  attempt  made  to 
get  Greece  to  cede  to  Bulgaria  the  Greek  region  of  Kavala. 
There  are  still  ^  a  number  of  people  in  our  midst  who  care 
more  for  the  interests  of  our  Bulgarian  enemy  than  of 
our  Serb  ally,  who  continually  urge  a  course  of  policy 
which  should  aim  at  buying  Bulgarian  support  at  the 
expense  of  Serb  territory.  More  frequently  such  a  course 
is  urged  on  the  specious  ground  of  the  necessity  of  securing 
a  Balkan  accord  and  a  permanent  settlement  with  which 
all  the  Balkan  States  will  be  satisfied.  Thus  Mr.  J.  L. 
Garvin,  whom  I  do  not  include  in  the  category  just  men- 
tioned, and  whose  talents,  as  I  happen  to  know,  are  highly 
appreciated  in  Southern  Slav  circles,  despite  things  which 
have  wounded  them,  wrote  as  follows  in  the  Observer  of 
April  2,  1916:  "Again,  despite  all  that  has  happened,  and 
all  the  iniquities  of  King  Fox's  policy  in  Bulgaria,  the 
fundamental  problem  remains  just  what  it  was  in  1912 — 

'  March  1917.  In  spite  of  Bulgarian  engagements  against  Russian 
troops,  we  are  still  without  a  pronouncement  on  the  official  attitude 
of  the  Entente  towards  the  Macedonian  problem. 


THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      223 

to  establish  a  system  by  which  bearable  relations  between 
neighbouring  peoples  may  be  restored  and  racial  hate  may 
cease  to  be  the  master-passion  of  the  Balkans.  In  grasp 
of  this  fact  still  lies  the  key  to  the  creation  of  a  Greater 
Serbia,  which,  with  an  enlarged  Boumania,  would  rank 
high  indeed,  next  to  the  leading  Powers  amongst  the  king- 
doms of  the  new  Europe."  This,  perhaps,  puts  the  argu- 
ment at  its  best,  but  it  requires  little  consideration  to  see 
how  weak  is  the  case  made  out.  It  cannot  be  said  that 
the  Balkan  problem  remains  what  it  was  in  1912.  Since 
then  Bulgaria  has  twice  stabbed  her  neighbour  in  the  back, 
Bulgarian  troops  have  overrun  Serbia,  and  the  Bulgarian 
authorities  have  sj'^stematically  looted  that  unhappy  country, 
while  graver  charges  of  massacre  have  been  made  on  good 
evidence.  To  say  that  after  all  this  the  problem  remains 
the  same  is  to  ignore  facts  as  completely  as  if  it  were 
asserted  that  the  European  problem  as  a  whole  is  the  same 
now  as  four  years  ago.  The  cessation  of  racial  hate  is  a 
thing  to  be  desired  in  the  Balkans  as  elsewhere,  but  that  is 
not  a  political  problem,  but  an  unrealizable  ideal  in  present 
circumstances.  I  have  alluded  more  than  once  to  the 
strange  obsession  which  regards  racial  feeling  as  some- 
thing different  in  the  Balkans  to  what  it  is  elsewhere, 
which  imagines  that  a  little  persuasion,  a  little  diplomatic 
treatment,  and  some  unexceptionable  homilies  will  assuage 
those  deep  and  dark  human  instincts  which  we  do  not 
imagine  for  a  moment  will  be  allayed  easily  in  western 
Europe.  Possibly  it  may  be  due  to  our  own  success  in 
establishing  good  relations  between  different  peoples  in  our 
own  Empire,  but  reflection  will  show,  though  the  topic 
cannot  be  pursued  here,  that  the  conditions  are  altogether 
different,  both  as  to  the  peoples  concerned,  the  nature  of 
the  problem,  and  the  means  to  be  employed.  It  is  difficult 
to  understand  in  what  sense  the  key  to  the  accomplishment 
of  Southern  Slav  unity  is  to  be  found  in  unjust  concessions 
to  Bulgaria,  unless  it  be  meant  that  the  latter  are  to  be 
made  a  condition  precedent  for  the  former,  a  project  of 
disloyal  coercion  that  has  unfortunately  not  been  without 


224  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

its  upholders  in  a  certain  section  of  our  publicists.  While 
regard  for  the  future  will  avoid  imposing  upon  Bulgaria  terms 
of  peace  which  might  seem  a  vindictive  punishment  for  her 
past  action,  on  the  other  hand,  as  any  idea  of  Serbo-Bulgarian 
friendliness  for  many  a  long  year  is  absolutely  Utopian,  we 
cannot  impose  upon  Serbia  conditions  which  have  regard 
to  considerations  possessing  no  correspondence  to  reality. 

A  question  of  honour  is  undoubtedly  involved.     Part,  at 
any  rate,  of  the   prestige  which  we   have  enjoyed  abroad 
in  the  past  has  been  due  to  recognition  of  the  fact  that  we 
have  stood  loyally  by  our  allies.    The  honour  of  an  English- 
man and  of   the    English    nation,  the  respect  paid  to  an 
Enghshman's  word,  the  feeling   that  an   Englishman  can 
always  be  relied  upon,  that  he  will  never  desert  a  friend  in 
distress — these  are  a  priceless  heritage  from  the  past.     It 
has  been  very  largely  by  means  of  such  considerations  that 
we  have  been  able  to  build  up  our  Empire  at  a  cost  so 
comparatively  small ;  they  have  stood  us  in  good  stead  time 
and  again.     This  honourable  prestige  is  not  a  thing  lightly 
to  be  thrown  aside  or  impaired.     Already  we  have  gravely 
compromised  our  position  in  the  Balkans  by  action  which 
has  appeared  to  be  actuated  by  other  motives.     It  cannot 
be  denied  that  the  suspicion  with  which  we  were  regarded 
in  Greece   in   October   1915   was   largely  due,  not   to   the 
action  which  we  were  compelled  to  take  upon  Greek  soil, 
but  to  our  treatment  of  Serbia,  for  the  Greeks  felt  that 
even   alliance   with   England   would   not   obviate  demands 
opposed  to  their  interests,  just  as  a  year's  comradeship  in 
arms  did  not  save  Serbia  from  exigences  put  forward  on 
behalf  of  a   State  whose  attitude  was  well  known  in  the 
Balkans,  and  apparently  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  though  not 
to  Lord  Crewe. I     Such  considerations  reinforced  others  of 

'  "  We  did  not  originally  assume  that  Bulgaria  was,  or  need  be, 
hostile  to  us  in  the  first  instance". — Lord  Crewe  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  October  14,  1915.  "  The  German  and  Austrian  sympathies  of 
the  King  of  the  Bulgarians  have  always  been  known,  and  reports 
of  Bulgarian  negotiations  with  Turkey,  under  German  influence,  came 
from  various  Balkan  sources  as  early  as  April". — Sir  Edward  Grey  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  November  9,  1915. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      225 

a  more  questionable  nature  in  determining  the  Greek 
Government  to  repudiate  its  treaty  obligations  to  its  ally. 
The  point  of  honour  thus  finds  contact  with  considera- 
tions of  policy.  It  is  necessary  that  we  should  declare 
ourselves  in  unambiguous  terms.  On  April  28,  1916,  when 
Mr.  E.  M'Neill  asked  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  an 
assurance  that  Bulgaria  should  not  be  permitted  to  acquire 
territory  at  the  expense  of  any  people  who  had  fought  or 
might  hereafter  fight  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  Lord  Eobert 
Cecil  stated  in  reply  that  such  a  statement  made  without 
discussion  with  our  Allies  would  be  contrary  to  the  declara- 
tion of  September  5,  1914,  by  which  each  of  the  Allies 
was  precluded  from  making  a  separate  peace  and  from 
demanding  conditions  of  peace  without  the  consent  of  each 
of  the  others,  and  he  did  not  think  that  at  present  any 
such  discussion  would  be  opportune.  In  plain  English,  he 
refused  to  give  any  assurance  that  Bulgaria  would  not  be 
permitted  to  acquire  any  Serb  territory  until  we  had 
discussed  the  matter  with  our  Allies,  and  he  did  not  think 
that  any  such  discussion  would  be  opportune.  At  that 
date,  therefore,  we  had  not  yet  determined  whether  not 
to  betray  the  interests  of  Serbia  and  refused  to  initiate 
a  discussion  of  the  matter  with  our  Allies.  Discussion  with 
our  Allies  should  certainly  have  been  not  merely  inopportune 
but  unnecessary,  on  the  ground  that  as  a  matter  of  course 
we  should  stand  by  our  friends.  So  long  as  the  attitude 
disclosed  in  Lord  Eobert  Cecil's  answer  represents  the 
policy  of  the  British  Government  it  is  childish  to  expect 
Balkan  neutrals  to  put  any  confidence  in  us.  All  the  time, 
moreover,  we  fill  the  world  with  our  contention  that 
Germany  is  using  her  Balkan  allies  as  mere  pawns  in  the 
game  and  will  be  ready  to  sacrifice  their  interests  to  her 
convenience.  We  are  giving  great  scope  to  our  enemies 
to  point  out  that  their  assertion  is  true  that  perfidious 
Albion  is  always  ready  to  sacrifice  those  foolish  nations 
who  throw  in  their  lot  with  her;  nor,  as  will  be  seen,  docs 
our  attitude  inspire  either  respect  or  gratitude  in  Bulgaria. 
If  we  give  grounds  for  the  belief   that   even  now  we  are 

15 


226    THE  FUTURE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

prepared  to  sacrifice  Serb  interests  the  effect  will  be  more 
than  unfortunate.  In  brief,  the  impression  produced  would 
!be  that  to  be  allied  with  the  Entente  would  not  protect 
I  national  interests  even  in  the  case  of  success,  since  they 
/might  be  sacrificed  to  a  rival  and  hostile  Power,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  openly  to  join  the  Central  Powers 
would  not  preclude  the  gaining  of  what  is  desired  at  the 
hands  of  the  Entente  itself.  In  short,  to  join  the  latter 
might  bring  disappointment  in  either  event,  while  to  side 
with  the  former  would  bring  realization.  The  effect  might, 
of  course,  be  obviated  if  it  were  announced  that  this 
peculiar  privilege  is  reserved  to  Bulgaria  alone,  but  even 
such  an  announcement  might  induce  undesirable  reflection. 
Our  aims  should  be  to  encourage  our  friends  by  unshakable 
loyalty,  to  win  the  confidence  of  neutrals  by  our  transparent 
honesty,  and  to  impress  our  enemies  by  the  strength  of 
our  hostility,  rather  than  to  encourage  our  foes,  depress 
our  friends,  and  give  pause  to  neutrals.^ 

It  remains  to  consider  how  far  there  is  any  justification 
for  the  arguments  which  are  derived  from  certain  alleged 
tendencies  among  the  Bulgarian  people.  It  is  asserted 
that  we  must  not  identify  the  nation  with  the  policy  of 
King  Ferdinand,  that  a  large  section  of  it  and  of  the 
political  leaders  are  pro-Ententist  and  have  been  the  objects 
of  coercion,  that  they  are  only  claiming  their  co-nationals 
according  to  their  interpretation  (which  has  been  seen  in 
the  previous  chapter  to  be  in  any  case  without  justifica- 
tion), and  that  the  Bulgarians  are  not  imperialistic.  These 
points  can  be  elucidated  with  the  help  of  the  Bulgarians 
themselves  by  means  of  the  notices  of  articles  appearing 
in  the  Bulgarian  Press,  interviews  granted  by  Bulgarian 
politicians,  and  signed  communications,  which  in  various 
ways  have  become  known  in  England. 

A  common  assertion  is  that  the  Bulgarians  are  not  united 

in  sentiment,  and  that   large  sections  both  of   the  people 

and  of   the  politicians  are  strongly  opposed  to  the  course 

adopted  by   King    Ferdinand,    are    animated    by  friendly 

'  These  words  were  written  before  the  entry  of  Eoumania  into  the  war. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      227 

feelings  towards  the  Entente,  and  are  only  awaiting  tho 
first  opportunity  both  to  manifest  their  sentiments  openly 
and  to  take  action  upon  them.  In  this  connection  frequent 
allusion  is  made  not  only  to  Dr.  Danev,  the  leader  of  the 
former  Russophil  party,  but  to  M.  Ge§ov,  who  is  described 
as  Bulgaria's  "  moderate  "  statesman  and  as  being  strongly 
pro-Ententist.  Every  scrap  of  news,  every  despatch  from 
a  neutral  journalist,  giving  evidence  of  bad  economic  con- 
ditions in  the  country,  is  hailed  as  further  proof  of  the 
correctness  of  these  opinions  and  as  being  a  sign  that 
the  day  is  fast  approaching  when  Bulgaria  will  turn  in 
her  tracks,  while  an  immediate  response  to  any  such  move- 
ment is  demanded  by  those  who  have  always  held  by 
the  Bulgarian  legend.  Conditions,  we  are  told,  are  fast 
becoming  unbearable,  the  Bulgarian  army  and  people  are 
deeply  dissatisfied,  and  the  end  is  not  far  off.  That  the 
economic  conditions  in  Bulgaria  have  approximated  to 
those  of  their  allies  is  probably  true  enough,  but  that  the 
natural  dissatisfaction  arising  therefrom  is  a  proof  of  change 
of  purpose  is  pure  hypothesis.  Economic  conditions  in 
Serbia  were  long  bad,  but  there  was  no  consequent 
instability  of  purpose,  and  it  would  be  foolish  to  expect 
anything  different  from  the  Bulgars.  That  Prussian 
arrogance  is  distasteful  is  also  likely  enough,  but  the 
Bulgarian  official  classes  must  have  made  their  people  so 
well  acquainted  with  that  particular  quality  that  it  is 
unlikely  to  produce  any  real  revulsion  of  feeling,  and  after 
all  it  is  only  in  a  comparatively  few  places  that  it  can 
be  in  evidence  from  the  nature  of  things.  There  is  not 
the  slightest  proof  of  any  division  of  feeling  among  the 
Bulgarians  ;  on  the  contrary,  all  the  evidence  points  the 
other  way.  The  Bulgarian  papers  are  full  of  abuse  not 
only  of  Russia  and  the  Russian  Emperor  but  of  the  other 
two  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  as  well,  and  they  are 
equally  insistent  on  the  unanimity  of  Bulgarian  feeling. 

On  January  15,  1916,  the  Sofia  Dnevnik  gave  some 
messages  for  the  Orthodox  New  Year  from  prominent 
Bulgarian   statesmen.      Dr.    Ge§ov,   the   "  moderate,"   the 


228  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

pro-Ententist,  said  that  they  were  greeting  the  New  Year 
with  a  Te  Deum  to  the  war  and  with  praises  to  the 
Allliance.  Dr.  Danev,  it  is  true,  speaks  of  striving  in 
ways  commensurate  with  Bulgarian  dignity  and  vital  in- 
terests to  facilitate  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Dr.  Genadiev, 
who  has  lately,  according  to  report,  been  arrested,  pleads 
for  one  effort  more.  At  a  later  date  Dr.  Gegov,  in  an 
interview  with  the  German  Vossische  Zeitung,  stated  that 
in  Bulgarian  home  politics  there  was  no  opposition. 
Before  the  war  his  party  had  believed  in  Russia's  strength, 
but  as  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Radoslavov  had  proved  correct 
Bulgarian  politicians  could  not  do  otherwise  than  acquiesce 
in  the  present  state  of  affairs.  Before  the  entry  of  Bulgaria 
into  the  war  he  had  declined  office  not  because  he  was 
in  favour  of  joining  the  Entente  Powers,  but  because 
he  wanted  a  coalition  government  in  order  to  preserve 
neutrality.  On  January  18  the  Mir,  which  is  M.  GeSov's 
organ,  remarked  that  the  English  and  French  still  believed 
that  the  Balkan  peoples  were  ready  to  go  knife  in  hand 
against  their  rulers.  They  had  been  expecting  a  revolution 
in  Bulgaria  in  the  event  of  mobilization.  Events  had 
proved  the  fallacy  of  their  opinion,  and  now  they  were 
believing  the  same  thing  of  the  Greeks.  The  Socialist 
leader,  M.  Sakazov,  at  the  New  Year  remarked  that 
Bulgaria's  destiny  was  inseparably  bound  up  with  the 
destiny  of  the  Central  Powers.  According  to  the  Frank- 
furter Zeitung  of  January  3  the  Democrat  M.  LiapSev 
said  that  no  one  would  hinder  the  government,  and  that 
what  had  been  undertaken  must  be  successfully  finished. 
The  Dnevnik,  on  January  24,  alluded  to  the  report  which 
had  appeared  in  the  Daily  Telegraph  of  dissatisfaction  with 
King  Ferdinand,  and  in  the  Daily  Neios  of  friction  between 
the  Bulgarians  and  the  Austro-Germans,  and  repudiated 
their  accuracy,  its  own  explanation  of  their  appearance 
being  the  alleged  dissatisfaction  in  England  over  the  in- 
troduction of  compulsory  service,  an  explanation  which 
perhaps  serves  to  point  out  the  need  of  caution  in  accept- 
ing news  of   similar  character  from  abroad;   probably  all 


THE   SETTLEMENT   WITH   BULGARIA      229 

the  belligerents  are  apt  to  lay  too  much  stress  on  reports 
of  bad  internal  conditions  in  enemy  countries.  M.  Malinov, 
who,  as  well  as  M.  Genadiev,  is  said  to  have  been  arrested, 
in  the  debate  in  the  Sobranje  on  February  28  on  the 
speech  from  the  throne  is  reported  in  a  Sofia  message  to 
the  Berliner  Tagehlatt  to  have  delivered  a  speech  which 
was  distinctly  hostile  in  its  general  tenor  to  the  govern- 
ment, but  in  which  he,  nevertheless,  alluded  to  the  omis- 
sion in  the  royal  speech  of  any  allusion  to  Russia,  saying 
that  in  his  opinion  Russia  in  the  bombardment  of  Varna 
had  acted  no  less  disgracefully  than  England  and  France 
in  Salonica.  It  is  needless  to  add  that  the  members  of 
the  Bulgarian  ministry  and  the  government  organs  have 
been  equally  emphatic  in  their  assertion  of  Bulgarian 
unanimity. 

The  statement  frequently  made  that  the  Bulgarians  are 
after  all  merely  seeking  the  satisfaction  of  legitimate 
national  claims,  besides  being  negatived  by  the  rejection 
of  the  offers  made  by  the  Entente,  which  included  a  large 
area  of  territory  which  the  Serbs  have  always  claimed  as 
part  of  the  national  heritage,  as  has  been  seen  above,  and 
to  which  any  claim  of  definite  Bulgarian  nationality  is  not 
borne  out  by  independent  testimony,  is  further  shown  to 
be  baseless  by  the  extravagant  claims  on  the  score  of 
nationality  now  put  forward  by  the  Bulgarians.  Thus  on 
December  27  the  Mir,  the  organ  of  the  moderate  Dr. 
Ge§ov,  remarked  that  the  Bulgarians  had  not  joined  in 
the  war  to  conquer  foreign  territories  but  to  unite  their 
sons  of  one  blood  and  one  faith.  At  Zajecar  and  Pirot,  at 
Nis  and  Leskovac,  at  Skoplje,  Kumanovo,  Veles,  Prilip, 
Monastir,  Ochrida,  Debar,  and  Ki6evo  beat  the  Bulgarian 
heart  and  lived  the  sons  of  the  Bulgarian  people.  It  is  no 
longer  then  a  question  of  a  Bulgarian  Macedonia,  but 
apparently  of  a  Bulgarian  Serbia  as  well !  It  is  not  sur- 
prising therefore  to  find  the  Narodni  Prava,  Dr.  Rado- 
slavov's  organ,  taking  up  the  same  line  of  thought  in  an 
article  published  on  February  4,  and  dealing  with  a  debate 
in    the   Sobranje    on    the    government    bill     establishing 


230  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Bulgarian  schools  in  the  occupied  territories.  Some 
members,  to  their  honour,  had  spoken  in  deprecation  of  a 
policy  of  denationalization.  The  paper  remarked  that  even 
if  Bulgaria  were  anxious  to  denationalize  anybody  it  had 
no  scope  for  such  a  propensity.  Whom  was  the  State  to 
denationalize  in  Macedonia  or  the  Morava  Valley?  The 
Bulgars  perhaps?  If  any  Serbs  were  living  in  Pirot, 
Vranja,  or  Zajecar  they  would  not  be  denationalized  by 
Bulgaria,  but  only  so  far  as  by  living  in  the  midst  of  a 
compact  Bulgarian  population  they  would  forget  their 
Serbomania.  On  the  two  following  days  the  same  paper 
published  letters  from  a  "  soldier-schoolmaster  ",  a  certain 
Dr.  D.,  alluding  to  the  manner  in  which  the  inhabitants 
of  Ni§  quickly  pick  up  their  old  mother-tongue  [the  two 
languages  are  mutually  intelligible  and  a  large  part  of  the 
vocabulary  is  practically  identical],  and  advocating  the 
estabhshment  of  schools  as  the  best  agency  for  the  propa- 
gation of  the  Bulgarian  tongue  among  a  population  which 
still  believed  in  the  return  of  the  Serb  government. 
When,  however,  a  train  was  fired  on  near  Sveta  Petka,  to 
the  north-west  of  Nis,  the  paper  quickly  discovered  the 
presence  of  Serbs,  and  alluded  to  the  incident  on  January 
22  as  a  manifestation  of  the  impotent  malevolence  of  Serb 
chauvinism  in  extremis,  and  it  advocated  severe  measures 
against  the  Serb  population — which  on  other  occasions  does 
not  exist,  being  replaced  by  a  people  with  a  Bulgarian  heart. 
It  demanded  less  tolerance  and  more  severity !  Decidedly 
the  Bulgarian  appetite  grows  with  satisfaction  when  all 
eastern  Serbia,  including  the  Morava  Valley,  is  claimed 
as  a  genuine  Bulgarian  land.  The  claim  is  of  interest, 
however,  for  other  reasons  to  be  alluded  to  below. 

In  curious  contradiction  to  some  of  these  claims  is  an 
article  by  Dr.  Boris  Vazov,  a  member  of  Dr.  GeSov's  party, 
in  the  Mir  of  January  16,  in  which  he  paid  a  tribute  to  the 
work  of  the  Serb  government  and  scientific  and  literary 
societies  in  the  publication  of  excellent  periodicals  and  of 
a  scientific  popular  library.  The  Bulgarians  had  neglected 
their  language.     In  Bulgaria  not  a  single  serious  literary 


THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      231 

publication  could  last,  there  was  not  a  Bulgarian  grammar 
[presumably  a  scientific  grammar  of  the  language],  nor  an 
adequate  dictionary.  All  this  implies  a  contradiction  of 
the  extreme  national  claims  of  his  countrymen.  In  spite 
of  all,  therefore,  a  policy  of  Bulgarization  is  needed,  and 
Dr.  Vazov  calls  for  it.  He  avowed  frankly  that  the 
struggle  was  one  between  the  two  languages,  and  victory  for 
Bulgaria  would  only  be  complete  when  Bulgarian  should 
predominate  in  the  Balkans.  In  the  occupied  territories 
he  said  that  soldiers  and  officials  were  struggling  to  speak 
Serb  with  the  population  [the  sons  of  the  Bulgarian  people 
with  the  Bulgarian  heart] ,  which  was  a  great  mistake.  In 
the  same  style  on  January  26,  Dr.  GeSov's  paper,  the  Mir, 
said  in  a  leading  article  that  the  school  was  the  only  means 
of  uniting  the  population  of  the  new  territory  to  that  of 
the  old,  and  the  Ministry  of  Instruction  was  deserving  of 
praise  for  its  bill  for  the  establishment  of  schools  in  the 
conquered  territory. 

All  this  sheds  a  valuable  light  on  Bulgarian  claims  in 
Macedonia.  We  find  the  Bulgars,  in  the  first  place,  not 
less  insistent  in  claiming  all  eastern  Serbia  as  a  true 
Bulgarian  land  than  they  have  been  in  the  past  in  making 
a  similar  claim  to  the  former  province,  a  claim  which  by 
ceaseless  repetition  had  come  largely  to  be  accepted  abroad. 
The  worthlessness  of  the  claim  in  the  one  case,  to  say  the 
least  casts  doubts  upon  its  value  in  the  other  quite  apart 
from  other  considerations,  and  it  ought  now  to  be  clear  to 
every  one  that  a  Bulgarian  claim  is  not  to  be  regarded  as 
justified  merely  because  Bulgarian  chauvinists  repeat  it 
ad  nauseam.  It  has  been  remarked  above  that  originally 
the  population  of  the  Ni§  district  of  Serbia  and  of  the 
Sofia  district  in  Bulgaria  was  of  the  same  indeterminate 
character  as  the  present  population  of  Macedonia,  though 
now  the  political  boundary  has  become  a  genuinely  national 
one.  In  the  pretensions  which  the  Bulgarians  are  now 
putting  forward  we  have  an  undesigned  corroboration 
of  the  truth  of  this.  It  may  be  agreed  that  it  has 
been   Serb   rule   and  Serb  schools   which    have  made   the 


232  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Nig-Pirot  region  definitely  Serb,  but  the  Bulgarians  forget 
that  it  has  been  equally  Bulgarian  rule  and  Bulgarian 
schools  which  have  determined  the  final  character  of  the 
Sofia  basin.  The  corollary  of  the  renewal  of  the  Bulgarian 
claim  to  Nig  would  be  a  revived  Serb  claim  to  Sofia  and  the 
one  is  no  more  absurd  and  unwarranted  than  the  other. 
Here  at  any  rate,  and  this  is  the  second  point  which  emerges 
from  this  riotous  chauvinism,  we  have  an  acknowledgment 
that  the  schools  have  influenced,  and  definitely  crystallized, 
the  national  consciousness  of  the  population,  though  it]|may 
well  be  doubted  whether,  once  definitely  roused  and 
formulated,  that  consciousness  could  ever  be  induced  to 
flow  into  another  channel.  If  the  Bulgarians  grudgingly 
acknowledge  that  the  Serb  schools  have  had  this  influence 
on  a  population  which  they  seek  to  claim  as  Bulgar  (with- 
out any  justification  whatever,  for  it  was  never  Bulgar  but 
only  amorphous) ,  and  if  they  even  go  so  far  as  to  imagine 
that  it  could  be  Bulgarized  by  the  establishment  of 
Bulgarian  schools,  what  then  becomes  of  the  contention 
that  the  population  of  central  Macedonia,  which  practically 
every  impartial  authority  regards  as  being  of  an  intermediate 
type,  is  so  definitely  Bulgarian  that  it  should  be  assigned 
to  Bulgaria  and  that  it  is  incapable  of  being  permanently 
acted  upon  by  Serb  influences  ?  If  the  Bulgarian  con- 
tentions be  taken  at  their  face  value,  if  they  really  believe, 
as  they  affect  to  believe,  that  Ni§  can  be  Bulgarized,  as 
according  to  them  it  has  been  previously  Serbized,  then 
a  fortiori  central  Macedonia  even  if,  as  they  also  assert,  of 
Bulgarian  character  is  capable  of  yielding  to  Serb  assimila- 
tion. In  short,  Bulgarian  chauvinists  in  their  frenzied 
eagerness  to  claim  everything  for  their  country  have, 
accepting  their  own  position,  knocked  the  bottom  out  of 
Bulgaria's  Macedonian  claims.  The  real  truth  is  that 
whatever  may  have  been  the  case  in  the  past.  Nig  is  now 
finally  Serb  as  Sofia  is  finally  Bulgarian,  and  that  the 
central  Macedonians  are  of  an  intermediate  type  which 
a  generation  of  Serb  rule  will  make  as  permanently  Serb  as 
a  generation    of   Bulgarian   rule  would   make   them    Bui- 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      233 

garian.  Finally,  we  have  in  the  above  manifestations  of 
Bulgarian  policy  abundant  evidence  of  a  definite  desire 
and  plan  to  attempt  the  forcible  Bulgarization  of  a  large 
part  of  Serbia,  v^hich  forms  an  illuminating  commentary 
on  the  assertion  that  the  Bulgarians  value  the  principle  of 
nationality  and  are  themselves  struggling  for  it.  They 
stand  self-confessed  as  striving  for  their  own  racial  pre- 
dominance at  the  expense  of  an  ancient  nationality  with  a 
history  greater  than  their  own  and  much  more  fertile  in 
cultural  advancement. 

Not  only  do  the  Bulgarians  desire  to  Bulgarize  part  of 
Serbia,  but  they  seek  the  final  and  entire  destruction  of 
that  State.  The  Berliner  Tagehlatt  of  January  30  gives 
an  interview  which  its  Sofia  correspondent  had  had  with 
Dr.  Radoslavov,  in  the  course  of  which  he  said  that  Serbia 
had  played  out  its  role  for  ever  and  that  Austria-Hungary 
would  of  course  retain  what  it  needed  in  order  to  obviate 
the  dangers  by  which  she  had  been  threatened.  In  the 
same  way  on  January  7  the  Vossische  Zeitung  reprinted 
part  of  a  conversation  between  Dr.  Mom6ilov,  the  Vice- 
President  of  the  Sobranje,  and  the  representative  of  the 
Hungarian  paper  Az-Est,  in  which  the  former  remarked  : 
"  Ceterum  censeo  Serbiam  esse  delendam ".  The  Bul- 
garians who  have  filled  the  world  with  their  clamour  for 
the  accomplishment  of  their  national  unity,  as  they  in- 
terpret it,  are  determined  so  far  as  they  can  to  prevent 
the  consummation  of  the  unity  of  the  Southern  Slavs, 
and  in  striving  against  it  they  cynically  admit  their 
jealousy  and  anger  at  the  idea  that  there  should  be  a 
Balkan  State  larger,  more  populous,  and  more  powerful 
than  Bulgaria.  In  the  Westminster  Gazette  of  November 
17,  1915,  will  be  found  a  lengthy  extract  from  an  inter- 
view granted  to  a  German  paper  by  M.  Kizov,  the 
Bulgarian  Minister  in  Berlin,  in  which  he  asserts  that  a 
governing  motive  for  the  Bulgarians  was  to  prevent  Serbo- 
Croat  unity,  since  if  the  Southern  Slavs  were  united  they 
would  be  more  powerful  than  the  Bulgarians.  It  is  thus 
not  national  rights  that  the  latter  desire  but  their  own  pre- 


234  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

dominance/  and  as  they  are  not  numerous  enough  to 
achieve  that  predominance  if  others  are  given  the  liberty  of 
full  development,  they  must  be  thv^arted,  divided,  left 
weak,  and  have  their  territory  partitioned  in  order  that 
Bulgaria  may  realize  her  ambition  of  being  the  mistress  of 
the  Balkans  ;  it  is  the  Prussian  spirit  exactly  reproduced 
in  this  people  which  its  admirers  are  always  telling  us 
is  a  peaceful,  non-imperialist,  peasant  democracy.  The 
idea  has  been  expressed  with  characteristic  coarseness  and 
brutality  by  the  Narodni  Prava,  the  government  organ, 
on  October  17,  1915,  within  a  week  of  the  declaration  of 
war.  In  the  course  of  an  article  on  Bulgarian  aims  it 
underlined  a  passage  in  which  it  was  asserted  that  the 
Serbs  had  taken  the  lives  of  the  Austrian  heir  and  heiress 
in  order  to  realize  their  impracticable  chauvinist  designs. 
The  foolish  Serb  government,  said  the  article,  expected 
to  unite  to  Serbia  fifteen  millions  of  Slavs,  and  the 
Bulgarians  did  not  admit  the  idea  that  Serbia  should  be 
united  to  those  Serbs,  therefore  the  Southern  Slav  slaves 
must  be  joined  by  the  Serbs  from  the  free  kingdom  of 
Serbia  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  cage.  On  May  19,  1916, 
the  same  paper  published  a  leading  article  under  the  title 
**  Generosity  at  the  Conclusion  of  Peace",  in  which  it 
says : — 

"Very  soon  the  Bulgarian  diplomats  will  have  to  speak 
at  the  general  peace  conference,  which  will  bring  about  the 
liquidation  of  the  present  war.  They  will  have  to  demon- 
strate and  theoretically  prove  the  Bulgarian  claims  which 
have  already  been  fully  established  by  the  force  of  our  arms. 
The  question  of  Serbia's  future  and  our  relations  with  the 
neighbouring  States,  etc.,  will  all  have  to  be  discussed  and 
definitely  formulated.  In  these  matters,  especially  in 
regarded  to  the  question  of  the  future  of  our  real  enemy — 

'  Bulgarian  publicists  have  never  made  any  secret  of  the  fact  that  the 
aim  of  Bulgaria  is  to  establish  a  Bulgarian  hegemony  in  the  Balkans. 
The  other  main  motive  avowed  during  the  last  two  years  is  opposition 
to  the  establishment  of  Russia  in  Constantinople.  The  two  motives 
are  of  course  correlative. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH   BULGARIA      235 

Serbia — our  diplomats  will  have  to  be  circumspect,  and 
most  important  of  all  they  will  have  to  be  strictly  in- 
exorable. In  this  question  our  diplomats  will  have  to  lay 
aside  all  sentiment,  all  humane  consideration  and  feeling. 
The  continued  existence  of  Serbia,  no  matter  in  what  form, 
means  the  subversion  of  all  peace  in  the  Balkans,  constant 
quarrels,  and  conflicts  between  Bulgaria  and  other  nations, 
and  a  permanent  obstacle  to  the  prosperity  and  peaceful 
development  of  Europe.  That  State,  which  since  the 
beginning  ot  its  independent  existence  has  been  a 
breeding-place  of  dissension  and  strife,  must  be  wiped 
from  off  the  face  of  the  earth,  in  order  to  establish  an 
understanding  for  peaceable  cultural  work  in  other  nations 
of  Europe  and  the  Balkans.  This  is  neither  malice  nor 
barbarity  on  our  part.  It  is  one  of  the  main  necessities 
for  the  future  of  humanity,  and  principally  for  ourselves 
and  our  neighbours.  To  this  question  it  is  most  suitable 
to  apply  the  words  of  the  German  political  genius, 
Bismarck,  spoken  by  him  on  the  night  from  the  1st  to 
the  2nd  of  September,  when  the  conditions  for  the  sur- 
render at  Sedan  and  the  rounding-up  of  the  French 
army  there  were  being  discussed.  Only  the  brutality 
of  the  Iron  Chancellor  in  face  of  the  entreaties  of  the 
French  secured  peace  and  prosperity  to  Germany  for 
forty-three  years.  The  relations  between  Germany  and 
her  western  neighbour  are  similar  to  those  between  Bul- 
garia and  Serbia.  That  is  why  it  is  the  bounden  duty 
of  our  diplomats  to  take  to  heart  Bismarck's  motto :  '  No 
generosity  at  the  conclusion  of  peace'".  This  is  the 
people  for  whom  there  are  still  to  be  found  intriguers  in 
our  midst,  a  people  which  has  never  as  a  nation  evinced 
gratitude  for  the  benefits  it  has  received,  and  is  now 
actuated  by  a  deadly  malice  against  its  neighbour. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  the  campaign  has  been  waged  by 
the  Bulgarians  with  such  ferocity,  if  such  be  the  ideas 
by  which  they  are  animated.  We  find  here  an  ex- 
planation of  the  systematic  looting  of  the  Serb  libraries, 
of  the  carrying  off  to   Bulgaria   all  the  movable   property 


236  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

which  is  desired  by  the  government  for  utilization  in  its 
own  country,  of  the  theft  of  agricultural  machinery 
supplied  to  the  Serb  peasantry  in  the  manner  described 
in  a  previous  chapter,  of,  worse  than  all,  the  massacres, 
of  which  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  they  have  been 
guilty.  I  well  remember  how  in  October  1915  a  young 
Serb  diplomatist,  in  conversation  with  me,  with  difficulty 
restrained  his  emotion  as  he  said,  "  What  we  fear  is  that 
the  Bulgarians  will  exterminate  the  population  in  the 
districts  they  enter".  On  the  evidence  of  German  wit- 
nesses, officers,  pastors,  and  women,  backed  by  documents 
and  photographs,  Professor  Schiemann  had  branded  Bul- 
garia's methods  of  war  in  1912-13  as  "  a  disgrace  to 
humanity  ",  and  it  is  hardly  likely  with  Germany's  example 
before  them,  and  against  the  Serbs,  that  the  methods  of 
the  Bulgarians  have  become  more  humane  even  though 
they  might  now  obtain  a  more  lenient  judgment  from 
the  Germans. 

The  Bulgarians  do  not  evince  that  gratitude  towards 
those  in  England  who  have  upheld  their  cause  which 
might  have  been  expected.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  efforts  on 
their  behalf,  and  the  manner  in  which  during  1915  our 
Foreign  Office  subordinated  the  interests  of  Serbia  to  the 
exigences  of  Bulgaria  and  her  demand  for  blackmail,  should 
have  earned  for  him  at  any  rate  a  measure  of  appreciation. 
Those,  however,  who  sacrifice  their  friends  to  their  enemies 
while  they  shake  the  confidence  of  the  former  rarely  earn 
the  gratitude,  still  less  the  respect,  of  the  latter,  who  are 
apt  to  despise  those  whom  they  dupe  and  of  whom  they 
make  use.  On  December  5,  1915,  for  example,  iheNarodni 
Prava  published  a  derisive  article,  "  The  bargainings  of 
the  bankrupts,"  directed  against  the  British  Premier  and 
Foreign  Secretary.  England  is  represented  as  partition- 
ing the  territories  of  others  in  order  to  bring  in  the 
neutrals,  as  increasing  her  offers  when  they  prove  unsuc- 
cessful, and  when  even  the  increased  offers  prove  to  be  of 
no  avail,  as  reducing  them  to  a  minimum  again.  It  can 
hardly  be  denied  that  there  is  a  certain  painful  accuracy 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      237 

in  this  summing  up  of  one  aspect  of  our  Balkan  policy, 
and  it  is  exemplified  in  our  dealings  with  Bulgaria  and 
Greece.  The  article  deals  with  special  severity  with  the 
famous  promise  of  aid  given,  as  all  the  world  believed  at 
the  time,  to  Serbia,  but  afterwards  explained  away  as  a 
promise  to  Greece  if  she  fulfilled  her  treaty,  and  with  the 
Foreign  Secretary's  explanation  that  his  words  "  without 
reserve  and  without  qualification "  were  a  "  political " 
promise,  and  meant  merely  that  Serbia  and  Greece  would 
not  be  required  to  yield  territory  to  Bulgaria — if  the  latter 
attacked  them !  '  The  Narodni  Prava  represents  the 
Ministers  as  losing  their  heads,  as  making  declarations 
only  to  deny  them,  of  declaring  to-day  that  they  will  help 
Serbia  and  to-morrow  hastening  to  explain  that  it  was 
only  a  "  political "    promise ;    they   have   become,  it   says, 

'  The  pertinent  passages  are  as  follows :  "  Not  only  is  there  no 
hostility  in  this  country  to  Bulgaria,  but  there  is  traditionally  a 
warm  feeling  of  sympathy  for  the  Bulgarian  people.  ...  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Bulgarian  mobilization  were  to  result  in  Bulgaria 
assuming  an  aggressive  attitude  on  the  side  of  our  enemies  we  are 
prepared  to  give  our  friends  in  the  Balkans  all  the  support  in  our 
power  in  the  manner  that  would  be  most  welcome  to  them,  in 
concert  with  our  Allies  without  reserve  and  without  qualification ". 
— Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  September  28,  1915. 
This  promise  seemed  as  explicit  and  categorical  as  it  well  could  be, 
but  it  was  subsequently  evacuated  of  all  intelligible  meaning.  "  On 
September  24,  when  I  first  informed  the  Serbian  government,  in 
answer  to  an  appeal  for  help,  of  the  despatch  of  troops,  I  did  so  in  the 
words  that  '  we  were  offering  to  Greece  to  send  forces  to  Salonica 
to  help  her  to  fulfil  her  obligations  towards  Serbia ',  I  said  nothing  as 
to  what  we  could,  or  could  not,  do  in  the  contingency  of  Greece 
refusing  to  help  Serbia.  ...  As  regards  the  last  part  of  the  question, 
I  do  not  understand  how  the  words  '  without  qualification  and  without 
reserve  '  could  have  any  other  construction  than  the  political  one  I 
have  placed  on  them,  viz.  that  promises  and  concessions  previously 
suggested  to  Bulgaria  were  at  an  end,  and  that  our  troops  would  be 
used  solely  to  help  our  friends  and  fight  our  and  their  enemies  ".—Sir 
Edward  Grey,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  November  9,  1915,  in  answer 
to  Mr.  Ronald  M'Neill.  It  surely  hardly  needed  a  formal  undertaking 
for  people  to  understand  that  our  troops  would  only  help  our  friends 
and  fight  our  enemies  I  Even  so  the  British  ministry  endeavoured 
to  get  out  of  its  undertaking,  and  the  troops  at  first  were  forbidden  to 
cross  the  Serb  frontier. 


238  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

a  mock  with  their  theories  on  political  and  non-political 
promises.  From  Bulgaria  that  is  indeed  black  ingratitude, 
however  appropriate  such  words  might  seem  in  the  mouth 
of  an  Englishman,  not  to  say  a  Serb.  It  is,  after  all,  only 
another  exemplification  of  the  old  truth  that  to  stand  firm 
by  your  friends  is  the  only  way  by  which  to  gain  the 
respect  even  of  enemies. 

That  Bulgaria  in  certain  eventualities  would  be  willing 
to  cut  her  losses  by  abandoning  her  present  allies  is  highly 
probable.  Her  past  policy  shows  that  she  would  not  be 
deterred  by  any  scruples  of  honour  or  plain  dealing,  and 
it  is  fairly  evident  that  the  possibility  of  another  act  of 
betrayal  has  by  no  means  been  lost  sight  of  by  her  rulers. 
Just  as  the  Hungarians  have  endeavoured  to  make  use  of 
the  English  Press, ^  so  from  Bulgaria  there  has  been  in 
the  past  the  pretence  of  an  existence  of  a  pro-Entente 
party,  so  that  if  ever  a  change  become  advisable  the  plea 
might  be  put  forward  that  the  Bulgarian  nation  was  not 
behind  King  Ferdinand's  betrayal  of  the  Slav  cause  and 
should  not  be  punished  for  his  mistakes.  As  has  been 
seen  above,  that  is  no  more  than  a  pretence  in  view  of  the 
expressed  opinions  of  the  so-called  pro-Entente  leaders. 
It  is  very  noteworthy  that  in  the  discussions  which  were 
alleged  to  have  taken  place  between  the  Bulgarian  and 
German  authorities  the  former  were  stated  to  have  pointed 
out  that  they  have  gained  their  end  in  the  war,  and 
that  if  further  efforts  were  required  further  rewards  must 
be   promised.      What   is   the   assumption    underlying   this 

'  Letters  from  Hungary,  if  genuine,  pass  the  Hungarian  censor  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  they  are  full  of  diatribes  against  Count  Tisza. 
Cui  bono  ?  To  whose  advantage  was  it  that  the  combined  attack  upon 
Serbia  was  described  as  bluff  up  to  the  last  moment  ?  To  whose 
advantage  that  the  old  fallacy  of  regarding  all  "Hungarians"  as  Magyars 
should  still  be  maintained  ?  To  whose  advantage  that  it  should  be  set 
forth  week  by  week  that  the  heart  of  the  Magyars  is  not  in  the  war  ? 
It  has  been  the  frenzied  chauvinism  of  the  Magyars  and  their  gross 
misgovernment  that  has  been  largely  responsible  for  years  for  some 
of  the  most  sinister  aspects  of  the  Near  Eastern  problem.  The  only 
reasonable  explanation  is  that  the  Hungarian  government  wishes  not  to 
be  without  sympathizers  in  the  Entente  camp. 


THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      239 

attitude?  Prima  facie  it  would  seem  that  Bulgaria's 
Macedonian  ends  cannot  be  considered  as  attained  until 
the  final  victory  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  that  Bulgaria 
must  go  on  on  pain  of  losing  what  she  has  so  far  won. 
The  underlying  assumption  is  obviously  this,  that  it  is 
open  to  Bulgaria  at  any  time  to  make  her  peace  with  the 
Entente  on  terms  that  she  should  be  allowed  to  retain 
Macedonia,  for  only  on  that  assumption  could  Bulgaria 
maintain  that  her  ends  have  been  secured  and  that  fresh 
efforts  cannot  be  required  of  her.  This  idea  has  been 
fostered  in  England  by  those  who  always  stand  by  Bulgaria. 
In  certain  sections  of  our  Press  it  was  frequently  pointed 
out  last  winter  that  Bulgaria  had  won  what  she  was 
fighting  for,  and  would  probably  be  henceforth  lukewarm 
in  the  Germanic  cause.  Again,  the  assumption  is  a  bargain 
by  which  Bulgaria  should  be  allowed  to  keep  at  any  rate 
her  Macedonian  conquests,  a  bargain  which  would  be  dis- 
honouring in  the  last  degree  to  any  statesman  of  the 
Entente  who  should  entertain  the  idea  of  entering  into 
it — more  dishonouring  to  him  than  to  the  Bulgarian  states- 
man who  after  betraying  one  side  (by  dishonest  negotiation) 
should  afterwards  betray  the  other.  It  is  inconceivable 
after  all  that  has  happened — or  it  should  be  inconceivable 
— that  such  a  bargain  should  be  struck.  Encouragement 
was  unfortunately  given  to  such  ideas  in  the  mind  of  the 
Bulgarians  by  a  passage  in  the  interview  accorded  by 
M.  Sazanov  to  M.  Naudeau,  the  special  correspondent  of 
the  Paris  Journal,  which  was  telegraphed  to  England  on 
October  5,  1915 :  "  That  people,  the  Bulgarian  people, 
Eussia  created  it  and  cared  for  it  in  its  trouble.  Further, 
however  great  msbj  be  its  errors,  maternal  Russia  will 
never  cast  off  its  child ;  she  will  always  be  ready  to  open 
her  arms  to  it."  These  words  were  a  direct  encouragement 
to  the  Bulgarians  to  hold  fast  by  the  idea  that  whatever 
they  may  do,  however  grievously  they  may  sin  against  their 
benefactors,  however  great  their  treachery,  they  have  only 
in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  their  plans  to  cry  peccavimus 
to  be  received  again  into  the  arms  of  Russia  and  to  escape 


240  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  consequences  of  their  deeds,  or  even  to  receive  as  a 
reward  for  their  penitence  what  they  had  sought  by  their 
wrong-doing.  It  is  fairly  certain  that  they  are  reckoning 
on  the  sentimentaHty  of  the  AlHes.  There  is  a  story,  the 
authenticity  of  which  is  guaranteed  by  those  from  whom 
it  emanates,  that  a  Sofia  soHcitor,  one  Ivan  Dimitrov,  had 
been  staying  for  some  time  till  the  early  part  of  last  year 
in  Geneva,  and  represented  himself  as  an  ex-secretary  in 
the  Sofia  Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  a  personal  friend  of 
King  Ferdinand.  A  Belgrade  merchant,  also  staying  in 
Geneva,  reproached  him  for  the  fact  that  Bulgaria  had 
attacked  Serbia  at  the  moment  when  Serbia  had  yielded 
to  her  demands.  After  saying  that  Bulgaria  was  bound 
to  join  the  Central  Powers  in  order  to  prevent  Russia 
coming  to  the  Dardanelles  and  to  prevent  Serbia  from 
becoming  larger,  which  two  things  the  Bulgars  must  im- 
peratively hinder,  he  replied  to  a  question  as  to  what  the 
Bulgars  would  do  in  the  event  of  the  Allies  winning  the 
war,  "We  will  cut  off  the  heads  of  Ferdinand  and  Eado- 
slavov,  and  afterwards  we  will  go  to  Petrograd,  and  fall  on 
our  knees  in  front  of  the  Tsar  asking  his  mercy.  Russia 
will  be  moved  with  compassion,  and  nothing  will  happen 
to  us  ".I  Without  demanding  that  anything  special  should 
"  happen  to  "  the  Bulgars,  at  the  very  least  we  should  see 
to  it  that  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  retain  their  spoils 
of  war.2 

We  have  to  remember  what  would  be  the  position  of 
Serbia  if  the  statement  made  by  the  Allies  just  previous  to 

'  The  new  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  M.  Miljukov,  was  at  one  time  a 
professor  in  Sofia,  and  is  a  very  strong  Bulgarophil.  His  expression  of 
Bulgarophil  feelings  in  the  French  Press  during  his  visit  to  France  and 
Switzerland  last  autumn  gave  rise  to  some  feeling  in  Southern  Slav 
circles. —  Vide  La  Serbie,  September  17,  1916.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
this  obsession  will  find  no  place  in  his  oflBcial  policy :  we  have  suffered 
more  than  sufficient  losses  owing  to  our  persistent  Bulgarophilism. 

'  The  manner  in  which  the  Bulgars  have  fought  against  the  Russians 
ought  surely  to  have  destroyed  the  last  illusions  on  the  subject  of  this 
people,  which  demonstratively  denies  its  Slav  character,  and  claims,  with 
justice,  to  be  of  Turanian  stock  and  congeners  of  the  Turks  and  Magyars. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      241 

the  Bulgarian  attack  that  the  offers  previously  made  to 
Bulgaria  had  lapsed  were  to  be  treated  as  a  scrap  of  paper 
and  if  those  offers  were  to  be  renewed.  The  result  of  the 
Dalmatian  agreement  is  that  Salonica  remains  for  Serbia 
of  practically  undiminished  importance  as  giving  her  a 
commercial  backdoor  free  of  Italian  domination,  a  point 
the  importance  of  which  has  been  brought  out  by  the 
analysis  given  above  of  the  effect  of  that  agreement  upon 
Serbia's  future  maritime  position.  The  line  of  the  Vardar, 
which  connects  her  with  Salonica,  will  assume  an  even 
greater  importance  if  certain  canalization  schemes  mature. 
English  engineers  are  already  studying  the  project  of  making 
the  Vardar  and  Morava  rivers  navigable  and  connecting 
them  by  a  canal  through  the  relatively  easy  waterparting 
which  divides  their  head-streams.  Such  a  canal  system 
would  unite  Salonica  by  water-carriage  with  the  Danube 
and  the  central  European  canals  connected  with  it.  The 
great  importance  of  such  a  project  is  obvious.  If  central 
Macedonia  be  given  to  Bulgaria,  then  the  latter  will  march 
with  the  frontier  of  Albania,  which  is  apparently  destined 
to  become  an  Italian  protectorate,  and  in  any  case  will 
be  in  close  contact  with  the  district  of  Valona.  As  has 
been  seen,  on  the  Adriatic  a  small  stretch  of  coast  from 
Dubrovnik  downwards  will  be  in  Serb  possession,  but  above 
that  the  coast  will  be  commanded  by  the  Italian  islands 
till  at  Trogir  commences  Italian  Dalmatia.  Northward, 
again,  the  Croatian  coasts  will  be  commanded  by  the  Italian 
islands  in  the  Quarnero,  which  link  Italian  Dalmatia  to 
Istria.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  Serbia  would  be 
entirely  cut  off  from  Greece,  and  could  be  held  tight  in 
an  Italo-Bulgarian  vice  which  would  render  her  inde- 
pendence precarious  unless  she  relied  upon  some  stronger 
Power.  The  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  would  be  even 
more  badly  circumstanced  from  the  point  of  view  of  render- 
ing aid  than  they  are  at  present,  for  the  lines  from  Salonica 
to  Skoplje  and  to  Monastir  would  pass  through  Bulgarian 
territory ;  in  fact,  they  could  render  no  direct  assistance  of 
any  description.     North  of   the  Drave,   again,   would   be 

16 


242  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Hungary,  which  for  some  time,  at  any  rate,  would  be  sore 
at  the  losses  sustained  in  an  unfavourable  issue  of  the  war, 
and  only  by  two  narrow  necks  of  land,  north-eastward 
through  Roumania  and  north-westward  through  German 
Austria,  could  Serbia  communicate  with  the  rest  of  Europe. 
It  would,  in  fact,  be  difficult  to  devise  any  means  more 
calculated  to  throw  Serbia  into  the  arms  of  Germany,  as 
the  only  Power  which  could  render  direct  assistance  to  her 
if  assailed  by  a  hostile  coaHtion,  than  the  surrender  of 
central  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria,  apart  altogether  from  the 
sentimental  and  psychological  reaction  of  such  a  loss.  The 
position  of  the  Southern  Slavs  will  in  any  case  be  difficult, 
as  they  will  be  almost  surrounded  by  States  which  have 
either  lost  territory  as  the  result  of  Southern  Slav  uni- 
fication, or  are  jealous  at  the  prospect  of  the  rise  of  an 
important  Jugoslav  State,  and  if  they  are  to  be  altogether 
cut  off  from  the  outside  world  save  through  Roumania  and 
Germany,  the  effect  may  be  such  as  largely  to  nullify  some 
of  the  gains  to  Europe  of  a  successful  result  of  the  war. 
It  is  not  a  mere  question  of  pique  or  of  cutting  off  the 
nose  to  spite  the  face,  but  a  question  of  the  political  results 
which  may  follow  from  the  hard  facts  of  political  geography. 
To  go  to  war  in  order,  inter  alia,  that  the  Germanic  Powers 
should  not  completely  absorb  the  Southern  Slavs,  and  to 
impose  terms  of  peace  which  might  force  the  latter  into 
the  arms  of  Germany,  would  indeed  be  an  act  of  supreme 
folly. 

At  the  moment  of  writing  it  is  of  immediate  importance 
that  an  unequivocal  assurance  should  be  given  to  the  Serbs. 
Is  it  really  seriously  proposed  that  the  Serbs  should  be 
asked  in  conjunction  with  the  Allies  to  conquer  Macedonia, 
already  twice  acquired  by  them  at  the  cost  of  great 
bloodshed,  only  in  order  that  when  conquered  again  it 
should  be  handed  over  to  Bulgaria?  Doubtless  these 
questions  have  been  asked  at  the  recent  conferences  by 
the  statesmen  of  Serbia,  who  would  hardly  receive  with 
equanimity  any  suggestion  that  they  should  act  as  a 
catspaw  to  pull  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for  Bulgaria. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  WITH   BULGARIA      243 

The  various  phases  of  the  problem  of  Macedonia  and 
the  settlement  with  Bulgaria  have  now  been  passed  in 
review,  and  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  this  study 
are  obvious  enough.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the 
Bulgarians  are  not  in  substantial  accord  on  the  policy 
that  has  been  pursued  by  their  government ;  it  has  been 
seen  that  the  so-called  pro-Ententist  M.  Gesov  has  him- 
self proclaimed  this  accord  and  acclaimed  the  alliance 
with  the  Central  Powers.  So  far  are  the  Bulgarians  from 
fighting  merely  for  the  claims  of  nationality  that  we  find 
them  extending  these  claims  to  a  large  area  of  the  old 
territory  of  the  modern  kingdom  of  Serbia,  and  again  it 
has  been  seen  that  M.  GeSov  endorses  these  claims.  We 
find  that  the  Bulgars  are  pursuing  a  policy  of  aggressive 
imperialism,  and  are  entering  upon  a  campaign  of  forcible 
Bulgarization  directed  against  undubitable  Serbs.  We  find 
the  open  avowal  that  they  will  not  permit  the  union  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  if  they  can  help  it,  that  they  are  aiming 
at  the  complete  and  permanent  destruction  of  Serbia,  that 
they  assert  the  necessity  of  Bulgarian  predominance  in 
the  Balkans,  and  that  it  is  in  fact  for  the  hegemony 
of  the  peninsula  for  which  they  are  struggling.  No  plea 
can,  therefore,  be  made  out  for  a  special  treament  of 
Bulgaria  on  any  of  the  grounds  which  have  been  brought 
forward  by  their  special  friends  in  this  country,  or  for 
sharply  differentiating  their  case  from  that  of  our  other 
enemies. 

On  every  ground  alike  of  honour  and  policy  we  are  bound 
to  stand  by  Serbia,  our  Balkan  ally.  Though  the  Balkan 
crisis  was  the  occasion  and  not  the  cause  of  the  war,  yet 
the  advance  of  the  Germanic  Powers  in  the  Balkans  was 
one  of  the  prime  gains  which  those  Powers  sought  to 
harvest  as  the  result  of  the  war.  Indeed,  supposing  it 
to  be  conceivable  that  a  peace  should  be  patched  up  by 
which  the  Central  Empires  should  be  forced  to  relinquish 
their  gains  in  the  east  and  west,  and  to  retain  their  present 
position  in  the  Near  East,  their  statesmen  would  probably 
consider  that  the   war  had   been   well  worth  while.     The 


244  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

cause  of  Serbia,  therefore,  forms  an  integral  part  of  the 
general  cause  of  the  Allies,  and  interest  no  less  than  mihtary 
and  poHtical  honour  demands  that  that  cause  should  enjoy 
our  full  support.  No  State,  not  even  Belgium,  has  suffered 
more  in  the  general  struggle,  and  it  is  known  now,  though 
not  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  that  the  aggres- 
sion upon  Serbia  was  as  deliberate  and  unprovoked  as 
the  attack  upon  Belgium :  this  has  been  determined 
definitely  apart  from  all  arguments  drawn  from  pohtical 
study  by  the  revelation  of  Signer  Giolitti.  That  war 
has  been  loyally  waged  by  Serbia,  which  has  refused 
to  accept  a  separate  peace  even  at  the  time  when  she 
was  being  left  to  face  alone  the  great  attack  which  was 
to  break  down  her  resistance  in  the  field.  It  cannot 
candidly  be  said  that  she  has  during  the  war  received 
that  support  and  recognition,  or  even  at  times  sympathy, 
which  as  a  faithful  ally  she  had  a  right  to  expect,  apart 
from  the  fact  that  her  cause,  as  will  be  seen  later,  is  in 
every  sense  the  cause  of  England  as  of  France  and  Russia. 
It  is  now  coming  to  be  recognized,  though  even  yet  only 
slowly,  that  a  well-nigh  fatal  mistake  was  made  when 
she  was  left  to  face  the  double  attack  alone. 

It  was  the  Serb  army  which  was  acting  as  a  flank  guard 
to  our  Gallipoli  enterprise,  and  which  was,  in  effect,  shield- 
ing Egypt.  This  became  apparent  when  that  army  was 
forced  to  yield  its  ground  and  to  evacuate  its  territory ;  the 
Gallipoli  expedition  had  to  be  withdrawn,  the  Turks  in 
Mesopotamia,  with  renewed  supplies,  were  able  to  make 
head  against  our  army,^  and  Egypt  was  so  far  in  a  position 
to  be  threatened  that  large  forces  were  concentrated  there 
for  its  defence— in  short,  the  whole  aspect  of  the  eastern 
campaign  was  altered.  The  debt  which  we  owe  the 
Serbs  and  our  own  interests  cannot  allow  us  now  to  play 
them   false   and  to   make   a  corrupt    bargain   with    their 

'  The  fall  of  Kut  was  a  logical  result  of  the  fall  of  Belgrade  and  Nis, 
for  without  German  supplies  and  German  officers  it  is  doubtful  how 
far  the  Turks  could  successfully  have  withstood  the  advance  of  the 
relieving  force. 


THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      245 

implacable  enemies  at  their  expense.  I  cannot  imagine 
that,  in  any  other  circumstances,  or  with  any  other  pro- 
tagonists, any  such  course  would  be  advocated  for  a 
moment,  but  some  malign  influence  seems  for  years  to  have 
manifested  itself  in  our  Balkan  policy,  probably  the  influ- 
ences of  ignorance,  in  part,  and  the  sheer  indifference  to 
which  a  British  diplomatist  alluded  some  years  ago  when 
he  said  that  "England  does  not  care  a  damn  about  the 
Balkans."  Added  to  this  has  been  the  curious  infatuation 
which  has  caused  the  greater  part  of  our  Press  and  of  our 
publicists  to  regard  Bulgaria  as  the  only  Balkan  State 
whose  wishes  were  ever  to  be  considered.  It  is  time  to  be 
done  with  such  ignorance  and  folly.  Any  sacrifice  of 
Serbia's  interests  to  Bulgarian  perfidy  now  would  finally 
seal  our  Balkan  policy  as  untrustworthy  to  those  who 
fight  with  us,  and  as  plainly  lacking  in  the  old  British 
staunchness  and  sense  of  honourable  obligation.  The 
effect  of  such  a  betrayal  upon  Roumania  might  be  dis- 
astrous. 

There  is  no  need  to  be  vindictive  in  the  terms  of  peace  to 
be  imposed  upon  Bulgaria,  not  because  she  has  done  any- 
thing to  deserve  leniency  of  treatment,  but  in  the  future 
interests  of  the  Balkans.  One  thing  is  certain,  that  Ferdi- 
nand should  have  to  go  as  the  condition  precedent  to  the 
granting  of  any  terms  of  accommodation.  Throughout  hi? 
long  reign  he  has  lived  in  an  atmosphere  of  deceit,  lov 
cunning,  and  chicanery,  and  he  has  exaggerated  rather  than 
modified  favourably  precisely  those  servile  vices  to  which 
his  recently  emancipated  politicians  were  already  too  prone. 
He  has  tricked  and  duped  all  with  whom  he  has  had  any 
dealings,  and  his  retention  of  power  would  in  itself  con- 
stitute an  absolutely  unconditional  condemnation  of  the 
schemes  to  which  reference  has  been  made.  There  can 
be  no  question  of  any  concessions  to  Bulgaria,  in  any  event 
in  central  Macedonia,  for  the  reasons  already  given.  Nor, 
indeed,  if  Bulgaria  is  to  be  treated  like  any  other  enemy 
can  there  be  any  question  of  territorial  gains  at  all  at  the 
expense  of  Serbia.     It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that 


2i6  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

neither  before  1912  did  Serbia  recognize  the  justice  of 
Bulgaria's  Macedonian  claims,  nor  did  the  deHmitation 
clauses  of  the  1912  Treaty  constitute  any  such  recognition, 
nor  still  less  did  the  concessions  acquiesced  in  by  Serbia 
on  September  1,  1915,  which  latter  were  nothing  more 
than  blackmail  extorted  from  her  by  the  military  necessi- 
ties of  the  moment  and  the  importunity  of  her  aUies. 
Neither  in  honour  nor  in  policy  can  there  be  any  reopening 
of  negotiations  with  Bulgaria.  Such  negotiations  have 
already  cost  us  dear.  It  is  true  that  Greece  was  bound  by 
the  terms  of  her  treaty  with  Serbia  to  come  to  the  aid 
of  the  latter,  but  it  must  not  he  forgotten  that,  when  from 
the  necessities  of  Serbia  her  allies  wrung  such  great  con- 
cessions for  her  enemy,  we  at  the  same  time  destroyed 
the  raison  d'etre  of  the  treaty  from  the  point  of  view  of 
Greece.  The  treaty  was  designed  to  prevent  such  an 
aggrandizement  of  Bulgaria  as  might  lead  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Bulgarian  hegemony,  and  to  secure  a  common 
Serbo-Greek  frontier — objects  which  were  frustrated  largely 
or  completely  by  the  concessions  in  question.  The  con- 
cessions, it  is  true,  were  withdrawn,  but  it  is  not  altogether 
surprising  if  the  Greeks  were  unable  to  keep  pace  with 
those  sudden  and  pitiably  undignified  reversals  of  policy  so 
trenchantly  satirized  by  the  Bulgarian  oflBcial  organ  already 
quoted. 'f  What  would  be  the  effect  produced  if  that  with- 
drawal were  itself  withdrawn  ?  What  little  credit  for  states- 
manship, for  stability  of  purpose,  for  understanding  of  the 
Balkan  position  which  still  remains  to  us  would  be  entirely 
lost,  and  we  should  be  left  with  a  reputation  for  naked 
perfidy.  As  Bulgaria  has  elected  to  throw  in  her  lot  with 
the  Central  Empires,  she  must  abide  the  result.  As  for 
any  genuine  movement  of  Bulgarian  opinion  in  a  direction 
hostile  to  King  Ferdinand  and  favourable  to  the  Allies,  it 
has  already  been  seen  that  there  is  no  ground  whatever  for 
such  an  assumption.     That  when  an  advance  is  made  by 

'  It  is  true  that  the  later  policy  of  Greece  has  been  moulded  by  the 
personal  will  of  the  King,  but  it  is  undeniable  that  the  position  of 
M.  Venizelos  was  badly  shaken  by  the  course  of  the  Allied  diplomacy. 


THE  SETTLEMENT  WITH  BULGARIA      247 

the  Allies,  and  the  plotters  of  Sofia  see  that  the  game  is  up, 
there  will  be  the  pretence  of  such  a  movement  is  more  than 
likely,  as  also  that  it  will  meet  with  a  response  in  certain 
quarters  of  England ;  but  if  we  would  be  true  to  ourselves 
and  to  our  friends,  such  a  feigned  repentance  should  not 
modify  the  Macedonian  settlement. 

When  Bulgaria  declared  war  one  or  two  writers,  not 
hitherto  conspicuous  for  their  support  of  Serbia's  cause, 
in  the  first  flush  of  anger,  characterized  by  a  passage  from 
one  extreme  to  the  other,  spoke  wildly  of  a  possible  dis- 
appearance of  Bulgaria,  and  one  of  them  concluded  a 
paragraph  with  the  words  ''finis  Bulgariae  ".  There  can 
be  no  end  of  a  nation  short  of  extermination  ;  and  while 
the  Bulgarians  have  no  claim  on  our  regard,  it  would  be 
foolish  and  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  all  concerned 
to  partition  the  territory  of  Old  Bulgaria,^  it  would  be  a 
mere  copying  of  the  action  which  has  brought  Bulgaria 
into  disrepute.  That  Ferdinand  should  be  dethroned  and 
that  Bulgaria  should  be  confined  roughly  to  the  fimits 
of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  together  with  the  loss  of  all 
hopes  of  Balkan  hegemony  will  be  punishment  sufficient. 
Placed  under  the  rule  of  a  Slav  prince  with  a  thorough 
purge  of  those  political  elements  which  have  dragged  her 
down  there  is  still  a  chance  that  Bulgaria  may  settle  down 
to  a  peaceful  and  orderly  development  undisturbed  by  the 
mirage  of  a  Balkan  empire.  She  would  still  retain  all 
the  lands  (excepting  indeed  the  southern  Dobrudza)  which 
are  indubitably  Bulgarian,  and  would  therefore  lack  the 
incentive  to  an  adventurous  policy  which  would  be 
furnished  by  the  grievance  of  a  partition  of  the  genuinely 
national  territory;  and  while,  as  I  have  said,  the  idea  of 
an  approximate  Serbo-Bulgarian  friendship  is  Utopian, 
and   any  policy  based  upon  such  an  idea  foolish,  yet  no 

•  Minor  rectifications  apart.  In  Macedonia  the  Serbs  should  be  given 
Strumica  as  a  safeguard  for  the  Salonica  railway,  which  at  this  point 
the  present  frontier  closely  approaches.  The  Bulgars  in  December 
1914  utilized  this  salient  to  cut  the  railway  at  a  critical  juncture  when 
Serbia  was  short  of  munitions. 


248  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

unnecessary  hindrance  should  be  placed  in  the  way  of 
an  eventual  rapprochement  between  the  two  States.  We 
stand  pledged,  moreover,  to  the  principle  of  nationality, 
and  our  sincerity  should  be  proved  in  the  case  of  Bulgaria, 
perfidious  enemy  though  she  has  been. 

Upon  a  review,  then,  of  all  the  factors  in  the  problem, 
the  past  history  of  Macedonia,  its  ethnographic  charac- 
teristics, the  Treaty  of  1912,  Bulgaria's  two  attacks  upon 
Serbia,  our  obligations  in  honour  to  a  sorely  tried  ally, 
the  fact  that  Bulgaria  is  fighting  for  predominance  and 
the  complete  extinction  of  her  hated  rival,  the  unanimity 
in  this  course  which  characterizes  Bulgarian  statesmen 
and  the  Sobranje,  and  their  support  of  King  Ferdinand, 
such  should  be  the  nature  of  the  settlement  with  Bul- 
garia— restriction  to  the  boundaries  of  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest.  We  must  have  an  end  of  the  pro-Bulgar 
sentimentalism  which,  exhibited  in  the  greater  part  of 
the  Press  and  by  almost  all  our  publicists,  has  tended  to 
obscure  counsel,  and  to  dismay  our  friends  and  allies  by 
a  display  of  weakness  without  excuse  ;  we  must  have  done 
with  the  folly  which  to  all  that  has  gone  before  would 
add  this  last,  that  Serbia  should  even  now  be  sacrificed 
and  Bulgaria  should  gain  by  her  stab  in  the  back  what 
she  sought.  We  have  one  good  and  loyal  friend  in  the 
Balkans,  and  that  is  the  Serb  people,  and  it  is  the  Serbs 
and  their  interests  which  must  form  the  pivot  of  our 
Balkan  policy. 


CHAPTEE  VIII 
THE  FUTURE  SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE 


It  cannot  be  said  that  the  proposals  set  forth  in  the 
foregoing  chapters  are  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  blind 
adherence  to  the  most  extreme  Southern  Slav  opinion,  for 
in  several  directions,  as  has  been  said,  they  fall  consider- 
ably short,  for  the  reasons  given,  of  what  has  been  claimed 
by  some,  at  any  rate,  of  their  spokesmen.  On  the  other 
hand,  stress  has  been  laid  on  those  claims  which  are  in- 
dubitably justified,  though  in  some  directions  they  have 
been  notably  infringed  by  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente, 
a  circumstance  which  has  vastly  enhanced  the  difficulty 
of  making  moderate  proposals  in  other  directions  and  of 
avoiding  the  appearance  of  consistently  loading  the  dice 
against  the  Southern  Slavs.  A  brief  conspectus  of  the 
elements  of  the  new  Southern  Slavdom  as  above  outlined 
may  be  of  use. 

The  State  would  be,  considered  as  a  whole,  remarkably 
homogeneous,  since  only  in  the  north-east  and  south-west 
would  there  be  any  appreciable  admixture  of  alien  elements. 
The  vast  bulk  of  the  population  would  be  composed  of 
Southern  Slavs.  Of  these  the  Slovenes  inhabit  the  area 
to  the  west  of  the  present  Croatian  frontier  with  a  large 
majority  of  Croats  in  eastern  Istria.  It  has  already  been 
pointed  out  that  though  they  have  been  for  centuries 
under  the  Habsburg  sway,  and  were  formerly  noted  for 
their  loyalty— they  are  said  to  have  given  as  their  reason 

249 


250  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

for  not  rising  in  1848  that  they  had  not  been  ordered  to 
do  so  by  the  Emperor — they  have  now  become  fully 
possessed  of  the  consciousness  of  their  race  brotherhood 
with  their  Serbo-Croat  neighbours,  with  whom  they  pro- 
claim their  essential  solidarity  and  unity.  The  total 
number  of  the  Slovenes  is  about  1,400,000. 

Next  to  them  come  the  Serbo-Croats,  the  term  used  as  a 
common  designation  for  these  two  branches  of  the  race. 
The  Serbs  and  Croats  are  ethnologically  one  people,  speaking 
one  language,  with  but  slight  tribal  differences.  By  race 
the  inhabitants  of  Croatia,  a  great  part  of  Slavonia  with 
the  exception  of  Syrmia  or  Srem,  and  northern  Dalmatia 
are  Croat,  while  the  inhabitants  of  Syrmia,  the  Serb 
Vojvodina  of  Hungary,  southern  Dalmatia,  Bosnia,  the 
Hercegovina,  Montenegro,  and  Serbia  belong  to  the  Serb 
stock.  Politically,  however,  the  real  division  is  by  religion, 
Orthodox  Croats  considering  themselves  Serbs,  and  Catholic 
Serbs  considering  themselves  Croats,  and  in  that  sense 
the  terms  will  be  used  in  this  section.  It  is,  however,  to  be 
noted  that  there  is  a  certain  misuse  of  terms  in  speaking 
of  the  Hercegovinian  Catholics — among  the  purest  Serbs — 
as  Croats,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  the  Dalmatians  in 
recent  years  have  become  among  the  warmest  partizans  of 
a  greater  Serbia.  The  Serbs,  including  Orthodox  Croats, 
use  the  national  phonetic  alphabet  known  as  the  Cyrillic, 
akin  to  the  Russian,  and  ultimately  derived  from  the  Greek. 
It  has  discarded  useless  letters  such  as  c  (which  is  either 
k  or  s)  and  has  added  others,  its  phonetic  quality  greatly 
aiding  the  work  of  education.  The  Croats  use  the  Latin 
alphabet,  but  with  various  diacritic  marks  in  order  to  render 
the  sounds  of  the  language:  this  is  the  only  "correct" 
way  of  spelling  Serb  words  in  our  alphabet,  and  it  is  a 
pity  that  it  is  not  generally  followed.  In  the  Austrian 
crown-lands  the  Croats  number  some  700,000,  of  whom 
168,184  are  to  be  found  in  Istria,  and  the  remainder  in 
Dalmatia,  where  the  river  Cetina  marks  the  old  boundary 
between  Croat  and  Serb.  In  the  Hungarian  crown-lands, 
the  kingdom  of  Croatia- Slavonia  has  a  population  of  over 


THE  FUTURE   SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE    251 


2,621,954,  of  whom  1,638,354  are  Croats,  and  644,955 
Serbs.  There  are  some  300,000  Croats  and  Slovenes  in 
the  south-west  of  Hungary  between  the  Mur  and  the 
Drave  and  in  the  adjacent  region. 

Next  in  geographical  order  come  the  Serbs.  "  In  Bosnia 
there  are  three  religions  but  only  one  nationality — the 
Serb ".  So  wrote  Baron  von  Kallay  in  that  history  of 
the  Serbs  which,  as  he  used  to  relate,  was  the  first  book 
he  put  on  the  Index  when,  after  the  occupation  of  Bosnia, 
he  became  governor.  Using  the  two  terms  "  Serb  "  and 
"  Croat ",  however,  in  their  political  sense,  we  find  in 
Bosnia  some  856,158  Serbs,  451,686  Croats,  and  626,649 
Serb  Moslems.  The  last-named  include  the  old  nobility 
of  Bosnia,  who  became  renegade  on  the  conquest  in  order 
to  preserve  their  position.  The  "  Croats  "  here  are  entirely 
Serb  by  race,  as  can  be  seen  by  their  geographical  distri- 
bution in  the  following  table,  where  it  will  be  noticed  that 
the  Orthodox  are  strongest  in  north-west  Bosnia,  nearest 
Croatia,  while  the  Catholics  are  strongest  in  the  centre  and 
south-east.  The  figures  are  those  of  the  census  of  1895,  as 
I  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  figures  of  any  later  census 
given  in  the  same  manner.  They  serve  to  indicate,  however, 
the  distribution  of  creeds  in  Bosnia  and  the  Hercegovina. 


Orthodox. 

Mohammedan. 

Catholic. 

Bosnia — 

Sarajevo 

72,904 

111,984 

88,096 

Banjaluka 

195,039 

73,016 

59,493 

Bihac   ... 

101,152 

81,777 

8,726 

Dolnja  Tuzla  ... 

150,814 

155,780 

49,080 

Travnik 

78,448 

69,940 

90,559 

Hercegovina — 

Mostar 

74,889 

56,135 

88,188 

673,246 

548,632 

834,142 

43  per  cent. 

35  per  cent. 

21  per  cent. 

The  areas  are    those   of  the    six    "  circles "  into  which 
the  country  was  divided  by  the  Austrians.     The  Krajina 


252    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 


t- 

o 

o 

C3 

o 

■^ 

C3 

o 

o 

o 

»n 

tH 

i-H 

rH 

(N 

o 

o 

Q 

o 

U5 

O 

o 

o 

lO 

lO 

tH 

o 

O 

CO 

o 

o 

^ 

o^ 

Cft 

Q 

o 

o 

C5 

00 

-* 

t- 

Ol 

73 

cT 

o" 

8 

O 

o 

i-T 

o 

Ci 

o 

>o 

■* 

{N 

T-t 

CD 

(N 

s 

CO 

ira 

cq 

C5 

-«*< 

GO 

^ 

CO 

CO 

T-t 

CO 

o 

kO 

■^ 

iH 

CO^ 

CO 

CO 

C» 

o> 

CO 

ti 

cf 

i-T 

(N 

iH 

m 

-* 

00 

05 

,  a 

t- 

o 

(N 

S  cS 

, 

, 

, 

, 

1 

, 

1 

1 

1 

co 

1 

CO 

"* 

1 

^1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

i 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

cjT 

1 

of 

1 

tH 

« 

a 

T-t 

d 

m 

g 

00 

»o 

T-t 

00 

•^ 

g 

T-t 

t- 

<M 

00 

CD 

Ol 

cS 

C3 

Q 

o 

1 

1 

*i 

o 

Cft 

"*» 

1 

a 

o^ 

e^ 

c^ 

1 

O^ 

1 

t-^ 

O) 

tjT 

1 

1 

TtT 

CO 

cq" 

t^ 

1 

© 

OI 

CO 

to 

<M 

o 

rH 

p 

c« 

00 

O 

05 

•* 

CO 

CO 

>3 

•>* 

T-t 

tH 

>o 

ea 

1 

1 

1 

1 

o> 

Q 

t 

I-H 

tH 

CI 

1 

1 

1 

1 

C-. 

1 

1 

1 

1 

»o 

t- 

1 

c:j" 

CO 

t-f 

1 

d 

o 

-<i< 

S 

•H 

n 

CQ 

Oi 

o 

00 

cq 

o 

a 

o 

(^ 

CN 

CD 

cS 

o 

<d 

CO 

1 

1 

1 

I 

1 

1 

Q 

1 

1 

o_ 

"^ 

a 

o 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

•-H 

1 

I 

1 

1 

1 

1 

UO 

1 

1 

00 

of 

a 

o" 

01 

<M 

iH 

5 

>o 

w 

S 

cq 

00 

Q 

(-5 

O 

o 

(N 

95 

t- 

g 

o 

'J* 

o 

05 

o 

O 

o 

O 

T-t 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

(S 

o 

o 

o 

o 

»o 

1 

1 

1 

1 

CO 

1 

1 

> 

05 

00 

o 

00 

<N 

o 

•<n 

-* 

53 

Sd 

©^ 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

CD 

1 

1 

CO  1-i 

o  © 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

CO 

1 

1 

S=" 

<M 

CD 

iO 

o 

tH 

CT> 

Q 

-* 

CO 

o 

o 

lO 

CM 

^ 

CO 

CO 

j^ 

CM 

o 

CO 

00 

o 

CO 

CO 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

8 

00 
CO 

00 

CO 

1 

1 

o 

T-t 

1 

1 

o 

iH 

CD 

>o 

■^ 

lO 

o 

CJ5 

lO 

00 

CO 

~^ 

lO 

o 

o 

CO 

w 

o 

o 

w 

05_ 

o 

CO 

CO 

T-t 

t- 

o 

J2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

i 

1 

"* 

1 

1 

o" 

o 

la 

CO 

00 

o 

O 

■^ 

00 

CD 

o 

in 

t- 

o 

cc 

CD 

rH 

iH 

00 

of 

T-t 

a  o  . 

UO 

o 

o 

Q 

8 

i-l 

o 

o 

o 

CD 

00 

o 

T-t 

•'^     JH     ™ 

'^ 

o 

o 

^ 

(N 

o 

>o 

o 

O 

CD 

o 

-* 

c8  5^,S; 

CO 

o 

o 

« 

05 

"*. 

CO 

1 

CO 

o 

o 

t-^ 

CO^ 

o» 

©      3-F^ 

1 

^^a 

eo" 

CO 

to 

of 

•^ 

c^ 

00 

iO 

T-t 

T-t 

T-t 

T-t 

' 

• 

t 

.^ 

t 

z 

z 

1 

t 

■ 

■     '     ■ 

M 

C3 

_ 

c3 

P4 

•t^ 

M 

^-^ 

f^ 

XL 

c3 

• 

& 

t^ 

S 

,,_^ 

© 

• 

^* 

'^ 

• 

• 

• 

l-l 

e3 

I 

a 

M 

Ut 

to 

¥ 

2 

.s 

c3 

c3 

■Si 
.2 

o 

o 
o 

■Si 
.2 

.2 

e3 
O 

cS 

c3 
■Bi 

c3 
M 

e3 

■Si 

sa 

c3 

.2 

1 
o 

CS 
CD 

w 

o 

OQ 

O 

M 

o 

f^ 

« 

m 

w 

Q 

fp 

OQ 

.^•f 


THE  FUTURE   SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE       253 


o 
o 

t-n-,a 

cp^  g 

o 

°£i^ 

00 
CI 

"S 

05 

0) 

1 

03 

O 

t- 

00 

o 

tH 

P- 

03 

-»' 

■* 

^ 

CO 

t-i 

<u 

• 

CO 

o 

t4 

00 

fl 

CO 

■^ 
1 

00 

o 

CI 
o 
o 

o 

04 

1 

r-T 

CO 

o 

00 

t- 

(M 

m 

00 

« 

P4 

§ 

CO 

CO 

iH 

o 

lO 

O 

«o 

t- 

>o 

"* 

<D 

co 

cu 

eo 

^ 

o 

CO 

«D 

iH 

W 

CM 

5^  l-H  -5 -O  CO  £/3  rH 


254  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

or  "Turkish  Croatia",  as  it  is  sometimes  called  in  our 
maps,  is  the  most  predominantly  Orthodox  portion  of 
Bosnia. 

In  the  kingdom  of  Serbia,  in  its  extent  before  the 
Balkan  wars,  there  were  2,778,706  Serbs  and  about  200,000 
of  other  races,  the  most  numerous  being  Roumanians  and 
Cechs.  Of  the  population  of  its  newly  acquired  territories 
there  are  no  good  statistics,  and  the  most  that  is  possible 
is  an  intelligent  guess  which  should  disregard  the  extreme 
claims  of  partisans.  Probably  550,000  would  be  a  fair 
estimate  of  the  Serbs  in  Old  Serbia,  the  Serb  share  of  the 
sanjak  of  Novipazar,  and  in  what  the  Serbs  call  Skoplian 
Old  Serbia,  i.e.  the  districts  of  Kumanovo,  Skoplje 
(Uskub),  and  Tetovo.  In  its  new  territories  Serbia  prob- 
ably embraces  some  250,000  Albanians,  of  whom  a  large 
number  live  in  the  Debar  and  Ochrida  districts  of  Mace- 
donia, while  there  may  be  in  central  Macedonia  some 
550,000  Macedonian  Slavs.  In  these  regions  all  estimates 
are  hopelessly  at  variance  and  irreconcilable,  and  the 
majority  are  not  even  plausible,  but  the  estimate  is  some- 
where near  the  mark.  The  Serb  population  of  Montenegro 
is  estimated  at  about  500,000.  In  southern  Hungary, 
formerly  known  as  the  Serb  Vojvodina,  there  is  a  numerous 
Serb  population,  of  whom  some  250,000  would  fall  to  the 
new  State. 

A  conspectus  of  the  whole  therefore  yields  the  following 
results.  In  the  triangle  of  territory  between  the  Drave 
and  Danube  on  the  north,  as  far  as  Negotin,  and  the 
Adriatic  from  Istria  to  Bar  (Antivari)  on  the  south-west, 
there  is  a  population  of  nearly  11,000,000  of  Southern  Slav 
stock,  who  occupy  that  area  to  the  practical  exclusion  of 
any  other  people,  the  majority  of  whom  could  be,  and 
ought  to  be,  included  in  the  "  Greater  Serbia "  of  the 
future.  The  area  is  compact,  geographically  well  defined, 
and  homogeneous.  The  chart  on  pages  252  and  253  gives 
in  tabular  form  the  area  and  population  of  the  Southern  Slav 
State  on  the  basis  of  the  proposals  made  above. 

If  the  treaty  with  Italy  be  carried  out  as  signed,  then 


THE   FUTURE   SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE    255 

a  reduction  must  be  made  in  respect  of  Dalmatia  of  some 
370,000  Croats,  80,000  Serbs,  and  13,000  Italians,  the 
figures  for  Istria  and  Gorica-GradiSka  disappear,  and  some 
100,000  Slovenes,  besides  some  Germans,  must  be  deducted 
from  the  population  of  Kranjska.  The  totals  would  read 
roughly  as  follows,  the  percentages  moving  slightly  against 
the  Southern  Slavs  as  a  whole,  but  slightly  in  favour  of 
the  Serbs  by  themselves  : — 


- 

a 

a3 

h 

u 
o 
OQ 

m 
d 

2 
o 

O  CD 

a 
P 
o 

m   a 
a   ea 

to 

u 

1 

o 
O 

ca 

a 

3 
O 

"3 
o 

H 

OQ 

M 

86.604 

6,095,463 

V 

2,321,408 

626,649 

874,628 

32,859 
[300,000] 

170,472 

260,000 

199,982 

10,879.703 

9,918,148 

II 

There  remains  the  important  question  of  the  form  to 
be  taken  by  the  future  Southern  Slav  State,  the  relations 
which  will  subsist  between  the  different  provinces  as  we 
know  them.  This  is  a  subject  on  which  it  is  impossible 
for  a  foreigner  to  dogmatize ;  it  is  pre-eminently  a  matter 
for  internal  solution.  It  is  of  good  augury  that  no  cut- 
and-dried  plans  exist  in  this  regard.  Serbia  will  leave 
the  form  to  be  taken  by  these  relations  to  the  people 
of  the  new  territories,  it  will  not  endeavour  to  force 
a  predetermined  solution — "In  Belgrade",  said  Professor 
Cvijic  to  the  writer,  "  we  have  no  policy  in  this  matter, 
only  ideas".  At  the  same  time  it  is  highly  important 
that  the  matter  should  be  fully  considered  in  an  informal 
manner  betimes,  since  when  the  time  comes  for  a  definite 
decision  the  leaders  of  the  nation  should  be  in  a  position 
to  give  some  clear  guidance  to  the  people ;  nor  is  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  matter  by  a  foreigner  altogether  out  of 
place,  if  only  on  the  assumption  that  onlookers  see  most 
of  the  game  and  that  freedom  from  local  influences  leads 


256  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

to  an  impartial  judgment.  There  are  obviously  three 
forms  which  may  be  taken  by  the  new  State  :  it  may 
be  a  federation  of  the  existing  provinces,  it  may  be  a  dual 
Serbo-Croat   monarchy,  or  it   may  be  a  unitary  kingdom. 

There  has  been  a  good  deal  of  somewhat  vague  talk 
of  a  future  Southern  Slav  federation,  so  that  it  may  be 
well  to  commence  with  a  consideration  of  that  solution 
of  the  problem.  With  some  "  federation "  like  "  Meso- 
potamia" is  a  word  of  blessed  import.  Federation  has 
been  suggested  for  all  manner  of  States  as  a  cure  for  all 
manner  of  ills,  taking  rank  as  a  panacea  only  after  the 
grant  of  a  constitution  after  the  latest  British  model. 
In  part  this  fondness  for  the  idea  may  be  the  result  of 
the  example  of  the  United  States,  in  part  due  to  the 
insistence  of  our  own  Imperial  problem,  which  so  far  as 
it  admits  of  formal  solution  can  be  solved  only  on  the  basis 
of  a  federal  or  rather  confederate  system,  in  part  to  the 
formation  of  the  German  Empire.  This  has  led  to  the 
theoretical  consideration  of  the  applicability  of  the  idea 
to  States  which  like  the  United  States  cover  a  vast  area, 
and  to  those  States  which  number  within  their  confines 
a  variety  of  races,  the  latter  application  being  directly 
suggested  by  the  success  of  the  Swiss  Confederation. 
There  has  been,  however,  a  tendency  to  apply  the  idea 
somewhat  indiscriminately  to  those  States  whose  con- 
ditions hardly  call  for  a  formal  federal  system,  and  to 
others  which  lack  the  internal  cohesiveness  which  in 
Switzerland  is  largely  the  result  of  pressure  from  with- 
out, of  its  situation  between  the  Great  Powers.  In  par- 
ticular have  theorists  been  prone  to  press  its  application 
to  the  Balkan  Peninsula  as  a  whole. 

In  the  formation  of  a  federal  State  a  strong  common 
interest  is  essential,  as  otherwise  there  is  no  basis  on  which 
to  build.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  interest  be  very  close 
and  the  political,  social,  and  economic  conditions  not 
too  markedly  dissimilar,  there  will  be  a  desire  not  for 
a  federal  but  for  a  unitary  government.  There  is  all  the 
difference  again  between  federalism  as  a  means  of  uniting 


THE   FUTURE  SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE    257 

under  one  supreme  government  elements  which  would 
otherwise  stand  apart,  and  its  employment  for  splitting 
up  an  already  united  people,  while  the  instance  of  a  people 
unwillingly  united  in  a  unitary  State  forms  a  third  case. 
If  the  interest  be  not  close  then  there  is  no  possibility 
of  federation,  and  consequently  talk  of  a  Balkan  federation 
lacks  political  "reahty".  It  is  very  well  to  say  that  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  forms  a  geographical  unit,  that  it  seems 
marked  out  by  nature  to  be  the  home  of  a  single  strong 
Power,  and  that  the  highest  interests  of  its  peoples 
would  be  best  served  by  a  cordial  co-operation  in  a 
federal  State,  but  if  the  peoples  themselves  do  not  desire 
this  union,  if  on  the  contrary  some  of  them  have  been 
secular  enemies  all  such  arguments  are  beside  the  mark. 
It  would  be  well  for  Europe  if  French  and  Germans, 
and  English  and  Germans,  could  heartily  co-operate 
with  mutual  respect,  esteem,  and  liking,  but  we  have 
to  take  the  world  as  it  is  and  human  nature  as  we 
find  it.  In  the  Balkans  the  secular  struggle  between 
France  and  "the  Empire"  has  its  counterpart,  as 
remarked  before,  on  a  smaller  scale  in  the  secular 
enmity  of  Serb  and  Bulgar,  and  Greek  and  Bulgar. 
It  is  absolutely  mischievous  to  talk,  as  some  have 
talked  and  talk,  of  imposing  some  such  solution  on 
the  Balkans  as  a  whole ;  it  cannot  be  done  in  the  first 
place,  and  in  the  second  place,  if  the  idea  leads  to  the 
proposal  of  measures  to  be  adopted  with  an  eye  to  an 
ultimate  solution  which  is  impracticable,  the  result  will 
be  neither  the  ideal  solution  nor  the  next  best  but  a  series 
of  measures  adopted  in  one  plane  of  ideas  which  will 
be  worked  out  in  another.  Professor  Freeman  considered 
the  Balkans  as  offering  ideal  ground  for  the  establishment 
of  a  monarchical  federation,  but  since  he  wrote  the  old 
feuds  have  broken  out  anew  and  have  been  exacerbated 
by  recent  events  to  an  extent  which  puts  off  indefinitely, 
I  fear,  the  day  when  Balkan  lambs  will  willingly  lie 
down  with  Balkan  lions. 

It  is  very  necessary,  not  merely  in  the  case  now  being 

17 


258  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

considered  but,  in  all  discussion  of  the  idea  of  federation, 
to  keep  clearly  in  mind  the  distinction  between  the  two 
main  types  of  a  federal  system,  between  the  Staatenbund 
or  confederation  of  States  otherwise  sovereign  and  the 
Bundesstaat  or  federal  State.  In  the  former  type  the 
central  executive,  except  in  the  matter  of  the  assigned 
functions,  can  only  act  on  the  citizens,  if  at  all,  through 
the  medium  of  the  State  governments.  In  this  form  each 
State  of  the  confederation  is  a  sovereign  State  and  retains 
all  the  attributes  and  powers  of  a  sovereign  State  except 
in  respect  of  those  functions  and  powers  which  are  ex- 
pressly assigned  to  the  federal  authorities,  i.e.  to  the 
central  executive  and  the  federal  Parliament,  and  also 
to  the  federal  judiciary,  which  in  this  type  is  apt  to 
become  of  necessity  a  co-ordinate  authority  under  the 
federal  Constitution.  Sovereign  powers  belong  to  the 
States,  and  these  States  delegate  certain  powers  to  the 
federal  authorities.  In  the  second  type,  the  Bundesstaat 
or  federal  State,  the  conditions  are  reversed  ;  the  central 
government  can  act  upon  the  citizens  directly;  sovereign 
powers  belong  to  the  Union  and  the  separate  States  enjoy 
only  such  powers  as  are  delegated  to  them  by  the  central 
government.  In  the  first  case,  sovereign  States  combine 
in  a  confederacy  and  delegate  certain  definite  powers 
to  the  common  government ;  in  the  second  case,  a  sovereign 
State  delegates  certain  powers  to  local  authorities ;  and 
the  distinction  still  remains  vital  even  if  in  the  second 
case  the  powers  possessed  by  the  component  parts  be  as 
extensive  as  the  reserved  sovereign  rights  of  the  different 
States  in  the  former,  for  the  central  government,  if 
sovereign,  can  vary  the  powers  of  the  local  governments, 
while  if  the  latter  be  sovereign  no  such  variation  is 
possible  without  an  alteration  of  the  Constitution  which 
inevitably  is  a  difficult  and  complicated  business. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  in  the  American  Civil  War  it 
was  the  party  known  as  the  Federals  who  were  victorious 
over  the  Confederates,  the  United  States  are  an  example 
of   a   Staatenbund  or  confederation   of  States  and  not  of 


THE   FUTURE   SOUTHERN  SLAV   STATE    259 

the  more  unitary  type.  Each  of  the  States  of  the 
American  Union  is  a  sovereign  State,  and  the  Federal 
Government  only  enjoys  delegated  powers,  a  point  which 
has  many  times  proved  of  great  practical  importance,  and 
which  accounts  for  the  elaborate  measures  necessary  for 
any  change  in  the  Constitution,  which  represents  in  effect 
a  treaty  between  the  different  States  composing  the 
Union.  Of  the  second  type,  the  Bundesstaat  or  federal 
State,  Canada  is  an  example,  and  this  sharply  differentiates 
its  case  from  that  of  the  United  States.  It  is  true  that 
Professor  Dicey  ^  has  insisted  strongly,  in  spite  of  some 
Canadian  criticism,  on  the  fundamental  identity  of  the 
two  Constitutions,  and  to  disagree  with  such  an  authority 
on  his  own  ground  may  seem  presumptuous,  but  the  dis- 
tinction noticed  above  seems  to  be  fundamental  in  the 
literal  sense  of  the  word  and  does  in  effect  modify  very 
considerably  the  working  of  the  two  governments  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  two  countries.  It  is  difficult  to 
see  an  essential  identity,  however  close  may  be  the 
likeness  of  their  outward  form  and  even  of  a  great  deal 
of  their  everyday  working,  between  two  Constitutions  in 
one  of  which  the  sovereignty  lies  with  the  central  govern- 
ment while  the  local  legislatures  possess  only  delegated 
power,  while  in  the  other  the  local  governments  are 
sovereign  while  the  central  government  enjoys  only 
delegated  power.  The  difference  in  the  assigned  powers 
respectively,  and  therefore  in  the  practical  working  of  the 
two  Constitutions,  is  brought  out  in  the  analysis  of  the 
attributes  of  the  central  and  local  governments  in  the  two 
countries  given  by  the  Professor  himself. ^  The  fact 
strongly  insisted  on  by  him  that  the  constitution  of  the 
Dominion  under  the  terms  of  the  British  North  America 
Act  can  only  be  altered,  except  within  narrow  limits,  by 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  British  Parliament,  does  not 
seem  to  be  essential  to  the  form  of  government  in  Canada, 
whose    federal    Parliament   might    have    been    given    full 

•  A.  V.  Dicey,  Laio  of  the  Constitution,  pp.  157  sq.     Fifth  edition. 
»  Vide  A.  V.  Dicey,  oy.  cit.    Appendix,  Note  II,  pp.  410  sq 


260  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

rights  of  amending  the  Constitution,  and  though  the  limita- 
tion provides  a  certain  resemblance  to  the  difficulty  of 
amending  the  United  States  Constitution,  it  does  not 
invalidate  the  distinction  drawn  above.  Indeed,  so  great 
is  the  contrast  that  the  Dominion  Government  has  even 
the  povv^er  of  disallov^ing  a  Provincial  Act  which  falls 
within  the  powers  assigned  to  the  Provincial  Legislatures 
by  the  Constitution. '^ 

The  distinction  is  by  no  means  of  theoretical  value  only. 
Hamilton  in  1789  thought  that  the  individual  States  were 
too  independent,  and  in  practice  to-day  we  find  such 
flagrant  evils  as  the  diversity  of  marriage  laws  in  dif- 
ferent States,  while  the  Federal  supervision  of  inter- 
State  traffic,  for  example,  has  presented  great  difficulties 
and  internal  State  traffic  lies  outside  the  scope  of  Federal 
authority.  In  some  cases  legal  fictions  have  come  to 
the  aid  of  the  Federal  Executive.  When  Australia  was 
federalized  various  circumstances,  such  as  the  fact  that 
"Western  Australia  was  cut  off  by  land  from  the  other 
colonies,  the  jealousy  between  New  South  Wales  and 
Victoria,  and  the  strongly  developed  local  independence 
of  all  the  colonies,  led  to  the  adoption  of  a  confederation, 
Staatenbund,  and  the  results  have  in  many  ways  hardly 
confirmed  the  wisdom  of  the  choice.  Conflicts  of  authority 
have  been  numerous,  and  a  large  section  of  the  electorate 
is  in  favour  of  an  increase  in  the  power  of  the  federal 
authorities.  Possibly  it  was  with  this  example  before  its 
eyes  that  South  Africa  in  forming  its  Union,  mindful 
also  of  the  grave  danger  of  the  old  jealousies  breaking 
out  in  a  fresh  form,  framed  its  Constitution  on  the 
Canadian  model. 

This  apparent  digression  will,  perhaps,  have  served  the 
purpose  of  enabling  a  consideration  of  a  possible  Southern 
Slav  federation  to  be  approached  with  a  clear  idea  of  what 
may  be  involved.  It  will  be  apparent  that  the  looser  form 
of   confederation   is   not   called   for   in   their   case   by  the 

'  Dicey,  ut  supra,  p.  412,  cit.  British  North  America  Act,  1867,  s.  90, 
and  Bourinot,  Parliamentary  Practice  and  Procedure,  pp.  76-81. 


THE   FUTURE  SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE    261 

necessities  which  may  make  that  form  the  best  attainable. 
The  territory  of    the  Southern  Slavs  is  not   so  extensive 
as  to  require  the   subdivision   of   its  area  for  purposes  of 
administrative    convenience    and    efficiency,    neither  is   it 
inhabited  by  diverse  races,  nor  by  populations  which  have 
long  possessed  a  complete  internal  autonomy  which  they 
might  be  unwilling  to   relinquish.     Nor   does   there   seem 
any  necessity   for   the    closer   form   of    federation   on   the 
Canadian  model  for  the  reasons   just   recited.     The  great 
argument  for  a  federal  system  arises  when  it  serves  to  unite 
those  who  for  national  or  physical  reasons  cannot  combine 
willingly  or  conveniently  in  a  unitary  State.     One  of  the 
advantages  of   federal   government   is   the   combination  of 
national  unity   with  a  strong   local   patriotism,  while  the 
exercise  of  an  extensive  local  government  gives  a  higher 
political  education  to  a  large  number  of  the  citizens.     On 
the  other  hand,  the  central  power  tends  to  be  weak  at  the 
extremities,  especially  in  the  case  of    a  Staatenbtmd.     An 
instance  of    the  danger   to   be   faced  in   this   respect  was 
afforded  by  the   dispute   between   the   United   States  and 
Japan    over    the    anti-Japanese    legislation  of    California. 
Complaints  addressed   to   the   federal   government  elicited 
the  reply   that   the  matter  lay  within  the  competence  of 
the  State  sovereignty  of    California,  and  that  the   central 
executive  possessed  no  coercive  jurisdiction  in  the  affair,  a 
response  which  gave  rise  to  the  light-hearted  jest  that  the 
United  States  should  rather  be  called  the  Disunited  States. 
The  problem  assumed  the  most  serious  proportions.     If  the 
central  authority  had  no  sympathy  with  the  legislation  in 
question  against  whom  did  a  remedy  lie  ?     If  the  Japanese 
had  recourse  to  the  ultimata  ratio  against  California  could 
the  federal  authorities  stand   aside?     If  not  the  wheel  of 
diplomatic   argument   came   full    circle   again.     Even   the 
closer  organization  of  Canada  has  not  relieved  the  Domi- 
nion government  of  problems  similar  though  less  serious. 
A  federal  system  for   the    Southern    Slavs  might  tend   to 
perpetuate  the  local  particularism  of  the  different  provinces, 
and  the  race  has   suffered    so   much   in   the  past  from  its 


262  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

internal  divisions  that  any  Southern  Slav  statesman  should 
be  careful  in  the  extreme  before  advocating  a  system  which 
might  perpetuate  or  exalt  similar  divisions  in  the  future, 
and  they  should  be  on  their  guard  against  the  surface 
attractions  of  federalism.  The  bitter  misfortunes  v^^hich 
have  made  the  history  of  the  race  an  age-long  tragedy, 
and  its  present  parcelling  out  among  different  jurisdictions, 
have  led  to  an  overpowering  desire  for  a  real  and  unequivocal 
unity.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  the  Skupgtina 
would  not  be  burdened  with  the  concerns  of  an  extensive 
empire,  while  the  vice  of  over-centralization  does  not  postu- 
late for  its  avoidance  a  fully  developed  federal  system. 
"  Federal  government  means  weak  government.  ...  A 
federation,  therefore,  will  always  be  at  a  disadvantage  in 
a  contest  with  unitarian  states  of  equal  resources".^  The 
Southern  Slavs  are  not  so  circumstanced  that  they  can 
afford  to  neglect  any  element  of  strength ;  after  the  war 
they  will  be  faced  by  jealous  neighbours,  at  whose  expense 
their  unity  will  have  been  achieved,  and  the  stronger  they 
are  the  more  likely  are  they  not  only  to  maintain  their  own 
position,  but  to  preserve  peace  in  their  part  of  the  world. 
Attention  has  been  directed  to  the  different  level  of  culture 
attained  by  the  various  territorial  divisions  of  the  Southern 
Slavs,  but  that  consideration  argues  rather  for  a  unitary 
government,  since  under  a  federal  system  the  different 
provinces  might  be  governed  under  varying  standards  of 
administrative  efficiency,  unless  the  actual  administrative 
personnel  in  the  more  backward  provinces  were  supple- 
mented from  the  more  developed.  In  that  event,  however, 
the  argument  for  federation  would  seem  pro  tanto  to  fail, 
and  there  would  still  remain  a  varying  level  of  legislative 
competence.  The  resources  of  the  whole  should  rather  be 
applied  to  the  development  of  the  whole.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  federal  system  accompanied  by  the  counter-checks 
which  are  present  in  the  American  constitution  makes  for 
a  certain  stability  and  continuity  of  policy.*     It  is  doubtful, 

'  A.  V.  Dicey,  op.  cit.,  pp.  162,  163. 

'  Vide  Lecky,  Democracy  and  Liberty,  vol.  i.  pp.  53  aq. 


THE   FUTURE   SOUTHERN   SLAV  STATE    2G3 

however,  how  far  this  system  of  counter-checks  could  be 
transplanted.  On  the  whole,  then,  the  balance  of  argument 
is  decisively  against  a  federal  system  for  the  Southern  Slavs, 
as  unnecessary,  not  being  required  by  the  extent  of  area  of 
their  country,  diversity  of  racial  elements,  or  past  political 
freedom  in  the  provinces  ;  as  being  fraught  with  the  danger 
of  particularism ;  as  likely  to  be  accompanied  by  a  varying 
standard  of  legislative  and  administrative  efficiency  which 
would  be  a  great  weakness  for  the  State  as  a  whole ;  as  not 
providing  for  the  best  possible  utilization  of  the  strength 
of  the  nation  in  its  cultural  elements ;  as  dissipating  instead 
of  strengthening  the  concentration  of  the  national  energy ; 
as  being  more  expensive  and  less  efficient ;  and  as  tending 
to  weaken  the  nation's  international  position. 

The  second  form  which  might  be  taken  by  Southern  Slav 
union  is  that  of  a  dual  State.  If  Serbia,  Bosnia,  southern 
Dalmatia,  Montenegro,  Syrmia,  and  the  Serb  portions  of 
southern  Hungary  were  united  into  a  single  State  the 
result  would  be  a  kingdom  whose  population  would  be 
overwhelmingly  Orthodox  Serb  with  a  Catholic  Croat 
minority  of  about  ten  per  cent,  of  the  Serb  numbers,  as 
a  glance  at  the  table  in  the  preceding  section  will  show. 
If  the  remainder  of  the  Southern  Slav  lands  were  formed 
into  another  State,  Croatia,  northern  Dalmatia,  eastern 
Istria,  and  the  Slovene  country,  or  such  portions  of  them 
as  may  be  left  to  their  natural  possessors  after  the  appetites 
of  others  have  been  gratified,  the  resulting  kingdom  would 
be  overwhelmingly  Catholic  Croat  and  Slovene.  These 
two  States  could  be  united  in  a  Southern  Slav  dual 
monarchy  upon  a  close  basis — closer  than  that  of  the 
present  Habsburg  monarchy.  The  idea  at  first  sight  is 
not  without  its  attractions.  Some  such  scheme  seems  to 
have  been  at  the  basis  of  Russian  proposals  in  1915,  and 
it  was  advocated  by  the  present  writer  in  an  article  written 
at  that  time,  but  further  reflection  has  considerably  modi- 
fied the  opinion  then  advocated.  The  very  points  which 
at  first  blush  indicate  such  a  solution  as  desirable  tell  to 
a  large  degree  against  it.     The  two  elements  of  the  State 


264  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

would  certainly  be  very  homogeneous,  but  in  that  homo- 
geneity would  be  a  danger  for  the  future  unity  of  the 
whole.  The  fact  that  one-half  of  the  monarchy  would  be 
Orthodox  Serb  and  the  other  Catholic  Croat  would  tend  to 
give  a  sharp,  and  more  disruptive,  note  to  any  disputes 
between  the  two,  and  disagreements  might  even  harden 
into  a  certain  antagonism,  or  at  any  rate  jealousy ;  it  would 
in  some  ways  make  it  harder  for  either  to  give  way  to  the 
other.  The  old  distinction  between  those  Southern  Slavs 
whose  past  history  has  been  linked  with  the  fortunes  of 
the  house  of  Habsburg,  and  those  whose  fortunes  have 
been  specifically  Balkan,  would  be  renewed  and  stereotyped, 
and  the  ultimate  result  might  be  fraught  with  danger  to 
the  hardly  won  unity  of  the  race.  Such  a  solution  would 
not,  of  course,  preclude  a  future  fusion  in  a  unitary  State, 
and  would  for  the  time  being  preserve  the  intensive 
strength  of  each  of  the  kingdoms.  It  was  this  last  argu- 
ment, that  the  Serbs  should  preserve  the  solidarity  which 
has  been  their  great  strength,  and  should  avoid  the  sacrifice 
of  intension  to  extension  that  formerly  weighed  with  the 
writer.  The  war,  however,  has  forged  still  more  strongly 
the  links  of  national  solidarity,  has  indicated  still  more 
vividly  the  danger  of  disunion  and  the  advantages  of  full 
fusion,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  argument  now  carries 
the  weight  that  might  formerly  have  been  attached  to  it. 
More  and  more  it  has  become  evident  that  the  different 
branches  of  the  Southern  Slavs  are  resolved  on  a  real 
union  even  though  the  exact  form  be  not  settled. 

Experience  has  shown  the  extreme  difficulties  which 
attend  the  working  of  a  dualistic  system  of  government. 
Neither  the  personal  union  (with  a  common  Foreign 
Office  but  separate  armies,  etc.)  of  Sweden  and  Norway, 
nor  the  closer  union  of  Austria  and  Hungary,  has  given 
good  political  results.  This  seems  to  lie  in  the  nature  of 
the  case.  In  a  federal  system  the  majority  opinion  will  be 
composed  from  time  to  time  of  varying  combinations  of 
States,  but  in  a  dualistic  system  whenever  there  is  disagree- 
ment it  is  of  necessity  always  between  the  same  two  parties. 


THE   FUTURE   SOUTHERN   SLAV   STATE    2C5 

If  one  of  them  usually  succeeds  in  getting  its  way  a  sense 
of  soreness  and  of  inferiority  will  be  engendered  in  the 
other.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  in  general  unanimity 
on  most  important  matters,  or  at  any  rate  an  even  see-saw, 
then  to  that  extent  a  dualistic  system  seems  uncalled  for 
unless  it  be  demanded  by  local  considerations  and  con- 
ditions in  the  two  halves  of  the  State."  The  diiliculty  of 
course  is  the  greater  when  it  is  a  genuine  dualism  between 
two  equal  partners,  and  not  a  mere  matter  of  granting  an 
extended  measure  of  local  self-government  to  a  certain  area 
in  an  otherwise  unitary  State,  for  it  is  the  very  equality 
which  is  apt  to  make  the  citizens  watch  with  jealous  regard 
that  the  equality  be  not  infringed.  At  the  same  time,  there 
is  in  theory  no  reason  why  two  States  each  managing 
its  own  internal  affairs  should  not  find  themselves 
fundamentally  at  one  on  the  great  matters  common  to 
both — the  army,  foreign  affairs,  trade  policy,  banking  and 
commercial  legislation — nor  why  such  divisions  as  may 
exist  on  these  matters  should  not  be  cross-divisions  affect- 
ing the  citizens  and  legislators  of  each  State  equally — 
divisions  horizontal  rather  than  vertical.  The  arguments, 
perhaps,  are  somewhat  nicely  balanced,  save  for  the  warning 
that  history  seems  to  give,  though  even  here  it  must  be 
remembered  that  historical  analogy  is  at  once  the  most 
facile  and  most  dangerous  of  arguments,  depending  upon 
an  identity  of  causes  which  seldom  exists  for  the  validity 
of  the  deduction  sought  to  be  made. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  complete  fusion  of  the 
Southern  Slavs  in  a  single  unitary  State  would  be,  if  it  can 
be  effected  and  if  it  be  the  desire  of  the  race,  the  ideal 
solution  of  the  problem  of  their  national  union.  A  unitary 
government  is  the  strongest  form  of  government,  and  a 
unitary  State  can  act  with  a  decision  and  promptness 
which  cannot  in  general  be  achieved  by  any  other.     The 

'  I  mean  that  theoretically  the  two  halves  might  have  a  common 
opinion  in  common  matters,  but  different  opinions  relative  to  internal 
matters.  This  divergence,  however,  could  only  arise  by  reason  of  groat 
differences  of  local  conditions. 


266  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

case  of  the  German  Empire  is  no  real  exception  to  this 
rule,  for  its  constitution  is  anomalous.  While  the  relations 
between  Prussia  and  Bavaria  partake  of  the  character  of 
a  Staatenhund,  the  relations  of  Prussia  with  the  minor 
States  are  those  of  a  strict  Bundesstaat,  and  it  was  for  that 
reason  that  Bismarck,  as  readers  of  his  reminiscences  and 
of  Prince  Hohenlohe's  memoirs  will  remember,  was  by  no 
means  anxious  to  force  the  pace  of  internal  union  be- 
tween 1866  and  1870,  since  he  was  anxious  that  the 
southern  States  should  find  themselves  forced  eventually  to 
come  in  on  Prussia's  terms,  and  the  concessions  made  to 
Bavaria  were  always  regarded  lather  as  a  matter  of  necessity 
than  as  being  desirable  in  themselves.  In  spite  of  these 
concessions,  the  constitution  of  the  German  Empire  gives 
an  almost  complete  predominance  in  all  matters  of  common 
concern  to  Prussia,  a  predominance  which  is  enhanced  by 
the  constitutional  position  of  the  Emperor  and  the  abso- 
lutism in  the  ministry  of  the  Chancellor,  facts  which  make 
for  prompt  decisions.  The  arguments  which  might  be 
adduced  against  a  Southern  Slav  unitary  State  have  been 
noticed  from  time  to  time  above  and  need  only  be  sum- 
marized here.  They  rest  on  the  different  degrees  of 
cultural  development  attained  by  the  different  divisions  of 
the  race,  the  difference  of  historical  development  and 
of  historical  tradition  which  has  distinguished  the  Serbs 
on  the  one  side  from  the  Croats  and  Slovenes  on  the  other, 
the  danger  of  the  enthusiasm  for  unity  cooling  when  the 
race  is  delivered  from  alien  domination,  and  the  difficulties 
which  will  attend  the  amalgamation  and  co-operation  of 
political  parties  which  have  been  formed  in  consequence  of 
different  needs  and  for  the  pursuit  of  different  sets  of  objects 
in  the  past.  On  the  other  hand,  the  answers  to  these 
arguments  have  also  been  brought  forward  in  discussing  the 
various  problems  that  affect  the  future  of  the  race.  We 
have  had  the  testimony  of  various  spokesmen  of  the  race 
to  the  desire  for  unity,  and  the  opinion  that  the  feeling  is 
permanent  and  deliberate,  and  the  result  of  definitely  con- 
ceived judgments  borne  in  upon  all  sections  as  the  great 


THE   FUTURE   SOUTHERN  SLAV  STATE     267 

and  lasting  lesson  of  the  past.  In  any  case,  change  will  be 
inevitable  as  the  result  of  the  war  in  the  composition  and 
outlook  of  the  various  political  parties,  and  complete  fusion 
would  afford  the  opportunity,  and  carry  the  necessity,  of 
fresh  political  groupings  to  meet  the  new  conditions,  and 
such  changes  casting  the  parties  adrift  from  their  old 
moorings  would  be  in  fact  a  boon  and  enable  the  politicians 
to  approach  the  future  freed  from  the  trammels  of  the  past. 
It  has  been  observed  above  that  the  religious  division  no 
longer  operates  as  it  has  done,  Orthodox  and  Catholic 
priests  have  enlisted  under  the  same  national  banner  and 
have  suffered  in  the  same  cause  as  good  Southern  Slavs. 
In  short,  as  a  unitary  government  is  the  strongest  and  in 
itself  the  most  desirable,  so  it  appears  to  be  the  goal  at 
which  the  Southern  Slavs  are  consciously  aiming.  The 
race  is  certainly  less  divided  than  was  the  Italian  at  the 
time  of  the  risorgimento ,  and  in  the  latter  case  we  know 
that  federal  schemes  had  to  give  way  to  the  desire  for 
complete  fusion  in  spite  of  the  great  distinction  which  still 
exists  between  north  and  south. 

The  title  of  the  new  State  and  the  style  of  its  sovereign 
are  matters  for  the  Southern  Slavs  to  decide  for  themselves. 
The  term  Jugoslavia  (Southern  Slavia)  has  come  into 
common  use  of  late,  yet  it  is  perhaps  permissible  to  hope 
that  no  newfangled  term  will  supersede  old  terms  which 
have  an  historical  past  behind  them.  Only  superficial 
people  will  lightly  deride  old  historic  terms,  formulao,  and 
styles,  for  they  carry  with  them  the  flavour  of  past  glory  as 
of  past  suffering,  form  part  of  the  complex  texture  of  race 
and  government,  and  have  a  real  even  though  often  un- 
perceived  influence  in  moulding  the  thoughts,  the  reverence, 
and  the  sense  of  historic  continuity  of  the  citizens.  It 
has  been  suggested  that  perhaps  a  personal  style  may  be 
assumed  by  the  King — King  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes.  No  foreigner  can  dogmatize,  but  the  present 
writer  confesses  to  a  great  dislike — not  very  reasonable — 
to  this  style.  Possibly  it  may  be  the  result  of  that  sorry 
episode   when   the   King   of  France   was   succeeded    by   a 


268  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

King  of  the  French  in  a  reign  of  appalling  commonplace, 
while  the  Tsar  of  the  Bulgars  has  not  made  the  style 
more  grateful.  I  confess  to  the  hope  that  the  renewal  of 
ancient  glories  may  see  a  revival  of  the  title  of  Tsar,  and 
that  we  may  see  the  old  King  Peter  end  his  days  as 
Tsar  of  Serbia,  King  of  Croatia  and  Slovenia.  No  in- 
feriority would  be  imputed  to  Croatia  in  such  a  style.  It 
is  true  that  in  practice  the  title  Tsar  or  King  of  Serbia 
would  be  colloquially  used,  but  that  would  be  the  case 
also  if  the  personal  style  were  adopted.  No  one  speaks 
of  the  King  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland ;  to  the  world  at  large  he  is  the  King  of  England, 
nor  is  any  grievance  felt  save  perhaps  among  the  Scotissimi 
of  London !  The  Scotch  probably  think  of  him  as  King 
of  Scots,  and  in  the  same  way  good  Croats  could  think  of 
their  ruler  as  King  of  Croatia.  Jugoslovenski  (Southern 
Slav)  would  serve  as  the  adjectival  qualification  of  the 
functions  of  the  Southern  Slav  Monarchy.  Trivial  matters, 
perhaps  these — to  those  who  do  not  understand  that  senti- 
ment, Bismarck's  imponderabilia,  is  a  very  hard  fact  and 
closely  to  be  reckoned  with. 


CHAPTEE  IX 

SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE  NEW  STATE 

In  whatever  form  the  unity  of  the  Southern  Slavs  be 
accomplished,  the  new  State  will  have  to  face  many  urgent 
problems  not  only  in  the  political  sphere  but  in  the 
economic  and  social.  The  first  question  is  that  connected 
with  the  German  element.  Allusion  has  been  made 
already  to  the  position  of  the  Germans  in  the  territories 
which  may  be  taken  into  the  new  State  and  to  the 
possibility  of  taking  comprehensive  measures  to  guard 
against  the  dangers  which  their  presence  might  bring. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  question  as  to  the  German  and 
Magyar  functionaries  employed  in  various  capacities  in 
the  administration  of  Bosnia  central  and  local,  and  in 
the  Banat,  or  of  the  same  elements  which  have  been  foisted 
upon  the  kingdom  of  Croatia.  They  will,  of  course,  dis- 
appear and  return  to  their  own  countries.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  has  also  since  the  occupation  of 
Bosnia  introduced  various  "  strategic  "  colonies  of  Germans 
and  Magyars  (also  some  Poles),  who  have  been  planted 
in  order  to  break  up  the  Slav  solidarity  of  the  country, 
and  similar  colonies  are  to  be  found  in  Syrmia.  There 
can  be  no  valid  objection  to  the  expulsion  of  these 
colonists.  As  they  have  been  planted,  so  can  they  be 
transplanted.  They  have  been  introduced  into  a  land  not 
their  own  as  an  alien  garrison,  as  a  disuniting  element 
in  the  country  in  which  they  have  been  planted,  and  as 
a  guard  against  Serbia,  and  they  cannot  now  complain, 
having   lent   themselves  to   these   purposes,   if  under  the 

269 


270    THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

changed  conditions  they  are  now  sent  home  again;  the 
retransplanting  should  be  less  painful  than  the  original 
planting  when  they  left  their  own  home  and  their  own 
kindred,  and  in  any  case  Serbia  cannot  be  expected  to 
tolerate  the  presence  of  a  foreign  garrison  introduced  as 
such  and  coming  with  knowledge  of  its  function. 

The  general  question  of  the  German  elements,  apart 
from  the  two  categories  just  mentioned,  who  will  be  found 
in  greater  Serbia  is  more  difficult  and  complex.  No 
question  of  expulsion  would  have  arisen  after  the  wars 
of  the  past  waged  as  honourable  war  used  to  be  waged, 
but  the  facts  of  the  present  war  must  have  an  effect  of 
the  greatest  importance  in  the  after-settlement.  Most 
illuminating  has  been  the  attitude  of  the  American 
Germans.  That  American  Germans  should  possess  a 
lively  sympathy  with  their  country  of  origin  is  natural 
and  to  be  expected,  but  what  was  not  to  be  expected  has 
been  their  attitude  towards  the  country  of  their  allegiance. 
They  have  emigrated  of  their  own  free  will,  they  have  been 
cordially  received,  they  have  received  the  rights  of 
citizenship  and  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  native- 
born  American,  they  have,  many  of  them,  acquired  great 
fortunes  in  their  adopted  country,  they  have  exercised  a 
great  influence  on  its  politics  and  its  industries,  and  yet 
in  spite  of  all  they  have  not  merely  evinced  a  sympathy 
with  Germany  which  was  natural  but  have  also  evinced 
a  plain  and  outspoken  hostility  to  the  United  States  which 
not  only  argues  the  grossest  ingratitude  but  has  constituted 
a  grave  danger  external  and  internal  to  their  country.  In 
order  to  achieve  their  aims  they  have  stuck  at  nothing. 
Factories  have  been  destroyed  by  bomb  or  incendiarism 
with  great  loss  of  life,  attempts  have  been  made  to  blow 
up  bridges  and  railways,  destruction  of  shipping  by  means 
of  infernal  machines  has  been  attempted  frequently,  though 
happily  with  great  lack  of  success  ;  murder  and  arson  and 
dynamite  outrages  all  alike  have  been  resorted  to,  and 
resorted  to  not  only  against  the  enemies  of  their  original 
country,  or    the    original   country   of    their   parents,    but 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    271 

against  their  own  fellow-citizens,  resorted  to  not  to  prevent 
hostile  acts  against  their  race-home,  but  to  prevent  their 
fellow-citizens,  the  citizens  of  their  State  of  allegiance, 
from  engaging  in  a  trade  recognized  by  international  law 
as  a  legitimate  trade  to  be  carried  on  by  neutrals.  The 
non-German  world  cannot  afford  to  allow  matters  to  stand 
there,  the  peril  of  the  German  alien  and  equally  of  the 
naturalized  German  alien  has  been  conclusively  shown, 
and  that  peril  must  be  taken  account  of  by  every  State 
where  an  appreciable  German  element  is  to  be  found,  since 
this  element  has  exhibited  an  acrid  and  cunning  capacity 
for  hostility  which  might  have  the  direst  consequences. 
Just  as  German  disregard  of  the  rules  of  honourable 
warfare  have  put  the  Germans  in  a  pale  apart  from 
honourable  foes,  so  has  the  conduct  of  the  "  hyphenated- 
German  "  placed  him  in  a  category  apart  from  other  alien 
denizens  naturalized  or  non-naturalized.  In  Belgium, 
further,  it  has  been  seen  how  the  German  denizen  has 
been  a  spy  and  an  advance  agent  acting  in  the  interests  of 
the  military  policy  of  his  government. 

These  facts  will  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  by 
the  Southern  Slav  government  in  the  reorganization  of 
its  territory  after  the  war.  The  Germans  who  have 
shown  such  callous  brutality  cannot  complain  if  such 
consideration  should  result  in  a  considerable  measure  of 
expulsion  against  members  of  their  race  from  Jugoslav 
territory;  if  the  Serbs  should  regard  with  disquiet,  for 
example,  the  large  German  element  in  the  town  and 
district  of  Pan6evo  almost  over  against  Belgrade.  The 
whole  problem  in  its  present  acute  form  is  a  new  one,  and 
has  been  created  by  the  action  of  the  Germans  themselves. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was  in  view  of  this  question 
that,  in  dealing  with  Southern  Slav  claims  in  southern 
Hungary,  I  suggested  that  they  should  be  put  forward 
with  the  strictest  moderation  in  a  territorial  sense,  and  in 
a  former  chapter  I  traced  a  frontier  line  which  comes 
considerably  short  of  extreme  demands  for  this  very 
reason.     The  principle  laid  down  was  that  the  line  should 


272  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

be  drawn  to  coincide  with  the  limits  of  a  solid  block  of 
Southern  Slav  population  with  no  more  than  small  islands 
of  alien  race  embraced  in  it,  and  that  it  should  not  be  so 
drawn  as  to  include  a  solid  block  of  alien  territory  even 
though  it  contained  considerable  Serbo-Croat  islands. 
The  suggestion  was  made  with  a  view  to  the  possibilities 
of  transmigration  after  the  war,  and  with  especial  refer- 
ence to  the  German  element,  and  thus  the  line  drawn 
excluded  all  Baranja  from  greater  Serbia,  by  far  the 
greater  part  of  the  Ba6ka,  and  a  large  area  to  the  east 
of  Veliki  Be5kerek,  inhabited  by  a  mixed  population  chiefly 
of  Germans  and  Magyars.  Any  forced  system  of  trans- 
migration savours  of  barbarian  times  (but  we  live  in 
barbarous  times)  and  excites  a  natural  distaste,  nor  must 
the  effects  on  the  Serbo-Croat  population  left  in  Hungary 
be  overlooked.  Yet  such  a  measure  applied  under  safe- 
guards and  with  liberty  to  transfer  movable  property  of 
all  descriptions  would  add  but  little  to  the  miseries  of 
our  time,  and  by  giving  ethnographical  frontiers  would 
afford  solid  advantages  for  the  future.  At  any  rate  the 
question  of  the  Germans  will  have  to  be  faced  by  the 
Southern  Slav  government,  and  it  may  be  that  a  trans- 
ference of  the  German  element  may  commend  itself  to  it, 
leaving  the  Magyars  to  act  in  turn  as  they  please. 

It  must  be  distinctly  understood  that  reference  has 
been  made  exclusively  to  the  German  element,  and  for 
the  reasons  already  recited,  and  not  to  the  Magyar  or 
Koumanian  elements  of  the  Banat.  As  to  the  former, 
while  it  is  true  that  they  are  strongly  anti-Serb  and  have 
committed  in  Serbia  the  most  horrible  atrocities,  yet  it 
must  be  remembered  that  politically  they  have  been 
exploited  even  in  their  own  country  by  the  Magyar- 
Jewish  oligarchy,  so  that  the  mass  of  the  Magyars,  them- 
selves for  the  most  part  peasants,  cannot  be  held 
responsible  for  all  the  misdeeds  of  the  poHticians.  In 
the  Hungarian  plain,  even  in  the  Southern  Slav  portion 
of  it,  they  may  be  said  to  be  in  their  own  home.  It  is 
to  be   hoped  that    after    the   war   there  will   be    a    new 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    273 

Hungary  reduced  to  a  genuinely  national  State,  in  which 
the  Magyar  peasantry  will  come  politically  to  their  own. 
Such  a  Hungary  should  eventually  become  a  friend  of 
the  Southern  Slav  monarchy,  belonging,  like  itself,  in 
part  to  the  Danubian  system,  and  no  action  should  be 
taken  by  the  Southern  Slavs  of  a  nature  calculated  to 
hinder  such  a  consummation.  The  Magyars  then,  apart 
from  the  functionaries,  exploiters,  and  strategic  colonies 
in  Bosnia  and  Syrmia,  should  be  left  in  peace,  in  enjoy- 
ment of  their  properties  and  with  full  rights  of  citizenship. 
There  is  nothing  to  suggest  that  such  Magyars  would 
constitute  the  peculiar  danger  attendant  on  the  presence 
of  a  large  German  element.  Reciprocity  of  treatment  for 
all  Serbs  left  in  Hungary  must  be  a  sine  qua  non,  and  full 
liberty  of  action  assured. 

What  has  been  said  of  the  Magyars  applies  with  even 
greater  force  to  the  Roumanians.  The  latter  have  always 
got  on  well  with  the  Serbs,  they  seem  to  be  mutually 
sympathetic,  the  interests  of  their  countries  are  identical. 
A  solid  Serbo-Roumanian  alliance  would  go  a  long  way 
towards  ensuring  peace  in  the  Near  East  when  each  of 
the  States  has  become  one  of  a  new  order  of  secondary 
Powers  of  considerable  strength  and  resources.  While 
Serbia,  Old  and  New,  will  include  some  200,000  Rou- 
manians, Roumania  will  include  close  upon  100,000  Serbs, 
and  there  is  every  reason  for  mutual  toleration.  The  two 
States  should  facilitate  any  voluntary  cross-migration  that 
might  manifest  itself,  but  their  efforts  should  be  strictly 
limited  to  the  supervision  of  such  a  voluntary  tendency, 
and  no  compulsion  of  any  sort,  direct  or  indirect,  should 
be  used.  Roumanians  and  Serbs  alike  must  receive  full 
rights. 

Special  measures  of  an  economic  nature  will  be  called 
for  in  Bosnia.  Its  resources  have  largely  been  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  ruthless  exploiters  of  Hungarian  nation- 
ality but  of  Jewish  race,  to  the  detriment  of  the  real 
interests  of  the  population.  It  cannot  be  expected  that 
these  men  will  be  left  in  possession  of  franchises  granted 

18 


274  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

in  despite  of  the  protests  of  the  inhabitants  themselves, 
and  of  many  members  of  the  Austrian  Eeichsrath.  The 
concession  of  a  central  land  bank,  for  example,  was 
granted  on  scandalous  terms  to  Budapest  capitalists,  and 
was  the  subject  of  acrimonious  debate  in  the  Austrian 
Parliament,  even  non-Slavs  expressing  their  condemna- 
tion of  the  transaction  which  was  subsequently,  I  believe, 
somewhat  modified.  Here  in  place  of  an  indemnity  the 
Serb  government  can  claim  the  right  to  cancel  concessions 
without  payment.  Commercial,  timber,  land,  and  mining 
concessions,  so  far  as  the  concessionaires  are  Austro- 
Hungarian  subjects,  should  be  resumed  and  worked  by  the 
State.  The  forest  wealth  of  the  Jugoslav  kingdom  will  be 
an  important  national  asset,  there  is  a  forestry  department 
in  Serbia,  but  it  needs  extension  and  working  on  modern 
methods,  and  so  reorganized  it  will  be  able  to  take  over 
the  working  of  the  State  forests  of  Bosnia,  now  leased  out 
to  exploiters.  The  forest  resources  of  Croatia  are  also  very 
considerable,  the  oak  forests  of  Slavonia  being  especially 
famous.  In  view  of  the  dearth  of  timber  and  its  rising  price 
throughout  the  world,  the  State  should  organize  this  source 
of  national  wealth  in  the  most  thorough  and  comprehen- 
sive manner,  and  above  all  keep  it  in  its  own  hands. 
The  alien  exploiters  of  Bosnia  can  very  well  follow  the 
functionaries  to  their  own  land,  and  the  country  be 
developed  for  the  benefit  of  its  own  people  and  its  own 
national  government. 

One  long-standing  question  that  will  be  settled  by  the 
terms  of  peace  will  be  that  of  the  Oriental  Railways  which, 
so  far  as  Serbia  is  concerned,  is  a  matter  of  the  main 
Salonica  railway  from  the  former  Serb  frontier  at  Ristovac 
to  the  Serbo-Greek  boundary.  At  the  time  of  the  Balkan 
wars  this  length  of  line  was  taken  over  and  worked  by 
the  Serb  government  as  part  of  the  State  railway  system. 
As  soon  as  events  foreshadowed  a  victory  for  the  Balkan 
States,  the  Austrian  government  induced  certain  banks  to 
buy  up  shares  in  this  line,  originally  one  of  Baron  Hirsch's 
lines,  although  the  operation  entailed  enhanced  prices  for 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF   THE   NEW   STATE    275 

the  stock.  A  proportion  of  the  shares  was  held  in  Paris. 
The  object  was  to  place  the  Austrian  government  in  a 
position  to  refuse  its  consent,  acting  through  the  owning 
banks,  to  the  buying  out  of  the  company  by  the  Serb 
government.  As  soon  as  the  latter  got  wind  of  the 
proposed  operation,  and  before  it  had  been  effected,  it 
declared  that  it  would  refuse  to  recognize  the  legality  of 
any  transfer  of  shares  in  the  railway  subsequent  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  When  peace  was  declared  Serbia 
made  offers  for  the  purchase  of  the  railway  from  the 
company,  but  the  offers  were  refused.  In  turn  the 
Austrian  government,  acting  nominally  for  its  nationals, 
demanded  the  return  of  the  line,  which  Serbia  refused. 
From  then  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  negotiations 
were  entered  into  from  time  to  time  without  result,  and 
the  position  remained  that  the  Serb  government  remained 
in  possession  of  the  line,  which  it  refused  to  return  but 
was  willing  to  purchase,  while  the  Austrian  holders  refused 
to  sell  and  demanded  its  surrender.  The  line  will  now, 
of  course,  become  the  property  of  Serbia,  and  it  is  likely 
that  she  will  refuse  to  compensate  the  Austrian  share- 
holders at  all  For  this  course  she  will  have  two  grounds; 
in  the  first  place,  that  the  purchase  of  shares  by  the 
Austrian  banks  was  a  political  manoeuvre  inspired  by  the 
Austrian  government  and  not  a  hond-fide  investment,  and 
that  consequently  the  banks  must  look  for  compensation 
to  the  government  whose  agents  they  were  ;  and  in  the 
second  place,  it  may  contend  that  the  real  owner  of  these 
shares  is  the  Austrian  government,  and  that  they  are 
therefore  lawful  prize  of  war,  while  even  if  they  were 
genuine  property  of  the  banks  holding  them  the  value  of 
them  will  be  some  offset  to  the  claim  for  damage  done 
in  Serbia  by  the  Austrian  army,  for  which  there  is  no 
likelihood  of  compensation  by  way  of  indemnity.  Share- 
holders other  than  Austrian  or  German  will  doubtless  be 
bought  out  at  an  agreed  price. 

There  will   be  also  the  opportunity  of   denounciDg  the 
convention-d-quatre    by    which    Austrian    goods    obtained 


276  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

preferential  rates  over  the  Oriental  Railway  and  over  the 
original  State  railvi^ay  of  Serbia,  namely  the  lines  Belgrade- 
Nis-Pirot,  and  Ni§-Ristovac  to  the  former  Bulgarian  and 
Turkish  frontiers.  It  will  be  to  Serbia's  interest  to  grant  a 
generous  railway  tariff  to  Hungarian  trade  passing  through 
Salonica  in  the  interests  of  its  own  railway  system, 
so  as  to  attract  through  traffic  and  earn  the  freight 
charges ;  but  she  will  probably  prefer  to  make  any  such 
arrangement  a  part  of  the  future  commercial  treaty  with 
Hungary  rather  than  to  place  her  railways  again  under  a 
perpetual  servitude  in  the  matter  of  such  rates.  In  any 
case  she  will  probably  refuse  anything  in  the  way  of 
internal  preferential  rates,  the  granting  of  which  would 
be  equally  unfair  to  the  Serb  trader  and  to  other  foreigners 
doing  business  in  Serbia.  Our  own  exporters,  for  example 
— and  after  the  war  our  trade  with  Serbia  should  grow 
enormously — would  be  prejudiced  by  any  renewal  of  the 
old  convention,  which,  it  is  to  be  thought,  Serbia  will 
certainly  refuse.^ 

A  difficult  question  will  arise  as  to  whether  any  of  the 
Austrian  debt  should  be  taken  over  with  the  annexed 
territories.  Of  late  years  in  such  cases  it  has  been  usual  to 
lay  it  down  that  a  portion  of  the  debt  should  be  taken  over. 
It  has  to  be  remembered,  however,  that  such  a  provision  is 
not,  as  sometimes  asserted,  a  matter  of  international  law. 
When  Germany  took  Alsace-Lorraine  from  France  she  did 
not  take  over  any  of  the  French  public  debt  with  the  pro- 
vinces, on  the  contrary  she  took  i0200,000,000  in  addition. 
After  the  Russo-Turkish  war  Russia  exacted  an  indemnity 
from  Turkey  (not  yet  paid  off)  as  well  as  territory  in  Asia. 
It  is  true  that  the  newly  emancipated  Balkan  States  were 
to  take  over  a  portion  of  the  Ottoman  Debt,  a  flagrant 
instance  of  one  law  for  the  strong  and  another  for  the 
weak,  but  as  a  fact  the  provision  was  never  carried  into 
effect.     Even   more  pertinent   to   the  question  is  the  fact 

'  The  convenHon-a-quatre  applied  only  to  the  lines  specified  above  in 
Serbia.  Before  the  war  Austria  made  an  endeavour  to  extend  its  appli- 
cation to  all  Serb  lines  present  or  prospective,  but  Serbia  refused. 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    277 

that  Austria-Hungary,  which  was  not  a  belligerent, 
assumed  no  portion  of  the  debt  when  she  occupied  Bosnia. 
It  is  true  that  in  1908  she  paid  over  a  sum  to  Turkey 
in  respect  of  government  property  in  Bosnia  when  the 
annexation  was  carried  out,  but  this  was  obviously  an 
after-thought  and  designed  to  smooth  the  way  to  Turkish 
acquiescence.  No  such  provision  was  announced  at  the 
time  of  the  annexation  proclamation,  and  if  Austria  had 
considered  even  this  payment  obligatory,  the  natural  time 
for  it  would  have  been  when  the  provinces  were  occupied 
and  when  she  entered  upon  a  free  usufruct  of  its  govern- 
ment which  she  enjoyed  without  payment  for  thirty  years. 
In  any  case  this  was  a  purchase  of  government  property 
not  an  assumption  of  debt.  The  idea  that  such  an  obli- 
gation exists,  or  should  exist,  to  assume  a  portion  of  the 
debt  in  respect  of  annexed  territory  is  due  to  the  great 
influence  of  international  finance  and'  to  the  fact  that 
holders  of  national  debts  are  to  be  found  in  all  countries. 
At  the  present  time,  for  example,  France  is  deeply 
interested  in  the  financial  future  of  Turkey,  and  in  the 
financial  arrangements  to  be  entered  into  in  respect  of 
what  was  once  Turkey.  The  classic  example  of  the 
results  of  such  interests  is  of  course  our  own  occupation 
of  Egypt  for  the  benefit  of  the  Egyptian  bondholders. 

It  cannot  be  argued  that  by  international  law  Serbia  or 
the  Southern  Slav  Kingdom  should  assume  any  part  of  the 
Austrian  or  Hungarian  debts,  or  of  the  common  debt  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy,  especially  as  the  former  will  perforce 
have  to  forgo  any  war  indemnity.  Moreover,  the  financial 
situation  of  the  Jugoslav  kingdom  will  be  in  any  case 
extremely  difficult.  In  addition  to  her  previous  debt  Serbia 
has  incurred  fresh  obligations  in  the  Balkan  wars,  and  to 
an  enormously  greater  extent  in  the  present  war,  which  will 
make  a  vast  addition  to  the  dead-weight  of  the  national 
debt.  She  has  also  lost  an  enormous  amount  of  wealth 
owing  to  the  course  taken  by  the  war.  The  kingdom 
is  purely  agricultural,  and  its  sources  of  wealth  consist 
precisely  in  those  things  of  which  she  has  been  so  largely 


278  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

deprived.  The  Ma^va,  the  richest  agricultural  district  of 
the  country,  has  been  utterly  laid  waste  by  the  Austrians 
in  their  invasions,  and  since  the  occupation  of  the  v^^hole 
of  the  national  territory  the  population  has  been  bled 
white.  The  pastoral  industry  is  perhaps  even  more  im- 
portant to  Serbia  than  tillage — the  Serb  pig  has  not  had 
to  pay  any  rent,  but  he  has  largely  paid  the  taxes.  It 
is  known  that  the  Austro-Germans  have  carried  out  a 
systematic  requisition  of  stock  throughout  the  country, 
and  pigs,  cattle,  and  sheep  in  thousands  have  been  sent 
into  Germany  and  Austria.  Leipzig  alone  was  stated  by 
the  Germans  to  have  received  20,000  pigs  last  Christmas 
season,  and  it  must  be  years  before  the  head  of  stock  in 
the  country  reaches  its  former  amount.  These  ravages 
have  extended  to  Macedonia  despite  its  alleged  Bulgarian 
character.  The  Bulgars  have  also  carried  away,  on  their 
own  admission,  a  great  quantity  of  agricultural  machinery. 
For  a  long  time,  therefore,  the  Serb  peasantry  will  be 
steeped  in  dire  poverty,  and  the  financial  resources  of  the 
State  will  be  correspondingly  diminished.  Serbia  is  entitled, 
therefore,  to  refuse  to  take  over  any  part  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  debts  or  of  the  Bosnian  debt  (the  province  has 
its  own  budget  and  liabilities),  since  she  will  be  unable  to 
obtain  any  compensation  for  these  losses.  So  far,  indeed, 
will  she  be  from  receiving  compensation  that  she  will  be 
obHged  to  incur  fresh  liabilities  in  order  to  set  the  popula- 
tion on  its  feet  again  ;  in  other  words,  the  Serb  State  will 
have  to  compensate  its  subjects  in  part  for  the  havoc 
wrought  by  the  Austrians.  All  these  liabilities,  the  debts, 
the  compensations,  the  means  of  restoring  the  economic 
life  of  the  people,  will  be  a  burden  to  be  shared  by  the 
whole  Southern  Slav  State,  for  the  present  Serb  kingdom 
could  not  stand  the  strain,  and  in  a  sense  a  great  deal  of 
these  burdens  may  be  regarded  as  having  been  incurred  in 
the  common  cause.  If,  in  addition,  the  State  were  to  take 
over  any  Austrian  debt  it  would  be  plunged  into  a  morass 
of  financial  trouble  just  at  the  moment  when  it  would  need 
all  its  resources  to  effect  an  economic  recovery. 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW   STATE    279 

It  may  be  said,  on  the  other  hand,  that  to  impose  upon 
the  reduced  States  of  Austria  and  Hungary  the  full  burden 
of  their  existing  debts  and  their  new  war  debt  would 
involve  them  in  something  like  national  bankruptcy.  But 
as  they  are  largely  responsible  for  the  war,  and  as,  at  the 
very  least,  it  was  their  action  that  gave  occasion  for  it, 
and  as  it  was  hailed  by  them  with  rejoicing  as  giving 
them  at  last  an  opportunity  of  dealing  finally  with  the 
Southern  Slavs,  there  is  no  injustice  involved  in  their 
suffering  the  penalty  of  their  misdeeds.  They  willingly 
took  up  arms  in  an  unjust  cause  and  must  abide  the 
result ;  to  saddle  the  Southern  Slavs  with  a  portion  of 
their  war  debt,  for  that  is  what  it  would  come  to,  would 
be  to  make  the  latter  pay  part  of  the  cost  incurred  by 
the  enemy  in  the  wanton  attack  upon  themselves.  The 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  and  his  advisers  stated  at  the 
commencement  of  hostilities  against  Serbia  that  they  had 
counted  the  possible  cost  of  their  action,  and  Austria  and 
Hungary  applauded,  and  if  now  the  cost  is  considerably 
more  than  they  bargained  for  that  is  their  affair ;  they 
are  reaping  what  they  have  sown.  The  question  hinges 
partly  upon  the  amount  of  the  pre-war  debt  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  that  was  held  in  the  countries  of  the  Entente, 
which  means  practically  in  France,  for  the  amount  held 
by  the  other  Allies  must  be  small.  It  should  be  possible 
in  the  terms  of  peace  to  put  the  foreign  pre-war  debt  of  the 
Monarchy  in  a  privileged  position,  leaving  the  Austrian  and 
Hungarian  governments  free  to  do  as  they  will  with  the 
debt  held  by  their  subjects  or  Germans.  If  they  repudiate 
the  latter  or  reduce  the  rate  of  interest  it  will  be  a  matter 
between  them  and  their  friends. 

Without  a  doubt  both  here  and  elsewhere  when  peace 
comes  to  be  made  we  shall  have  to  guard  most  carefully 
against  the  influence  of  la  haute  finance,  the  finance  which 
knows  no  country,  and  is  inspired  solely  by  regard  for  its 
own  interests.  It  was  largely  international  finance  which 
bolstered  up  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  the  past,  and  more 
and  more  it  has  become  a  custom  for  such  finance  to  act 


280  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

for  its  own  gain  and  then  to  call  upon  the  national 
governments,  or  whichever  government  can  be  brought 
in  ostensibly  for  the  protection  of  its  nationals,  to  support 
its  claims.  The  peace  that  is  to  be  made  must  be  made 
in  the  largest  interest  of  the  Allies,  great  and  small,  and 
not  to  secure  the  profits  of  those  who  recognize  their 
country  chiefly  when  they  have  need  of  its  services.  At 
any  rate  the  Southern  Slavs  should  not  be  crippled  at  the 
outset  by  a  load  of  debt  not  incurred  by  them  but  by  their 
enemies,  incurred  not  for  their  benefit  but  for  the  express 
purpose  of  dealing  them  a  final  blow. 

A  comparatively  minor  matter  to  be  dealt  with  in  the 
terms  of  peace  will  be  the  return  of  the  manuscripts,  books, 
antiquities,  etc.  which  have  been  looted  from  Serbia, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  Austro-Hungarian  museums 
should  have  to  give  up  all  manuscripts,  antiquities,  and 
objects  of  art  which  have  their  origin  in  the  Southern 
Slav  provinces.  Many  antiquities,  for  example,  including 
coins  of  the  early  Serb  Kings  and  Tsars  have  been 
removed  from  Bosnia ;  it  has  been  stated  indeed  that, 
especially,  early  Serb  coins  have  been  taken  to  Vienna 
lest  their  presence  in  Sarajevo  should  convey  too  pointed 
an  historical  lesson  to  the  Bosnian  Serbs.  The  destruction 
of  historical  memorials  carried  out  by  the  enemy  un- 
doubtedly was  not  the  result  of  mere  wantonness.  It 
was  conceived  with  the  subtle  idea  of  destroying  the 
material  facts  and  influences  which  go  to  feed  historical 
and  national  consciousness  and  self-realization. 

The  local  conditions  in  the  different  Southern  Slav 
provinces  differ  in  many  important  respects.  In  the 
present  kingdom  of  Serbia  there  is  practically  no  land 
problem  save  that  of  guarding  against  an  excessive  parcel- 
ling out  of  the  small  peasant  properties,  and  that  unfor- 
tunately will  have  been  largely  solved  by  the  grievous 
loss  of  population  during  the  war.  Already  the  Austrian 
papers  are  talking  of  the  measures  of  colonization  in 
Serbia  proposed  in  view  of  that  decrease.  In  Bosnia 
there   is  an  urgent  land  problem  akin  to    the   Irish,    and 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE  NEW  STATE    281 

soluble  only  by  the  same  means.  While  some  of  the 
peasants  own  their  holdings  as  in  free  Serbia,  it  is 
estimated  that  there  are  112,000  families,  comprising 
650,000  persons,  who  farm  their  lands  from  the  Agas,  or 
land-owners,  estimated  at  10,000  families  and  40,000 
persons ;  these  agas,  or  begs,  are  mostly  Moslems,  and  in 
great  part  represent  the  old  Bosnian  nobility  who  turned 
renegade.  These  Moslems  or  "  Turks "  are,  of  course, 
Serb  by  race.  The  rent  principle  is  almost  universally 
file  metayer  system.  The  metayer  peasants  naturally 
desire  to  own  their  land  like  their  freeholding  neighbours, 
but  the  Austrian  law  has  made  mutual  consent  a  neces- 
sary condition  of  sale,  and  the  process  of  enfranchizing 
the  land  has  been  correspondingly  retarded.  Acting  upon 
the  principle  divide  et  impera,  the  Austrians  have  fostered 
the  privileges  of  the  begs  in  order  to  divide  the  popula- 
tion into  hostile  sections.  The  remedy  can  only  be  an 
act  for  compulsory  sale  even  at  the  risk  of  arousing  a 
certain  amount  of  discontent  among  the  begs.  Among 
the  majority  of  the  Moslems,  Serb  sympathies  are  by  no 
means  wanting,^  for  after  all  the  early  history  of  the 
Serb  race  is  largely  a  history  of  their  own  families,  a 
fact  of  which  many  are  quite  conscious,  as  Sir  Arthur 
Evans  discovered  in  his  travels  forty  years  ago,  and  told 
in  his  Illyrian  Letters.  When  to  this  is  added  the 
fatalism  of  the  genuine  Moslem,  we  may  expect  the  greater 
number  to  acquiesce  without  any  great  trouble,  and  in 
any  case  a  certain  amount  of  transient  fanaticism  mani- 
fested probably  by  the  more  ignorant  Moslems  will  be 
better  than  the  dragging  out  of  a  long  and  embittered 
agrarian  dispute.  The  sooner  the  nettle  is  grasped  the 
better  for  all  concerned.  In  Croatia  and  the  Banat  side 
by  side  with  peasant  properties  are  large  landed  estates 
belonging  to  the  great  magnates,  some  of  native  stock, 
but  the  majority  Magyar  or  Magyarized,  as  well  as  to 
the   Church.     As   regards    the   properties   of    the   Magyar 

'  The  Moslem  Serbs  of  Bosnia  residing  in  Switzerland   have   pro- 
claimed their  wholehearted  adherence  to  the  Southern  Sliv  cause. 


282  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

nobles  there  is  little  to  be  said  against  confiscation.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Magyar  aristocracy  has 
been  reactionary  in  the  extreme,  and  that  it  has  always 
been  its  policy  to  keep  under  "the  nationalities"  of 
Hungary  and  to  Magyarize  them  as  much  as  possible. 
It  has  been  the  tyranny,  misgovernment,  and  chauvinism 
of  the  Magyar  nobles  which  have  been  largely  responsible, 
not  only  for  the  chronic  unrest  in  Hungary  and  its 
borderlands,  but  also  for  the  war  itself.  Their  policy  has 
made  it  impossible  in  the  past  for  any  tolerable  modus 
Vivendi  to  be  entered  into  with  the  subject  peoples,  and 
they  were  among  the  foremost  in  insisting  upon  a  settle- 
ment with  Serbia  which  should  take  the  form  eventually 
of  the  disappearance  of  the  kingdom,  or  at  least  in  its 
reduction  to  the  position  of  a  helpless  vassal.  They  may 
now  be  feeling  the  pinch  of  the  war,  but  it  was  the 
Magyars  who  at  the  beginning  were  most  anxious  for 
the  chastisement  of  Serbia  and  most  enthusiastic  in  the 
cause  of  war.  The  evidence  of  Professor  Reiss  is  conclu- 
sive as  to  the  methods  of  the  Imperial  army  in  Serbia, 
and  Hungarian  officers  and  soldiers  were  foremost  in  the 
atrocities  committed  on  the  population  and  jin  the  utter 
devastation  of  the  richest  district  of  the  kingdom.  They 
have  since  looted  and  carried  away  property,  and  have 
been  considering  projects  of  colonization.  The  financial 
situation  of  Austria-Hungary  does  not  offer  much  prospect 
of  an  indemnity,  indeed  if  the  Monarchy  be  decomposed 
into  its  elements  the  exaction  of  an  indemnity  would 
become  practically  impossible.  In  place  of  indemnity, 
therefore,  the  Serbs  should  claim  the  right  to  undertake 
various  necessary  measures  of  reform  and  reconstruction 
without  having  to  indemnify  the  Austrians  or  Magyars 
concerned,  the  latter  being  left  to  the  solicitude  of  their 
own  governments.  One  such  measure  should  be  the 
parcelling  out  of  the  estates  belonging  to  the  Hungarian 
nobles  in  Croatia  and  the  Banat  among  the  peasants 
without  indemnity.  These  men  showed  no  consideration 
when   they   murdered    and    ravaged    and    laid   waste   the 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    283 

property  of  the  Serb  peasants,  and  the  loss  of  their  own 
properties  will  be  a  just  punishment  in  kind.  As  a  matter 
also  of  public  policy,  it  is  necessary  to  make  it  plain  that 
conduct  such  as  has  distinguished  our  foes  in  the  present 
war  will  entail  retribution,  not  merely  national  but,  per- 
sonal to  those  who  have  been  the  authors  of  the  violation 
of  the  old  honourable  codes  of  warfare. 

With  these  varying  agricultural  problems  a  unitary 
government,  endowed  with  a  greater  total  ability,  experi- 
ence, and  independence  than  local  legislatures  and  adminis- 
trations, will  be  better  able  to  deal  than  the  latter  more 
at  the  mercy  of  local  conditions  and  influences. 

Not  so  immediate  as  the  land  question,  but  hardly  less 
important,  will  be  the  problem  of  the  form  to  be  taken 
by  the  future  industrial  conditions  of  the  Southern  Slav 
Kingdom.  It  possesses  large  mineral  resources  in 
Danubian  Serbia  and  Bosnia,  while  Macedonia,  hitherto 
outside  the  sphere  of  mineral  production,  is  also  stated 
to  be  rich.  The  best  coal  in  the  Balkans  comes  from 
Serbia,  which  is  rich  also  in  copper  and  lead,  while  iron 
and  some  gold  and  silver  are  also  found  as  well  as  other 
minerals.  It  is  asserted  that  it  should  be  a  potential  oil- 
field also.  By  law  all  minerals  belong  to  the  State,  which 
simplifies  some  matters  greatly,  and  if  full  insistence 
is  laid  upon  the  consequences  of  this  ownership  the 
benefit  to  the  State  should  be  very  great.  The  manu- 
facturing interests  are  but  very  slightly  developed,  and  the 
Serb  happily  does  not  take  very  kindly  to  the  process  of 
ceasing  to  be  his  own  man  in  order  to  become  somebody 
else's  hand.  The  great  importance  and  interest  of  the 
industrial  development  of  the  country  is  twofold  :  in  the 
first  place  there  arises  the  question  of  foreign  capital  and 
the  dangers  of  pacific  penetration,  and  in  the  second  the 
extremely  interesting  point  as  to  the  exact  form  to  be 
taken  by  the  industrial  edifice.  These  two  questions  are 
distinct  and  must  be  considered  separately. 

There  is  no  need  here  to  attempt  anything  approaching 
to   a   full   discussion   of   the   manner   and   method   of  the 


284  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

process  of  pacific  penetration,  or  to  do  more  than  indicate 
a  few  general  propositions.  It  has  been  said  that  "  the 
nation,  proposing  to  absorb  a  district  and  make  a  colony 
out  of  it,  loans  money  to  the  ruler  and  to  as  many  of  his 
subjects  as  possible ;  obtains  a  security  for  the  money 
advanced,  if  it  can,  a  part  of  the  public  revenue ;  builds 
railways  in  exchange  for  large  grants  of  land,  and,  in 
general,  develops  the  country.  Then,  when  the  available 
resources  have  been  pretty  completely  hypothecated,  the 
nation  claims  that  its  interests  in  the  territory  are  so 
considerable  that  it  must  be  conceded  a  share  in  the 
direction  of  administration  and  policy,  in  order  to  assure 
the  safety  of  its  investment."  ^  "  To  be  sure,  the  financial 
operations  known  as  peaceful  penetration  are  not  exactly 
what  we  have  been  accustomed  to  consider  methods 
of  violent  conquest ;  but  by  such  means  large  numbers 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  smaller  countries  have  just 
as  certainly  lost  their  land  and  the  products  of  their 
labour  as  if  an  army  had  destroyed  them."  ^  The  American 
Professor's  remarks  in  their  literal  application  deal  rather 
with  the  methods  which  have  been  applied  to  decadent 
Oriental  States,  such  as  Egypt  and  Morocco,  than  with 
the  processes  applicable  to  such  a  State  as  the  Southern 
Slav  Kingdom  will  be,  but  they  describe  accurately  the 
means  employed  in  their  most  open  form.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, such  States  alone  which  have  been  subjected  to  the 
process  of  pacific  penetration  with  baneful  effects  upon 
the  economic,  and  even  the  political,  independence  of  the 
countries  concerned.  It  is  not  necessary  for  a  State 
to  sink  as  low  as  Egypt  or  Morocco,  two  classical  instances 
of  different  forms  of  a  similar  pressure,  the  one  by  means 
of  la  haute  finance  and  governmental  necessities,  and  the 
other  by  means  of  politico-commercial  exploitation,  to  find 
itself  seriously  curtailed  in  the  exercise  of  its  sovereignty.3 

'  R.  G.  Usher,  Pan-Oermanism,  p.  121.  ^  Ibid.  p.  246. 

3  I  am  not  calling  in  question  the  action  of  England  and  France  in 
the  two  countries  mentioned,  but  I  instance  them  as  examples  of  the 
consequences  of  financial  pressure  and  pacific  penetration.  That  the 
occupations  were  legitimate  rather  emphasizes  the  danger  in  question. 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW   STATE    285 

Before  the  war  Antwerp  had  become  largely  a  German 
port,  and  its  German  population  acted  entirely  in  the 
interests  of  Germany  in  the  political  sphere  besides  acting 
as  spies  for  the  General  Staff.  In  Italy  wc  have  an  even 
more  noteworthy  example  of  the  dangers  of  this  sort 
of  penetration.  A  great  part  of  the  trade  has  been  in 
German  hands  and  has  been  transacted  with  Germany, 
and  the  latter  above  all  has  made  full  use  of  the  weapon 
placed  at  her  disposal  by  the  development  of  the  modern 
banking  system.  The  great  Banca  Commerciale,  with 
its  numerous  branches,  was  practically  in  German  hands ; 
it  maintained  the  closest  relations  with  German  producers 
and  merchants,  it  was  in  a  position  to  finance  German 
exports  to  Italy,  and,  by  discounting  the  debts  due  by  the 
Italian  buyer  to  the  German  seller,  to  provide  the  former 
with  the  long  credit  which  he  needed  and  the  latter 
with  ready  cash.  Such  functions  are  of  course  merely 
in  the  ordinary  way  of  the  business  of  a  bank  of  commerce, 
but  when  such  a  bank  is  extremely  rich  and  able  to  crush 
possible  rivals,  and  when  it  is  in  the  hands  of  foreigners, 
it  places  in  the  hands  of  the  latter  a  powerful  lien  on 
a  country's  trade.  In  England  itself  the  same  results 
have  been  at  work.  When  war  broke  out  Baron  von 
Schroder  was  naturalized  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
necessary  for  the  credit  of  the  City  of  London. ^  Com- 
mercial companies  of  every  description  were  found  to  be 
German  even  when  nominally  British.  German  firms 
controlled  a  great  part  of  the  trade  in  metals,  large 
German  interests  affected  in  some  cases  even  the  senti- 
ments of  a  great  town,  and  the  country  became  conscious 
of  the  startling  extent  to  which  its  commercial  and  manu- 
facturing freedom  was  mortgaged  to  its  enemy.  In 
Australia   special    legislation    has   been    necessary   to   free 

'  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  plea  was  absurd.  Had  the  Baron's  office 
been  taken  over  by  a  representative  of  the  Treasury,  the  financial 
houses  wove  quite  capable  of  supplying  the  necessary  personnel  for 
carrying  on  the  business.  All  that  was  necessary  was  to  act  at  once 
before   the   books   could  be   tampered  with. 


286    THE   FUTURE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  metal  trade.  If  such  a  state  of  things  had  come  to 
pass  in  England,  the  centre  (with  Paris)  of  international 
finance,  and  the  home  of  intensive  manufacturing  and 
commercial  activity,  it  is  easy  to  see  the  plight  to  w^hich 
might  be  reduced  a  smaller  country  with  great  unde- 
veloped natural  resources  but  with  a  practically  non-existent 
financial  and  industrial  organization  and  a  lack  of  fluid 
capital. 

This  points  to  the  extreme  unwisdom  of  any  forced 
industrial  development  in  the  greater  Serbia  of  the  future, 
and  the  absolute  necessity  of  framing  betimes  such 
banking,  industrial,  commercial,  and  company  legislation 
as  shall  leave  the  Southern  Slavs  masters  in  their  own 
house.  It  will  be  incumbent  upon  the  government  to  see 
that  its  people  shall  not  be  exploited  for  the  benefit  of 
foreigners,  that  its  population  shall  not  sink  to  be  hewers 
of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  for  foreign  capitalists  and 
financial  interests,  and  that  the  profits  arising  from  the 
exploitation  of  the  country's  resources  shall  be  for  the 
benefit  of  its  own  subjects,  not  merely  the  profits  of 
wages  but  the  net  profits  of  capital  also  to  the  extent 
that  may  be  practicable.  Above  all  will  it  be  necessary 
to  guard  against  the  possibility  of  such  a  lien  upon  the 
country's  development  being  held  either  by  those  who 
are  opposed  in  heart  to  the  nation's  independence  or  by 
those  who  are  nationals  of  a  State  which  makes  financial, 
industrial,  and  commercial  interests  a  normal  lever  of 
political  pressure.  It  is  not  unusual  for  English 
merchants  to  complain  that  they  receive  insufficient 
support  from  the  English  government,  that  their  in- 
terests are  not  pushed  and  not  efficiently  safeguarded 
when  menaced.  I  doubt  whether  on  the  contrary  these 
things  have  not  been,  and  in  the  future  may  be  still 
more,  to  the  benefit  of  English  trade.  It  has  been  the 
recognition  that  an  English  trader  is  not  a  politician 
thinly  disguised,  that  an  English  bank  is  a  financial 
institution  and  not  a  government  weapon,  which  has  in 
many   cases   caused   the   foreigner   to   have    dealings  with 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW   STATE    287 

the  Englishman,  whom  he  does  not  suspect  of  enter- 
taining deep  pohtical  designs,  rather  than  with  the  trader 
behind  whom  is  very  visible  the  form  of  an  active  and 
aggressive  government. 

It  will  be  for  the  permanent  benefit  of  the  Southern 
Slavs  if  there  is  not  too  great  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
government  to  encourage  foreign  capital  to  work  the 
natural  resources  of  their  country,  but  rather  a  resolve 
to  work  them  with  national  funds.  State  ownership  is 
already  familiar  to  them  ;  the  railways  are  State  railways, 
the  minerals  belong  by  law  to  the  State,  by  far  the 
greater  part  of  the  forest  area  of  Serbia  belongs  either  to 
the  State  or  to  the  communes,  the  latter  working  under 
State  supervision,  there  is  a  tobacco  regie,  and  salt, 
petroleum,  cigarette  papers,  and  matches  are  all  State 
monopolies,  and  other  resources  should  be  worked  as  far 
as  possible  in  the  same  way.  A  great  source  of  power  in 
the  future  will  be  hydro-electric,  derived  from  the  water- 
falls and  swift  rivers  of  the  mountain  regions  which 
comprise  so  large  an  area  of  the  land,  and  it  would  be 
wise  before  vested  interests  are  created  to  declare  a  State 
monopoly  of  hydro-electric  power.  The  Serbs,  as  has  been 
seen,  take  kindly  to  co-operation,  and  this  mode  of  exploi- 
tation should  be  fostered  to  the  uttermost  and  protected 
from  unfair  and  "  wrecking "  competition.  It  may  be 
said  that  under  such  circumstances  progress  may  be 
slower.  This  raises  the  question,  which  cannot  be  argued 
here,  as  to  what  is  the  real  content  of  national  progress. 
There  are  those  who,  when  a  fair  countryside  is  defiled 
with  smoke,  when  the  peasantry  are  replaced  by  towns- 
men, when  villages  give  place  to  gaunt  factories  belching 
their  fumes  into  the  air,  when  large  areas  of  land  become 
covered  with  acre  upon  acre  of  mean  and  ugly  streets 
composed  of  brick  boxes  with  slate  lids,  when  wealth  is 
accumulated  frequently  by  absentee  shareholders  of  in- 
dustrial companies  ("a  company  has  no  soul"),  and  when 
the  early  night,  and  the  late  night  of  Saturday,  rings  with 
shouts  of  vacant  laughter,  and  the  whistling  of  the  latest 


288  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

nmsic-hall  inanity,  are  eloquent  of  the  "progress"  and 
"  development "  achieved.  There  are  others  v\?ho  look 
upon  these  things  as  a  degradation,  who  say  that  the 
vitality  of  the  city  population  is  maintained  by  the  influx 
of  country  blood,  and  deny  that  these  things  constitute 
"progress"  still  less  "civilization".  Tovs^ns  were  not 
always,  however,  a  blot  upon  the  landscape,  associated 
with  ugly  speculative  building,  or  consecrated  to  the 
multiplication  by  machinery  of  things  sometimes  un- 
necessary and  often  ugly.  Old  towns  like  old  houses  (not 
because  they  are  old)  add  to  the  beauty  of  the  countryside, 
and  what  modern  industrialism  needs  is  a  method  of 
reconciling  utility  with  beauty,  of  restoring  as  far  as  we 
can  pride  of  workmanship,  of  giving  the  workman  a 
living  and  proud  interest  in  his  work,  in  short  of  restor- 
ing civilization  to  the  home  to  which  as  the  name  implies 
it  properly  belongs.  Extremes  meet,  and  many  a  true- 
blue  Tory  is  attracted  by  the  underlying  ideas  of  the 
Socialists  Ruskin  and  William  Morris.  In  strict  bearing 
upon  the  subject  immediately  under  discussion  it  can  be 
said  that  slower  progress  on  national  lines  is  infinitely 
to  be  preferred  in  the  interests  of  any  people  to  quick 
progress  and  swift  development  at  the  cost  of  foreign 
exploitation ;  nations  like  individuals  suffer  if  they  try 
too  hard  to  get  rich  quick.  If  there  were  a  large  amount 
of  native  capital  available  the  whole  case  would  be  altered, 
but  the  point  is  that  such  capital  is  non-existent,  and  the 
choice  for  Jugoslavia  will  be  between  handing  over  its 
resources  to  foreign  capitalists  or  proceeding  by  the  utili- 
zation of  national  capital,  a  process  which  will  be  slower 
but  will  bring  with  it  the  securing  to  the  nation  at  large 
a  greater  portion  of  the  profits  derived  from  the  country 
and  full  national  mastery  over  the  national  wealth.  The 
war  has  shown  the  grave  perils  to  real  independence 
which  are  the  effect  of  foreign  exploitation,  the  facts  have 
never  before  emerged  so  clearly,  and  nations  must  shape 
their  course  in  accordance  with  the  knowledge  now  acquired. 
Foreign   capital  is   of  course  necessary,  but   it   may  be 


SOME  PROBLEMS   OF  THE  NEW  STATE    289 

borrowed  by  the  government  and  by  it  used  for  the 
commercial  and  industrial  development  of  the  country, 
and  if  the  Southern  Slav  becomes  a  hand  he  will  at  any 
rate  be  a  hand  working  for  his  national  State.  It  will 
be  said  that  this  is  State  socialism  pure  and  simple ;  but 
circumstances  alter  cases.  Our  own  colonial  administra- 
tions working  in  undeveloped  countries  work  on  the  lines 
indicated.  They  endeavour  to  prevent  the  exploitation  of 
the  native  inhabitants,  prevent  the  wasteful  exploitation 
of  natural  resources,  use  government  capital  freely,  and 
assure  to  the  State  the  enjoyment  of  natural,  and  some 
artificial,  monopolies.  In  such  countries  the  government 
undertakes  a  great  deal  of  work  and  supervision  that  in 
developed  States  can  be  left  to  private  initiative.  The 
Sudan  has  been  largely,  indeed  almost  entirely,  built  up 
by  government  expenditures  and  government  supervision, 
and  the  same  course  is  pursued  in  other  undeveloped 
areas,  and  from  the  Western  point  of  view  the  Southern 
Slav  Kingdom  will  be  an  undeveloped  country.  Even  in 
England  itself  the  war  has  seen  many  changes  in  this 
respect  and  some  of  them  will  probably  be  permanent ;  it 
is  unlikely  that  when  the  war  is  over  we  shall  slide  back 
into  the  old  groove;  we  have  seen  the  growth  of  "con- 
trolled" industries,  and  some  of  the  knowledge  acquired  will 
probably  be  utilized  when  peace  returns.  It  is  agreed 
that  certain  "key"  industries  should  be  maintained,  and 
if  such  industries  cannot  be  started  with  private  capital 
they  will  probably  be  started  with  national  capital ;  if  again 
they  can  only  be  maintained  under  the  protection  of  a  high 
tariff,  it  is  likely  that  in  return  for  this  protection,  and  the 
profits  thereby  secured,  the  community,  acting  through  the 
State,  will  insist  on  a  certain  amount  of  control.  In  any 
case  industrial  conditions  in  England  are  in  a  flux,  and  we 
shall  have  to  beware  of  the  tyranny  of  catch  phrases,  and  of 
prejudice  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term ;  still  more  is 
such  caution  necessary  for  undeveloped  communities.^ 

'  Apart  from  the  outstanding  instances  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand, 
I  believe  that  in  so  individualistic  a  country  as  Canada  State  activity  is 

19 


290  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Concretely  the  new  State  will  have  to  guard  against, 
preferably  prohibit,  foreign  ownership  of  land  ^ ;  it  will 
maintain  its  State  railways  and  forests ;  it  will  have  to 
pass  comprehensive  legislation  in  restraint  of  certain 
activities  of  foreign  banking  corporations  and  foreign 
companies.  In  many  cases  no  more  will  be  necessary 
than  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  legislation  of  Serbia 
such  as  its  homestead  law,  and  the  regulations  noticed 
(in  Chapter  III)  on  the  subject  of  bills  of  exchange  on 
agricultural  produce,  etc.  The  present  activities  of  the 
Land  Bank  must  be  extended  to  the  whole  kingdom,  land 
mortgages,  rural  or  urban,  prohibited  except  with  the 
State  bank,  and  the  co-operative  institutions  fostered  and 
strengthened.  Foreign  banks  must  be  prevented  from 
acquiring  a  hold  over  the  essential  productivities  of  the 
nation,  and  their  activities  must  be  subject  to  a  control 
which  will  enable  the  government  to  arrest  any  operation 
injurious  to  the  national  interests.  Restrictions  will  also 
be  necessary  upon  the  holding  of  shares  in  companies 
by  certain  foreign  elements.  The  working  out  of  these 
projects  in  detail  may  show  that  control  may  be  better 
in  this  or  that  matter  than  prohibition,  and  moreover  there 
ought  to  be  a  distinction  between  the  capital  and  the 
projects  of  allies  and  those  of  enemies;  what  should  be 
forbidden  to  a  German  bank  with  politics  in  the  back- 
ground could  well  be  conceded  to  an  English  bank 
engaged  in  its  legitimate  business,  subject  always  to 
national   control   over  the   national    heritage.     It   is  here 

employed  in  the  western  fruit-growing  areas  in  the  direction  of  grading 
and  packing  fruit.  Co-operation  in  Ireland  is  another  example  of  the 
same   general  trend   of  ideas. 

'  I  cannot  endorse  Dr.  Savic's  suggestion  of  Englishmen  starting 
farms  in  Serbia.  It  seems  to  me  an  example  of  that  sentimentalism 
which  is  capable  of  becoming  a  weakness  in  the  Serb  character.  Such 
ownership  could  not  be  confined  to  Englishmen,  and  the  result  might 
be  the  buying  up  of  large  areas  of  land  by  foreign  capitalists  from  an 
impoverished  peasantry.  That  is  a  real  danger  to  be  guarded  against, 
and  for  a  considerable  time  foreign  ownership  of  land  should  be 
prohibited.  Such  prohibition  is  equally  necessary  in  the  case  of  urban 
land  in  view  of  prospective  developments. 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    291 

that  the  absence  of  governmental  pressure  to  which  I 
have  alluded  should  stand  us  in  good  stead.  Some  mines 
are  vi^orked  by  the  State,  some  are  leased.  If  the  latter 
system  be  employed  in  the  future  it  should  be  remembered 
that  as  the  State  is  the  real  vendor  or  lessor  the  capital 
of  the  company  should  not  be  watered  with  a  dead  weight 
of  vendor's  shares.  It  should  be  practicable  to  insist 
upon  all  such  companies  being  capitalized  upon  a  purely 
working  capital  basis,  apart  from  a  small  promoter's  profit 
to  be  paid  in  ordinary  shares  in  return  for  his  enterprise. 
Under  such  a  system  royalties  could  be  replaced  by  a 
provision  securing  all  profits  to  the  company  up  to  a 
certain  percentage  upon  the  capital,  all  further  profits 
to  be  shared  between  the  company  and  the  State.  This, 
it  seems  to  me,  would  be  an  excellent  way  of  uniting  the 
exploiting  interest  of  the  foreign  capital  employed  and  the 
interests  of  the  State  acting  for  the  community,  and  of 
guarding  alike  the  interests  of  the  genuine  investor  and 
the  proprietary  interest  of  the  national  government. 

Such  regulations  would  doubtless  raise  opposition  in 
some  financial  circles,  but  it  will  bear  repetition  that 
slower  development  on  national  lines  will  be  better  than 
quicker  development  under  the  exploitation  of  the  foreign 
company  promoter.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  the  mining 
industry  such  legislation  should,  when  it  becomes  known, 
encourage  the  genuine  investor  whose  interest,  it  will 
have  been  seen,  will  not  only  be  guarded  by  the  State 
but  will  be  identical  with  that  of  the  latter,  since  both 
would  be  adversely  affected  by  watered  capital  and 
unscrupulous  promotion,  and  the  current  of  genuine  in- 
vestment capital  would  therefore  be  attracted.  The 
government  should  not  be  deterred  in  these  matters  by  the 
objection  of  a  certain  class  of  foreign  capitalist,  or  by 
the  charge  of  being  retrograde  and  reactionary,  or  by  the 
taunt  of  slow  progress  as  compared  with  other  States 
whose  quick  advance  has  been  paid  for  by  the  mort- 
gaging of  their  resources. 

In  all  cases  provision  should  be  made  for  the  resumption 


292  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

by  the  State,  should  it  be  desired,  of  its  original  proprietary 
rights  by  the  coropulsory  repurchase  on  equitable  terms 
of  the  shares  of  the  concern  in  question. 

One  of  the  sources  of  interest  in  the  Balkan  States  is 
the  fact  that  from  the  industrial  and  commercial  point 
of  view  they  are  practically  tabula  rasa  on  which  may 
be  written  a  new  page  in  the  history  of  industrial  develop- 
ment. From  some  points  of  view  modern  "Western 
industrialism  may  be  said  to  be  morally  bankrupt,  and 
we  are  conscious  of  a  growing  distaste  for  many  of  its 
manifestations,  a  distaste  which  is  shared  by  people  of 
various  habits  of  mind.  There  has  been,  for  example,  the 
marked  growth  of  appreciation  of  hand-work  as  applied 
to  many  articles  until  recently  given  over,  since  the  full 
development  of  machinery,  to  factory  production. 
"  Machine  carving  "  of  wood  is  now  a  term  of  reproach  ; 
hand-made  furniture  is  sought  by  those  who  can  afford 
it,  hand-woven  fabrics  from  thick  tweeds  to  finest  linen 
are  in  demand,  the  architect  specifies  hand-made  brick 
and  tile  when  his  client's  purse  will  allow  it,  hand-wrought 
ironwork,  jewellery,  silver-ware,  book-binding  are  all 
increasingly  appreciated.  One  of  the  most  formative  of 
our  architects,  Mr.  Baillie  Scott,  whose  work  is  to  be 
found  in  Russia  and  Poland,  even  in  America,  as  well  as 
in  England,  has  not  only  practised  a  return  to  older  and 
simpler  methods  of;  planning  but  uses  hand-work  whenever 
possible.  Mr.  C.  F.  A.  Voysey,  whose  architectural  style 
is  quite  different,  is  at  one  with  Mr.  Scott  in  the  methods 
which  he  advocates,  while  an  architect  who  is  not  one 
of  the  so-called  craftsmen  architects  like  the  two  just 
mentioned,  Mr.  Detmar  Blow,  owes  some  of  the  qualities 
of  his  work  to  the  knowledge  of  material  gained  by  working 
on  it  with  his  own  hands.  The  whole  "  arts  and  crafts  " 
movement  and  the  colony  of  craftsmen  at  Chipping 
Campden,  where  Mr.  C.  R.  Ashbee  practises  architecture 
on  the  lines  spoken  of,  is  eloquent  of  this  change. 

It   is  not   merely  from   an  aesthetic  point  of   view  that 
dissatisfaction  is   felt.     Industrial  unrest   despite  increase 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    293 

of  wages  and  better  conditions  is  endemic,  and  it  is 
noteworthy  that  it  is  shown  most  acutely  in  trades 
where  wages  are  highest.  In  part  this  may  be  put  down 
to  growth  of  the  appetite  and  the  desire  for  more,  but  in 
part  it  would  seem  to  be  indicative  of  an  unrest  which  is 
really  spiritual — men  are  discontented  they  barely  know 
with  what  even  though  the  concrete  form  which  the 
discontent  takes  is  a  demand  for  an  increased  wage. 
Many  of  the  leaders,  however,  have  become  more  articu- 
late, and  it  is  seen  that  men  are  increasingly  dissatisfied 
with  being  somebody  else's  hands,  they  want  to  be  their 
own  masters.  The  rise  of  syndicalism  (I  speak  of  syndi- 
calism as  properly  understood — the  man  who  puts  grit 
into  a  machine  and  calls  it  syndicalism  is  a  mixture  of 
knave  and  fool  who  does  not  know  what  he  is  talkinof 
about)  is  a  direct  product  of  this  feeling,  and  in  some  of 
its  aspects — extremes  meet  again — recalls  a  harking  back 
to  the  guild  system  of  the  Middle  Ages.  State  socialism 
and  syndicalism  are  commonly  held  incompatible,  but  I 
think  that  a  blend  of  the  two  would  be  preferable  to 
either  and  not  more  difficult  in  operation.  We  have  in 
England  a  wage-earning  proletariat  divorced  from  pro- 
prietorship of  land  or  other  means  of  production  such  as 
no  other  country  possesses,  and  that  represents  a  state 
of  society  which  is  full  of  danger  to  the  community  besides 
yielding  some  of  the  objectionable  results  already  alluded 
to.  The  substitution  of  limited  liability  companies  for 
personal  ownership  and  the  growth  of  combines  further 
divorce  the  more  wealthy  classes  of  the  nation  from  the 
wage-earner,  and  society  tends  to  become  sharply  strati- 
fied with  a  lack  of  cohesion  between  the  diiBferent  strata. 
Even  the  rise  of  individuals  usually  means  that  they  pass 
from  one  stratum  to  another  rather  than  that  they  form 
a  bond  between  the  two. 

The  organization  of  industry  has  passed  during  the 
past  century  through  three  main  stages.  The  first  was 
the  era  of  comparatively  small  concerns,  as  business  is 
measured  nowadays,  in  the  hands  of  private  owners,  it  was 


294  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

the  age  of  the  private  entrepreneur.  The  second  saw  the 
growth  of  the  Hmited  laibiHty  company.  The  latter  was 
the  more  elastic  as  it  allowed  of  various  combinations 
of  capital;  some  companies  were  private  concerns  con- 
verted into  hmited  companies  with  but  little  addition 
of  outside  capital,  others  were  in  the  main  in  the  hands 
of  a  small  number  of  capitalists  with  some  smaller  share- 
holders, while  others  again  were  owned  by  a  large  number 
of  shareholders  whose  individual  holdings  were  small  in 
comparison  with  the  aggregate  capital  engaged  in  the 
business.  Then  ensued  a  period  of  industrial  consolidation  : 
rival  firms  amalgamated,  smaller  firms  were  bought  out 
when  they  were  not  crushed  out,  interests  were  pooled, 
and  industry  thus  came  under  the  sway,  speaking  quite 
generally,  of  a  smaller  number  of  very  large  firms,  side 
by  side  with  which,  or  rather  over  against  which,  stood 
the  similar  combinations  of  artizans  in  their  trade 
unions.  The  policy  of  laissez  /aire,  as  it  is  generally  but 
somewhat  erroneously  called,'  has  been  gradually  aban- 
doned ;  workmen  were  protected,  the  labour  of  women 
and  children  forbidden  or  restricted,  regulations  imposed 
in  matters  of  ventilation  and  sanitation  generally,  and 
the  principle  of  each  for  himself  and  the  devil  take  the 
hindermost  has  given  place  gradually  to  an  increasing 
appreciation  of  the  essential  solidarity  of  society.  The 
growth  of  the  larger  limited  companies  was  fostered  not 
only  by  the  desire  to  eliminate  competition,  but  by  the 
many  economies  inherent  in  a  system  where  operations 
could  be  undertaken  on  a  very  large  scale,  the  same 
economies  which  had  accelerated  the  decline  of  the  small 
private  firms.  Late  years  have  seen  this  process  of 
consolidation  carried  yet  further.  Apart  from  pooling 
agreements  and  trade  understandings  between  firms 
formally  independent,  we  have  seen  the  growth  of  the 
trust,  combine,  or  kartel,  which  in  its  extreme  form  includes 

*  To  speak  accurately  the  general  system  is  laissez  aller  "go  as  you 
please,"  divided  into  laissez  /aire,  freedom  of  manufacture,  and  laissez 
passer,  free  trade. 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE  NEW  STATE    295 

all,  or  practically  all,  the  firms  engaged  in  a  particular 
line  of  business,  and  in  less  extreme  instances  a  very 
large  proportion  of  such  firms.  The  great  home  of 
the  trust  is  America,  with  its  Standard  Oil  Trust,  Beef 
Trust,  Steel  Trust,  etc.,  but  the  German  kartcls  are 
extremely  strong,  and  it  has  been  very  largely  the  organi- 
zation of  these  kartels,  their  close  co-operation  vs^ith  each 
other,  and  the  support  given  to  them  by  the  German 
banks,  which  has  accounted  for  the  growth  of  German 
trade.  The  objections  raised  to  these  trusts  are  familiar 
and  need  not  be  restated  ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  un- 
deniably true  that  they  stand  in  the  due  line  of  industrial 
development  and  follow  in  logical  sequence  from  what 
has  gone  before,  that  they  can  effect  great  economies,  and 
therefore  if  they  will  can  reduce  prices  in  many  cases,  that 
they  can  give  stability  to  manufacture,  and  in  short  repre- 
sent the  scientific  use  of  the  resources  of  modern  capital, 
machinery,  labour,  and  banking.  The  problem  is  how  to 
reconcile  their  existence  with  the  rights  of  labour,  and  of  the 
general  consumer,  with  liberty  of  trade,  and  even  in  extreme 
cases  with  the  full  enjoyment  by  the  nation  at  large  of  its 
sovereignty  over  the  national  territory  and  the  activities  of 
the  community.  Some  socialists  have  been  not  altogether 
adverse  to  this  growth  ;  Mr.  Bernard  Shaw  has  remarked 
that  the  Trust  magnates  are  preparing  the  way  for  State 
socialism  far  more  effectively  than  any  socialist  propaganda, 
because  eventually  the  community,  if  it  must  have  a  sort  of 
collectivism,  will  prefer  to  see  it  in  the  hands  of  the  State 
to  seeing  it  in  the  hands  of  a  small  number  of  irresponsible 
capitalists.  There  is  also  the  via  media  of  State  control, 
an  idea  with  which,  as  remarked,  we  are  becoming  more 
familiar. 

With  the  great  trusts  we  have  arrived  at  a  point  of 
development  where  there  is  a  possible  reconciliation  between 
ideas  in  appearance  diverse  and  even  contradictory.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  trust  stands  for  the  almost  untram- 
melled power  of  the  great  financier,  on  the  other  hand, 
with  a  modified   internal   organization,   it   could  be  made 


296  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

to  approximate  closely  to  the  syndicate  or  guild ;  on  the 
one  hand  it  stands  for  a  tremendous  force  even  against 
the  State,  on  the  other  by  control,  not  to  speak  of  expro- 
priation, it  would  lend  itself  to  the  State  supervision  of 
industry  (also  a  medieval  idea)  ;  on  the  one  hand  it  has 
come  to  stand  as  a  symbol  of  the  negation  of  popular 
rights,  on  the  other  it  could  be  turned  into  a  combination 
or  co-operation  of  producers.  A  combination  or  correlation 
of  trusts  under  the  close  control  of  the  State  and  in  alliance 
with  a  banking  system  working  with  it  would  be  a  near 
equivalent  to  a  combination  of  guilds  under  State  control, 
or  in  other  words  to  a  syndicalist  system  with  a  controlling 
element  representing  State  socialism  or  collectivism.  It  is 
not  a  question  whether  we  like  these  developments  or  not, 
for  modern  Western  industrialism  has  come  to  stay,  and  the 
point  is  to  make  the  best  of  it,  and  on  the  whole  a  large 
measure  of  State  control  is  preferable  to  the  dominance  of 
the  trust  lord. 

This  brings  me  to  the  point  of  contact  with  my  general 
subject.  It  is  earnestly  to  be  hoped  that  the  Southern 
Slav  statesmen  will  not  be  led  by  a  misplaced  modesty, 
by  fear  of  being  branded  as  behind  the  times,  or  by  the 
idea  that  they  can  best  prove  their  modernity  and  their 
realism  by  exactly  aping  the  contemporary  West,  into 
a  policy  which  should  allow  the  growth  in  greater  Serbia 
of  precisely  the  same  industrial  civilization  with  which 
we  are  blessed  or  cursed.  The  West  has  a  great  deal  to 
learn  as  well  as  to  teach,  and  moreover  it  is  one  of  the 
large  justifications  of  the  existence  of  small  States  that 
they  can  act  as  political  and  social  laboratories  in  which 
can  be  observed  the  working  of  scale  models  of  innovation 
and  experiment.  In  a  large  country  and  a  highly  developed 
the  road  is  blocked  by  a  complexity  of  legitimate  vested 
interests,  and  also  by  the  widespread  harm  that  would 
result  from  a  false  move.  There  is  not  the  slightest  reason 
why  the  new  Serbia  should  laboriously  undergo  all  the 
phases  of  Western  industrial  development  when  she  can 
instead  take  stock  of  the  position  and  start  where  we  have 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF   THE   NEW   STATE    297 

left  off,  or  rather,  learning  from  our  experience,  determine 
upon  an  industrial  polity  which  shall  seek  to  avoid  mani- 
fested evils  and  take  due  account  of  the  obvious  trend 
of  growth.  Precisely  because  industrially  Serbia  will  be 
tabula  rasa  it  will  be  open  to  her  to  predetermine 
by  legislation  the  form  which  shall  be  taken  by  her  own 
industry,  to  set  up  a  framework  to  which,  already  erected, 
the  nascent  industry  must  needs  adapt  itself.  What,  in 
my  opinion,  the  framework  should  be  has  been  already 
indicated.  Since  modern  industrialism  ends  in  trusts  and 
kartels,  and  the  process  seems  inevitable,  let  that  be  the 
starting-point.  The  rights  of  the  workers  must  be  guarded 
not  merely  by  "factory  legislation"  but  in  the  constitution 
of  the  trust  by  representation  upon  the  directing  board. 
But  a  trust,  or  a  syndicate,  can  become  as  a  whole  an 
exploiting  agent  against  the  general  community,  so  must 
enter  the  third  element  of  State  control  by  means  of  a 
representative  or  representatives  with  a  power  of  veto 
over  prices  to  be  charged  and  so  forth.  All  engaged  in 
a  given  production  should  be  included  in  the  trust,  there 
can  be  no  question  of  crushing  outside  firms  or  of  refusing 
admittance — all  engaged  in  the  industry  ipso  facto  must 
become  members.  The  way  will  be  opened  to  co-operative 
productive  societies,  for  such  societies  will  no  longer  have 
to  fear  underselling,  since  there  will  be  one  selling 
price  fixed  for  all  with  penalties  for  infringement;  they 
will  no  longer  have  to  fear  unfair  competition  in  the 
buying  market,  for  the  economy  of  co-operative  buying 
in  gross  for  the  whole  trust  will  apply  to  them  equally 
with  others ;  they  will  no  longer  have  to  fear  the 
war  of  exhaustion  waged  by  a  firm  with  large  liquid 
capital  to  sink  against  the  co-operative  producers  with 
only  their  labour  and  the  need  of  immediate  returns. 
Thus  the  national  zadrugas  of  the  new  type  will  find 
their  place  and  scope  in  this  modern  industrial  framework, 
they  will  not  be  overborne  by  capitalist  production,  and 
the  instinct  of  the  Serb  for  co-operation  and  for  being 
his  own  master  will  be  given  full  play,  and  his  co-operative 


298  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

inheritance  from  the  former  family  zadruga  (see  Chapter 
III)  will  become  to  him  a  tower  of  strength.  A  place  will 
be  able  to  be  found  for  handicraft  as  in  the  carpet  zadruga, 
in  which  are  already  united  those  who  make  the  hand- 
woven  and  natural-dyed  Pirot  carpets.  This  is  obviously 
not  the  place  to  attempt  to  go  into  details,  but  sufficient 
has  been  said  to  indicate  the  main  idea,  which,  let  it  be 
repeated,  is  but  a  development  of  the  stage  of  industrial 
organization  which  has  already  been  reached.  We  shall 
have  in  the  West  to  adopt  some  form  of  State  control 
almost  inevitably  before  long,  why  then  should  not  the 
Southern  Slavs  make  that  their  starting-point  since  the 
road  is  already  marked  out,  since  no  vested  interests  stand 
in  the  way,  and  there  is  no  necessity  deliberately  to  ignore 
the  trend  of  modern  industrial  thought  in  order  to  allow 
to  grow  up  a  system  which  we  ourselves  our  preparing  to 
modify  in  spite  of  difficulties  present  with  us,  with  all  our 
past,  but  absent  from  the  simple  social  organization  of  the 
Serbs  ? 

In  this  way  perhaps  the  new  Serbia  may  be  able  to 
find  a  point  of  reconciliation  between  capitalism  and  labour, 
between  syndicalism  and  socialism,  between  individualism 
and  collectivism,  between  the  old  order  and  the  new. 
These  things  lie  in  the  future,  but  their  roots  are  in  the 
present,  it  is  while  the  ground  is  clear  that  the  seed  can 
be  sown.  Such  an  attempt  would  be  no  small  glory  to 
the  Serbs  in  the  history  of  mankind,  and  if  successful  would 
confer  a  lasting  benefit  on  others  and  on  themselves  an 
abiding-place  in  the  history  of  civilization.  Capital  of  the 
non-predatory  type,  too,  would  probably  prefer  to  embark 
on  industry  thus  stabilized  rather  than  to  meet  untram- 
melled competition. 

For  many  years,  however,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  no 
effort  will  be  made  artificially  to  stimulate  industry.  The 
ultimate  strength  of  a  nation  is  derived  from  agriculture, 
and  for  a  long  time  the  soil  of  greater  Serbia  with  its 
agriculture,  its  forests,  and  its  pastoral  industry  will 
suffice  to  maintain  not  merely  the  present  population  but 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE  NEW  STATE    299 

one  very  much  larger.  Nations  pay  dearly  enough  for 
industrialism  in  the  loss  of  many  things  that  make  life 
sane  and  sweet,  in  the  decay  of  a  sturdy  peasantry,  in  the 
loss  of  a  simpler  and  more  healthy  mode  of  life,  of 
simpler  and  healthy  pleasures,  and  of  a  really  gentle  code 
of  manners.  To  transform  the  Serb  peasant  into  a  copy 
of  the  western  artizan  would  be  a  poor  work,  and  if  the 
Serb  retains  his  present  dislike  for  manufacture  and  town 
life,  the  evil  would  be  still  worse  either  in  the  form  of  a 
corruptio  optimi  pessima  or  in  the  introduction  of  an  alien- 
owned  and  worked  industry  superimposed  upon  those 
elements  which  have  preserved  the  heritage  of  the  Serb 
through  darkest  depression  to  our  own  day.  "  A  peasant 
State  ",  so  let  it  remain  as  long  as  may  be. 

The  situation  of  Serbia's  capital  has  for  some  years 
constituted  a  serious  weakness  for  the  State,  and  in  the 
present  war  has  proved  most  unfortunate.  No  other 
Power  has  its  capital  standing  actually  on  the  very  frontier, 
and  that  frontier  the  one  which  marches  with  the  most 
dangerous  and  formidable  foe,  in  such  a  position  that  it 
can  be  bombarded  from  enemy  territory  immediately  war  is 
declared.  Serbia  had  to  commence  the  war  with  an 
act  which  in  other  States  connotes  a  dangerous  military 
position — the  evacuation  of  her  capital  and  the  transference 
of  the  organs  of  government  to  a  temporary  seat  of 
administration.  Even  the  position  of  Paris  in  the  north- 
east of  France,  though  it  is  so  much  further  removed  from 
the  frontier,  has  frequently  been  an  embarrassment  to 
France,  and  the  situation  of  Belgrade  regarded  as  a  capital 
is  infinitely  worse,  though  its  fine  natural  position  at  the 
junction  of  the  Save  and  Danube  and  at  the  entry  of  the 
Morava  valley  will  always  make  it  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant, if  not  eventually  the  most  important  town  of  the 
Balkans,  Constantinople  excepted.  When  the  Turk  was 
more  to  be  feared  than  the  Austrian,  and  so  much  of 
Serbia's  moral  and  intellectual  strength  was  derived  from 
the  Vojvodina,  the  choice  of  Belgrade  was  natural,  but 
with  the  decline  of  the  Turk  and  the  growth  of  Austrian 


300  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

ambition  Belgrade  has  become  more  and  more  unsuitable 
for  the  seat  of  government.  While  the  capital  of  a  country 
always  tends  to  grow  in  population  there  is  no  necessity 
for  the  choice  of  the  largest  town  for  the  capital :  the 
Hague  as  a  city  is  overshadowed  both  by  Amsterdam  and 
Rotterdam,  Rome  was  not  the  largest  city  in  Italy  when 
it  became  the  capital  of  the  unified  kingdom,  Edinburgh 
is  smaller  and  commercially  and  industrially  much  less 
important  than  Glasgow,  as  is  the  case  also  with  Dublin 
and  Belfast.  In  former  days  the  choice  was  restricted 
owing  to  the  lack  of  railway  communication,  but  with  the 
growth  of  the  railway  system  the  area  of  'choice  is  con- 
siderably widened  and  includes  towns  whose  historical 
associations  and  more  central  position  entitle  them  to 
serious  consideration  as  a  future  seat  of  government. 

The  position  will  of  course  be  considerably  modified 
if  at  the  end  of  the  war  Serbia  obtain  the  opposite  shores 
of  the  Save  and  Danube,  Syrmia  and  the  southern  Banat, 
and  the  acquisition  of  the  latter  is  urged  for  this  very 
reason  as  well  as  on  the  ground  of  nationality.  With  both 
banks  of  the  river  in  possession  of  the  Serbs  the  latter 
would  be  able  to  fortify  the  approaches  to  Belgrade,  but 
even  so  the  situation  of  the  latter  would  be  far  from  ideal 
in  spite  also  of  the  direct  railway  communication  with 
Agram.  Even  if  some  portion  of  southern  Hungary  in 
the  Banat  be  obtained  the  area  thus  acquired  would  be 
comparatively  small  in  extent  and  the  frontier  with 
Hungary  would  be  not  more  than  some  sixty  miles  distant, 
and  the  Roumanian  frontier — a  less  important  matter — 
would  be  still  nearer.  Moreover,  the  intervening  territory 
offers  no  obstacle  to  military  operations  as  hitherto 
conceived,  the  country  being  a  dead  level,  a  continuation 
of  the  great  Hungarian  plain  without  any  marked  range 
of  hills.  There  would  be,  in  fact,  no  natural  obstacle  to 
the  advance  of  an  army  in  this  direction,  even  the  principal 
river,  the  Theiss,  flowing  southward  to  its  junction  with 
the  Danube.  A  further  point  for  consideration  is  that 
in  consequence  of  the  Austrian  bombardment  the  principal 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE   NEW  STATE    301 

government  buildings  will  have  to  be  rebuilt.  The  new 
Skup§tina  House  still  remained  a  project  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war,  and  will  in  any  case  be  a  completely 
new  building.  The  extension,  moreover,  of  the  kingdom 
will  call  for  increased  accommodation  for  the  administra- 
tion, and  fresh  building  on  this  score  will  in  any  case 
be  inevitable.  It  will  not,  consequently,  be  a  case  of 
abandoning  adequate  public  buildings  in  good  repair,  but 
in  any  case  of  building  or  rebuilding  the  majority  and  of 
adding  to  the  remainder ;  it  is  merely  a  question  whether 
the  inevitable  expense  is  to  be  incurred  in  the  existing 
capital  or  in  some  other  town  to  be  selected.  After  recent 
experience,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  new  frontier 
will  in  any  case  not  be  far  distant  with  no  natural 
obstacles  in  between,  it  would  seem  desirable  that  Belgrade 
should  be  abandoned.  It  has  to  be  remembered  that  no 
great  historical  traditions  are  connected  with  Belgrade 
as  capital,  though  the  town  is  of  extreme  antiquity  as  a 
site  dating  at  least  to  the  days  of  the  Roman  Empire 
and  probably  before  that.  It  is  significant  that  in  the 
Middle  Ages  it  was  frequently  in  dispute  with  Hungary. 
Even  since  the  emancipation  of  Serbia  Belgrade  has  not 
always  been  the  capital,  which  under  MiloS,  owing  perhaps 
to  the  presence  of  a  Turkish  garrison  at  the  citadel  was 
fixed  at  Bj:agujevac,  though  the  Prince  often  stayed  in 
Belgrade,  while  under  Prince  Michael  it  was  for  a  time 
at  KruSevac.  The  latter  would  be  in  many  ways  a  better 
position.  It  has  old  historical  associations  as  the  capital  of 
the  last  Tsar  Lazar,  whose  church  and  the  ruins  of  his 
castle  remain,  and  of  the  Despots,  his  successors,  until  the 
advance  of  the  Turks  drove  them  to  Smederevo  (Semen- 
dria) ;  it  occupies  a  more  central  position  than  Belgrade, 
Kragujevac,  or  Ni§,  and  now  stands  on  the  railway,  which 
latter  though  now  of  narrow  gauge  will  eventually  be 
widened  to  the  normal  gauge  and  extended  to  meet  the 
existing  Bosnian  line  at  Mokragora,  just  east  of  Vi^egrad. 
When  this  connection  is  made  KruSevac  will  be  on  the 
direct  line  between   Ni§   and   Sarajevo,   and  it   may   also 


302  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

be  on  the  Danube-Adriatic  line  if  one  of  the  proposed 
traces,  Kladovo-NiS-Sarajevo-Spljet  or  Dubrovnik  be 
adopted.  It  is  a  small  town,  but  as  has  been  said  that 
is  not  necessarily  an  objection,  and  the  very  fact  of  its 
smallness  will  enable  a  new  capital  to  be  laid  out,  an 
opportunity  for  town  planning  which  in  the  future  might 
have  the  happiest  results  now  that  architects  have  turned 
so  much  of  their  attention  to  this  branch  of  their  art. 
Indeed  the  result  might  eventually  from  a  modest  beginning 
give  a  fine  and  distinctive  seat  of  government  to  the 
Southern  Slav  Kingdom.  Belgrade  could  still  remain  an 
occasional  place  of  residence  as  Ni§  has  frequently  been 
since  1878,  and  in  any  event  as  the  northern  gate  into 
Danubian  Serbia  it  should  be  strongly  fortified,  a  project 
for  which  possession  of  both  banks  of  the  rivers  and  of 
the  islands  in  mid-stream  would  give  great  facilities. 
It  is  a  commanding  position  of  which  full  advantage 
should  be  taken,  but  a  frontier  fortress,  however  strong 
its  position,  is  emphatically  not  the  place  for  a  capital, 
and  such  sentiment  as  may  attach  to  it,  itself  of  quite 
recent  growth,  should  yield  to  the  still  greater  national 
sentiment  attached  to  Krugevac  which  has  been  called 
for  the  Serbs  a  "sacred  city":  no  government  should 
be  placed  in  the  position  of  having  to  evacuate  its  capital 
as  the  first  operation  of  war.  It  is  true  that  troubles 
from  the  north  may  be  less  insistent  in  the  future,  but 
Hungary  will  for  some  time  at  least  be  a  jealous  neighbour, 
and  in  any  case  the  objection  to  fixing  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment  in    a   frontier   town  remains. 

Both  orthographies,  the  Cyrillic  and  the  Croatian,  will  be 
put  on  the  same  footing,  and  it  has  been  announced  that  both 
will  be  taught  in  the  schools.  Some  years  ago  it  was  pro- 
posed by  Croatian  patriots  to  introduce  the  Cyrillic  alphabet 
into  Croatia  itself  both  as  a  manifestation  of  Southern 
Slav  solidarity  and  because  of  its  phonetic  quality,  but  it 
is  unlikely  that  such  a  proposal  will  be  made  now  beyond 
what  is  contained  in  the  design  to  teach  all  children  both 
orthographies.     The  central  administrative  documents  will 


SOME   PROBLEMS   OF  THE  NEW  STATE    303 

doubtless  continue  to  be  written  in  the  Cyrillic  script  in 
order  to  avoid  confusion  as  the  central  administration  of 
the  enlarged  kingdom  will  be  an  extension  of  the  present 
government  offices.  Any  remains  of  the  old  jealousy  on 
this  score  should  be  assuaged,  and  the  matter  regarded 
as  being  quite  divorced,  as  naturally  it  is,  from  any  question 
of  religion  or  tribal  difference,  and  the  field  left  clear  to 
the  eventual  predominance  of  whichever  script  forms  the 
best  vehicle  of  the  common  language.  On  the  one  hand 
the  Croatian  orthography  is  in  line  with  the  script  of 
the  western  European  languages  though  differentiated  by 
diacritic  marks  which  give  it  in  practice  several  additional 
letters,  on  the  other  the  Cyrillic  is  allied  to  the  Russian 
alphabet  and  can  claim  the  advantages  of  sentiment  and 
of  its  phonetic  character. 

Religion  is  no  longer  the  dividing  force  it  once  was  and 
the  difficulties  on  this  score  will  be  less  than  would  formerly 
have  been  the  case.  On  sentimental  grounds  one  may  hope 
for  the  revival  of  the  Serb  Patriarchate,  nominally  perhaps 
at  Pec  as  England's  Primate  is  of  Canterbury,  though 
usually  residing  in  London.  The  Jesuits  in  Bosnia  have 
been  a  strongly  anti-national  force,  but  the  Society  is 
adaptable  and  will  find  it  to  its  own  interest  to  modify 
its  Habsburg  loyalty.  It  is  not  so  strong  anywhere  in 
popular  favour  as  to  risk  taking  up  an  attitude  hostile  to 
a  united  Southern  Slavdom  when  the  fact  is  accomplished, 
"but",  it  was  remarked  to  me,  "we  shall  not  allow  it 
to  proselytize  ". 

[Note. — Only  since  this  volume  has  been  in  the  press  have  I  read  the  full 
record  of  the  fiendish  cruelties  and  obscene  bestialities  committed  in  Serbia 
by  the  Imperial  troops,  chiefly  Magyar,  as  related  by  Dr.  Roiss  :  I  do  not 
see  how  Magyars  and  Serbs  will  be  able  to  live  in  amicable  juxtaposition,  and 
this  modifies  the  expression  of  opinion  on  pages  272,  273.  The  proposed 
boundaries  having  been  drawn  on  a  very  moderate  basis,  I  think  that  the 
proposal  made  on  page  187  (note)  might  be  adopted,  i.e.  to  attribute  to  Serbia 
the  south-western  Backa  and  apply  to  the  enclosed  Magyar  "  islets  "  a  policy 
of  cross-migration.  In  any  case  the  latter  policy  might  be  adopted  apart 
from  the  rectification  of  frontier  mentioned.] 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  EUROPEAN  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE 
SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

It  would  seem  to  be  extremely  difficult  for  Englishmen  to 
realize  even  yet  the  extent  of  our  interest  in  the  nature 
of  the  Southern  Slav  settlement,  and  the  manner  in  which 
a  faulty  solution  will  react  unfavourably  both  on  the 
general  European  position  in  general  and  upon  our  lown 
affairs.  While  Serbia  was  standing  alone  in  the  path  of 
Austria  there  was  admiration  for  her  gallantry,  but  there 
was  little  understanding  that  it  was  our  business  that  was 
being  settled  on  the  Danube.  It  is  true  that  a  writer 
in  the  Times  described  her  as  keeping  watch  on  the 
Danube  and  holding  the  gate  to  the  East,  and  again,  "  It 
is  in  truth  for  the  supremacy  over  Great  Britain  that  the 
fight  is  being  fought  out  when  shells  fall  upon  Serbian 
regiments ",  while  the  Relief  Committee  reminded  the 
nation  that  she  was  guarding  the  flank  of,  and  making 
possible  our  operations  in  Gallipoli,  but  I  do  not  think 
that  it  will  be  denied  that  these  words  made  no  impression 
upon,  and  conveyed  but  little  of  their  real  meaning  to, 
the  generality  of  the  public,  ever  slow  to  seize  upon  a 
new  idea  especially  in  the  domain  of  foreign  politics.^ 
Nor  can  it  be  altogether  wondered  at  when  even  our 
political  and  military  leaders  failed  to  grasp  the  essentials 
of  the  problem.     Not  only  was  there  a  reaction  from  the 

'  "  Unfortunately  the  English  mind  has  no  grasp  of  ideas,  and  no 
sense  of  proportion.  Indeed,  the  Englishman  has  no  mind  at  all, 
he  has  only  an  hereditary  obstinacy  ". — Creighton. 

304 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  305 

view  that  Serbia  was  the  cause  of  the  war  to  the  idea  that 
her  affair  was  the  merest  occasion  (in  one  sense  the  Austro- 
Serb  dispute  was  a  mere  occasion  for  the  open  manifesta- 
tion of  Austro-German  aims,  but  on  the  other  hand  one 
of  those  aims  was  Near  Eastern  predominance),  but  the 
intimate  bearing  of  Serb  resistance  on  both  our  general 
mihtary  position  in  the  East  and  also  on  the  pursuit  of 
an  essential  German  aim  seemed  to  be  ignored.  Our 
rulers,  accustomed  to  look  upon  the  Balkan  States  from 
the  heights  of  Olympus  and  unwilling  to  mingle  in  the 
affairs  of  Balkan  men,  did  not  rise  to  the  full  conception 
of  the  issues  at  stake.  Now  at  length  we  do  realize  how 
the  whole  current  of  our  war  in  the  East  (not  merely 
"  Serbia's  War",  as  one  newspaper's  headhne  constantly 
ran)  has  been  changed,  and  we  understand  how  different 
would  be  the  aspect  of  affairs  if  an  Allied  army  stood  in 
front  of  an  intact  Serbia  on  the  Danube,  but  still  people 
do  not  see  the  importance  of  the  future  settlement.  "  Tha 
Southern  Slav  question  is  caviare  to  the  general ",  remarked 
a  friend  of  mine  the  other  day.  It  remains  therefore  to 
conclude  this  volume  by  a  short  resume  of  the  extent  and 
manner  in  which  our  particular  interests  are  engaged. 

The  prime  importance  of  the  Southern  Slavs  from  a 
general  European  point  of  view  lies  in  the  enormous 
strategical  importance  of  the  territory  which  they  occupy, 
an  importance  which  has  not  lessened  but  increased 
because  of  the  progress  of  modern  politico-commercial 
development,  with  its  eastward  trend  and  growing  con- 
nection with  the  opening  up  of  the  areas  of  hither  Asia. 
The  Southern  Slavs  lie  in  the  way  of  a  German  advance 
eastward,  and  it  was  for  that  reason  that  the  attack  on 
Serbia  formed  an  integral  part  of  Germany's  plan  of 
expansion,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  domination 
of  the  Near  East  is  for  Germany  one  of  the  essential 
objects  for  which  the  war  is  being  waged,  and  should  she 
at  the  close  of  hostilities  be  in  a  position  to  maintain  her 
hold  upon  the  Near  East,  she  would  be  enabled  to  derive 
from  that  position  fresh  resources  both  for  her  commer- 

20 


306  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

cial  and  economic  development  and  for  the  building  up 
of  her  military  power. ^  Eight  years  ago  the  writer  re- 
marked in  an  unpubhshed  study  of  the  Balkan  situation, 
"  Austria  has  strengthened  her  position  in  Bosnia,  and  the 
next  move,  if  the  conditions  allow,  and  if  the  Entente 
Powers  do  not  take  the  only  means  of  precaution — the 
strengthening  of  their  naval  and  mihtary  resources — will 
be  made  against  King  Peter's  realm".  Serbia  lies  on  the 
land  route  between  East  and  West,  and  all  the  main 
lines  of  communication  from  western  Europe  to  Asia 
Minor,  and  through  Asia  Minor  to  Persia  and  India, 
pass  through  Serb  territory.  These  routes  form  also  the 
lines  of  invasion,  and  whosoever  from  central  Europe 
would  exercise  dominion  over  Asia  Minor  must  sooner 
or  later  possess  himself  of  Serbia,  just  as  any  southern 
Asiatic  conqueror  who  desires  a  European  realm  must 
also  conquer  Serbia.  These  facts  are  well  marked  in  the 
history  of  the  land  from  ancient  days.  Under  the  Roman 
Empire  Moesia  Superior  was  an  important  province  united 
to  Italy  by  the  road  which,  passing  along  the  Save 
valley,  went  through  Siscia  (Sisak)  and  thence  by  Emona 
(Ljubljana)  to  Gradisca,  Venice,  and  Milan.  It  thus 
formed  part  of  the  overland  connection  between  east 
and  west,  as  well  as  a  barrier  against  incursions  from  the 
Pannonian  plain.  Naissus  (Nig)  and  Singidunum  (Bel- 
grade) were  important  in  those  days  as  now,  and  when  East 
and  West  came  into  conflict  the  territory  now  occupied 
by  the  Southern  Slavs  was  a  frequent  scene  of  conflict. 
Invasion  of  Upper  Moesia  cut  off  the  Eastern  Empire 
from  the  Western,  and  resulted  in  mutual  isolation  save 
by  sea  so  long  as  the  invaders  remained  unsubdued. 

Goth  and  Hun  in  early  times,  as  the  Mongol  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  struck  from  the   north  at  this  nerve  centre 

'  Since  these  words  were  written  the  truth  of  the  idea  expressed  has 
come  more  generally,  but  not  generally  enough,  to  be  recognized  very 
largely  owing  to  M.  Cheradame's  book,  The  German  Plot  Unmasked. 
A  German  Near  East  would  mean  a  German  domination  of  Europe, 
and  if  we  would  prevent  a  resumption  of  the  plans  a  strong  Jugoslavia 
is  essential. 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  H07 

of  the  later  Empire.  When  the  Ottoman  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  the  acquisition  of  a  central  European  dominion, 
after  he  had  secured  his  hold  upon  Asia  Minor,  which  he 
conquered  from  the  Seljuk  from  Thrace,  which  was  the 
real  seat  of  his  power  after  the  conquest  of  Adrianoplc, 
Serbia  had  to  bear  the  first  brunt  of  the  attack.  For  some 
time  after  Kosovo  the  struggle  lacked  its  fiercest  intensity, 
but  when  Anatolia  was  secured  and  Constantinople  had 
fallen  to  Mahommed  the  Conqueror,  the  days  of  Serbia 
were  numbered.  Six  years  from  the  latter  event  saw  the 
end  of  Serb  independence,  followed  after  another  four  years 
by  that  of  Bosnia.  Europe  then  failed  to  appreciate  the 
danger  till  it  was  too  late,  and  the  later  Serb  monarchs  had 
frequently  to  defend  themselves  against  Hungarian  attacks. 
Hungary  paid  the  penalty  for  this  short-sightedness  when, 
the  Serb  barrier  overthrown,  she  had  to  lead  the  crusade 
against  the  Turks,  and  became  herself  the  prey  of  the 
Asiatic  invaders.  With  the  decay  of  Turkish  power  the 
tide  of  conquest  turned,  as  has  been  seen  in  a  previous 
chapter,  and  the  Habsburgs  began  their  Drag  nach  Osten. 
Again  it  was  upon  the  Serb  lands  that  the  waves  of  inva- 
sion broke  as  the  Imperialists  drove  the  Turks  back  along 
the  roads  by  which  they  had  advanced.  Whether  then  the 
course  of  empire  in  south-eastern  Europe  were  running 
westward  or  eastward,  it  was  always  the  conquest  of  the 
Serb  territory  that  was  a  necessary  preliminary  to  advance 
in  the  enemy's  country,  always  for  the  West  she  held  the 
gate  of  the  East,  as  for  the  East  she  held  the  gate  of  the 
West.  Had  the  Southern  Slavs  been  united  and  strong, 
the  whole  current  of  European  history  would  have  been 
changed ;  they  would  have  formed  a  strong  buffer  State,  a 
barrier  regulating  and  confining  the  flow  of  invasion.  Too 
weak  to  hold  back  the  Turks,  they  have  been  too  weak  to 
hold  back  the  Habsburgs,  and  until  they  are  united  and 
have  acquired  the  strength  that  union  will  give  there  will 
always  be  chronic  unrest  in  these  regions,  and  one  of  the 
most  important  tasks  in  diplomacy  will  be  to  give  them  that 
unity  which  will  enable  them  to  stabiHze  the  ebb  and  flow 


308  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

of  conflicting  ambitions  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula :  a  weak 
people  in  an  important  strategical  position  will  always 
invite  attack  from  ambitious  neighbours  and  be  a  source 
of  unending  disturbance.  The  different  history  of  Eou- 
mania,  a  country  so  much  more  open  to  attack  geographi- 
cally, and  its  comparative  autonomy  under  Turkish  rule 
have  been  the  consequence  of  its  geographical  position,  and 
illustrate  by  contrast  the  different  strategical  position  of 
Serbia.  Lying  in  a  backwater,  away  from  the  great  inter- 
continental routes,  Eoumania  could  be  left  to  a  certain 
extent  to  her  own  devices ;  she  led  nowhere  save  into  the 
vast  expanses  of  Russia,  and  the  would-be  conquerors  of 
central  Europe  passed  through  Serbia. 

A  few  geographical  details  will  serve  to  illustrate  shortly 
the  general  strategical  position  of  the  Southern  Slav  lands 
and  to  act  as  a  commentary  upon  historical  tendencies  past 
and  present.  The  north-western  Balkans  form  the  real 
point  of  junction  between  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  central 
and  western  Europe.  Below  Belgrade  the  Danube  is  both 
wide  and  deep,  till  it  is  confined  by  the  mountain  masses, 
its  passage  through  which  forms  the  Iron  Gates,  below 
which  the  river  besides  being  broad  is  fringed  on  the  north 
by  marshy  country.  Thus  from  Belgrade  to  the  Black  Sea 
there  is  at  present  only  one  bridge  across  the  river,  that  at 
Cernavoda,  and  even  at  Belgrade  the  bridge  is  not  over  the 
Danube  but  over  the  Save,  the  Danube  itself  being  bridged 
higher  up  at  Petrovaradin.  The  whole  area  turns  its  back 
upon  Italy  as  Italy  does  upon  the  Balkans,  the  mountain 
system  having  its  spine  close  to  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic, 
so  that  the  course  of  the  rivers  westward  is  for  the  most 
part  short,  the  country  thus  draining  chiefly  to  the  north- 
east and  thence  by  the  Danube  into  the  Black  Sea.  The 
north-western  portion  of  the  area  inhabited  by  the  race 
thrusts  itself  forward  into  the  Alpine  knot  where  the  Julian, 
Carnic,  and  Noric  Alps  meet,  Kranjska  (Carniola)  being  in 
main  the  head  valley  of  the  Save.  From  this  region  the 
Croatian  coast  is  bordered  by  the  desolate  Karst,  forming 
part  of  the  head  system  of  the  Dinaric  Alps,  whose  main 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  'AGO 

longitudinal   ridge    separates   Dalmatia   from   Bosnia  and 
which   throws   off   spurs   throughout    the   greater  part   of 
Bosnia,  Montenegro,  and  the  western  portion  of  Danubian 
Serbia.     Croatia  and  Slavonia,  apart  from  this  mountainous 
region  in   the   west,    forms   a   long  Mesopotamia,  running 
eastward  between  the  Drave  and  the  Save  with  its  eastern 
end  formed  by  the  Danube  between  the  points  of  junction 
with  it  of  these  two  rivers.     Large  portions  of  this  Mesopo- 
tamian  area  are  flat,  and  it  is  nowhere  really  mountainous. 
Bosnia  is  decidedly  mountainous  apart  from  the  low-lying 
region,  the  Posavina,  along  the   Save.     It  has  easy  com- 
munication  with  Dalmatia   along   the  Narenta,  the  most 
considerable  stream  flowing  westward  ;  elsewhere  for  poli- 
tical reasons  the  passes,  such  as  the  Arzano  leading  to  the 
headwaters  of  the  Cetina,  have  not  been  properly  exploited. 
The  Hercegovina,  like  north-western  Bosnia  which  borders 
the  Karst,  is  a  difficult  limestone  region  affording  scanty 
tilth,  scored  by  fissures,  and  undermined  by   subterranean 
watercourses.      The   central     area,     though    difficult    and 
mountainous,  is  richer  in  soil  and  forest  growth.     Commu- 
nications are  everywhere  difficult  by  the  narrow  mountain 
defiles,  the  more  so  as  the  mountains  form  tangled  knots 
instead    of    running    in    well-defined    continuous    ranges. 
Montenegro    is    a    wilderness    of     mountains,    while    the 
sanjak   of    Novipazar    is    traversed    by    mountains   whose 
trend,  almost  due  south,   imposes   increased   difficulties  in 
the  way  of  south-easterly  communication. 

Old  Serbia  ^  is  in  some  ways  the  key  to  the  Balkan 
Peninsula.  It  represents  an  elevated  plain  surrounded  by 
high  mountain  ranges  otTering  but  few  points  of  ingress 
and  egress.  On  the  north-west  it  is  closed  in  by  the 
sanjak  system,  the  Albanian  Alps,  etc.,  and  here  stands 
the  town  of  Novipazar,  itself  in  a  mountainous  basin 
opening  to  the  Ibar.  This  river  opens  a  way  into 
Danubian  Serbia  uniting  wifh  the  western  Morava  at 
Kraljevo.  It  was  by  this  route  that  the  British  hospital 
units  retreated  from  northern  Serbia  during  the  Austro- 
'  Region  of  Prizren,  Pristiua,  etc. 


310  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAYS 

German  invasion.  From  Easka,  where  the  Ibar  flows 
from  the  plateau  of  Old  Serbia,  the  north-eastern  boundary 
of  the  latter  is  formed  by  the  Kopaonik  mountains, 
ranging  to  7,000  feet  in  height  with  a  practical  pass  at 
Prepolac,  by  which  retreated  the  Serb  forces  from  the 
Timok  valley  and  Ni§,  and  by  which  runs  one  of  the  traces 
of  the  Danube-Adriatic  railway.  On  the  south-east  lie  the 
Sar  Planina  and  the  Crna  Gora  (Karadagh),  the  former 
rising  in  Ljubitrn  to  a  height  of  10,000  feet.  Over  the 
§ar  is  a  difficult  mountain  track  to  Prizren,  Between  it 
and  the  Karadagh,  3,000  to  4,000  feet  high,  is  the  pass  of 
Kacanik,  down  which  flows  one  of  the  headwaters  of  the 
Vardar  past  Skoplje.  This  is  also  the  route  of  the 
Mitrovica-Skoplje  railway.  It  was  in  this  direction  that 
the  retreating  Serbs  massed  in  Old  Serbia  endeavoured 
to  break  through  in  order  to  join  hands  with  the  French 
on  the  lower  Vardar,  and  on  the  failure  of  this  attempt 
it  was  the  holding  of  the  northern  end  of  the  pass  which 
enabled  the  bulk  of  the  army  to  make  good  its  escape  by 
the  remaining  route,  that  to  the  south-west  by  which  Old 
Serbia  connects  with  Porto  Medua,  which  runs  a  little  to 
the  south  of  the  united  Drin,  bifurcating  from  which  is 
the  route  along  the  valley  of  the  Black  Drin  to 
Debar  and  Ochrida.  The  remainder  of  Old  Serbia  is 
closed  in  by  the  mountains  lining  the  western  edge  of 
the  White  Drin  valley,  through  which  is  a  difficult  route 
through  Pec  to  Berane,  taken  by  many  of  the  refugees,  a 
few  following  the  head  stream  of  the  Ibar  which  runs  to 
the  north  of  the  Albanian  Alps. 

Danubian  Serbia  approximates  in  general  to  Bosnia  in 
its  physical  features,  a  tangle  of  mountains  enclosing  river 
valleys,  well  wooded  and  offering  many  difficulties  to 
internal  communication.  To  this  there  is  one  outstanding 
exception  in  the  valley  of  the  Morava,  which  has  been 
in  all  ages  the  great  road  of  communication  between 
central  and  south-eastern  Europe.  The  river  itself  reaches 
the  Danube  at  Smederevo  (Semendria),  but  the  railway 
diverges   to  Belgrade.     The  main  valley  reaches  into  the 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  311 

heart  of  the  country  to  the  neighbourhood  of  KruSevac, 
not  far  from  which  town  the  eastern  and  western  Moravas 
unite.  The  eastern  valley  leads  up  to  Ni§,  whence  two 
routes  separate.  The  one  passes  up  the  Nissava  valley 
to  Pirot,  and  thence  the  trunk  Hne  goes  to  Sofia,  Philip- 
popolis,  and  Constantinople,  the  other  runs  up  the  eastern 
Morava  valley,  past  Vranja  to  Kumanovo  and  Skoplje, 
and  thence  to  Salonica  down  the  Vardar  valley,  the  water- 
parting  between  the  two  streams  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Kumanovo  being  low  and  easy.  By  way  of  the  western 
Morava  runs  the  route  to  U2ice  and  thence  to  ViSegrad 
and  Sarajevo,  while  at  Kraljevo,  as  has  been  seen,  it  is 
joined  by  the  Ibar ;  there  is  thus  a  certain  correspondence 
between  the  two  head  -  streams  of  the  Morava.  The 
Oriental  Railway  runs  from  Belgrade  vid  Ni§  and  Sofia 
to  Constantinople,  while  from  NiS  runs  the  Salonica  line 
vid  Skoplje. 

So  much  is  the  line  of  traffic  in  the  western  Balkans 
dictated  by  the  physical  configuration  of  the  country, 
that  at  first  glance  but  little  difference  can  be  perceived 
between  a  modern  railway  map,  showing  proposed  exten- 
sions, and  a  road  map  of  the  later  Roman  Empire.  The 
Oriental  lines  follow  the  track  of  the  old  Roman  roads ; 
the  lines  leading  to  Zagreb  and  Ljubljana  correspond  also  ; 
the  southerly  and  northerly  traces  of  the  Danube-Adriatic 
line  follow  also  roughly  the  Roman  roads  from  the  modern 
Alessio  through  Prizren  and  the  Prepolac  pass  to  Ni§,  and 
vid  Uzice  to  Sarajevo  and  the  Narenta  valley ;  the  sanjak 
line  as  proposed  also  represents  an  old  road,  and  even 
the  proposed  Serbo-Roumanian  Danube  bridge  which  is 
projected  is  not  far  from  Trajan's  bridge.  The  point  is 
of  importance  as  testifying  to  the  fact  that  the  physical 
features  of  the  country  dictate  now  as  in  early  days  the 
necessary  trace  for  the  great  lines  of  communication — 
the  strategic  conditions  are  permanent. 

From  the  foregoing  summary  some  idea  will  have  been 
obtained  of  the  general  geographical  importance  of  the 
Southern  Slav   lands.      The    Morava   valley   at   each   end 


312  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

receives  a  confluence  of  trade  routes  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance, and  destined  to  be  more  used  and  of  greater 
value  in  the  future  than  in  the  immediate  past.  The  first 
of  these  routes  is  that  of  the  existing  Orient  express,  which 
from  western  Europe  leads  through  Vienna  and  Budapest 
to  Belgrade.  This  particular  stream  of  traffic  may  be 
regarded  as  having  several  head-streams — Paris,  Antwerp, 
Ostend,  Rotterdam,  Hamburg,  and  Berlin — meaning  by  that 
that  traffic  from  these  various  centres  emerges  ultimately 
on  Belgrade  through  Budapest.  For  some  years  there  has 
been  talk  of  a  new  international  route  from  the  West  which 
would  materially  shorten  the  distance  between  Paris  and 
Constantinople.  This  route,  known  as  the  Po  and  Save 
valley  line,  would  make  use  of  the  Simplon  tunnel  and 
pass  by  way  of  Milan,  Venice,  Trieste,  Ljubljana,  and 
Zagreb  to  Belgrade.  The  utilization  of  this  route  has 
hitherto  been  blocked  by  Magyar  jealousy,  but  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war  on  favourable  terms  would  see  this 
obstacle  removed.  Eventually  it  could  be  shortened  still 
further  by  the  construction  of  more  direct  lengths  of  line 
from  Belgrade  to  Mitrovica  on  the  Save,  and  from  the 
latter  to  Slavonian  Brod,  which  would  cut  off  the  loops 
made  by  the  existing  track.  This  international  line,  which 
would  serve  to  tap  new  sources  of  through  traffic,  joins  the 
existing  Oriental  route,  as  has  been  seen,  at  Belgrade. 
Other  trans-continental  routes  converge  at  the  same  point, 
for  the  shortest  line  from  Warsaw  to  Constantinople  and 
Salonica  runs  through  Budapest  to  Belgrade,  as  does  also 
the  most  direct  line  from  Riga  through  Vilna  and  Lemberg, 
though  in  the  latter  case  connections  between  Burgas  and 
Varna  and  thence  with  the  Roumanian  system  via  Dobric 
might  eventually  provide  a  shorter  line. 

All  these  convergent  routes  pass  together  up  the  Morava 
valley  as  far  as  Nis,  where  they  meet  a  similar  convergence 
of  routes  from  Asia  Minor  and  the  Levant,  which  may  be 
regarded  as  a  branching  out  of  the  routes  already  men- 
tioned. From  Ni§  the  Oriental  line  runs  through  Sofia  to 
Constantinople,    and    along   this    passes  all   traffic  which 


IMPORTANCE   OF  THE   SOUTHERN  SLAVS    313 

has  been  gathered  in  at  Belgrade,  from  west,  north-west, 
and  north,  which  is  making  for  that  city.  Important 
as  this  route  is  it  will  be  of  infinitely  greater  importance 
in  the  near  future.  With  the  completion  of  the 
Bagdad  railway  to  the  Persian  Gulf  will  be  established 
a  new  overland  route  to  India.  Nor  is  that  all. 
There  will  inevitably  be  before  long  with  the  decay  of 
old  prejudices  on  the  point  a  southern  Persian  line  which, 
linking  up  at  one  extremity  with  the  Bagdad  line,  will 
find  its  eastern  terminus  by  way  of  the  existing  Indian 
system  at  Bombay.  This  will  be  a  genuinely  overland 
route  to  the  East,  broken  only  by  the  short  Channel 
crossing  from  Dover  and  the  still  shorter  crossing 
over  the  Bosphorus  from  Constantinople,  and  if  train- 
ferry  services  were  established  over  those  breaks  it 
would  be  possible  to  travel  in  the  same  railway  carriage 
from  London  to  Bombay.  Such  a  hne  would  not  com- 
pete with  the  sea  route  for  goods  traffic,  save  perhaps  for 
a  small  number  of  articles  of  little  bulk  and  high  value, 
but  it  would  attract  those  passengers  for  whom  a  sea 
voyage  has  no  attractions,  and  still  more  those  whose 
object  it  is  to  reach  their  destination  as  soon  as  possible. 
Its  effect  on  English  trade  development  would  be  largely 
by  its  action  on  the  personal  element,  since  the  English 
importer  or  exporter  would  be  able  to  make  a  compara- 
tively quick  passage  to  India  to  study  local  conditions  on 
the  spot  or  to  meet  his  Indian  correspondents.  From  Ni§ 
diverges  another  through  route  of  immediate  importance 
up  the  head  valley  of  the  eastern  Morava  and  down  the 
Vardar  to  Salonica.  The  importance  of  the  latter  will  in 
some  respects  yield  to  that  of  the  Pirasus,  for  with  the 
completion  of  the  Greek  lines  to  form  a  junction  with 
the  Salonica  line,  now  just  completed,  the  Piraeus  may 
become  the  southern  terminus  of  the  present  overland 
route  instead  of  Brindisi,  the  voyage  from  the  former 
to  Alexandria  being  some  three  hundred  miles  shorter 
than  that  from  the  latter.  Salonica  also  is  a  focus  for 
Levantine  traffic  in  and  out.     Hence  Nii^,  "  the  Clapham 


3U  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

Junction  of  the  Balkans,"  and  Belgrade  are  of  greater 
importance  than  Sofia  or  Skoplje,  for  while  the  former 
bestride  both  the  Vienna-Constantinople  line  and  the 
Vienna-Salonica,  Sofia  bestrides  only  the  Constantinople 
line,  and  Skoplje  only  the  Salonica  route. 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  the  Morava  valley  controls 
all  the  main  arteries  of  traffic  in  the  Balkans.  All  land 
traffic  to  the  East  from  the  western  seaports  from 
Marseilles  to  Rotterdam,  as  from  Milan,  Paris,  Brussels, 
and  Amsterdam,  and  all  the  traffic  from  the  northern 
ports  from  Hamburg  to  Riga,  as  from  Berlin,  Vienna, 
Prague,  and  Warsaw,  enter  the  valley  at  Belgrade,  while 
from  Ni§  diverge  the  land  routes  to  Constantinople  and 
eventually  to  India,  as  well  as  the  southern  lines  of  traffic 
to  Salonica  and  the  Piraeus  and  thence  by  sea  to 
Alexandria  and  the  Suez  Canal.  If,  as  a  result  of  the  war, 
Asia  Minor  comes  under  civilized  government  and  its 
vast  natural  resources  are  developed,  it  will  become  one 
of  the  richest  regions  of  the  world.  What  it  was  in 
ancient  days,  as  Mesopotamia  also,  is  known  to  every 
student,  and  its  interior  is  studded  with  the  ruins  of 
what  used  to  be  great  and  prosperous  cities.  If  in  some 
respects  its  natural  fertility  has  been  decreased  by  de- 
forestation and  consequent  denudation,  yet  its  poten- 
tial agricultural  and  pastoral  wealth  is  immense.  With 
the  construction  of  roads  and  railways  its  mineral 
resources  will  be  developed,  its  copper  and  coal  as  well 
as  its  marble  quarries.  A  great  commerce  will  spring 
up  and  the  land  routes  to  it  will  correspondingly  increase 
in  importance.  It  was  with  a  sure  insight  that  the 
Germans  marked  it  down  for  their  own,  and  so  marking 
it  cast  their  eyes  also  on  the  means  of  access,  the  lands 
of  the  Southern  Slav  who  holds  the  gate  to  the  East. 
Thus  is  apparent  the  role  of  the  race  as  the  great  obstacle 
in  the  Drang  nacli  Osten.  The  Germans  so  long  as  they 
cherish  ambitions  in  hither  Asia  are  bound  to  seek  to 
crush  the  Southern  Slavs,  and  conversely  all  those  whose 
interest  it  is  that  German   penetration  in  the  Near  East 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  315 

should  be  prevented  are  bound  by  motives  of  self-interest, 
apart  altogether  from  the  doctrine  of  nationality  or  from 
any  feelings  of  sentiment,  to  see  to  it  that  the  Southern 
Slav  barrier  should  be  made  as  strong  as  possible.  We 
English  in  particular  have  tremendous  interests — naval, 
political,  and  commercial — in  these  regions,  and  conse- 
quently as  a  matter  of  purely  self-regarding  policy  must 
give  our  closest  heed  to  the  settlement  of  the  western 
Balkans.  For  years  we  have  been  disquieted  by  the  hold 
of  the  Germans  over  the  Bagdad  railway,  it  has  been  a 
question  that  has  aroused  fiercest  criticism  of  the  conduct 
of  our  foreign  policy ;  we  have  felt  the  menace  of  the 
approach  to  our  Indian  frontier  of  an  aggressive  military 
Power,  and  felt  it  so  acutely  that  it  furnished  the  in- 
centive to  the  accommodation  of  our  long-standing  disputes 
with  Russia,  it  gave  us  an  insight  into  our  true  interests 
and  the  harmfulness  of  a  suspicion  which  had  crystal- 
lized with  one  political  party  into  a  maxim  of  policy ; 
we  saw  the  menace  to  our  naval  interests  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  second  naval  Power  on  the  flank  of  our 
sea  route  to  the  East  in  close  proximity  to  Egypt  and 
the  Suez  Canal,  and  so  in  Persia  the  era  of  rivalry  with 
Russia  was  closed  by  an  accord.  These  interests  must 
form  an  abiding  preoccupation  of  English  statesmen,  and 
it  is  therefore  incumbent  upon  them  to  strengthen  our 
position  by  a  means  which  will  make  no  call  upon  us, 
and  raise  up  no  fresh  rival,  by  establishing  upon  a  firm 
basis  a  State  which  can  never  be  a  danger  to  ourselves. 
It  is  not  only  the  trans-continental  traffic  east  and  west 
which  passes  through  Serbia.  At  the  time  of  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia  a  great  deal  was  heard  of  the  proposed 
Danube-Adriatic  line  whose  original  trace  was  vid  Nis^,  the 
Prepolac  pass,  and  Prizren  to  Porto  Medua.  The  object  of 
this  line  was  both  to  provide  Serbia  with  an  outlet  to  the 
sea  and  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Roumanian  system. 
After  the  war  it  will  be  one  of  the  first  tasks  of  the  govern- 
ment to  build  this  hne.  The  trace,  however,  will  be 
altered  in  accordance  with  the  altered  territorial  arrange- 


316  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

ments  on  the  eastern  Adriatic.  If  Spljet  (Spalato)  be  left 
in  Serb  hands,  and  in  such  a  way  that  its  harbour  is  not 
commanded  by  foreign  guns,  then  the  line  starting  from 
the  Danube  at  Kladova  will  run  via  Ni§,  the  western 
Morava  valley  to  Uzice,  Sarajevo,  Bugojno,  and  the  Arzano 
pass  to  Spljet.  On  this  route  connection  will  have  to  be 
made  between  Uzice  and  Mokragora,  and  beyond  Bugojno 
with  Sinj,  moreover  the  sections  Ni§-Uzice  and  Mokragora- 
Bugojno  are  narrow  gauge  (2  feet  6  inches).  An  alternative 
trace  which  has  not  much  to  recommend  it  and  would 
require  a  lot  of  new  work  is  along  the  Danube  to  Belgrade 
and  thence  to  Sarajevo.  Should  the  position  at  Spljet  be 
such  as  is  foreshadowed  by  the  secret  treaty  with  Italy, 
then  the  Serbs  will  be  well  advised  to  abandon  Spljet  as  a 
terminus  in  spite  of  its  position  and  advantages,  and  to  fix 
it  at  a  port  where  they  would  be  masters  in  their  own 
house.  By  establishing  Gru^  (Gravosa),  the  port  of 
Dubrovnik,  as  the  terminus  the  latter  part  of  the  line  from 
Sarajevo  would  be  formed  by  the  existing  narrow-gauge 
line  to  the  port  mentioned  :  it  would  have  to  be  made  of 
normal  gauge  and  a  tunnel  pierced  through  the  BielaSnica 
range  where  now  rack  and  pinion  are  utilized.  Less  will 
probably  be  heard  of  the  proposed  southerly  trace,  since  the 
Serbs  will  naturally  prefer  to  develope  their  own  harbours 
rather  than  any  Albanian  port.  A  possible  trace,  however, 
would  be  from  Kraljevo  up  the  Ibar  valley  to  Berane  and 
thence  by  KolaSin  to  Antivari  (a  poor  port)  or  Budva,  which 
potentially  is  a  good  one.  A  lot  of  new  work  would  be 
required  here,  and  the  line  would  be  costly  to  construct, 
and  in  all  probability  the  Danube-Adriatic  railway  will 
find  its  terminus  at  Gruz  or  Spljet.  This  line,  however, 
is  much  more  than  a  Danube-Adriatic  railway.  The 
project  is  to  carry  it  over  the  Danube  by  a  railway  bridge 
and  so  to  form  a  junction  with  the  Roumanian  system. 
It  will  thus  become  a  transverse  continental  line,  con- 
necting the  Adriatic  with  Bucharest,  and  through  Bucharest 
with  Odessa,  Kiev,  and  Moscow.  It  will  thus  become  an 
important  avenue  of  through   traffic  with  Roumania  and 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  317 

Russia,  an  avenue,  it  will  be  noticed,  that  crosses  the 
great  east  and  west  routes  at  Ni§  at  the  southern  end  of 
the  Morava  "  funnel  ",  so  that  Nig  will  become  the  greatest 
rail  and  road  centre  in  the  Balkans.  This  line,  also, 
emphasizes  the  important  strategic  position  of  Serbia  and 
the  Morava  valley  as  the  focus  of  trans-Balkan  trade 
routes. 

Enough    has,    perhaps,    been    said    to    bring    out    the 
European   importance    of    the    Southern    Slav    lands   and 
therefore  of  a  full  and  proper  settlement  of  the  Southern 
Slav  question.     The   Southern   Slavs   occupy  one  of   the 
most  important  strategic  areas  on  the  continent,  all  move- 
ments of  conquest  from  nearer  Asia  into  Europe   or  vice 
versa  have  perforce   made   their    way   through    this   land, 
and  it  is  a  European  interest  that  the  Southern  Slav  mon- 
archy should  be  strong  enough  successfully  to  sustain  the 
role  thrust  upon  it.    It  has  not  been  a  matter  of  ambition  or 
of  national  restlessness  that  has  made  this  people  loom  so 
large  in  recent  diplomatic  history.     Apart  from  the  circum- 
stance of  the  parcelling  out  of  the  nationality  among  several 
governments,  it  has  been  the  territorial  distribution  of  the 
race  that  has  thrust  it  willy  nilly  into  the  vortex  of  vast 
diplomatic    combinations    and     immense     ambitions.      It 
cannot   escape  its  destiny  in   the   future   any  more  than 
in  the  past,  the  happiness  that  belongs  to  a  nation  that 
has  no  history  has  never  been  Serbia's  nor  ever  will  be ; 
if  she  does  not  make  history  herself  others  will  make  it 
for  her;    either  she   will  be  a   strong  barrier  to   lawless 
ambition  or  she  will  be  again,  as  in  the  past,  the  roadway 
of  conflicting  nations  of  irreconcilable  ambitions.     If  then 
anything  like  a  permanent   settlement   is   desired  in  the 
Near  East,   if    in    our   own   selfish   interests — apart   from 
all   other  considerations — we  desire  to  put  a  term  to  the 
Germanic  Drang  nach  Osten,  then   our  course  is   clearly 
marked  out,   we  must   effect   the  union   of  the   Southern 
Slav   race   and   strengthen   it   by   every   legitimate   means 
in  our  power.     A  strong  Southern  Slav  kingdom  will  be 
a  stabihzing  element  both  in  the  narrow  Balkan  problem 


318  THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS 

and  in  that  much  graver  question  of  the  future  relation- 
ship between  East  and  West,  of  the  future  interactions 
of  central  Europe  and  hither  Asia.  The  European 
function  of  the  greater  Serbia  of  the  future  is  to  act  as 
a  sort  of  spring  buffer  between  East  and  West  so  that 
poHtical  shocks  having  their  origin  in  either  quarter  can 
be  taken  up  and  absorbed.  That  is  clearly  marked  in 
the  whole  history  of  Serbia,  in  the  history  of  Tsar  Du§an, 
when  for  a  time  it  seemed  as  if  she  might  be  able  to  take  up 
and  absorb  the  Turkish  impact,  as  in  the  history  of  King 
Peter  when  the  impact  comes  from  the  opposite  direction. 
Not  hitherto  has  this  buffer  been  strong  enough  to  stand  up  to 
its  work,  and  it  must  be  the  task  of  the  Allies  in  the  general 
European  settlement  so  to  re-establish  it  that  in  future  it 
will  be  able  to  perform  its  appointed  work.  A  weak  buffer 
State  such  as  diplomatists  love  is  useless,  it  can  never  do 
its  work,  it  is  always  inviting  attack,  and  is  thus  the  cause 
of  ceaseless  jealousy  and  of  constant  trouble.  This  spring 
buffer  of  fundamental  importance  in  the  general  European 
mechanism  must  be  made  as  strong  as  possible.  It  would 
indeed  be  well  for  Europe  if  the  Southern  Slavs  were  more 
numerous  and  stronger  than  they  are,  yet  I  think  that  in 
union  they  will  be,  with  proper  support,  strong  enough  for 
the  purpose.  As  we  have  seen,  a  united  Southern  Slavdom 
would  be  even  now  a  nation  of  some  twelve  millions,  and 
as  the  area  they  inhabit  amounts  to  some  90,000  square 
miles  there  is  room  for  a  much  larger  population.  With 
a  population  of  three  hundred  to  the  square  mile  at  some 
future  date  the  land  would  not  be  overcrowded  in  view  of 
all  its  resources,  and  thus  eventually  we  should  have  a 
nation  numbering  between  twenty-five  and  thirty  millions, 
which  should  be  strong  enough  to  hold  the  gate  and  to 
prevent  it  from  being  forced. 

If  this  desirable  consummation  is  to  be  attained  we 
must  approach  the  settlement  with  a  clear  eye,  not  only 
to  the  innate  justice  of  the  Southern  Slav  cause,  but  also 
to  our  own  national  interests,  which  in  this  matter  are 
also  the  general  interests  of  Europe.    We  must  endeavour 


IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SLAVS  319 

even  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  bring  to  a  wiser  frame  of  mind 
those  who,  blind  to  their  real  advantage,  would  seek  out  of 
causeless  jealousy  to  bring  about  a  maimed  and  partial 
settlement  which,  so  far  from  furthering  European 
interests,  would  work  them  perhaps  irretrievable  harm, 
which  might  drive  the  Southern  Slavs  into  a  fatal  course, 
which  so  far  from  bringing  peace  to  south-eastern  Europe 
would  bring  a  sword  and  be  the  precursor  of  future  wars, 
which  instead  of  stabilizing  the  Balkan  position  would 
result  in  chronic  unrest,  and  would  fail  to  provide  the 
bulwark  we  need.  That  bulwark  can  only  surely  be  built 
up  if  all  the  Southern  Slavs  are  united  under  the  white 
double  eagle  of  the  Nemanjic.  It  is  to  our  interest,  to 
Europe's  interest,  equally  to  the  interest  of  the  threefold 
Southern  Slav  stock  that  not  Serbs  alone,  but  Serbs, 
Croats,  and  Slovenes  should  now  at  long  last  after  five 
centuries  of  martyrdom  gallantly  borne  enjoy  the  fruition 
of  the  aspiration  expressed  in  S.  Sava's  proverb  cherished 
all  these  long  years,  and  enshrined  in  the  four  C's  (in  the 
Cyrillic  alphabet),  which  find  a  place  in  the  national  arms 
of  Serbia,  "  Samo  Sloga  Srhina  Spasava" — Union  alone 
is  Serb  salvation. 


NOTE   ON  THE  MAP 

This  map  is  included,  by  kind  permission  of  the  Jugoslav 
Committee,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  a  general  idea  of  the 
ethnographic  features  of  the  Southern  Slav  lands.  Unfortu- 
nately the  Rumanian  element  in  North-Eastem  Serbia  is 
not  indicated,  nor  the  Albanian  element  in  "  Old  Serbia." 
It  would  have  been  well,  also,  to  differentiate  the  "  Macedo- 
Slovenes."  Apart,  however,  from  these  omissions,  the  map 
is  substantially  accurate.  It  has  been  included  in  lieu  of  a 
map  specially  prepared  for  this  volume  by  the  author  which 
it  was  found  impracticable  to  reproduce. 


INDEX 


Adrianople,    conquered     by     the 

Turks,  52 
Adriatic    Question,    Chapter    IV 
passim 
Ethnological  aspect,  128-36 
General  problem,  104-20 
Historical,  121-8 
Secret  Treaty  with  Italy,  161 

sq.,  173 
Strategical,  136-50 
Aehrenthal,  Count,  93 
Agram,  see  Zagreb 
Agram  High  Treason  Trial,  93 
Agrarian  problem — 
in  Bosnia,  280,  281 
in  Croatia,  281-3 
Agriculture  in  Serbia,  100-8 
Albania — 

Frontier  modifications,  197  sq. 

Future  status  of,  199 

Italy,  Austria,  and,  107,  108 

Alexander    Karagjorgjevic,   Prince 

of  Serbia,  see  Karagjorgjevid 

Alexander    Obrenovid,    liing,    see 

Obrenovi6 
Altomanovi<5,  53 
Andrassy,  Count,  85 
Andrew  II,  King  of  Hungary,  37 
Andronicus  II,   Emperor    of    the 

East,  39 
Andronicus  III,  Emperor  of  the 

East,  41 
Angora,  Battle  of,  39 
Architecture,  Serb,  45,  46 
Austria — 

Effect  of  occupation  of  Bosnia 
on  policy  of,  86  sq. 


21 


Austria — continued. 

Effect  of   Serb  independence 

on  policy  of,  67 
French  opinion  on  future  of, 

176, 177 
Necessity    of    dismembering, 

174  sq. 
Occupies  Bosnia,  79 
Oppression  of  nationalities,  83 
Policy     towards     Hungarian 

Serbs,  61  sq. 
See  also  Hungary  and  Magyar 
Austrian   Press  misrepresentation 

of  Serb  affairs,  25 

Backa,  185  sq. 

Statistics  of  population,  252, 
253 
Bagdad  railway,  315 
Bainville,  M.,  176 
Balcid,  53 
Baldwiti  I,  Emperor  of  the  East, 

37 
Balkan  war,  second,  209  sq. 
Banat,  187  sq. 

Statistics  of  population,  189- 
191,  252,  253 
Baranja,  182  sq. 
Barzilai,  Sig.,  115 
Bela  IV,  King  of  Hungary,  38 
Belgrade,  43,  52,  299-302,  311,  312, 

314 
Berlin — 

Congress  of,  85 

Treaty  of,  73 
BisBolati,  Sig.,  113,  116,  160 
Bogomils,  67 

m 


322 


INDEX 


Boris,  Tsar  of  Bulgaria,  33,  34 
Boselli,  Sig.,  116,  117 
Bosnia — 

Annexation  by  Austria,  79 
Land  question  in,  280,  281 
Medieval  history  of,   32,   36, 

37,  40,  43,  52,  53,  57,  58 
Mohammedan  Begs  of,  281 
Occupation  by  Austria,  84 
Eesults     of     occupation     on 

Austrian  policy,  86  sq^. 
Statistics  of  population,  251, 
252,  253 
Boundaries,  ancient,  of   Southern 

Slav  tribes,  30 
Brankovic,  Vuk,  54 
Brankovic,  George,  "  Despot  "   of 

Serbia,  56 
Brankovid,  George  III,  "Despot" 

of  Serbia,  61 
British  ignorance  of  Balkans,  26 
British  interests  in  the  Southern 
Slav   question.   Chapter    X 
passim 
British    Balkan    policy    in    1915, 

18  eg- 
British  policy  in  the  future,  222  sq>, 

241,  242 
Bulgaria — 

Bulgarizing     policy     of,      in 

occupied  territory,  229-31 
Desire      for      destruction     of 

Serbia,  233,  235 
Looting  in  Serbia,  235,  236 
Macedonia  and,  see  Macedonia 
Medieval    history   of,   31,   34, 

40,  41,  42,  202,  203 
Mutual    antipathy    of     Serbs 

and  Bulgars,  34 
PoUcy  of,  in  1915,  19  sq 
Serbo-Bulgarian      Treaty      of 

1912,  209  sq. 
Settlement  with,  Chapter  VII 

passim 
Bulgarian  Exarchate,  207 
Bulgarian  Press  on  Sir  E.  Grey, 

236-8 


Bulgarophils,     English,     20     sg., 

222  sq. 
Bulgars — 

Reliance  of,  on  sentimentality 

of  Entente,  239,  240 
Tartar  origin  of,  31 
United  in  war  policy,  226  sq. 

Cantacuzene,  John,  41,  43 

Carinthia,  169 

Cattaro,  see  Kotor 

Ceslav,  Grand  Zupan  of  Serbia,  35 

Cippico,  Sig.,  120 

Conversion  of   Southern  Slavs  to 
Christianity,  33 

Co-operation  in  Serbia,  100,  101 

Croatia,  80  »?.,  250 
Future  of,  179  sq. 
Land  question  in,  281-3 
Placed  under  Magyar  domina- 
tion, 84 
Statistics  of  population,  252-3 

Croatian    orthography,    8,    9,   82, 
250,  302 

Croats  in  favour  of  Southern  Slav 
unity,  179,  182 

Cyril  and  Methodius  SS.,  33 

Cyrillic  alphabet,  8,  33,  250,  302 

Dalmatia,  80,  Chapter  IV  "passim 
Ethnology  of,  128-36 
Geographical  claims  of  Italy 

120,  121 
Stronghold  of  Southern  Slav 

unity,  90,  135 
Statistics   of   population,  128, 

252,  253 
Venetian  Dominion,  121-8 
Character  of,  123-6 
Dalmatian,     Agreement     between 
Italy  and  the  Entente,  161 
sq.,  173 
Danev,  Dr.,  211  sq.,  228 
Danube-Adriatic  line,  154,  315,  316 
Debar  (Dibra),  199 
Decani,  Monastery  of,  39  and  note 


INDEX 


323 


Dicey,  Professor  A.  V.,  cited  259, 

260,  262 
Djakovica,  198 

Dragutin,  see  Stephen  Dragutin 
Drang  nacli  Osten,  307,  308,  314, 

315,  317,  318 
Drave,  R.,  178 
Dualism  as  form  of  Southern  Slav 

State,  263-5 
Dubrovnik   (Ragusa),  43,  47,  124, 

126,  131,  154,  165,  195,  316 
See  also  Gru2 
Dusan,  see  Stephen  Dusan 

Eastern      Empire,      Chapter      II 
passim 
Attacked  by  Milutin,  38 
Conquests  of  Dusan,  41 
Final  attack  of  Dusan,  44 
Invaded  by  the  Slavs,  29 
Macedonia  and,  202,  203 
Victorious       over       Stephen 
Nemanja,  36 

English  opinion  and  Serbia,  17 

Exarchate,  Bulgarian,  207 

Federalism  and  the  Southern  Slav 

provinces,  256  sg. 
Ferdinand,  King  of  Bulgaria,  227, 

247 
Finances  of  Serbia,  98  sq. 
Financial     conditions     in    future 

Southern   Slav   State,  283- 

99 
Fiume,  see  Rijeka 
Fleet,  Future  Serb,  143  sq. 
Francis      Ferdinand,      policy      of 

Archduke,  91 
French     opinion     on    future     of 

Austria,  176,  177 
Friedjung,  Professor,  93 

Gauvain,  M.,  177 
Genediev,  M.,  229  sq. 
German  colonists  in  Southern  Slav 
lands,  269-72 


German   Drang  nach  Osten,  307, 

308,  314,  315,  317,  318 
Germany  and  Trieste,  156  sq. 
Germany,  Italy,  and  Serbia,  156  sq. 
Gesov,  M.,  227  sq. 
Gorica-Gradiska,  169,  172  sq. 
"  Greater  Austria,"  91 
Greece  and  the  Entente,  224,  225 
Greek  Empire,  see  Eastern  Empire 
Grey,  Policy  of  Sir  E.,  224  sq. 
Gruz  (Gravosa),  153,  316 

Habsburgs,  failure  of,  92 

Helena,  wife  of  Stejihen  the  Great 

of  Serbia,  38 
Hercegovina — 

Early  history  of,  see  Zahumlija 
Erected  into  a  duchy  (Herce- 
govina), 58 
Hilindav,  Monastery  of,  36,  39 
Hungary — 

Future  of,  177  sq. 

Medieval  relations  with  Serb 

lands,  32,  37,  38,  40,  43,  52 
See  also  Austria  and  Magyar 

Industrial     conditions     in     future 
Southern  Slav  State  283-299 
Istria,  169,  172  sq. 
Isvolski,  M.,  214  sq. 
Italo-Slav    accord,    Necessity    of, 

159,  160 
Italy — 

and  the  Adriatic,  Chapter  IV 

passim 
and  Albania,  107,  108 
and  Dodekancsc,  109 
Balkan  policy  under  Marquis 

di  San  Giuliano,  110 
Growth  of  Italian  claims.  111 
Imperialism  of,  109 
Negotiations  with  Austria,  111 
Policy  towards  Serbia,  109 
Press       accusations       against 
Southern    Slav    Committee, 
116,  117 


324 


INDEX 


Italy — continued 

Press      anti-Serb      campaign, 

112  sq. 
Press   attempts  to   dissociate 

Serbs  and  Croats,  118  sg. 
Secret   Treaty  with  Entente, 

161  sg.,  173 

Jelacid,  Ban  of  Croatia,  83 
Jesuits,  303 

John  Asen  II,  Bulgarian  Tsar,  37 
John   Vladimir,   Grand    Zupan    of 

Serbia,  35 
John  Vladislav,    Bulgarian    Tsar, 
35 


Karadzid,  Vuk,  81  sq. 
Kara  George,  65  sq. 
Karagjorgjevid,  Alexander,  Prince 

of  Serbia,  71 
Karagjorgjevic,  Peter,  elected  King 
of  Serbia,  78 
Domestic  policy  of,  97,  98 
Karlovci  (Karlowitz),  Patriarchate 

established  at,  62 
Kmet  or  Merop,  48  sq. 
Kosovo,  Battle  of,  54  sq. 
Kotor  (Cattaro),  43,  106,  126,  144, 

145,  165 
Kranjska,  169,  172  sq. 

Statistics   of  population,  169, 
252,  253 
Krusevac,  301,  302 
Kutromanid,  Ban  of  Bosnia,  40 
Kutzo-Vlachs,  32 


Land  question — 

in  Bosnia,  280,  281 

in  Croatia,  281-3 
Lazar,  Tsar,  53,  sq. 
Lissa,  see  Vis 

Ljubljana  (Laibach),  173,  311,  812 
Losinj  (Lussin),  152 
Louis  the  Great,  King  of  Hungary, 


Macedonia,      193,     Chapter     VI 
passiyn 
Bulgarian    occupation    of,   in 

Middle  Ages,  202 
Bulgarian  propaganda,  206-8 
Medieval  history  of,  201  sq. 
Bacial  characteristics,  204-6, 

231,  232 
Serb  occupation  of,  in  Mfddle 

Ages,  203 
Serbo-Bulgarian     Treaty     of 
1912,  209  sq. 
Macedonian  Committee,  206-8 
Macva,  38,  39 
Magyar — 

Atrocities  in  Serbia,  303  note 
Colonists    in    Southern    Slav 

lands,  269-72 
Intrigues     in     England,    238 

note 
Opposition  to  Serbs,  63 
Oppression  of  Croatia,  84 
Oppression     of     nationalities, 

83 
See  also  Austria,  and  Hungary 
Manuel  Comnenus,  Emperor  of  the 

East,  36 
Marica,  battle  of,  53 
Marko  Kraljevid,  53 
Markovid,    Professor     L.,    Italian 

accusations  against,  117 
Mazzini,  133 
Medieval     conditions     of     Serbia, 

46  sy. 
Merop  or  kmet,  48  sq. 
Michael,  Grand  Zupan  of  Serbia, 

35 
Michael     Obrenovid,     Prince     of 

Serbia,  see  Obrenovid 
Milan      Obrenovid,      King,       see 

Obrenovid 
Milutin,     King     of     Serbia,     see 

Stephen  Milutin 
Mirko    of     Montenegro,     Prince, 

197 
Mohammedarj    Begs     of    Bosnia, 
281 


INDEX 


325 


Montenegro —  I 

Desire     for     Southern     Slav 

unity,  195 
Future  of,  193  sq. 
Medieval  history  of,  see  Zeta 
Statistics  of  population,  252, 
253 
Morava    valley,    Importance    of, 

311-14 
Muntimir,  Grand  Zupan  of  Serbia, 
34 

Nemanja  dynasty,  35  sq. 
Nicholas,    liing    of     Montenegro, 

194  sq. 
Ni§,  36,  206,  229,  230,  231,   311, 

312,  313 
Novisad  (Neusatz),  185,  186 

Obradovid,  Dositije,  81  sq. 
Obrenovid,    Alexander,     King     of 
Serbia,  74— 

Domestic  policy  of,  74-7. 

Murder  of,  77 
Obrenovid,  Michael,  Prince,  70  sq. 

Foreign  policy  of,  72 
Obrenovic,  Milan,  King,  73,  74 
Obrenovic,  Milos,  Prince,  66  sq. 
Ochrida,  42,  201 
Old  Serbia,  17  and  note,  30,  309, 

310 
Oriental  line,  new,  312 
Oriental  Eailway,  274,  275,  312 
Otrok,  49 
Overland  route,  313 

PaSic,  Dr.  Nikola,  76,  78 

Pec,  See  of,  39 

Pec,  Patriarch  Arsen  III,  62 

Pe6,  Patriarchate  of,  41,  59,  60 

Place  names,  Serbo-Croat,  9 

Pola,  106,  151 

Prezzolini,  Professor,  quoted  Chap- 
ter IV  passim 

Primorija,  see  Zahumlija  and 
Hercegovina 

Prizren,  198 

J>utnik^  Fifild-Marshal,  95 


Badoslav,  Grand  ^upan,  33 

Radoslavov,  M.,  228  sq. 

Railways,  Serb,  102 

Raska,  36  sq. 

Renascence  of  Serbia  under  King 

Peter,  95  sq. 
Rijeka  (Fiume),  153,  182 

Resolutions  of,  90 
Roumanians,  273 

See  Banat 
Russia  and  Bulgaria,  239,  240 

Second  Balkan  war,  213  sq. 

S.  Sava,  37 
Salandra,  Sig.,  113 
Salonica,  241,  311,  313 
Salvemini,  Professor,  119,  143,  160 
Samuel,  Bulgarian  Tsar,  35 
San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  73 
Sarajevo,  311 
Sebar,  47  sq. 
Sebenico,  see  Sibenik 
Serbia — 

Claims  on  the  Entente,  243  sq. 
Concessions    to    Bulgaria    in 

1915,  21,  246 
Social  conditions  in  medieval, 

46  sq. 
Statistics   of  population,  252, 
253 
Serbo-Bulgarian  enmity,  34 
Treaty  of  1912,  209  sq. 
War  of  1885,  74 
Serbo-Croat  Coalition,  91  sq. 
Serbs — 

Distribution  of,  25 
of  Hungary,  61  sq.,  83,  182  sq. 
gibenik  (Selenico),  131,  134 
Simeon,  Bulgarian  Tsar,  35 
Sisman,  Bulgarian  Tsar,  35 
Slovene     original     appellation     of 

Southern  Slavs,  29 
Slovenes,  169-73,  249, 250 

Statistics  of,  169,  252,  253 
Sofia,  206,  231 
Sokolovid,  Mehemet,  59 
Sonnino,  Baron,  114 


326 


INDEX 


Southern  Slav  Committee —  I 

Funds  of,  117,  118  | 

Italian    accusations    against,   ! 
116,  117 
Southern  Slav  State —  I 

Barrier  to   German   advance, 
307,  308,  314,  315,  317,  318 
Future  form  of,  256  sq. 
Intei'nal  problems  of,  Chapter 

IX  passim 
Statistics  of   population,  252, 

253,  255 
Strategical      importance      of. 
Chapter  X  passim 
Southern  Slav  Unity,  idea  of,  81 

sq.,  90,  135,  179,  182,  195 
Spljet  (Spalato),  106,  131,  153,  154, 

164,  316 
Statistical  Tables — 

Agx'icultural  holdings  in  Serbia, 

100 
Finances  of  Serbia,  98,  99 
Population  of  the  Banat,  191 
Population  of  Bosnia  (rehgious 

distribution),  251 
Population  of  Dalmatia,  128 
Population  of  Istria,  Kranjska 

(Carniola),  etc.,  169 
Population    of    the    Southern 
Slav  State,  (all   provinces), 
252,  253,  255 
Stephen,  Nemanja,  36 
Stephen  II,  Prvovencani,  37 
Stephen  III,  (Rodoslav),  37 
Stephen  IV,  (the  Great),  38 
Stephen  V,  Dragutin,  38 
Stephen  VI,  Milutin,  38 
Stephen  VII,  Decanski,  40,  41 
Stephen  VIII,  Dusan,  Tsar,  41-4 
Stephen  Lazarevic,  "Despot"   of 

Serbia,  55 
Stephen  Voislav,  Grand  Zupan,  35 
Stephen  Vukcic,  58 
Strategical    position    in    Adriatic, 

104  sq.,  136-50 
Strategical  importance  of  Southern 
Slav  lands,  Chapter  ^passim 


Strumica,  193  note,  247 
Syrmia  or  Srem,  37,  38 

Tommaseo,  133 
Trialism,  91 

Trieste,  106,  151,  169,  171,  172 
Trogir,  131,  132 
Turks,  advance  of,  39,  53 
Tvrtko,   Stephen,  Ban  of  Bosnia, 
53,  57 

Unitary  State  as  form  of  Southern 

Slav  State,  265 
Unitary     State     compared     with 

federal,  262,  265,  266 
Unity,  idea  of  Southern  Slav,  81 

sq.,  90,  135, 179,  182,  195 
UroS,  see  Stephen 
Uro5  V  (Tsar  Uros),  52 

Valona,  106,  110,  150,  151,  153 

Velbuzd,  Battle  of,  40 

Vladislav,  King  of  Serbia,  37 

Vlastela,  46 

Vlastimir,  Grand  Zupan,  34 

Voislav,  Grand  Zupan,  33 

Vojvode,  Serb,  in  Hungary,  62 

Vojvodina,  62,  63,  83 

Vidin,  36,  37,  38 

Vis  (Lissa),  106,  153,  161 

Vukasin,  52,  53 

Zadar,  129,  131 

Eesolutions  of,  91 
Zadruga,  102 
Zagorija,  36 

Zagreb  (Agram),  311,  312 
Zahumlija,      (Primorija,       Herce- 
govina),  36,  40,  43,  53,  57 

See  also  Hercegovina 
Zakonik   of    Stephen    Dusan,   42, 

46  sq.,  126 
Zara,  see  Zadar 
Zeta  (Montenegro),  36,  53 

See  also  Montenegro 


Frintcd  in  Great.  Britain  by 

TimviN  BR0THEI18,  LIMITED 
\fOZINa  AND  LO»DOD 


„«.VEKS.T^  OF  CAl-IFORmA  UBRAKV 

Los  Angeles 


i 


-^ 


,pr^     low  ui^orwn 

111  ldJSrl  MAYU-2^ 

'^E  ■^*'^  0  ^  1990 


j7r\ 


:;^)M:^ 


REN 

rornLD&- 


F 


315 


